Displaying: 81-100 of 216 documents

0.044 sec

81. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Kordula Świętorzecka Sformalizowana ontologia orientacji klasycznej [Formalized Ontology inspired by Classical Philosophy]
82. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Miłowit Kuniński Jerzy Wacław Perzanowski (1943-2009)
83. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Ruth Weintraub The Doomsday Argument Revisited (a Stop in the Shooting-Room Included)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Leslie’s doomsday argument purports to show that the likelihood of the human race perishing soon is greater than we think. The probability we attach to it, based on our estimate of the chance of various calamities which might bring extinction about (a nuclear holocaust, an ecological disaster, etc.), should be adjusted as follows. If the human race were to survive for a long time, we, livingnow, would be atypical. So our living now increases the probability that the human race will end shortly. In this paper, I criticize some attempts to rebut the argument, and present my own. To facilitate the analysis, I consider a structurally similar problem, the “ShootingRoom.”
84. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Time Change and Imaginary Numbers. From Hamilton to Einstein in Search for Understanding of the Imaginary Numbers
85. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Krzysztof Brzechczyn Leszek Nowak (1943-2009)
86. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Christopher Norris Badiou on Set Theory, Ontology and Truth: mathematics as a guide to metaphysics (Part Two)
87. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Michael Potts Against Bioethics
88. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Matthew Mosdell The Philosophy of Philosophy
89. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Adam R. Thompson The Four Category Ontology
90. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Magdalena Środa Barbara Skarga (1919-2009)
91. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Attila Tanyi Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections if they can vindicate the reduction proposed. This, however, leads to further conditions whose fulfillment is necessary for the success of the vindication. I deal with one such condition, which I borrow from Peter Railton and Mark Schroeder:the demand that naturalist reductions must be tolerably revisionist. In the remainder of the paper I argue that the most influential versions of the Model are intolerably revisionist. The first problem concerns the picture of reasons that many recent formulations of the Model advocate. By using an objection from Michael Bedke, I show that on this interpretation obvious reasons won’t be accounted for by the Model. The second problem concerns the idealization that is also often part of the Model. Invoking an argument of Connie Rosati’s, I show that the best form of idealization, the ideal advisor account, is inadequate. Hence, though not the knock down arguments they were intended to be, OQA and TO do pose a serious threat to the Model.
92. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
José Ruiz Fernández Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s phenomenological relevance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
After interpreting some of the passages in which Wittgenstein refers to phenomenology, this paper tries to clarify why Wittgenstein came to conclude that his work had to be ultimately understood in terms of phenomenology. Secondly, the paper discusses the phenomenological relevance of some of Wittgenstein’s views on language.
93. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Alex Orenstein Ontological Arguments
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There are good reasons for being dissatisfied with standard criticisms of the various arguments, all of which are referred to as being “The Ontological Argument”. While refutation by logical analogy is compelling, it merely teaches us that something is amiss. It does not specify the exact nature of the flaw. The first part of this paper examines and rejects several well-known attempts at refuting and clarifying the argument(s). The second part attempts to provide a principled uniform account of what is wrong by treating the arguments as resting on definitions. Then, by bringing to bear Ajdukiewicz’s exhaustive classification of definitions, we arrive at a unified account of the flaw common to such arguments. In effect we have an explication of the dictum that one cannot define into existence.
94. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Błażej Skrzypulec Rodzaje naturalne. Rozważania z filozofii języka [Natural Kinds from the Point of View of the Philosophy of Language]
95. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Marek Przychodzeń Traktat o wolności [Treatise on Freedom]
96. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jan A. Kłoczowski Leszek Kołakowski (1927-2009)
97. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Husserl’s Lebenswelt and the problem of spatial cognition – in search of universals
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Perception and conceptualization of space are some of the most basic elements of human cognition. It has been long assumed that human spatial thinkingand frames of reference used to grasp and describe the location of an object in relation to other objects are of universal nature and so are projected in naturallanguages in basically the same manner; three principal dimensions in egocentric perceptual space were distinguished: up-down, front-back and left-right, reflecting our biological make-up. If differences in spatial terminology were observed, they were relegated to surface structure phenomena, but were not regarded as differences in perceptual and conceptual representations in the human mind. That belief in the universal perception of spatial relations among humans was ofconsiderable importance for some philosophical theories, also for Husserl’s conception of the Lebenswelt a priori and his defence of the validity of scientificpropositions and of absolute truth. It now appears that the extent of the diversity in spatial thinking has been drastically underestimated (Levinson 2003), but it does not follow that Husserl’s intuitions regarding the existence of universal constituents in incompatible Lebenswelt experiences were necessarily wrong.
98. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Maciej Brachowicz Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity. A Phenomenology of Human Rights
99. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Maximiliano Korstanje What Compounds Greece [Lo que hace a Grecia, 1]: from Homer to Heraclitus. Seminaires 1982-1983. Human Creation II [De Homero a Heráclito: Seminarios 1982-1983. Lacreación humana II]
100. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Piotr Sikora Ateism, Agnosticism, and Apothatic Theism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper, I propose a specific version of theism which I would call apophatic theism. In the first part of the paper, I argue that this in the only tenableversion of theism. Due to the fact that it may seem indistinguishable from a very strong form of agnosticism (or atheism understood in the etymological sense of the word: as a-theism where ‘a’ means ‘without’), in the second part of my paper, I try to distinguish apophatic theism from agnosticism (or a-theism), and from so called “Wittgensteinian” view of religion, which also may seem similar to the position I propose.