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81. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Marcin Tkaczyk Marcin Tkaczyk
The Antinomy of Future Contingent Events — a Rebuttal
Antynomia Przyszłych Zdarzeń Przygodnych — Replika

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In this paper I account for some of the topics raised by the Authors of the papers included in the debate I focus mainly on the following topics: the concept of representation and reliability of my formal analysis of the future contingent antinomy, the concept of causation with an emphasis put on backword causation, the idea of timeless eternity and the position of religious beliefs in philosophical theories. Furthermore I shortly address topics of Ockhamism, Molinism, soft and hard facts, fragmentism and the concept of necessity.
82. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 2
Maciej Wąs Maciej Wąs
“There Is an ‘Is’”: Intuition of Being in the Thought and Writings of Gilbert Keith Chesterton (a Maritainian Perspective)
„Jest Jakieś ‘Jest’”

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The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that Gilbert Keith Chesterton possessed the genuine intuition of being as defined by the French Thomist, Jacques Maritain, albeit almost without the proper metaphysical habitus. It opens with some explanations of the terms used, and with a short extrapolation of the theory of the intuition of being. Next it proceeds to proving the thesis assumed by the means of demonstrating that Chesterton exhibited the intuition of being as to three most important elements: its proper object (with the principle of identity included), the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of finality. Next it attempts to demonstrate that despite that understanding, he never spoke in a properly metaphysical manner, the fact that points to the lack of metaphysical habitus, and to establish certain consequences of this state of things. The text ends with a list of practical conclusions that could be drawn from an analysis such as this.
83. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 3
Dariusz Dąbek Dariusz Dąbek
Edward A. Milne’s Philosophy of Science: Between Aristotelianism and Popperism
Filozofia Nauki Edwarda A. Milne’a

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The article seeks to show that E.A. Milne’s philosophy of science has its roots in the philosophy of Aristotle and it could be an inspiration for Popper’s philosophy. The similarities with Aristotle’s concept are as follows: 1) the aim of science is to explain phenomena by discovering general principles; 2) the mind is responsible for discovering them, although experience guides the search; 3) deducing detailed statements from general assumptions is the most important element of research. On the other hand, Milne’s proposal is consistent with Popper’s main ideas: 1) criticism of the principle of induction; 2) preference for the hypothetical-deductive method (assumptions should be bold hypotheses that require empirical testing to be accepted); 3) appreciation of falsification and confidence in the effectiveness of deductive logic.
84. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Gyula Klima Gyula Klima
Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Its Role in a Causal Proof of God’s Existence
Realna Różnica Akwinaty i Jej Rola w Kauzalnym Dowodzie na Istnienie Boga

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This paper is not going to offer any criticism of the way Gaven Kerr treats Aquinas’ argument. Instead, it offers an alternative way of reconstructing Aquinas’ argument, intending to strengthen especially those controversial aspects of it that Kerr’s reconstruction left untreated or in relative obscurity. Accordingly, although the paper’s treatment will have to have some overlaps with Kerr’s (such as the critique of Kenny’s critique of Aquinas), it will deal with issues essential to adequate replies to certain competent criticisms of his argument untreated by Kerr (such as Buridan’s critique). For the sake of the “formally inclined” reader, the paper’s treatment will also include an Appendix offering a formal reconstruction of both the main argument and its subarguments to demonstrate the formal rigor of Aquinas’ original.
85. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Andrzej Maryniarczyk Andrzej Maryniarczyk
“Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine”: Thomas Aquinas’s Reinterpretation of the Understanding of Being and Essence as the Basis for the Discovery of the First Cause as Ipsum Esse
„Mały Błąd na Początku Wielkim Jest ma Końcu”

