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81. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Boersema Introduction: Pragmatism and Neopragmatism
82. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Heidi Salaverria Who is Exaggerating? The Mystery of Common Sense
83. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Hendrik R. Pieterse Neopragmatism and the Christian Desire for a Transcendent God: Is a Meaningful Dialogue Possible?
84. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Charbel Niño El-Hani, Sami Pihlström Emergence Theories and Pragmatic Realism
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The tradition of pragmatism has, especially since Dewey, been characterized by a commitment to nonreductive naturalism. The notion of emergence, popular in the early decades of the twentieth century and currently re-emerging as a central concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, may be useful in explicating that commitment. The present paper discusses the issue of the reality of emergent properties, drawing particular attention to a pragmatic way of approaching this issue. The reality of emergents can be defended as a pragmatically-useful ontological commitment; hence, pragmatism can be employed as a tool in the debate over the structure and reality of emergence. This strategy of justifying ontological commitments is examined through historical and systematic discussions of the pragmatist tradition. It turns out, among other things, that while classical pragmatists did not specify any technical notion of emergence in the contemporary sense, their non-reductively naturalist views are relevant to the more recent emergence discussions -- especially because they rejected the metaphysical realism typical of today’s ontologically-oriented emergence theories.
85. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Gregory M. Fahey The Idea of the Good in John Dewey and Aristotle
86. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Kevin Decker Habermas on Human Rights and Cloning: A Pragmatist Response
87. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Mark McEvoy Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity and the Argument Against the A Priori
88. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Brian E. Butler Legal Pragmatism: Banal or Beneficial as a Jurisprudential Position?
89. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
D. S. Clark Pragmatism’s Instrumental View of Moral Reasoning
90. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Nancy Williams Introduction
91. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Jaime Bihlmeyer Jane Campion’s The Piano: The Female Gaze, the Speculum and the Chora within the H(y)st(e)rical Film
92. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Katherine Cooklin Lustmord in Weimar Germany: The Abject Boundaries of Feminine Bodies and Representations of Sexualized Murder
93. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lenore Wright The Wonder of Barbie: Popular Culture and the Making of Female Identity
94. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Dennis R. Cooley Medical Research Ethics: Introduction
95. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
David Rudge Do Unknown Risks Preclude Informed Consent?
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Allen Buchanan and Daniel Brock, in a widely influential account, Deciding for Others (1990), advocate a sliding scale approach to the determination of whether a patient is competent to make a decision regarding his/her health care. An analysis of two critiques of their position (Beauchamp and Childress (1994), Wicclair (1991 a,b)) reveals a tacit presumption by all of these authors that the greater cognitive challenge often posed by high risk therapies constitutes grounds for an elevated standard of competence. This presumption cannot be consistently maintained in cases where the patient's decision involves experimental therapies. It implies either that informed consent can never take place in such situations, or, perhaps even more counter-intuitively, that a lower standard of competency should be used than when the patient is asked to choose only among standard therapies.
96. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Richard B. Miller How the Belmont Report Fails
97. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Eric M. Rovie Editor’s Introduction
98. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
John M. Parrish Defining Dilemmas Down: The Case of 24
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One of the most important concepts in the field of political ethics is the idea of a moral dilemma – understood as a situation in which an agent’s public responsibilities and moral imperatives conflict in such a way that no matter what the agent does she will in some way be committing a moral wrong. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the notion of a moral dilemma has undergone a profound reconceptualization in American political discourse, and there has perhaps been no more important cultural forum for that conceptual revision than the quintessential post-9/11 melodrama, FOX Television’s 24. This paper first describes and then critically evaluates America’s new model moral dilemma as portrayed on 24. Focusing specifically on 24’s Season Five (the year the show won the Emmy for Best Dramatic Series), the paper shows how 24’s creators have substituted in the public mind almost a parody of the standard philosophical account of a moral dilemma in place of the traditional notion. Their methods for this conceptual revision have included both an extravagant, even baroque portrayal of the grand dilemmas which confront Jack Bauer and his fellow patriots, on the one hand, and on the other, a subtle de-valuing of the moral stakes in the more pedestrian variety of moral conflicts Bauer and company must overcome in their quest to keep America safe whatever the cost.
99. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Gabriela Remow A Sentimentalist Approach to Dirty Hands – Hume, Smith, Burke
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This paper explores what the three best-known thinkers in the sentimentalist tradition - David Hume (1711-76), Adam Smith (1723-90), and Edmund Burke (1729-97) – have to say about the topic of “dirty hands” (the view that some forms of power, used properly, lead to guilt and bad actions). Although the views of these philosophers have often been declared inconsistent, my project is to defend and resurrect key elements of their position, which may have value for this debate. I contend that a coherent and unified view about dirty hands may be extracted from their work. By discussing this view, I aim to elucidate a philosophical tradition that may not be familiar to many readers today.On their sentimentalist approach, all jobs or social roles inevitably lead to characteristic varieties of wrongdoing (i.e. dirty hands), due to corruption, increased temptation and opportunity. Such inevitability does not excuse the wrongdoing, but it might diminish the appropriate level of moral blame for those at the bottom, while enhancing blame for persons at the top.
100. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Kevin DeLapp Les Mains Sales Versus Le Sale Monde: A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands
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The phenomenon of “dirty hands” is typically framed as an issue for normative or applied ethical consideration—for example, in debates between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism, or in discussions of the morality of torture or political expediency. By contrast, this paper explores the metaethical dimensions of dirty-hands situations. First, empirically-informed arguments based on scenarios of moral dilemmas involving metaethical aspects of dirty hands are marshaled against the view that “ought implies can.” Second, a version of moral realism is conjoined with a version of value-pluralism that charitably accommodates and explains the central features of the phenomenology related to dirty hands. It is not simply that agents are or are not justified in getting their hands dirty (les mains sales); rather, in certain situations, it is the nature of the moral domain itself to be intractably messy (le sale monde), such that dirty hands are unavoidable. The paper concludes by considering some important normative and psychological implications of this view.