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Displaying: 41-60 of 102 documents

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41. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (3) Ke stati Petra Dvořáka: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
42. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Materna Ontologie Vztahů (1) Poznámka k Sousedíkově kritice soudobé ontologie zztahů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
43. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Materna (3) Závěrečné vyjádření: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
44. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Ke Gahérově analýze Tomášovy „druhé cesty“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
45. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné (dokončení): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
46. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (2) Vyjádření k Maternově poznámce: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
47. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Palkoska „Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis onpinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.
48. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Prokop Sousedík Moorova filosofická metoda: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this article I consider two aspects of Moore’s philosophical method which lead to the turn to natural language. These are his interest in the meaning (not the truth) of problematic philosophical theses and his interest in common sense philosophy. However, Moore himself did not completely achieve the linguistic turn: he merely prepared the way for it. In the conclusions I show that Moore’s themes were developed by N. Malcom. The deeper sense of my paper is to show that the linguistic turn as begun by Moore does not conflict with the spirit of the Aristotelian tradition.
49. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Alfred J. Freddoso Fides et ratio: radikální vize intelektuálního bádání
50. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Thomas Williams Nad metodou historie filosofie: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
51. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík M. Rhonheimer o Kantovi a katolické teologii: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
52. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Ladislav Koreň Záverečné slovo: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
53. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lukáš Novák Sémantika vlastních jmen Odpověď L. Koreňovi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
54. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
David Svoboda Pravdivost výroků o (podmíněně) budoucích nahodilých událostech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article deals with the problem of the future contingents from the logical point of view, i.e. whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents have a determinate truth-value. The author attemps to show how the problem was discussed both in the 17. century between a Prague’s Jesuit M. Větrovský and a French Dominican A. Goudin, as well as how the discussion has progressed through contemporary analytical philosophy. Firstly the history of the problem is explored to provide the sources for the discussion. Secondly the polemic of Větrovský with Goudin is examined and finally how A. J. Freddoso and W. L. Craig discuss the problem in contemporary analytical philosophy. The essential aspect of the argument is whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents might have a determinate truth-value if the causal grounding (futuritio causalis) is being detached.
55. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Ad „K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
56. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Marvan Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativita: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.
57. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Abstraktívne poznanie podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology.
58. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Josef Smolka Caramuelův List Markovi Marci Ještě Jednou: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
59. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Reálné Potence: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
60. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Kamila Pacovská Kritika metaetiky v díle P. Footové a dalších „deskriptivistů“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article aims to present one of the most decisive criticisms of metaethics which resulted in the restoration of substantive ethics in Great Britain in the late fifties. Philippa Foot attacks the basic metaethical presupposition that evaluative meaning is logically independent of descriptive meaning. She concentrates on the semantics of the word “good”. The second, most extensive part of my article summarizes her argumentation for the thesis that evaluative meaning of the latter word can imply some description of the object evaluated. This result can be linked with the rejection of formalistic methods in ethics.