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In this article, the author notes that Thomas Aquinas, in his brief work entitled De Ente et Essentia, proved that at the base of understanding the world, the human being, and God in particular, there is our understanding of being and its essence. When we make a small mistake at the beginning (parvus error in principio) in our understanding of being and its essence, it will turn to be a big one in the end (magnus in fine). And what is “at the end” of our knowledge is the discovery of the First and Ultimate Cause of all things, known as: Ipsum Esse, God, the Absolute, The Most Perfect Substance, on whom everything depends, and who depends not on anything else. These present inquiries about the proper understanding of being and its essence are aimed at formulating proof of the necessity of existence of a Being that is the First Cause, and which, existing as Ipsum Esse, is the source and reason of existence of all beings. Without these inquiries, the proof itself would be incomprehensible, and more importantly it would be a purely a priori one (i.e., ontological). Furthermore, without the existential conception of being, which Thomas first formulated, one could not discover the First Cause which, as Ipsum Esse, is the source of the existence of every being. This issue seems to have escaped the attention of the author of the book Aquinas’s Way to God. The Proof in “De Ente et Essentia.”
86. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Krzysztof Ośko Krzysztof Ośko
The Metaphysical Argument for God’s Existence
Argument Metafizyczny na Istnienie Boga

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In this paper, I present main theses of Aquinas Way to God: The Proof in the De Ente et Essentia by Gaven Kerr. The book in question is a contemporary interpretation and defence of Thomas Aquinas’s argument for the existence of God, based on the real distinction between the essence of the thing and its act of being. I stress the fact that Kerr underlines the metaphysical character of Thomas’s argument and the role of participation in Aquinas’s understanding of the act of being. In the last part of the article, I discuss Kerr’s interpretation of Aquinas’s argument for the real distinction between essence and an act of being, as well as Kerr’s own argument. These arguments are of particular importance since they provide metaphysical presuppositions for the argument for God’s existence considered in Kerr’s book. As for the first argument, I argue that the first part of Aquinas’s argumentation (the so-called Intellectus Essentiae Argument) pertains to the real order rather than conceptual. Concerning the second argument, I attempt to highlight the difficulties of Kerr’s understanding of Thomist esse as a principle of the existence of a thing.
87. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
John F.X. Knasas John F.X. Knasas
The Analytical Thomist and the Paradoxical Aquinas: Some Reflections on Kerr’s Aquinas’s Way to God
Analityczny Tomista i Paradoksalny Akwinata

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My article critically evaluates five key claims in Kerr’s interpretation of Aquinas’s De Ente et Essentia, ch. 4, proof for God. The claims are: (1) the absolutely considered essence is a second intention, or cognitional being; (2) à la John Wippel, the real distinction between essence and existence is known before the proof; (3) contra David Twetten, Aristotelian form is not self-actuating and so requires actus essendi; (4) the De Ente proof for God uses the Principle of Sufficient Reason; (5) an infinite regress must be eliminated before concluding to God. This author wonders if these questionable claims are traceable to the mindset of analytic philosophy which values precision and discreteness and so can fail to appreciate crucial paradoxes in Aquinas’s metaphysics.
88. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Jacek Wojtysiak Jacek Wojtysiak
Existence and God: On Aquinas–Kerr’s Metaphysical Argument
Istnienie i Bóg

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In this paper, I discuss, as carried out by Gaven Kerr, a reconstruction of Aquinas’s argument for the existence of God from his work De Ente et Essentia. My analysis leads to complementing Kerr’s proposal with the following elements: (i) a summarization of the presented argument in a more formal manner; (ii) a specification of the main presuppositions of the Thomistic conception of existence; (iii) a drawing of attention to the fact that the essence–esse composition is a borderline case of the array of potency–act compositions; (iv) a distinguishing of the empirical (connected with the problem of the regress) and speculative (deprived of such a problem) interpretations or versions of Aquinas’s argument; (v) a clarification of what is the Divine exception from the essence–esse composition; (vi) a distinguishing of the three models of participation and a defence of the moderate model. I regard the following two issues to be of key importance for the argument under discussion: the relation between the Aristotelian compositional model and the Platonic model of participation as well as the defence of the Thomistic conception of the essence–esse composition.
89. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Paul O’Grady Paul O’Grady
Existence and Wisdom
Istnienie i Mądrość

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In this paper, I examine the debate about existence between deflationist analytic accounts and the ‘thicker’ conception used by Aquinas when speaking of esse. I argue that the way one evaluates the debate will depend on background philosophical assumptions and that reflection on those assumptions could constitute an account of theoretical wisdom.
90. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
David Twetten David Twetten
How Save Aquinas’ “Intellectus essentiae Argument” for the Real Distinction between Essence and Esse?
Jak Ocalić Akwinaty „Argument Intellectus Essentiae” za Realną Różnicą Między Istotą i Esse?

