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Displaying: 81-100 of 336 documents

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81. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
David E. Cooper The Law of Non-contradiction
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Several philosophers have argued, against the hypothesis of alternative logical mentalities, that it is not conceivable that there should be peoples who reject the law of non-contradictlon. In reply, I argue first that these philosophers are lending an unwarranted pre-eminence to this law (perhaps because of a mistake they make about entailment), and second that their case is made to look stronger than it is by confusing different senses in which a logical law might be 'rejected'. Finally, I consider some remarks of Wittgenstein which suggest that 'acceptance' of contradictions might not be unintelligible.
82. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
L. B. Cebik The Unspoken Influence of Concepts: Thoughts Toward an Understanding of the Consequences of Ideas on Perceptions and Consciousness
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It is argued that ideas and theories often evolve into preconceptions of our perceptions. Such evolution is implicit in Heidegger's notion of truths of alethia. The description of this process holds implications for the traditional givenness of humans for themselves in terms of the changabllity of absolute presuppositions. Among the implications are 1. the insufficiency of the historical mode for explaining changes in human self-perception; 2. the inadequacy of radical subjectivism and environmentalism; 3. a radical contingency and complexity to the course of human conceptualization; and 4. the awareness that human efforts can influence alterations in preconceptions. The influence of modern brain theory is subject to these conditions.
83. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Lawrence Crocker The Existence of Something
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It is sometimes thought that the existence of something rather than nothing is, in some respect, surprising or improbable and that it requires, for this reason, a special explanation, different in kind from ordinary or scientific explanations. In this paper, I argue that there is not any reasonable sort of probability under which the existence of something rather than nothing is improbable. I then show that, even if it were improbable, it would not be the sort of improbability which requires a special explanation.
84. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
M. Damnjanovic Rationalismus und Rationalität
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Aus der Einsicht, dass das was rational nicht fassbar ist, bei weitem nicht irrational sein muss, möchte ich den Weg zum Vorrationalen beschreiten, das sich weder mit dem Ueberrationalen, das das Rationale in seiner Rationalität übertrifft, noch mit dem Noch-nicht-Rationalen, das das Rationale noch nicht erreicht, deckt. Das grundsätzliche Ueber schreiten oder Unterschreiten des Rationalen verweist also auf vor rationale, dem aber eine neuartige Rationalität oder Logizität anscheinend paradoxal zukommt. Es geht darum, die "Rationalität des Vorrationalen" als vorreflexive Sinngebung aufzuzeigen.
85. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Jacques D'Hondt Raison scientifique et raison technique
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On croit parfois lever l'opposition entre science et technique en les réduisant l'une à l'autre. Dans d'autres cas, on souligne leur complémentarité ou leur solidarité. Ces tentatives n'aboutissent pas à une véritable unification. Celle-ci requiert en effet que soit surmontée la séparation absolue du sujet et de l'objet, d’où proviennent les autres ruptures. Mais l'identité du sujet-objet dans une raison que l'on pourrait appeler "praxique", implique une dialectique et un monisme dont la raison scientifique et la raison technique, habituellement, se méfient.
86. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
A. I. Davidov Some Characteristic Features of Philosophical Knowledge as a Type of Rational Knowledge
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When comparing different types of rationality the "ideal type" of rational knowledge in general should be taken as a standard» The specificity of philosophical type rationality consists in that the reality is examined from the point of view of subject-object relation including the whole mental-practical and specific-cognitive spheres; in the development of reflexion as a general philosophical method; in investigation of the conditions of possibility, concrete historical limits, rôle, functions and significance of knowledge as a kind of socio-cultural and historico-culturali activity.
87. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Richard T. De George Biology and Human Freedom
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Advances in biology, genetic research and operant behavior modification have thrown into question the status of human freedom of self-determination, i.e., the ability to conceive and understand rules and the ability to act in accordance with or in opposition to them. An argument based on biological and psychological research is sometimes claimed to show that all human behavior is determined by genetic make-up and environment and that freedom of self-determination is an illusion. An analysis of human action and of the scientific enterprise, however, shows such determinism to be inconsistent and hence untenable.
88. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
N. Depenchuk Biology Actualizes the New Aspects of the Philosophy of Science
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The modem biology challenges the philosophy of science, acturlizing in it the new aspects of the old problems. One of them is the problem of the correlation of the theoretical and empirical knowledge. Being solved earlier on the basis of the development of the exact sciences, it is considerably supplemented with the development of the modem biology. One of the significant aspects, proposed by biology, is the problem of the adequacy of the theoretical and the empirical under the conditions when the formulated in the exact sciences theory is transferred to the empirical material, which got the primary theoretical treatment within the limits of biology. The process of achiveing their adequacy proposes both the modification of the theory and the change of the empirical material: its selection, quantification, reinterpretation etc. The attempts of formulating the principles of such mutual modification of the theoretical and the empirical in biology are considered here.
89. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Bogdan Bjankov The Theory of Semantic Categories and the Problem of the Typology of Universals
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According to the basic idea of the theory of semantic categories the huge variety of expressions could be reduced to three basic classes, called basic semantic categories: names, statements, and functors. On this basis abstract objects or universale can be reduced also to three basic typest abstract objects-terms, abstract objects-statements, and abstract objects-operators. The so-called auxilliary signs, in particular brackets in formalized languages, fulfil a certain, structural function and, on this ground, can be numbered to the type of abstract objects-operators with a specific semantic index.
90. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
J. M. Delgado-Ocando Sur le fondement scientifique des normes juridiques
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Entre le-niveau normatif (Sollen) et le niveau ontologique (Sein) existent des rapports dialectiques, qui constituent un systems social ouvert» La science du droit explique et comprend le niveau normatif avec la coopération des autres disciplines (sciences de la nature et de l'homme), dont l'objet de connaissance c'est le niveau ontologique. Une modalité importante de la philosophie du droit présente (théorie de la nature des choses) cherche à concevoir l'essence du droit comme l'expression normative du niveau des rapports sociaux.
91. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Jude P. Dougherty The Determination of Moral Norms
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This paper attempts a reexamination of classical natural law theory and argues that such theory is properly understood as a meta-ethic rather than as a body of norms. As a meta-ethic, it speaks to topics such as ethical reasoning, the movement from descriptive to normative assertions, the use of science in ethics, the extra-legal grounds for judicial decision, judicial activism and the societal basis of law.
92. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
D.I. Dubrovsky Informational Approach to the 'Mind-Brain' Problem
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The proposed approaoh qualifies the relationship between the mantal phenomenon (subjectire reality) and the respective brainprocess as a relationship between information and its material bearer. The operating function of mental phenomena is explained on the basis of the principle of invariability of information in respect of the physloal properties of its bearer. This makes it possible to give a theoretleally non-contradictory description and explanation of the peculiarities of the connection of mental phenomena with brain processes.
93. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Tsung-I Dow Acupuncture: Challenge of Philosophy to Science
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Acupuncture exists because it works. Why it works? We are unable to explain it within the confines of our present scientific terms except the traditional Chinese theory which is philosophical rather than scientific in nature. The recent discovery of acupuncture analgesia does not necessarily invalidate our present knowledge in neurology, physiology, and psychology. It does call for a vigorous re-examination the premises and methods underlying both the traditional Chinese and present Western theories of medicine. For Instance, the reversal of the congenital nerve deafness, full consciousness of patients in surgery under acupuncture demand for a new theory in biology, etc.
94. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Nilim Dutta The Challenge of Contemporary Ethics
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The recognition of ethics as a social science demands the rejection of all theological and metaphysical dogmatic norms, associated with the traditional ethics. Modern humanistic ethics pre-supposes man's conviction to and active engagement in the progress of human society. It propounds ethical relativity, which justifies a person's right to prefer his norms of behaviour according to the specific conditions of his social life. It, however, does not imply a complete repudiation of morals. Free ethics is unacceptable, as moral valuation is impossible without a scientific approach.
95. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Carolyn Elsele The Modern Relevance of the Mathematical Philosophy of Ch. S. Peirce
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Irrefutable evidence is now readily available to sustain the thesis that Peirce's philosophical stance is grounded in 19th century mathematical foundations. He once remarked: "To attempt to make myself understood by anybody but a mathematician would be futile." (New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce: 3, 914). His studies of individual characteristics and universal relations reflect his pragmatic attempts to mould his methodology in the cast of that of mathematics.
96. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Seweryn Dziamski Vom objektiven Charakter des Wertes
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In der Tradition des axiologisohen Gedankengutes herrscht die Überzeugung, daß der Objektivismus des Wertes sowohl vom Materialismus als auch vom objektiven Idealismus verkündet wird. Das negative Verhältnis zum axiologisohen Objektivismus wurde seitens der positivistischen Philosophie vertreten. Die marxistische Haltung zeichnet sich durch eine, objektive Erfassung des Wertzustandes aus. Bamt ditser Ansicht wird zum Wert solch ein objektiver Sachverhalt der gesellschaftlichen Prasis, der über seinen in den Vordergrund gerückten Zustand entscheidet. Indem die Werte in der Praxis als Klasse von Erscheinungen "an sich" bleiben, können sie mit der essentiellen Sphäre dieser Praxis identifiziert werden. Im Moment des Vordringens in das Bewußtsein, sobald sie im Bewußte ein der gesellschaftlichen Praxis existieren, werden sie zur Klasse von Erscheinungen "für sich"; und nur in diesem Sinne haben sie einen subjektiven Status.
97. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Kathleen Emmett Mental Activity in Dreams
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Many philosophers have argued that dreams cannot be conscious states since they occur during sleep. Some wish to identify dreams with only what we remember of them and, discounting the reliability of memory, also discount dreams. I will argue that access to dreaming is not limited to our waking memories of them. Dreaming is similar to other marginal or altered states of consciousness, and as such can be held to involve consciousness even when we do not remember dreams.
98. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Jane English Ethics and Science
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An emerging view of science rejects an infallible observational given and takes consensus as the starting point for confirmation. Theory and Observation are seen as mutually correcting. I argue that the same is true of ethics, such as Rawls' "reflective equilibrium." Though epistemologically similar, their truth conditions may differ. Ethics may be reducible to physics; but even if it is not, that does not imply that it has no truth conditions. The options for truth in ethics are the same as those of other abstract fields such as mathematics.
99. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Hans-Michael Elzer Nichtkongruenz von Rationalität und Sozialität - ein anthropologisches Grunddatum
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Rationalität und Somialität sind keine deckungagleichen Effektoren in System "Mensch". Fortschritt in Naturwissenschaft und Technik, kaum Fortschritt und Harmonisierung im Sosialverhalten und im politischen Machtbereich. Das "Animal rationale et sociale" lebt aus diesem Widerspruch, - analog dem Dualismus von "Leib und Seele"« Auch die Artgeschichte hat diesen Gegensatz nicht überwunden. Die Philosophie hat sur theoretischen Aufklärung und praktischen Überwindung unterschiedliche Denkend Handlungsmodelle entworfen, die aber immer nur die Inkongruenz als Grunddatum konstatieren müssen.
100. Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie: Volume > 2
Frank Fiedler Philosophie-Wissenschaft-Rationalität
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Wissenschaft und marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie sind Formen der Aneignung der natürlichen; und gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit zum Zwecke ihrer bewußten Beherrschung, Beide stehen untereinander in Wechselwirkung. Rationalität ist eine Eigenschaft menschlicher Tätigkeit, des Erkennens und Handelns, und immer auf Gesetzmäßigkeit bezogen. In diesem Sinne ist Rationalität nicht nur ein Merkmal der Einzelwissenschaften, sondern auch der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie, die die Rationalität der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis und das rationale Handeln, einschließlich der Wissenschaftliehen Tätigkeit gelber, miteinander vermittelt.