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81. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Daniel Howard-Snyder Theism, the Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure
82. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
John Zeis Truth-Warranted Manifestation Beliefs
83. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Derk Pereboom Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza
84. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Terence D. Cuneo Combating the Noetic Effects of Sin: Pascal's Strategy for Natural Theology
85. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Robert Merrihew Adams Liebniz's Examination of the Christian Religion
86. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Index: Volume 11, 1994
87. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nicholas Wolterstorff John Locke's Epistemological Piety: Reason is the Candle of the Lord
88. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
John Carriero On the Theological Roots of Spinoza's Argument for Monism
89. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Robert Sleigh Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge
90. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Andrew V. Jeffrey Gale in Reference and Religious Experience
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Richard Gale, in On the Nature and Existence of God, offers several reasons why an “historical-cum-indexical” theory of reference cannot be appropriate in explaining how people refer to God. The present paper identifies five distinct lines of argument in Gale, attempts to clarify several important desiderata for a successful theory of reference, and argues that Gale fails to discharge the burden of proof he has assumed, leaving the most important features of Alston’s “direct reference” theory untouched. Nevertheless, it is conceded that some consequences of Alston’s theory are quite counter-intuitive. The paper therefore concludes with a consideration of two alternatives: either taking a hard, Alstonian line in conflict with people’s linguistic intuitions, or striking a compromise with descriptivism along lines similar to those found in Gareth Evans’s paper, “The Causal Theory of Names.”
91. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Richard Swinburne Dualism Intact
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I have argued in many places that a carefully articulated version of Descartes’ argument to show that he is essentially an immaterial soul is sound. It is conceivable that I who am currently conscious continue to exist without my body, and that can only be if there is currently a non-bodily part of me which alone is essential for me. Recent counter-arguments of Alston and Smythe, Moser and van der Nat, Zimmerman, and Shoemaker are rejected.
92. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Graham Oppy Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology
93. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Andrew P. Porter Science, Religious Language, and Analogy
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Ian Barbour sees four ways to relate science and religion: (1) conflict, (2) disjunction or independence, (3) dialogue, and (4) synthesis or integration. David Burrell posits three ways to construe religious language, as (a) univocal, (b) equivocal, or (c) analogous. The paper contends that Barbour’s (1) and (4) presuppose Burrell’s (a), Barbour's (2) presupposes Burrell’s (b), and Barbour’s (3) presupposes Burrell’s (c), and it explores some of the implications for each alternative.
94. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Paul J. Weithman Catholicism and Liberalism
95. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Stephen Griffith Miracles and the Shroud of Turin
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Using the scientific investigation of the Shroud of Turin as an extended example, it is argued that miracles are best understood not as violations of natural law, but as scientifically inexplicable events. It is then argued that even though we can imagine circumstances in which science itself might provide us with good grounds for believing that an event is scientifically inexplicable, these grounds would at best provide us with circumstantial evidence that the event was miraculous, and would in any case be inconclusive.
96. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Robert C. Coburn God, Revelation and Religious Truth: Some Themes and Problems in the Theology of Paul Tillich
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This paper begins with an explanation of why, despite their obscurity, Tillich’s writings have been attractive to a wide audience. I then describe some of the main features of his mature theological position and discuss a number of the central questions and difficulties to which this position gives rise. The discussion focuses on such questions as whether Tillich can justify holding his own “interpretations” of traditional Christian ideas to have a privileged status, whether the deliteralization of traditional Christian language is compatible with the idea that Christianity is a historical religion, how we are to understand Tillich’s notion of a symbolic or mythological account’s being adequate to revelatory experience, what it is for a “practical interpretation” of revelatory experience to be an adequate expression of such experience, and what is the best way of handling the problems raised by TiIlich’s claim that there are no literally true statements---or only one literally true statement---about God.
97. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Ronald E. Hustwit Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?
98. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Gary Mar The Modal Unity of Anselm’s Proslogion
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Anselm claimed that his Proslogion was a “single argument” sufficient to prove “that God truly exists,” that God is “the supreme good requiring nothing else,” as well as to prove “whatever we believe regarding the divine Being.” In this paper we show how Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion and in his Reply to Gaunilo can be reconstructed as a single argument. A logically elegant result is that the various stages of Anselm’s argument are validated by standard axioms from contemporary modal logic.
99. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Phillip Cary Believing the Word: A Proposal About Knowing Other Persons
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Our concept of knowing of other persons ought to include respect for them. Since respect implies considering whether what they say is true, I propose that believing others’ words is a necessary condition of knowing them. I explore the contribution such belief makes to knowledge of other persons, as well as some surprising but welcome implications, including theological consequences.
100. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
John Lamont Believing That God Exists Because the Bible Says So
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The paper considers Renee Descartes’ assertion that believing that God exists because the Bible says so, and believing that what the Bible says is true because God says it, involves circular reasoning. It argues that there is no circularity involved in holding these beliefs, and maintains that the appearance of circularity results from an equivocation. It considers a line of argument that would defend the rationality of holding these beliefs, but does not try to prove its soundness.