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Aquinas’ so-called “Intellectus essentiae Argument” for the distinction between being and essence is notoriously suspect, including among defenders of Aquinas’ distinction. For the paper in this volume, I take as my starting point the recent defense of the argument by Fr. Lawrence Dewan, O.P. Fr. Dewan’s project is unsuccessful. Pointing out some shortcomings in his readings allows me to take up his call to highlight the “formal” or “quidditative side” of Aquinas’ metaphysics, in this case in regards to the proofs of the “real distinction.” Accordingly, the second half of this paper sets forth a way in which the famous “Intellectus essentiae Argument” of De Ente et Essentia 4 can succeed as a proof of the real distinction. Aquinas’ argument presupposes the prior real distinction between essence and supposit or individual substance. Esse is the ontological component that makes true our judgments that substances actually are: Obama exists. By contrast, this “truth-maker” cannot be predicated of humanity, although it is in Obama as really distinct from him. If Aquinas’ reasoning in this most contentious of his proofs can be saved, so, perhaps, can most of his other proofs.
91. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Marek Piwowarczyk Marek Piwowarczyk
Problems with the Inseparability of Esse
Problemy z Niesamodzielnością Istnienia

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One of the most important theses of Existential Thomism is that contingent things are composed of essence and existence. The thesis is immediately supplemented by a proviso that these components are not parts in the regular sense of the word. Essence and existence are not extended pieces of the thing which can be detached from it. They are inseparable aspects of the thing wherein inseparability is understood as a sort of dependence. In my paper I analyze the thesis of the inseparability of existence. For me this is untenable. I argue that this inseparability blocks up the essential function ascribed by Thomists to existence: the function of making the thing real. Thus to save this function we are forced to export existence to outside the thing. It contradicts our deep belief that existence is the most intimate aspect of the thing. Therefore the Thomistic analysis of existence seems to be invalid.
92. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
David Burrell David Burrell
Gaven Kerr, O.P., On Creation with Its Philosophical Corollaries
Gaven Kerr OP o Stworzeniu i Jego Konsekwencjach Filozoficznych

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Author endorses the study by Gaven Kerr, O.P., for the way it shows the centrality of Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation: showcasing the ‘real distinction’ between esse and essentia, followed by Aquinas’ unique treatment of each, as well as a deep consideration of esse tantum. At the end he states the ‘proof’ which Gaven Kerr has articulated so deftly reflects the manner in which the Creator ‘appears’ in creation, thereby ‘showing’ what cannot be ‘said’ (Wittgenstein).
93. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 67 > Issue: 4
Gaven Kerr Gaven Kerr
Author’s Response to Contributors
Odpowiedzi Autora

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The text represents the author’s responses to the contributors who have addressed issues in my 2015 book, Aquinas’s Way to God: The Proof in De Ente et Essentia, published by Oxford University Press.
94. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 1
Grzegorz Hołub Grzegorz Hołub
The Philosopher as the Therapist: A Lesson from the Past
Filozof Jako Terapeuta

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This article is about the philosopher as a potential therapist. It starts from tendencies exhibited by a group of contemporary philosophers involved in a so-called human enhancement. Drawing on the newest discoveries of genetics, genetic engineering and pharmacology, they offer a set of therapies aimed at the extensive ‘improvement’ of the human condition. In the second part of the paper, selected ideas concerning philosophical therapy by the Ancient philosophers are presented. They basically employed personal contact, conversation, and wise counselling. Then these two approaches to this kind of therapy are compared and contrasted. The contemporary approaches offer novel, technical ways of intervention but are blind as far as far-reaching goals and the essential goods of human life are concerned. Despite serious cultural differences, the contemporary therapy can learn a lot from the ancients. If the human being is to be treated by philosophers, an integral picture of who the former is must be taken into account. This means that both his interiority and exteriority should be subjects to the therapy.
95. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 1
Robert T. Ptaszek Robert T. Ptaszek
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and Its Doctrine: A Philosophical Approach
Kościół Jezusa Chrystusa Świętych w Dniach Ostatnich i Jego Doktryna

