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81. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 6
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: Reductio Arguments
82. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 6
Kenneth Holmqvist, Jaroslaw Pluciennik The Hebraic and the Indian Sublime from the Rhetoric Point of View
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In Hegel's 'Aesthetics', one can find a strong distinction between the Hebraic, true sublimity and the Indian, positive sublime. The main thesis of our article is that, from the rhetorical and cognitive point of view, the two sublimities do not form an opposition, although from the theological point of view they do. In order to affirm the thesis, we briefly analyze the main figures of the sublime as presented in Pseudo-Longinos' 'On the Sublime' and the concept of the sublime in Kant. According to our theory of the sublime, the Lyotardian formula of the sublime as 'presenting the unpresentable' should be expressed as 'representing the unimaginable'. When we examine the main examples of the Hebraic and the Indian sublime, we can easily see that in both literary cultures we can find a strong mimetic element as well as antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable. We identify the mimetic element in the sublime texts not only with space seen in accord with Kant but also with 'mimesis of emotion' which is regarded as the main form of mimesis in the ancient Greek tradition, for instance in Plato.
83. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 6
Jonathan C. Kramer The Subjective Experience of Time in Dhrupad, a Genre of North Indian Classical Music
84. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 6
Majid Amini Religious Discourse and Identity
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There is a widespread assumption that ethnic origins substantially contribute, if not constitute, the identity of individuals. In particular, among the ethnic elements, il is claimed that religion takes precedence and people could be individuated in terms of their religious affiliations. The purpose of this paper, however, is to show that strictly speaking identity cannot be constituted by religion. More precisely, it is argued that a phenomenological characterisation of individual identity fails to do justice to the philosophical requirements of identity. The argument is obviously philosophical by nature and is developed through an analysis of the concept of revelation. The phenomenon of revelation plays a pivotal role in the Judaic-Christian-Islamic tradition, yet by its very nature owes its authenticity to something prior to itself, namely, reason. This entails the priority of reason over revelation and as such undermines claims that purport to define identity in terms of revelation/religion. This detachment of identity from religion would clearly have far-reaching socio-political imphcations for issues such as diversity, pluralism and globahsation.
85. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 8
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: Auxiliaries
86. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 8
Michael Stoltzfus Our Fruitful Earth Buddhist Values for Moderation in Procreation
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Buddhist values emerge from a vision of interdependence, nonattachment, and moderation in all pursuits. This article is a reflection on these traditional Buddhist teachings within the context of the current crisis of overpopulation and environmental degradation. I highlight the implied link (present in many religious traditions), between spiritual piety and the production of progeny, and the Buddhist rejection of this link is investigated. More importantly, the Buddhist values that encourage moderation and responsibility regarding procreation are highlighted. Buddhism does not suggest that people should 'go forth and multiply,' just as it does not view humans a special creation by 'God' and therefore given 'dominion' over the natural world.
87. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 8
Ornan Rotem Some Observations on the Non-Ethical Dimensions of Karuṇā Arising from a Consideration of the Buddha's Decision to Teach
88. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 8
Murat Bac Truth-Making in A Cultural Context
89. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 8
Ron Geaves From Founder to Institution: Metaphors of Experience and the Sant Tradition
90. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 8
Guy Axtell Religious Pluralism and its Discontents
91. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 9
Michael C. Lazich The 'Term Question' Revisited Missionary Constructions of A Confucian Theology
92. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 9
Sukharanjan Saha Unestablished Probans in Nyaya
93. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 9
Leon Schlamm Ken Wilber's Spectrum Model: Identifying Alternative Soteriological Perspectives
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In this paper I identify two problematic strands of Wilber's transpersonal theory. Firstly, I question Wilber's claim that his spectrum model is supported by the materials of all the world's major mystical traditions, arguing that his integral, hierarchical perspective privileges some traditions, while distorting others. Drawing heavily upon Andrew Rawlins on's recent, taxonomic study of mystical traditions, which identifies four authentic routes to spiritual emancipation (Cool Structured, Cool Unstructured, Hot Structured and Hot Unstructured), I argue that while Wilber's model, itself Cool (the source of spiritual liberation hes within oneself) and Structured (developmental, hierarchical), provides a valuable cartography of transpersonal structures and states of consciousness, h cannot adequately handle the materials of the alternative, soteriological paths of Hot traditions (emphasising the numinous, and as other than oneself) and Unstructured traditions (affirming that there can be no gradual, or progressive, spiritual development at ah). Secondly, and more cursorily, in the light of this discussion, I argue that it is Wilber's Cool Structured perspective that informs his judgement that Jung is an elevationist. I demonstrate that Jung's psychic model of the conjunction of opposhes is a Hot Structured one, which provides an alternative, soteriological path for people whose spiritual needs are very different from those addressed by Wilber.
94. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 9
Donald Moores The Darkness of Enlightenment, the Effulgence of Agnosia: 'Cosmic' Epistemology in Wordsworth and Whitman
95. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 9
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: Usage about Non-entities
96. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 9
Thomas Forsthoefel Epistemologies of Religious Experience in Classical and Modern Advaita
97. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth
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This article explains precisely in what sense the Nyaya philosophers promote a correspondence theory regarding the nature of truth. It also explains how truth may be inferred from successful effort and argues that successful effort can be produced only by true awareness. While successful effort is the major test of truth, other tests of truth in the Nyaya view should be recognized as and when appropriate. Thus, that if the pervaded belongs to something, the pervader too belongs to that thing may be known to be true by the mind alone without reference to the inferential test of truth. Truth is in most cases extrinsic in the sense that truth of an awareness is determined with reference to another awareness. This does not lead to a vicious infinite regress; in some cases, as in the pervaded-pevader case or in the case there is cognition where there can be no cognition that there is cognition unless there is cognition, truth is intrinsic and may be determined without reference to another awareness.
98. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Negative Entities
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It is argued that efforts by Plato, Bradley, Cook Wilson, Bergson, Russell, Prabhakara, etc. to reduce negation to affirmation or negative predicates to positive predicates fail: the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of negative entities deserves serious consideration. Important evidence for negative entities comes from perception such as that there is no book on the table: this testifies to the existence of absence of the book (the negatum or what is negated) on the table (the locus of negation) as an indispensable negative entity. Such perception is not set aside by compelling counterevidence, is reliable and justifies admitting negative entities on grounds of simplicity. A negative entity presupposes awareness of the negatum and differs as the negata differ but may be the same in different loci, e.g. the same absence of the book may be on the table and the floor. Negative entities are of four kinds: prior absence (absence of a thing before origin), posterior absence (absence of a thing after cessation), absolute absence (of something in something such as absence of color in air that is forever) and difference of one thing from another thing.
99. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Svabhavahetu in Dharmakirti's Logic
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The concept of svabhavahetu is a major contribution of Dharmakirti to Buddhist logic. In such a case the invariable relation of pervasion between the probans and the probandum is based on identity or non-difference. This implies, according to our interpretation, that some general statements are true by virtue of meaning but are not devoid of content. This disagrees with the view of many recent philosophers who hold that statements true by virtue of meaning are devoid of content. We explain that svabhava general statements are true by virtue of meaning in the sense that the grounds for calling something by the name of the probandum are the same as some or all of those for calling something by the name of the probans. We explain how such general statements differ from general statements based on causation as also the threefold classification of svabhava general statements.
100. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Universals
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In the Nyaya-Vaisesika view universals are eternal and objectively real often perceptible common characters that are independent of the particulars and inseparably inherent in the latter in the sense that the latter as long as they exist remain related to the universal. Such common characters should not be confused with Platonic Ideas that are perfect exemplars graspable only by reason. It is argued that without objective common characters it is hard to account for the distinction between natural classes such as man, horse, etc. that are independent of human convention and conventional classes such as lawyers, cooks, etc. Universals are also needed to provide objective basis for causal connections whereby only things of a certain kind produce other things of a specific kind. There are universals for generic terms such as man or horse, for qualities such as color or smell, for relations such as spatial proximity, for motion such as contraction, etc. But no universal is admissible if any restrictive condition such as not leading to a vici11ous infinite regress is violated.