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41. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
(LH XXXV, I, 14, bl. 57)
42. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Paul Lodge Garber’s Interpretations of Leibniz on Corporeal Substance in the ‘Middle Years’
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In 1985 Daniel Garber published his highly intluential paper “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years”. In two recent articles, Garber returns to these issues with a new position - that we should perhaps conclude that Leibniz did not have a view concerning the ultimate ontology of substance during his middle years. I discuss the viability of this position and consider some more general methodological issues that arise from this discussion.
43. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Glenn A. Hartz Reply to Philip Beeley
44. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Acknowledgments, Abbreviations Used in Articles and Reviews
45. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Andreas Blank Reply to Brandon Look
46. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Stefano Di Bella Reply to Donald Rutherford
47. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Yitzhak Y. Melamed Inherence and the Immanent Cause in Spinoza
48. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Andreas Blank Leibniz on Justice as a Common Concept: A Rejoinder to Patrick Riley
49. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Vincenzo De Risi Leibniz around 1700: Three Texts on Metaphysics
50. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Peter Loptson Leibniz’s Body Realism: Two Interpretations
51. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Roger Berkowitz Reply to Michael Seidler
52. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 17
Justin E. H. Smith The Body-Machine in Leibniz’s Early Physiological and Medical Writings: A Selection of Texts with Commentary
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Other than the historical writings, the edition of which has yet to begin, Series VIII of the Academy Edition of Leibniz’s writings, presenting his “natural-scientific, medical, and technical” contributions, has been, since the project began in 1923, consistently deemed to be of low priority, and it is only very recently that the project has got fully underway. Coming, as it does, nearer to the end of the edition of the complete works, Series VIII has the advantage of accumulating some of the ‘run-off’ of the philosophical writings, that is, texts of philosophical import that for whatever reason were not initially deemed sufficiently philosophical to be included in Series II or VI. Currently in preparation are the writings on chemistry, hydrology, and other natural sciences. The medical and ‘biological’ manuscripts, identified as ‘LH III’, will be edited likely some years from now.2 On our reading of these manuscripts, all or most are of at least some interest to the scholar of Leibniz’s philosophy.
53. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 17
Jeffrey K. McDonough Leibniz: Creation and Conservation and Concurrence
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In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz’s views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their sys­tematic compatibility with Leibniz’s theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous creation, and argues that they can be allayed once two readings of the prin­ciple are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation.
54. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 17
Mogens Lærke Quod non omnia possibilia ad existentiam perveniant: Leibniz’s ontology of possibility, 1668-1678
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In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time.
55. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 17
Ursula Goldenbaum Why Shouldn’t Leibniz Have Studied Spinoza?: The Rise of the Claim of Continuity in Leibniz’ Philosophy out of the Ideological Rejection of Spinoza’s Impact on Leibniz
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In light of the growing interest in the relation between Leibniz and Spinoza in recent years, I would like to draw attention to earlier discussions of this topic in Germany and France during the 19th century. Stein and Erdmann argued that Spinoza had an impact on Leibniz. According to their critics Guhrauer, Trendelenburg and Gerhardt in Germany, as well as Foucher de Careil in France, Leibniz studied Spinoza only after the main points of his system were already developed. I will show that the well known thesis about the amazing continuity in Leibniz’ thinking is due to this claim of a general chronological impossibility of any impact of Spinoza on Leibniz. This thesis was then canonized in Mahnke’s book about the young Leibniz and has determined the view of Leibniz since the end of the 19th century. It has only in recent years come to be increasingly challenged.
56. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 17
Samuel Levey On Unity and Simple Substance in Leibniz
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What is Leibniz’s argument for simple substances? I propose that it is an extension of his prior argument for incorporeal forms as principles of unity for individual corporeal substances. The extension involves seeing the hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances as implying a resolution of matter into forms, and this seems to demand that forms, which are themselves simple, be the only elements of things. The argument for simples thus presupposes the existence of corporeal substances as a key premise. Yet a theory of simple substances as the elements of things threatens to preclude the existence of corporeal substances for Leibniz, and the extension of the argument for forms into an argument for simples is not cogent. If nothing else rides on the simplicity of individual substances, then perhaps instead of being its most fundamental tenet, the doctrine of simples—the monadology—is something that over-extends and destabilizes Leibniz’s metaphysics.
57. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Mogens Lærke Response to Ohad Nachtomy on Possibilia in Leibniz, 1672-1676
58. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Donald Rutherford Unity, Reality and Simple Substance: A Reply to Samuel Levey
59. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Mark A. Kulstad Newton, Spinoza, Stoics and Others: A Battle Line in Leibniz’s Wars of (Natural) Religion
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Starting from Leibniz’s complaint that Newton’s views seem to make God the soul of the world, this paper examines Leibniz’s critical stance more generally towards God as the soul of the world and related theses. A preliminary task is determining what the related theses are. There are more of these than might have been thought. Once the relations are established, it becomes clear how pervasive the various guises of the issue of God as the soul of the world are in Leibniz’s thought and how central they are in his debates with contemporaries about the truths of natural religion and even more strictly philosophical issues. Leibniz’s arguments against God as the soul of the world are reconstructed and evaluated, and the difficult question of the exact meaning, or meanings, that Leibniz ascribes to the thesis that God is the soul of the world is taken up. The clearest core of meaning discussed in this paper is most directly relevant to Leibniz’s criticisms of Spinoza and the Stoics, as well as of Descartes. Less clear, but obviously important, are meanings relevant to Leibniz’s debates with the occasionalists and Newtonians.
60. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Anja Jauernig Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses
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Contrary to popular belief, I argue that Leibniz is not hopelessly confused about motion: Leibniz is indeed both a relativist and an absolutist about motion, as suggested by the textual evidence, but, appearances to the contrary, this is not a problem; Leibniz’s infamous doctrine of the equivalence of hypotheses is well-supported and well-integrated within Leibniz’s physical theory; Leibniz’s assertion that the simplest hypothesis of several equivalent hypotheses can be held to be true can be explicated in such a way that it makes good sense; the mere Galilean invariance of Leibniz’s conservation law does not compromise Leibniz’s relativism about motion; and Leibniz has a straightforward response to Newton’s challenge that the observable effects of the inertial forces of rotational motions empirically distinguish absolute from relative motions.