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61. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Ohad Nachtomy Remarks on Possibilia in Leibniz, 1672-1676: Quod non omnia possibilia ad intelligentiam perveniant?
62. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Samuel Levey Why Simples?: A Reply to Donald Rutherford
63. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Ohad Nachtomy Reply to Stefano Di Bella
64. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Timothy Crockett Space and Time in Leibniz’s Early Metaphysics
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In this paper I challenge the common view that early in his career (1679-1695) Leibniz held that space and time are well-founded phenomena, entities on an ontological par with bodies and their properties. I argue that the evidence Leibniz ever held that space and time are well-founded phenomena is extremely weak and that there is a great deal of evidence for thinking that in the 1680s he held a position much like the one scholars rightly attribute to him in his mature period, namely, that space and time are merely orders of existence and as such are purely abstract and occupy an ontological realm distinct from that of well-founded phenomena. In the course of arguing for this interpretation, I offer an account of the nature of Leibnizian phenomena which allows Leibniz to hold the view that space and time are phenomena, while at the same time thinking of them as abstract, ideal orders of existence.
65. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 18
Ursula Goldenbaum Leibniz’ Marginalia on the Back of the Title of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
66. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 19
Edward Slowik Another Go-Around on Leibniz and Rotation
67. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 19
Massimo Mugnai “On extrinsic denominations” (LH IV, iii, 5a-e, Bl. 15): Transcription and English Translation
68. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 19
Marius Stan Kant’s Early Theory of Motion: Metaphysical Dynamics and Relativity
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This paper examines the young Kant’s claim that all motion is relative, and argues that it is the core of a metaphysical dynamics of impact inspired by Leibniz and Wolff. I start with some background to Kant’s early dynamics, and show that he rejects Newton’s absolute space as a foundation for it. Then I reconstruct the exact meaning of Kant’s relativity, and the model of impact he wants it to support. I detail (in Section II and III) his polemic engagement with Wolffian predecessors, and how he grounds collisions in a priori dynamics. I conclude that, for the young Kant, the philosophical problematic of Newton’s science takes a back seat to an agenda set by the Leibniz-Wolff tradition of rationalist dynamics. This results matters, because Kant’s views on motion survive well into the 1780s. In addition, his doctrine attests to the richness of early modern views of the relativity of motion.
69. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 19
Mogens Lærke Monism, Separability and Real Distinction in the Young Leibniz
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In this article, I discuss how Leibniz’s first correspondence with Malebranche from early 1676 can shed new light on the notorious “all-things-are-one”-passage (ATOP) found in the Quod ens perfectissimum sit possibile from late 1676—a passage that has been taken as an expression of monism or Spinozism in the young Leibniz. The correspondence with Malebranche provides a deeper understanding of Leibniz’s use of the notions of “real distinction” and “separability” in the ATOP. This forms the background for a discussion of Leibniz’s commitment to the monist position expounded in the ATOP. Thus, on the basis of a close analysis of Leibniz’s use of these key terms in the Malebranche correspondence, I provide two possible, and contrary, interpretations of the ATOP, namely, a “non-commitment account” and a “commitment account.” Finally, I explain why I consider the commitment account to be the more compelling of the two.
70. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 19
Anja Jauernig Leibniz on Motion – Reply to Edward Slowik
71. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 2
Michael J. Murray Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom
72. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 2
Donald Rutherford Leibniz and the Problem of Soul-Body Union
73. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 2
R. C. Sleigh, Jr. Author Responds to Review
74. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Tamar Levanon A Reply to Anja Jauernig’s article, ‘Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypothesis,’ The Leibniz Review, Vol. 18, 2008
75. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Paul Lodge The Empirical Grounds for Leibniz’s ‘Real Metaphysics’
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In discussion of Leibniz’s philosophical methodology Donald Rutherford defends the view that Leibniz regarded metaphysics as an a priori demonstrative science. In the course of this discussion Rutherford isolates and tries to deflect a significant challenge for his view, namely the observation that in many of his mature writings on metaphysics Leibniz appears to defend his views by means of a posteriori arguments. I present some prima facie difficulties with Rutherford’s position and then offer an alternative account of how Leibniz thought he needed to establish metaphysical claims. My suggestion is that the challenge that Rutherford poses may be best answered by attending to the fact that Leibniz recognized a kind of metaphysical enquiry, ‘real metaphysics’, that is essentially a posteriori, in virtue of the fact that it is concerned not just with possible kinds of beings, but with the kinds of beings that God actually created.
76. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Massimo Mugnai Leibniz’s “Schedae de novis formis syllogisticis” (1715): Text and Translation
77. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Massimo Mugnai Leibniz and ‘Bradley’s Regress’
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In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for his own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence (‘inesse’) plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’.
78. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Mogens Lærke A Conjecture about a Textual Mystery: Leibniz, Tschirnhaus and Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling
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In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s.
79. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Laurence Carlin The Non-Aristotelian Novelty of Leibniz’s Teleology
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My aim in this paper is to underscore the novelty of Leibniz’s teleology from a historical perspective. I believe this perspective helps deliver a better understanding of the finer details of Leibniz’s employment of final causes. I argue in this paper that Leibniz was taking a stance on three central teleological issues that derive from Aristotle, issues that seem to have occupied nearly every advocate of final causes from Aristotle to Leibniz. I discuss the three Aristotelian issues, and how major thinkers treated them in the medieval period. I argue that Leibniz rejected all of the mainstream Aristotelian teleological views on these issues. I conclude that Leibniz broke with longstanding threads of teleological thinking in ways that were often extreme.
80. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Douglas Bertrand Marshall Leibniz: Geometry, Physics, and Idealism
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Leibniz holds that nothing in nature strictly corresponds to any geometric curve or surface.Yet on Leibniz’s view, physicists are usually able to ignore any such lack of correspondence and to investigate nature using geometric representations. The primary goal of this essay is to elucidate Leibniz’s explanation of how physicists are able to investigate nature geometrically, focussing on two of his claims: (i) there can be things innature which approximate geometric objects to within any given margin of error; (ii) the truths of geometry state laws by which the phenomena of nature are governed. A corollary of Leibniz’s explanation is that physical bodies do have boundaries with which geometric surfaces can be compared to very high levels of precision. I argue that the existence of these physical boundaries is mind-independent to such an extent as to pose a significant challenge to idealist interpretations of Leibniz.