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81. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Yvonne Raley Science and Ontology
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Many philosophers (such as, for instance, Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, and Hartry Field) regard scientific practice as the final arbiter in ontology. In this short paper, I argue that the very philosophers who profess to derive their ontological commitments from scientific practice impose certain views on the theories established by that practice that the practice itself does not support. This is not consistent with their view that science tells us what there is.
82. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Brit Strandhagen Disconnecting Reality: On Kant's Aesthetic Judgement
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In the Critique of Judgement Kant develops a theory of taste, according to which taste is the ability to make judgements concerning beauty, beauty in nature and in art. These judgements are based on a particular reflective activity, an activity in which the understanding is driven into a never-ending play with the imagination.In my paper I will try to show the actuality of Kant's aesthetic theory as a general theory of aesthetic experience, not only in connection with art, but as a particular kind of experience possible in other areas as well. Aesthetic experience is, as I read Kant, a peculiar kind of setting free, of detaching the connection between our experience and objective reality, a connection presupposed in every non-aesthetic discourse. This disconnection from the empirical world, which is essential in aesthetic reflection, I will call an aesthetic emancipatedness.To experience something aesthetically means to set it free, to embody it in the aesthetic emancipatedness, to set it free from the boundaries of normality and make it something extraordinary; a deviation. But a deviation would only exist in contrast to that which it deviates from. Emancipatedness can only exist in contrast to a not yet emancipated condition. This explains why the aesthetic experience also affects the moral and the cognitive aspects of reality.
83. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Chenyang Li International Human Rights Discourse as Moral Persuasion
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I argue that the nature of the international human rights discourse ("IHRD") is to promote certain moral values across various cultural traditions; as such, this should be done through persuasion; it should not merely be forcing people to change their behavior; it should seek to have people accept certain moral values that they have not embraced or accept certain moral values as more important than they have held them to be. With persuasion as a goal, we need to make strategies suitable for this purpose. The paper has the following sections.
84. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Robin Attfield Sustainable Development Revisited
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My aim is to defend the concept of sustainable development both against economists' interpretations that make it involve perpetual gains to human well-being, and against sceptical accounts that make its meaning vary from speaker to speaker, serving as a cloak for the status quo and the suggestion that it be discarded. The assumptions of the economists' interpretation are questioned, and the centrality among early advocates of sustainable development of sustainable practices and of sustainability being social and ecological as well as economic is used to support a different interpretation. On this interpretation, sustainable development involves the satisfaction of basic needs and comprises the precondition of economically, socially and ecologically sustainable practices. What is to be sustained is overtly practices and more basically intrinsic value. This account is shown to assist with solving conflicts between nature preservation and alleviation of poverty, solutions to which are argued to embody sustainable development even in the absence of prospects of ever-increasing quality of life for humanity. While this interpretation already counts against sceptical accounts, these are also shown to arise from the adoption of the radical concept of sustainable development by governments, international agencies and multinational business at the Rio Summit of 1992, and consequent re-interpretations. But the rational response is not discarding the concept but rediscovering the radical core and potential to which these various bodies are in theory committed.
85. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Helena Siipi Naturalness in Biodiversity Management
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Decline of biodiversity—richness, variety and variability of living beings—is an issue of concern world wide. Nevertheless, not all biological diversity is valued by conservation biologists. Most of them reject an idea of creation of so called A-areas—i.e. maximally rich and diverse biotic areas which have been produced by methods like genetic engineering and species introduction. Reasons for this are considered. A-areas are artefacts: their existence has been intentionally brought about by intentionally modifying their properties in order to produce an entity of their type. Nevertheless, since some restored ecosystems are equally artifacts and still valued over A-areas in biodiversity management, artifactuality cannot alone explain the low value of the A-areas. The essential difference between A-areas and restored ecosystems is in naturalness of their properties. By contrast with the properties of A-areas, the properties of any restored ecosystem are similar to the properties of some ecosystems that have originated through evolutionary processes. I conclude that biodiversity management decisions are based on multiple and different conceptions of natural, unnatural and artificial. The most desired alternatives are natural in all senses of the terms. Because of limits set by the real world, conservation biologists sometimes have to settle for second best alternatives that are unnatural in some sense of the term, but not in all or many of them.
86. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
René von Schomberg The Erosion of our Value Spheres: The Ways in which Society Copes with Scientific, Moral and Ethical Uncertainty
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In the following, I will discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I will clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, law [Recht) and morality in the modern world with the process of de-differentiation of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse either losing their original function or becoming transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Law becomes a basic constituent of an amoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory (Apel, 1988; Habermas, 1996), as well as outline a possible solution.
87. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Elisa Aaltola The Moral Value of Animals: Three Altruistic Versions
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Altruism has often been thought to be the reason we treat animals with a certain moral respect. Animals are not moral agents who could reciprocally honour our well being, and because of this duties toward them are considered to be based on other-directed motivations. Altruism is a vague notion, and in the context of animals can be divided into at least three different alternatives. The first one equates altruism with benevolence or "kindness"; the second one argues altruism is based on recognising inherent value in others; and the third one emphasises identification. Out of these three the first one seems the poorest, for it ultimately falls into egoism: we treat animals with respect out of a need to cultivate our "humanity". The second option is well justified and has been defended thoroughly in the field of animal ethics. Still, it has been criticised recently for being too theory-dependent and even abstract. The third alternative seems tempting in its willingness to give room to practice instead of emphasising abstract moral notions. However, this willingness also comes with a price, for it seems unclear what the mere concentration on contexts and practice can tell us about duties and norms. The main problem is fitting together identification as a practical grounds for moral sentiment with the need for "codified" and even abstract moral principles. One way to do this, the paper suggests, is to use a three-level approach that seeks to take both sides into account.
88. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Kaija Rossi Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?
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In my paper, I will argue that in the liberal tradition of thinking, illiberal practices of minority groups cannot be supported without interventions that already liberalize illiberal cultures. For example, positive group rights have to be evaluated in ways that demand democratization. Moreover, nonintervention with conditions, such as the right of exit, will fail to be noninterventive if taken seriously because illiberal treatment of individuals diminishes their ability to actualize their rights of exit. In addition, nonintervention as a basis of cultural preservation is based on a view of culture that is misleading in portraying minority cultures as entities where changes in the group could be differentiated into internal and external. I will claim that intervention is not as intrusive as often perceived, and, moreover, can be crucial for the wellbeing of women.
89. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Ömer Naci Soykan Looking at the World from Istanbul as a Metaphor
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The problem of environment is the leading common problem of people living on Earth, the sky and soil of which have been polluted. I believe that pollution in a broad sense is the basis for all other important problems of this world. Man has polluted himself and Earth. In the former, which is called cultural pollution, man becomes alienated from other members of his own species and in the latter, which is called physical pollution, man becomes alienated from nature of which he is a child. Both problems, which are based on alienation, show the deficiency in the implementation of the idea of the unity of man and nature, of the unity of mankind. The unity of humanity presupposes the consciousness of living in a common world and of the fact that man is a child of Earth. The possibility of and the necessity for such a consciousness to come into being in a physical-geographical space, which is metaphorically represented by Istanbul, in which different cultures managed to exist side by side throughout history, shows itself more clearly in the present day. Istanbul might be seen as the city which is probably most suitable for being seen as a metaphor for a world in which the idea of the unity of humanity may be realized in the future, because it is an entrance to Asia with its eastern side and to Europe with its western side and as such the point of intersection of the eastern and western cultures. It was a cosmopolitan city and still is. Having a look at the world from Istanbul as a metaphor is in a sense the same as having a look at Istanbul itself.
90. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Donald V. Poochigain Human Nature and Human Rights
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Human rights are universally accepted duties to one another as persons which make possible all other human relations. In order to get along in the world beings are grouped and treated as equal, distinctions being made only when an individual is familiar. Treatment of beings according to their general characteristics constitutes natural or species rights of which human rights are an instance. Such rights are an abstraction, an average of the behavior of all group members, extreme deviation from which is disregarded as pathological. Encompassed in human rights are welfare considerations as well as freedoms, all together establishing a minimal condition of life which everyone owes every other.
91. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Andrew Hunter Indigenous Peoples' Intellectual Property
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The present paper examines conventional wisdom on the subject of the justification of indigenous peoples' intellectual property rights, and offers an alternative approach. The examination is achieved by a critique of two such conventional approaches in terms of the strength of each argument employed, and in terms of the efficacy of each in the roles allotted to them. The first such argument is Stenson and Gray's application of Kymlicka's individualist theory advocating national minority autonomy. The second argument is the labour entitlement theory of property acquisition, as advanced by Locke and Nozick. These theories only explain how a liberal social contract theorist would construct justifications from the outside. That this is inadequate is shown by reference to a case study involving indigenous claims against Australian law based on indigenous customary law. There, appeals are not made to abstract theory, but to tribal imperative. This observation finds sympathetic support in a reading of Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel finds spirit in all peoples at all times. To Hegel, non-state peoples are developmentally prior to states; this means that states have developed dialectically from such peoples and cannot therefore deny them without self-contradiction. This places an onus upon a state that has subsumed an indigenous people to accommodate its laws and ways.
92. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Mitsuo Okamoto Peace Culture in Hiroshima
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Fifty-seven years ago. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were annihilated by unprecedented state terrorism. But survivors of both cities never said "Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki!" No survivors harbored the feeling "once recovered from devastation of the holy land, Japan will not fail to revenge". Instead, they realized in the atomic inferno that violence begets violence and pledged: "Rest in peace. We will never repeat the mistakes. No more Hiroshima, No more Nagasaki".
93. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Michael Giudice Understanding Anti-Terrorism Legislation
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There is widespread agreement that the significant threat of terrorist activity and the importance we attach to safety and security demands that terrorists and terrorist activity be stifled as quickly and effectively as possible. However, much dominant thought about the very nature or approach taken to anti-terrorism legislation has gone without critical reflection. Drawing on a recent article by contemporary political philosopher Ronald Dworkin, in this paper I shall examine whether the metaphor of a balance, with safety or security pitted against individual rights or civil liberties, is an appropriate way to understand or approach anti-terrorism legislation. To simplify matters, I shall depart from close consideration of Canada's new anti-terrorism legislation (in particular the new power of preventive arrest which it creates), with the observation that it is reflective of many other countries' legislative response to terrorism.
94. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Mary-Rose Barral Freedom and Human Rights
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Human beings are endowed by the Source of their existence on earth with those inalienable rights which all members of humanity ought to respect. Freedom, in all its basic forms, is the root of these rights, but sadly, it is not the patrimony of all the people of the world. Political, societal, even domestic situations often deprive persons of this personal endowment. Basically, a philosophy of life, construed on a set of false premises, rejects some persons and/or peoples as unworthy of the freedom which is their right.
95. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Antonio Pérez-Estévez May Western Rights, by Extension, Become Human Rights?: A New Reading of John Rawls' The Law of Peoples
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The problem that underlies Rawls' The Law of Peoples is the problem of how something particular—western— may become universal and human. Rawls claims that he solves this problem by means of extending particular western rights to other non western peoples. The extension of western liberal rights is done by a second original position similar to the first one in A Theory of Justice. The paper tries to prove that the second original position, in its second step, is not similar to the first one and the parties taking part in this second original position are not symmetrically situated. Rawls' proposal falls into ethnocentrism and eurocentrism. The only way to transform particular rights into universal rights is by means of a universal multicultural dialogue where all peoples can make proposals and listen to other peoples' proposals.
96. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Erol Kuyurtar Are Cultural Group Rights against Individual Rights?
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This paper focuses on the nature of cultural group rights in relation to individual rights. The recent liberal acceptance that minority cultures should have a collective power over their cultural matters has been challenged by other liberals on the grounds that cultural rights as group rights cannot be reconciled with the basic moral and political principles of liberalism which are derived from individual liberties and rights. Through tackling some liberal arguments against group rights, we reject the view that regards group rights as normatively and practically incompatible with individual rights, and argue that group rights can be defended and justified on the ground that the interests and values protected through them are the shared interests and values of individuals. Thus, whether they are exercised individually or collectively, justifications of all group rights are derived from the interests and values that individuals have as members of the group. Like any other rights, cultural group rights also have some limitations. That is, the rights of a group to preserve its culture are limited by individual human rights, the rights of other relevant groups and the state.
97. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Sergey Shevtsov The Genealogy of the Feeling of Law in Orthodox Countries
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This paper investigates man's feeling of law, i . e. the perception of law, the comprehension of law and its influence on human activity, in the countries that have historically belonged to the Orthodox tradition. Consciousness of law is based, firstly, upon a concept of law, and, secondly upon a certain attitude to law, i.e. the place of this concept in everyday life and human activity. The paper treats those elements of the Orthodox outlook that constituted certain inherent mechanisms of culture, and thus greatly influenced the process of formation of the feeling of law in the countries of the Orthodox culture. These elements include interaction of the Orthodox Church and the State, then the problem of the meaning of life according to the Orthodox doctrine, and finally the way personality is perceived and treated in the Orthodox outlook. The paper also considers particular features of the Orthodox outlook as they were exposed in the course of the cultural history of Orthodox countries.
98. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Heather D. Macquarrie Ethics and the Role of Women in Transforming Violent Conflict: Why Hegel Matters
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In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security", calling for women's full and equal participation in all aspects of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. The world is at last recognizing that gender issues and peace are inextricably connected, and that women's involvement in peace efforts is essential for the prevention of renewed conflict. Given the need for women's involvement in peace and security issues, we must address the reasons why women's influence is limited, why they still do not have access to power or leadership roles, while their level of participation in the armed forces is minimal to non-existent. Meanwhile, wars rage. This paper argues that to think through the deeper connections between gender issues and peace is to engage in an unsettling, necessarily philosophical inquiry about the nature of modern ethical life— as a dysfunctional system of separate and competing ethical imperatives: family and state, public and private, individual and state, masculine and feminine. My inquiry is conducted from the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy. In the Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel draws upon the tragedian Sophocles for his insight that once upon a time in the ancient world, universal ethical substance divided itself into distinct ethical spheres of human and divine law. Human relationships to these ethical worlds were shaped by gender. The division of ethical substance precipitated conflicts that eventually caused the ancient world to collapse. For Hegel, the project of modernity is all about the recovery, in self-conscious form, of a harmonious ethical life, through reconciliation of conflicting ethical worlds. Hegel's philosophy of modern life has its shortfalls, but is a powerful resource for the argument that gender justice is a condition for long-lasting peace.
99. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Koray Tütüncü The Role of "Legality" in Kant's Moral Philosophy
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This study deals with the place and meaning of "legality" in Kant's moral philosophy. Although the return to Kantianism dominates contemporary political and legal thought, the boundaries of the analyses of the relationship between morality and legality in Kant's moral philosophy are confined to the boundaries drawn by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. While Rawls and Habermas consider law and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, they mostly consider this relationship in terms of the question of the legitimacy of law. By contrast, this study is an attempt to reconsider the Kantian link between morality and legality beyond the question of the legitimacy of law. Without the deontological filters of the Rawlsian and Habermasian political and legal theory, and therefore without leaving teleological and axiological concerns outside of the field of application, this study is an attempt to analyze the possible ways of understanding the conceptual connection between morality and legality in Kant's moral philosophy. Hence in this study, by paying particular attention to The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and The Metaphysics of Morals, I will analyze the role of legality in Kant's morality. The study first explains the goals of Groundwork and Metaphysics as Kant describes them. The study then turns to the discussion of duty as the central concept of Kant's thought. In the process, the study questions the possible ways of understanding the conceptual relationship between moral and legal obligation in Kant's thought, and mainly emphasizes two possible different conceptualizations of that relationship, (a) The first understanding can be constructed on the claim that the obligation of the moral subject is also to follow the fundamental principles of morality, the Categorical Imperative, in the legal order, which is part of the phenomenal world. The main point of this understanding lies in the idea that Kant's understanding of legal obligation presupposes the will's capacity to abstract from inclinations, (b) The second understanding, in contrast to the first one, can be built on the belief that moral and legal obligations should be conceived as completely distinct and non-intersecting in Kant's moral philosophy. From this perspective, neither moral obligation nor legal obligation can affect each other. The study concludes by focusing on moderate interventionism as a possible third option for linking moral and legal obligations in Kant's moral philosophy.
100. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Sharon Anderson-Gold Cosmopolitan Community and the Law of World Citizenship
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In this paper I argue that Kant's concept of cosmopolitan right is the philosophical basis for contemporary international human rights. The law of world citizenship or cosmopolitan right is necessary in order to secure hospitable interactions between individuals and states. Such interactions in turn create an international civil culture or "cosmopolitan condition" which 1 is the source of the further specification and eventual codification of human rights. Human rights, I conclude, are universal because of their international significance and scope and are inherently linked to cosmopolitan values.