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61. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Jacob Howland Plato’s Dionysian Music?: A Reading of the Symposium
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Like Aristophanes’ Frogs, Plato’s Symposium stages a contest between literary genres. The quarrel between Socrates and Aristophanes constitutes the primary axis of this contest, and the speech of Alcibiades echoes and extends that of Aristophanes. Alcibiades’ comparison of Socrates with a satyr, however, contains the key to understanding Socrates’ implication, at the very end of the dialogue, that philosophy alone understands the inner connectedness, and hence the proper nature, of both tragedy and comedy. I argue that Plato reflects in the character of Socrates the primordial wisdom embodied in satyric drama. I conclude with a brief consideration of Nietzsche’s challenge to Plato’s Dionysian wisdom.
62. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Walter Brogan Letter from the Editor
63. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Dennis E. Skocz Aristotle and Heidegger on the “Worldliness” of Emotion: A Hermeneutical Auseinandersetzung
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The reflection undertaken here aspires to understand human emotion by joining Aristotle’s and Heidegger’s descriptions of emotion in a thoughtful confrontation(Auseinandersetzung). In his 1924 Aristotle lectures, Heidegger carries out a phenomenology of being-in-the world which illuminates the “structures” of emotion.Aristotle’s descriptions of emotions in the Rhetoric serve to enrich the structures delineated by Heidegger. Although millennia separate the two thinkers and their civilizations, what they say together about emotion is meaningful today. Their philosophical projects may seem to subordinate consideration of emotion to rhetorical or ontological purposes, but they actually serve to enrich our understanding by recognizing the intertwining of speech, world, and emotion.
64. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
María del Rosario Acosta López Beauty as an Encounter between Freedom and Nature: A Romantic Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Judgment
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This essay presents a possible interpretation of the concept of beauty in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, which was itself suggested by Kant in the two introductionsto the text and gained force among the Early German Romantics and Idealists, introducing an alternative point of view into the concept of beauty and the role it plays in the relationship between reason and sensibility, man and world. Through the analysis of the four moments of the Analytic of the Beautiful, beauty will manifest itself as the realm in which a special encounter between human freedom and nature takes place. Therefore, and as an alternative to some traditional interpretations of Kant’s aesthetic investigation, which understand Kant’s judgment of taste exclusively on the basis of its subjective conditions, the judgment of beauty will present itself also in the relationship it establishes with the objects of nature.
65. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Christopher Fox The Apotheosis of Apotheosis: Levinas’s On Escape, Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness, and Us
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The recent translation of Emmanuel Levinas’s essay On Escape complicates our view of his relationship to Hegel, and reopens the ontological question of escape. The impetus for Levinas’s essay was National Socialism’s effort to reduce subjectivity to being qua biologistic. To resist this, Levinas enlists idealism as an ally. He affirms the idealist subject’s effort to escape being, but denies that it makes good its escape. I challenge this denial by comparing Levinas’s phenomenology of escape with Hegel’s phenomenology of unhappy consciousness, paying special attention to the themes of shame and the will to escape. The similarity between treatments leads me to suggest that the urge to escape emerges at least as early as medieval Christianity, thus predating the historical predicament of mid-1930s European Jewry. I conclude by interpreting space travel and the posthuman figure of the cyborg as signs that escape continues asan object of human aspiration.
66. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Joe McCoy The Argument of the Philebus
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This essay explores Socrates’ argumentative strategy in the Philebus, which is a response to the view that pleasure is the good. Socrates leads his interlocutorsthrough a series of steps in order to demonstrate to them the “conditions and dispositions of soul” upon which hedonism rests. Socrates’ aim is not to refute the claim that pleasure is a good, but rather to show the dependence of the experience of pleasure on intellect and the other elements of the life of mind. In this manner, Socrates is able to show the superiority of the life of mind, or philosophy, in terms that are intelligible to the pleasure-seeker.
67. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Walter Brogan Letter from the Editor
68. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Markus Zisselsberger The Claim and Use of Language in Translation: Heidegger (and) Übersetzen
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Starting from the premise that what calls for and happens in the work and thinking of translation is inseparable from the experience of reading Heidegger’sphilosophy, this article suggests that translation in Heidegger’s work is a philosophical problem fundamentally implicated in the thinking of Being. The article first examines Heidegger’s distinction between Übersetzen—a form of translation that seeks correspondences between words of different languages, and Übersetzen—a translation within one’s own language that seeks to respond to the “claim” of language itself. The second part of the article links translation with Heidegger’s later reflections on language in Unterwegs zur Sprache, arguing that what is at stake in the work of translation is a thinking of our relation to language. Focusing on the notion of “usage/Brauch,” it concludes with the suggestion that insofar as thinking translation according to (and with) Heidegger requires a “response” to the claim of language, it also calls for a more sustained engagement with the question of how the human is claimed and used by language.
69. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Friedrich Hölderlin, David Farrell Krell The Death of Empedocles
70. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Kōichi Tsujimura, Martin Heidegger, Richard Capobianco Martin Heidegger’s Thinking and Japanese Philosophy and From Martin Heidegger’s Reply in Appreciation
71. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
F. W. J. Schelling, Andrew A. Davis, Alexi I. Kukuljevic On Construction in Philosophy
72. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Martin Heidegger, Markus Zisselsberger Of the Origin of the Work of Art (first elaboration)
73. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jean-François Courtine, Christopher Cohoon Give/Take: The Hand
74. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
F. W. J. Schelling, Adam Arola, Jena Jolissaint, Peter Warneck Timaeus
75. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Peter Warnek Bastard Reasoning in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift
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The paper explores a connection between Schelling’s celebrated Freedom Essay and Plato’s Timaeus by considering the importance of Schelling’s translation of a phrase found in the Platonic dialogue in which Timaeus expresses the limits of human discourse, speaking of it as a kind of “bastard reasoning.” These limits are said to arise necessarily through the progression of the inquiry carried out by Timaeus. Schelling’s own resistance to viewing his inquiry determined by such limits and such necessity is highlighted by the fact that he curiously translates the phrase as “false imagination” or sin. The paper questions the reasons for such resistance given the striking structural similarity between the Timaeus and Schelling’s own essay. The paper concludes that Schelling’s thinking of the “unground” is comparable to the chorological interruption enacted in the Timaeus, but that Schelling does not consider how such an interruption bears upon God’s word. The paper thus points to a self-estranging necessity at the heart of all discourse and thought.
76. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Matthew S. Linck Double Vision: On the Sensible and the Intelligible
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This article argues that the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible in Plato’s dialogues (here with respect to the Republic) is not a dogmaticassertion or the foundation for a set of doctrines, but is rather the very starting point of philosophical activity. This starting point will be shown to be, in its most fundamental aspect, not something chosen by the philosopher, but rather the attribute that makes the philosopher who he is. Much of my argument will turn on a consideration of the divided line. In Part I, I situate the discussion of the divided line within both its global and immediate context in the Republic. As the divided line will serve as the focal point of my argument it is important to clarify its place in Socrates’ discussion with Glaucon and Adeimantus from the outset of my presentation. Part II consists of a brief analysis of the key passages devoted to the divided line. This analysis will culminate by highlighting the problematic nature of geometrical objects with respect to the schema of the line. I will argue that geometrical objects have no secure place on the line. This insecurity will call into question the apparent continuity between the sensible and the intelligible that the divided line suggests, and might call for a way to mediate or bridge the gap between the sensible and the intelligible. In Part III, I consider one such attempt in Proclus’s commentary on Euclid in order to show how such an attempt failson Platonic terms and thus cannot constitute the true core of Platonic philosophy. Part IV will argue that if rightly interpreted the divided line itself offers a solution to the problem and clarifies both the nature of philosophical activity and the status of the sensibility/intelligibility distinction within Platonic philosophy
77. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Chiara Bottici Mythos and Logos: A Genealogical Approach
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The paper aims to put forward a critique of the common view of the birth of philosophy as the exit from myth. To this end, it proposes a genealogy of myth whichstarts from the observation that the two terms were originally used as synonymous. By analyzing the ways in which the two terms relate to each other in the thinking of Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle, the paper argues that up to the fourth century BC no opposition between mythos and logos was stated and that not even in Aristotle is there an identification of myth with false discourse. This, in the end, is the result of the fact that their views of truth and reality enabled a plurality of programmes of truth to coexist next to one another.
78. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Carl B. Sachs Nietzsche’s Daybreak: Toward a Naturalized Theory of Autonomy
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Any interpretation of Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality must show whether or not Nietzsche is entitled both to deny free will and to be concerned with furtheringhuman freedom. Here I will show that Nietzsche is entitled to both claims if his theory of freedom is set in the context of a naturalistic drive-psychology. The drive-psychology allows Nietzsche to develop a modified but recognizable account of freedom as autonomy. I situate this development in Nietzsche’s thought through a close reading of Daybreak (Morgenröte). In conclusion I contrast Nietzsche’s naturalistic account of autonomy with the transcendental account developed by Kant.
79. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Daniel L. Tate Transforming Mimesis: Gadamer’s Retrieval of Aristotle’s Poetics
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This essay traces the trajectory of Gadamer’s retrieval of mimesis by reconstructing his interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics. Mimesis names the transformationthat takes place when the work constitutes a structure (Gebilde) that offers a presentation (Darstellung) in which the spectator participates. The reconstructiontreats Gadamer’s interpretation of mythos, mimesis, and katharsis as he appropriates them to his understanding of the work as a “transformation into structure” which is a “transformation into the true” that effects a self-transformation in the spectator. By transforming mimesis Gadamer retrieves this ancient concept for the hermeneutic understanding of the work of art as an event of being.
80. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Jim Vernon The Moral Necessity of Moral Conflict in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
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While not an explicit claim of Hegel’s, this paper aims to use his analysis of ‘Conscience’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit to demonstrate that the conflict betweendifferent moral judgments is morally necessary. That is, rather than being the unfortunate result of ‘hard’ cases, I argue that moral conflict is a necessary condition for the possibility of duty. Grasping the moral ground of moral conflict, I contend, allows us to understand why such conflicts arise, how and why they become entrenched into ‘moral issues’ and what our duties are in such cases. Thus, I aim to articulate both the moral necessity and dutiful resolution of seemingly intractable moral conflicts.