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61. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Recent Works on Leibniz
62. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Justin E. H. Smith Confused Perception and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz
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I argue against the view that Leibniz’s construction of reality out of perceiving substances must be seen as the first of the modern idealist philosophies. I locate this central feature of Leibniz’s thought instead in a decidedly premodern tradition. This tradition sees bodiliness as a consequence of the confused perception of finite substances, and equates God’s uniquely disembodied being with his maximally distinct perceptions. But unlike modern idealism, the premodern view takes confusion as the very feature of any created substance that makes possible its distinctness from the Creator. Modern idealism, in contrast, emerges when the external world becomes a problem, when the epistemological worry arises as to how the mind might access it. In the tradition in which I place Leibniz, there simply is no such worry.
63. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Philip Beeley Leibniz on the Limits of Human Knowledge: With a Critical Edition of Sur la calculabilité du nombre de toutes les connaissances possibles
64. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Andreas Blank Incomplete Entities, Natural Non-separability, and Leibniz’s Response to François Lamy’s De la Conoissance de soi-même
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Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz’s rehahilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained etlort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim that Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics.
65. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Marcelo Dascal Ex pluribus unum? Patterns in 522+ Texts of Leibniz’s Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe VI, 4
66. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz SUR LA CALCULABILITÉ DU NOMBRE DE TOUTES LES CONNAISSANCES POSSIBLES
67. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ON THE CALCULABILITY OF THE NUMBER OF ALL POSSIBLE TRUTHS
68. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Herbert Breger News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
69. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Acknowledgments, Abbreviations Used in Articles and Reviews
70. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Patrick Riley Leibniz’s Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice, 1703-2003
71. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Web Resources on Leibniz
72. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Jack D. Davidson Leibniz on the Labyrinth of Freedom: Two Early Texts
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Leibniz devoted immense energy and thought to questions concerning moral responsibility and human freedom. This paper examines Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin in two important early texts - “Von der Allmacht Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” and “Confessio Philosophi” - as a propaedeutic to a detailed examination of the development of Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin. In particular, my aim is to see if Leibniz’s early thinking on freedom and sin in these early writings was among those metaphysical topics about which he changed his mind. My focus is on human, not divine, freedom, and the young Leibniz’s metaphysical psychology, rather than his early efforts in theodicy. I conclude that Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin are in place as early as 1672/3, and remain relatively stable thereafter.
73. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Concha Roldán News from the Spanish Leibniz Society
74. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 13
Patrick Riley Notice of G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Reihe IV (Politische Schriften), Band 5, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, forthcoming February 2004.
75. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
Andreas Blank Definitions, Sorites Arguments, and Leibniz’s Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice
76. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
News from the Spanish Leibniz Society
77. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
Catherine Wilson Report on the 2004 Montreal Nouveaux Essais Conference
78. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
Michael J. Murray Pre-Leibnizian Moral Necessity
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The mature Leibniz frequently uses the phrase “moral necessity” in the context of discussing free choice. In this essay I provide a seventeenth century geneology of the phrase. I show that the doctrine of moral necessity was developed by scholastic philosophers who sought to retain a robust notion of freedom while purging bruteness from their systems. Two sorts of bruteness were special targets. The first is metaphysical bruteness, according to which contingent events or states of affairs occur without a sufficient explanation. The second is semantic bruteness according to which a proposition can be true without a truth maker. Denying eithersort of bruteness was thought by some to raise problems for freedom. Defenders of moral necessity thought the notion solved these problems without having to invoke bruteness.
79. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
Massimo Mugnai Substance and Individuation in Leibniz
80. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz On Estimating the Uncertain