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61. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Rhys McKinnon Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning
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This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.
62. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Dan Chiţoiu On Kuhn`s Philosophy and its Legacy
63. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, Robert B. Talisse On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
64. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Ned Markosian A Simple Solution to the Two Envelope Problem
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Various proposals have been made for solving The Two Envelope Problem. But even though the problem itself is easily stated and quite simple, the proposedsolutions have not been. Some involve calculus, some involve considerations about infinite values, and some are complicated in other ways. Moreover, there is not yet any one solution that is widely accepted as correct. In addition to being notable for its simplicity and its lack of a generally agreed-upon solution, The Two Envelope Problem is also notable because it demonstrates that something that has been taken to be a fundamental principle of decision theory is false. The main purpose of this paper is to propose and defend a simple solution to The Two Envelope Problem. But I also want to make a start on the project of figuring out how the relevant fundamental principle of decision theory should be revised.
65. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Jimmy Alfonso Licon No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales
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Steven Hales constructs a novel argument against the possibility of presentist time travel called the suicide machine argument. Hales argues that if presentism were true, then time travel would result in the annihilation of the time traveler. But such a consequence is not time travel, therefore presentism cannot allow for the possibility of time travel. This paper argues that in order for the suicide machine argument to succeed, it must make (at least) one of two assumptions, each of which beg the question. The argument must either assume that the sequence of moments is invariant, or that time travel through time requires distinct, co-instantiated moments. Because the former disjunct assumes that presentist time travel is impossible and the latter assumes that presentism is impossible, the suicide machine argument fails.
66. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
67. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Hamid Vahid Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
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Transcendental arguments have been described as disclosing the necessary conditions of the possibility of phenomena as diverse as experience, self-knowledge and language. Although many theorists saw them as powerful means to combat varieties of skepticism, this optimism gradually waned as many such arguments turned out, on examination, to deliver much less than was originally thought. In this paper, I distinguish between two species of transcendental arguments claiming that they do not actually constitute distinct forms of reasoning by showing how they collapse into more familiar inferences. I then turn to the question of their epistemic potentials which I argue to be a function of both their types as well as their targets. Finally, these claims are reinforced by uncovering links between certain recent claims about the efficacy of transcendental arguments and the so-called Moore’s paradox.
68. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Cătălin Bobb Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
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The aim of our text is to explore the ties of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with ontology and epistemology. We have to admit that (1) for Ricoeur, at the beginning of hiswork, hermeneutics (as one can find it in Le conflit des interprétations) was never a main topic (hermeneutics, as hermeneutic intelligence, was always a solution to a certain problem and never a problem in itself), and (2) that when hermeneutics becomes a main topic (as one can find it in Du texte à l'action), the purpose of Ricoeur is to suggest a renew ontological hermeneutics, beyond Heidegger and Gadamer, but still tied with his non-hermeneutic intents. Our thesis is that Ricoeur’s latest hermeneutics, beyond his epistemological status, can be regarded as ontology. Of course, one cannot find a direct ontology, as we can find it in Heidegger or Gadamer, but one can find what we can call a reversed ontology, an ontology which does not start from the centre of the human experience of understanding but outside of it. In other words, we are going to show that not even his late hermeneutics (the critical moment), better known as textual hermeneutics, is not per se an epistemological hermeneutics beyond its declared intention as being one.
69. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Guy Axtell Recovering Responsibility
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This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about sources of epistemic normativity.
70. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
71. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Mark Owen Webb A Peace Plan for the Science Wars
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In what has become known as the ‘Science Wars,’ two sides have emerged. Some philosophers of science have claimed that, because science is a social practice, it is hopelessly infected with political bias. Others have claimed that science is a special kind of practice, structurally immune to bias. They are both right, because they are referring to different things when they use the word ‘science.’ The second group is referring the method of theory selection, as practiced by scientists in the laboratory, while the first group is referring to the ongoing social practice of science, of which theory choice is a part. The scientific method of theory choice, when practiced correctly, is resistant to bias, while the socially embedded practice is particularly sensitive to political forces, and so is subject to bias.
72. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Eugen Huzum Epistemology and the Regress Problem
73. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Matheson The Case for Rational Uniqueness
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The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for anybody of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can’t reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can’t what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can’t it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn’t the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn’t a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).
74. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
75. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Paul Humphreys Unknowable Truths
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This paper addresses a solution due to Michael Fara to the Church/Fitch paradox of knowability. Fara’s solution has significant interest but the paradox can beresurrected within his approach by considering a slightly more complex sentence. The issue of what counts as an epistemological capability for enhanced agents is then discussed with some emphasis on the developmental heritage of agents and their ability to transcend conceptual frameworks.
76. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
77. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Teodor Dima Complementarity and Antinomy
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In this study we present some contributions of the logician and philosopher Petre Botezatu (27.02.1911-01.12.1981), who turned the idea of complementarity,formulated by Niels Bohr for the interpretation of the wave-particle structure of the quantum world, into an ordering principle of his work. Thus, he understood general logic as a synthesis in which the style of classical logic is complementary to the style of the 20th century logic. He didn’t give up either the mathematical modelling of logical language or the conceptual description through natural language. Thus, natural operational logic was created. Then Petre Botezatu assessed the achievements and failures of deduction in order to build the notion of methodological antinomy, and formulated five antinomies of axiomatization and five antinomies of formalization. The main purpose of this study is to present and interpret them.
78. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Adrian Costache For A Post-Historicist Philosophy Of History. Beyond Hermeneutics
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With the publication of Being and Time and Truth and Method philosophical hermeneutics seems to have become the official philosophy of history, with exclusive rights on the questions arising from the fact-of-having-a-past. From now on the epistemological approach of the German historical school, reaching a peak in Dilthey’s thought, is unanimously recognized as definitively overcome, aufheben, by the ontological interrogation of hermeneutics. But, with the same unanimity, it is also recognized that the reasons behind this overcoming and their validity are not readily apparent. For, as it has been shown in the literature, Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey proves to be partial and lacunar, whereas Gadamer’s is straightforwardly ambiguous. Our paper assumes as its first task a re-evaluation of these critiques and of the hypotheses proposed in the literature with regard to what could be the problem with Dilthey’s epistemology. In this sense the paper argues that the problem resides in that the fundamental concepts on which it is based are bound to miss the peculiarity of history by idealizing it and masking the power relations inhabiting it. As a second task, our paper proposes an investigation of whether philosophical hermeneutics itself manages torise to the expectations through which Dilthey’s thought is evaluated. As it will become manifest, the answer to this question is in the negative. That is why, in the end, we will defend the necessity of a post-historicist and post-hermeneutic philosophy of history.
79. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Rik Peels Tracing Culpable Ignorance
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In this paper, I respond to the following argument which several authors have presented. If we are culpable for some action, we act either from akrasia or fromculpable ignorance. However, akrasia is highly exceptional and it turns out that tracing culpable ignorance leads to a vicious regress. Hence, we are hardly ever culpable for our actions. I argue that the argument fails. Cases of akrasia may not be that rare when it comes to epistemic activities such as evidence-gathering and working on our intellectual virtues and vices. Moreover, particular cases of akrasia may be rare, but they are not exceptional when we consider chains of actions. Finally and most importantly, we can be culpable for our actions even if we do not act from akrasia or from culpable ignorance, namely in virtue of our unactivated dispositional beliefs.
80. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
John Turri Promises to Keep: Speech Acts and the Value of Reflective Knowledge
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This paper offers a new account of reflective knowledge’s value, building on recent work on the epistemic norms of speech acts. Reflective knowledge is valuable because it licenses us to make guarantees and promises.