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41. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2004 > Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen 陳瑞 麟
Testing through Realizable Models

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How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.
42. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Catherine D. Rau The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention
43. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Robert L. Martin Ayer on Sense and Reference
44. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Martin A. Bertman Pain
45. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Chung-ying Cheng Metaphors: An Annotated Bibliography and History by Warren Shibles
46. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2005 > Issue: 30
Francisco Calvo Garzón Francisco Calvo Garzón
Game-Theoretical Semantics and Referential Inscrutability
賽局理論語意學與指涉之 不可測度說

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This paper consists of two parts. First, (i) I shall consider two defences of Quine´s polemical Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference put forward by Hookway (1988), and Calvo Garzón (2000a; 2000b), respectively. Then, (ii) I shall consider an extension of Quine´s succinct behavioural criteria of Radical Translationsuggested by Hintikka´s Game-Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka´s semantics suggest behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka´s behavioural data tells against Hookway´s proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, a reason as to why my proposed perverse semantic theory enjoys the same priviledged status that a standard semantic theory is supposed toenjoy.
47. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2005 > Issue: 30
Aysel Doğan Aysel Doğan
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities and Causal Determination

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Some compatibilists believe that the principle of alternative possibilities has been shown to be false by Frankfurt-style arguments, and this gives way to the compatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who defend the principle of alternative possibilities, on the other hand, insist on the truth of the principle and on the incompatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. In this article, I argue that Frankfurt-stylecounterexamples are unsuccessful in indicating the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities, and yet this failure is inconclusive to prove the correctness of incompatibilism. In fact, the principle of alternative possibilities is, I show, compatible with causal determination and thus with compatibilism on a specificunderstanding of determinism and compatibilism.
48. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2007 > Issue: 34
Caleb Y. Liang 梁益堉 *
Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character

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Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but to show that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.
49. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2007 > Issue: 34
Melissa Zinkin Melissa Zinkin
Kant’s Concept of Force: Empiricist or Rationalist?
康德之力的概念: 經驗論者或理性論者?

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This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness
50. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2010 > Issue: 39
Chung-Kee Lee 李仲 驥
From Aquinas’ Analogy to Ian Ramsey’s Models and Disclosures – the Possibility of Religious Language Then and Now
從阿奎那的類比法到藍聖恩的 「模型」與「揭示」 ──宗教語言可能性的古與今

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The search for a proper language for God-talk is a perennial task in theology as well as in philosophy. From times of antiquity, the use of analogy was employed in different realms of knowledge. Yet it was not until the medieval era, primarily through the effort of Thomas Aquinas, that analogy was used extensively in religious discourse. However, Thomistic analogy was not accepted by all. The contention between univocal and analogical use of words was never settled. The contemporary scene adds further fuel to the debate. Logical positivism claims that God-talk is totally meaningless, as truth claims can never be established in such a domain. And some critics say that religion belongs to the world of the ‘un-sayable’ and silence is the only response. The situation demands an urgent response from the side of the religious thinkers, and Ian Ramsey, previous Nolloth professor of Philosopy of Christian Religion at Oxford University, has taken up the task to face this challenge. Ramsey’s job is twofold. First, he is of course concerned with defending religious discourse against such philosophical critiques. At the same time, he is eager to show how theological apologetics could actually benefit from the tenets of Logical Empiricism. His method of ‘models’ and‘disclosures’ is used to demonstrate the empirical relevance of religious language. Such approach also reveals that religious discourses do containsomething more than the narrowness of meaning and truth set down by the logical empiricists. The purpose of this paper is to place Aquinas’ analogyside by side with Ramsey’s models approach and see how they compare and contrast each other. Specifically, we will see how these approaches haveroughly the same dynamics of going from what is seen to what is unseen in talking about God. We will also see how the two projects differ owing to a fundamental difference in their ontology.
51. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1981 > Issue: 4
Paui Yu On Theories of Reference
52. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1981 > Issue: 4
Po-wen Kuo On Arthur Danto's Criticism of the Speculative Philosophy of History
53. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 44
Jih-Ching Ho 何志 青
The Motivational Structure in Practical Reason

