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Displaying: 61-80 of 236 documents

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61. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Zoë Sachs-Arellano Starting Points: An interview with Hubert Dreyfus
62. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Massimo Grassia Frege’s Criteria of Synonymy
63. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Erich H. Reck Frege on Numbers: Beyond the Platonist Picture
64. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
John P. Burgess Being Explained Away
65. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Robert B. Talisse Liberalism, Pluralism, and Political Justification
66. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Margaret Atherton Reading Lady Mary Shepherd
67. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Sean Dorrance Kelly Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis
68. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Bas van Fraassen, Kenneth Walden On Taking Stances: An interview with Bas van Fraassen
69. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Eugene Chislenko, Thomas Scanlon The Primacy of the Moral: An Interview with Thomas M. Scanlon
70. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Sukjae Lee Passive Natures and No Representations: Malebranche’s Two “Local” Arguments for Occasionalism
71. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Martha C. Nussbaum “Equal Respect for Conscience”: Roger Williams on the Moral Basis of Civil Peace
72. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Kelly Oliver Tropho Ethics: Derrida’s Homeophatic Purity
73. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Paul Skokowski Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?
74. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Marc Lange Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature
75. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Nicholas Brown, Tadhg Larabee Editors' Introduction
76. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Justin Wong, Woojin Lim, Michelle Lara, Benjamin Simon, David Chalmers An Interview with David Chalmers
77. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Romy Aran, Nathan Beaucage, Melissa Kwan, Peter Carruthers An Interview with Peter Carruthers
78. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Eli Alshanetsky Making Our Thoughts Clear
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We often get clear on our thoughts in the process of putting them into words. I investigate the nature of this process by posing the question, “Do you know which thought you are trying to articulate, before successfully articulating it?” and rejecting two answers to the dilemma it yields. The first is that the answer is yes, and that articulation is either the recollection of prior knowledge or the mere acquisition of a skill or ability rather than of propositional knowledge. The second is that the answer is no, and that your thought is unknown in that it is not yet fully realized. Clarity, according to this response, is a metaphysical property of the thought rather than the thinker’s epistemic relation to it. I offer a third solution: you start out with implicit knowledge of your thought but lack explicit knowledge of it. The process of articulation moves you from implicit to explicit knowledge.
79. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Hans-Johann Glock Determinacy of Content: The Hard Problem about Animal Intentionality
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Few arguments against intentional states in animals have stood the test of time. But one objection by Stich and Davidson has never been rebutted. In my reconstruction it runs: Ascribing beliefs to animals is vacuous, unless something counts as an animal believing one specific “content” rather than another; Nothing counts as an animal believing one specific content rather than another, because of their lack of language; Ergo: Ascribing beliefs to animals is vacuous. Several attempts to block the argument challenge the first premise, notably the appeals to “naked” belief ascriptions and alternative representational formats. This essay defends the first premise and instead challenges the second premise. There are non-linguistic “modes of presentation”; these can be determined by attributing to animals specific needs and capacities—a “ hermeneutic ethology” based on lessons from the debate about radical translation/interpretation in the human case. On that basis we can narrow down content by exclusion. What remains is an “imponderability of the mental” which does not rule out attributions of intentional states to animals.
80. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 27
Michael Tye Filling In and the Nature of Visual Experience
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This essay begins with a discussion of the phenomenon of filling in. It is argued that filling in is naturally accounted for by taking visual experiences to be importantly like drawn pictures of the world outside. An alternative proposal is then considered, one that models visual experiences on incomplete descriptions. It is shown that introspection does not favor the pictorial view. It is also shown that the phenomenon of blurriness in visual experience does not provide a good reason for favoring the pictorial view either. Why, then, be a pictorialist? It is argued that visual experiences conform to what have been called “the laws of appearance” and that their conformity to these laws gives us an excellent reason for preferring the pictorial account.