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Displaying: 41-60 of 216 documents

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41. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Dale Jacquette Denying the Liar Reaffirmed
42. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Melissa M. Shew Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind
43. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński Notes on Books
44. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Ryszard Wójcicki Przyczyna i wyjaśnianie: [Cause and Explanation]
45. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Robert Poczobut Interdisciplinarity and Mind: An Onto-Methodological Perspective
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The article’s aim is to analyse the ontological and methodological aspects of the interdisciplinarity problem in the context of contemporary research into the mind. After a brief presentation of the differences in meaning in the use of the terms: “multi-,” “inter-,” and “transdisciplinaryity,” the case of cognitive sicence is discussed. According to the author, the levels of analysis and explanation inmulti(inter)disciplinary science of the mind correspond to different levels or dimensions of its architecture. One of the main ontological issues arising here concerns the nature of interlevel relationships constituting the hierarchical structure of the cognitive system. The article’s last part is devoted to showing that an integrated ontology of mind (consistent with scientific knowledge) must be transdisciplinary in character and based on emergentist assumptions.
46. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Piasecki Istnienie i sens: [Existence and Sense]
47. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
John Barker Undeniably Paradoxical: Reply to Jacquette
48. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Noel Boyle Natural Minds
49. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Marek Kwiek Revisiting The Classical German Idea of the University: (On the Nationalization of the Modern Institution)
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The aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical and historical background to current discussions about the changing relationships between the university and the state through revisiting the classical “Humboldtian” model of the university as discussed in classical German philosophy. This historical detour is intended to highlight the cultural rootedness of the modern idea of the university, and its close links to the idea of the modern national state. The paper discusses the idea of the university as it emerges from the philosophy of Wilhelm von Humbold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schleiermacher, as well as - in the 20th century - Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas. More detailed questions discussed include the historical pact between the modern university and the modern nation-state, the main principles of the Humboldtian university, the process of the nationalization of European universities, the national aspect of the German idea of culture (Bildung), and the tension between the pursuit of truth and public responsibilities of the modern university. In discussing current and future missions and roles of the institution of the university today, it can be useful to revisit its foundational (modern) German idea. In thinking about its future, it can be constructive to reflect on the evident current tensions between traditional modern expectations of the university and the new expectations intensified by the emergence of knowledge-based societies and market-driven economies. From the perspective of the tensions between old and new tasks of the university, it is useful to look back at the turning point in its history.
50. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Andrew Jorgensen Understanding as Endorsing an Inference
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Fodor & Lepore (2001) and Williamson (2003) attack the inferentialist account of concept possession according to which possessing or understanding a concept requires endorsing the inference patterns constitutive of its content. I show that Fodor & Lepore’s concern - that the conception places an exorbitant epistemological demands on possessors of a concept - is met by Brandom’s tolerance of materially bad nonconservative inferences. Such inferences themselves, as Williamson argues, present difficulties for the ‘understanding as endorsement’ conception. I show that, properly understood, Brandom’s broad conception of inferential role, which encompasses social-perspectival inferential connections, has the resources to respond to Willianson’s challenge.
51. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Michael Shaffer Re-formulating The Generalized Correspondence Principle: Problems and Prospects
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The generalized correspondence principle is the assertion of something like the following methodological norm: successor theories ought to incorporate precursor theories as special cases. However, the actual core connotation of this principle seems to be that when we are constructing new theories in some domain of application we ought to retain as much of prior but refuted theories as is possible while eliminating inconsistency with the data. As a result, it is argued here that the correspondence principle has not been correctly formulated. Also, it is argued here that there is no compelling extant justification of this proposed methodological norm.
52. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Emanuela Ceva Impure procedural justice and the management of conflicts about values
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This paper aims to outline the essential structural traits that a procedural theory of justice for the management of conflicts about values should display in order to combine open-endedness and cogency. To this purpose, it offers an investigation into the characteristics of procedural justice through a critical assessment of John Rawl’s taxonomy of prodeduralism, in terms of perfect, imperfect and pure procedural justice. Given the concessions the two former kinds of proceduralism make to substantive theories, and the potentially misleading characterisation Rawls gave of pure procedural theories of justice, it reformulates the latter category in terms of impure proceduralism. In this case, the theory is required not to pose substantive constraints on the qualities of just outcomes, but is, rather, expected to provide a transcontextually applicable account of the qualities of just procedures on the basis of an independent criterion of justice.
53. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Wesley Cooper Decision-Value Utilitarianism
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A decision value alternative is proposed to the various formulations of the principle of utility, which counsel maimization of expected utility as utility is variously conceived. Decision value factors expected utility into causal expected utility and evidential expected utility, and it adds a third factor --- symbolic utility. This latter introduces deontological and a ‘perceived value’ elements into calculations of utility. It also suggests a solution to a lingering problem in population ethics, the so-called Repugnant Conclusion that consequentialist thinking demands a vast population of people leading lives barely worth living.
54. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Murali Ramachandran Kripkean Counterpart Theory
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David Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought -- and in some eyes, unwelcome -- consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent directness. Contingent identity follows for free. The theory is Kripkean in that the counterpart relation is in a sense stipulated rather than grounded on similarity, and is such that no object has more than one counterpart at a world. This avoids a number of objections Fara and Williamson have recently levelled against counterpart theory generally; their other objections are addressed by enriching the theory with special quantifiers and actuality operators.
55. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Joseph Ulatowski Rationality and Logic
56. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Khalil M. Habib Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership
57. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Notes on Books
58. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Todd D. Janke Making Room for Bodily Intentionality
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The recived view in contemporary philosophy of action, inspired and sustained largely by Donald Davidson and his followers, holds that an action is intentional if and only if it is caused in the right way by beliefs and desires. In what follows below I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s account of bodily intentionality, with the aim of showing that it offers us an account of a form of intentional behavior that cannot be understood in terms of causally efficacious mental states like beliefs or desires. the aim, in short, is to show that, however things may stand with other forms of intentional behavior (deliberate action, for example), bodily intentional behavior is autonomously intentional --- it doesn’t derive its intentionality from the intentionality of mental states.
59. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Katarzyna Paprzycka Sneddon on Action and Responsibility
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The paper is a critical discussion of Sneddon’s recent proposal to revive ascriptivism in philosophy of action. Despite his declarations, Sneddon fails in his central task of giving an account of the distinction between actions and mre happenings. His failure is due to three major problems. First, the account is based on a misconceived methodology of “type” necessary and “token” sufficient conditions. Second, the “type” necessary condition he proposed is so weak that the connection that obtains between action and responsibility also obtains between action and lack of responsibility. Third, neither the idea of responsibility nor the idea of defeating conditions is elucidated sufficiently to play any role in understanding what it is to be an action.
60. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Mikel Burley The B-Theory of Time and the Fear of Death
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This paper discusses Robin Le Poidevin’s proposal that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides a reason to relinquish the fear of death. After outlining Le Poidevin’s views on time and death, I analyze the specific passages in which he makes his proposal, giving close attention to the claim that, for the B-theorist, one’s life is “eternally real.” I distinguish two possible interpretations of this claim, which I call alethic eternalism and ontic eternalism respectively, and argue, with reference to statements by other B-theroists, that alethic eternalism is the only viable option. I highlight two problems for Le Poidevin’s proposal: firstly, even if alethic eternalism does provide a reason not to fear death, this same reason is available to A-theorists; and secondly, alethic eternalism does not in fact provide such a reason. Having critically assessed possible responses to these problems, I conclude that Le Poidevin’s proposal is unfounded.