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A central issue in the contemporary philosophy of action focuses on the relation between reason and motivation: Internalism holds, while Externalism denies, that there is a necessary connection between reasons for action and motivational states. In 1980, Bernard Williams launched a powerful argument against Externalism in his article, “Internal and External Reasons,” which triggered influential debates in ethics, action theory, and theory of reason. Twenty years later Williams published “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons” (2001), in which he refined his Humean theory so as to accommodate the many criticisms he had so far received. More importantly, he classified his major critics, in the past two decades, mainly into two groups, “the Kantian” and “the Aristotelian,” and raised objections to both. This paper explores the later development of the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches, primarily in terms of the recent works of Christine Korsgaard and John McDowell, and argues to the effect that Williams’ objections are insufficient to refute the two approaches.
54. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2012 > Issue: 44
Eric M. Peng 彭孟 堯
Why Resemblance is Not a Relation? -Trope Ontology in a Conceptualist Guise
為什麼相似性不是一個關係 ─從概念論看殊性存有論

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It is argued that Trope Particularism need not take trope-level resemblance to be an ontological primitive. The main idea is the appeal to the Arity Principle suggested by Butchvarov. But, this does not mean that “resemblance” is unintelligible. I propose that “resemblance” can be metaphysically reduced to a second order internal relation over two first order internal relations such as “greater than” and “heavier than,” and that the phenomena of similarity should call solely for an epistemological or psychological explanation.
55. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 47
Cheng-Hung Tsai 蔡政 宏
Technê and Understanding

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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
56. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 47
Caleb Liang 梁益 堉
Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Vision Science

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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.
57. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 48
Hsiu-Lin Ku 古秀 鈴
The Semantic Theory and the Availability Principle

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This paper aims to defend François Recanati’s Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and “awareness-of” presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question--the bearer of the semantic content--and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect the empirical basis of meaning.
58. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 48
Tzu-Wei Hung 洪子 偉
Why the Enzyme Model of Modularity Fails to Explain Higher Cognitive Processes

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The enzyme model (EM), inspired by biological enzyme catalysis, is a computational-functional description of information processing and distribution in modular cognitive systems. It has been argued that EM offers advantages in solving both the allocation problem and global computation and thus may play a role in upholding the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH). This paper, however, argues that EM solutions are untenable, as EM avoids the infinite regress of allocation problem only at a high cost and with several critical drawbacks. Moreover, to clarify global processes, EM needs to satisfy two necessary conditions: first to demonstrate that the EM allows cross module communication, and second to be sensitive to not only the syntax but also the semantics of representations. I argue that EM only satisfies the first condition and thus fails to hold.
59. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2015 > Issue: 49
Hua-kuei Ho 何畫瑰
Plato’s Treatment of Desire and Eryximachus’ Medicine in the Symposium
理性的慾望:柏拉圖對慾望的看法 與《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯「愛的醫療」

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Confronted with the stereotype of a rationalistic Plato, the paper argues for the value of desire at its own right in Plato. To explore the relation between desire and rationality in Plato, I choose Eryximachus’ medicine in the Symposium as an object of comparison. Eryximachus’ τέχνη, representing the Hippocratic medical knowledge, is in conformity with Plato’s earlier requirement of knowledge, that is, giving a rational account. The medicine achieves the harmony by balancing the good and bad desires. Plato’s philosophy, however, goes beyond the epistemic model of rational science or τέχνη. On the treatment of desire, he does not follow the discrimination of good and bad desires in medicine, nor does he even out the different desire, because as the doctor. Plato’s philosophy needs the strength of desire, because—though desire sometimes becomes irrational—it is the vital strength of the soul to pursue philosophy.
60. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1982 > Issue: 5
Hsueh-Li Cheng Mādhyamika, Kant and Wittgenstein