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In the article, I demonstrate how realistic philosophy of religion can be employed in order to obtain a preliminary verification of the truthfulness of the doctrine proclaimed by a particular religious community. The first element of a religious doctrine that qualifies for philosophical evaluation is its non-contradictory character. For this reason I endeavour to reconstruct one such doctrine and show how it is possible to demonstrate, through philosophical analyses, that such a doctrine does not meet the aforementioned criterion. For the object of my studies I chose the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (called the Mormon Church for short), as I find it particularly interesting among the religious movements alternative to Christianity.Among new religious movements currently in existence the Mormon Church stands out in several respects. First, this religious community utilises a variety of sources of revelation. Furthermore, although their sacred story, that spanning a dozen or so centuries, begins in Israel it mostly takes place on American soil. Finally, the Mormon Church sets forth a vision of a future ‘holy land,’ and the concept of salvation that is essentially different from those of other Bible- based religious movements.The Mormon concept of salvation, referred to as the plan of eternal progress shows both unique goal and unique means to achieve it. People are to become gods and populate multiple worlds. According to Mormons there will be different levels of salvation associated with what life a person lived on earth.Reconstruction and philosophical analysis of the main elements of the Mormon doctrine shows its weak points, inconsistencies, and oversimplifications. From this perspective, the Mormon ‘sacred story’ hardly could be regarded as something more than a colourful and interesting myth. But the question of reasons why Mormons still put their faith in such an inconsistent doctrine lies outside the scope of these considerations.
96. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
John Carriero John Carriero
Descartes (and Spinoza) on Intellectual Experience and Skepticism
Kartezjusz (i Spinoza) w Kwestii Intelektualnego Doświadczenia i Sceptycyzmu

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Descartes’s epistemology is rooted in his profound interest in and respect for what might be called intellectual experience, especially lucid intellectual experience. (Lucid intellectual experience is my term for what Descartes calls perceiving clearly and distinctly.) This interest, it seems to me, was shared by Descartes’s rationalist successors Spinoza and Leibniz. In the first part of this paper, I locate the phenomenon of lucid intellectual experience, focusing on Descartes and Spinoza. I try to show if we do not give enough attention to the character of such experience, we risk losing touch with a central motivation behind their respective epistemologies. In the second part of the paper, I consider intellectual experience in the context of skeptical doubt, particularly radical doubt. Although Descartes and Spinoza are often taken to be opposed here, I think they share more than is commonly appreciated.
97. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut, Arkadiusz Gut The Highlights of Descartes’ Epistemology
98. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Monika Walczak Monika Walczak
Epistemic Functions of Intuition in Descartes
Epistemiczne Funkcje Intuicji u Kartezjusza

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The topic of the paper is the notion of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy and its epistemic functions. Descartes introduces his notion of intuition in the context of a description of his method and process of knowing and doing science. Intuition is a significant component of this process. I intend to show that the main epistemic functions of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy are differentiated. Intuition is essential not only in the context of justification (the Cartesian synthetic method of proof) but also and especially in the context of discovery (the Cartesian analytic method of discovery). It plays not only a role in the foundation of the cogito but also on different stages of constructing the system of knowledge. Intuition has important functions in grasping simple natures, forming primary concepts, comprehending complex natures, forming primary propositions (including primary principles), and capturing relationships between them and building deductive reasoning (the role of intuition in deduction). Hence, intuition is the foundation for all primary stages of producing knowledge. It is active and important element of pure thinking (a priori) in human knowledge, and science. It fulfils these functions due to its specific epistemic properties. I also argue that intuition is not an autonomous and complete type of knowledge. Nor is it an intuitive thesis, but rather the basis of a justification for theses (including the cogito).
99. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Abbreviations Used
100. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
C. P. Ragland, Everett Fulmer C. P. Ragland
The Fourth Meditation and Cartesian Circles
Czwarta Medytacja A Kartezjańskie Koła

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We offer a novel interpretation of the argumentative role that Meditation IV plays within the whole of the Meditations. This new interpretation clarifies several otherwise head-scratching claims that Descartes makes about Meditation IV, and it fully exonerates the Fourth Meditation from either raising or exacerbating Descartes’ circularity problems.