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Displaying: 81-100 of 216 documents

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81. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Kordula Świętorzecka Sformalizowana ontologia orientacji klasycznej [Formalized Ontology inspired by Classical Philosophy]
82. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Miłowit Kuniński Jerzy Wacław Perzanowski (1943-2009)
83. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Ruth Weintraub The Doomsday Argument Revisited (a Stop in the Shooting-Room Included)
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Leslie’s doomsday argument purports to show that the likelihood of the human race perishing soon is greater than we think. The probability we attach to it, based on our estimate of the chance of various calamities which might bring extinction about (a nuclear holocaust, an ecological disaster, etc.), should be adjusted as follows. If the human race were to survive for a long time, we, livingnow, would be atypical. So our living now increases the probability that the human race will end shortly. In this paper, I criticize some attempts to rebut the argument, and present my own. To facilitate the analysis, I consider a structurally similar problem, the “ShootingRoom.”
84. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Time Change and Imaginary Numbers. From Hamilton to Einstein in Search for Understanding of the Imaginary Numbers
85. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Krzysztof Brzechczyn Leszek Nowak (1943-2009)
86. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Christopher Norris Badiou on Set Theory, Ontology and Truth: mathematics as a guide to metaphysics (Part Two)
87. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Michael Potts Against Bioethics
88. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Matthew Mosdell The Philosophy of Philosophy
89. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Adam R. Thompson The Four Category Ontology
90. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Magdalena Środa Barbara Skarga (1919-2009)
91. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Attila Tanyi Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit
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The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections if they can vindicate the reduction proposed. This, however, leads to further conditions whose fulfillment is necessary for the success of the vindication. I deal with one such condition, which I borrow from Peter Railton and Mark Schroeder:the demand that naturalist reductions must be tolerably revisionist. In the remainder of the paper I argue that the most influential versions of the Model are intolerably revisionist. The first problem concerns the picture of reasons that many recent formulations of the Model advocate. By using an objection from Michael Bedke, I show that on this interpretation obvious reasons won’t be accounted for by the Model. The second problem concerns the idealization that is also often part of the Model. Invoking an argument of Connie Rosati’s, I show that the best form of idealization, the ideal advisor account, is inadequate. Hence, though not the knock down arguments they were intended to be, OQA and TO do pose a serious threat to the Model.
92. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
José Ruiz Fernández Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s phenomenological relevance
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After interpreting some of the passages in which Wittgenstein refers to phenomenology, this paper tries to clarify why Wittgenstein came to conclude that his work had to be ultimately understood in terms of phenomenology. Secondly, the paper discusses the phenomenological relevance of some of Wittgenstein’s views on language.
93. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Alex Orenstein Ontological Arguments
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There are good reasons for being dissatisfied with standard criticisms of the various arguments, all of which are referred to as being “The Ontological Argument”. While refutation by logical analogy is compelling, it merely teaches us that something is amiss. It does not specify the exact nature of the flaw. The first part of this paper examines and rejects several well-known attempts at refuting and clarifying the argument(s). The second part attempts to provide a principled uniform account of what is wrong by treating the arguments as resting on definitions. Then, by bringing to bear Ajdukiewicz’s exhaustive classification of definitions, we arrive at a unified account of the flaw common to such arguments. In effect we have an explication of the dictum that one cannot define into existence.
94. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Błażej Skrzypulec Rodzaje naturalne. Rozważania z filozofii języka [Natural Kinds from the Point of View of the Philosophy of Language]
95. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Marek Przychodzeń Traktat o wolności [Treatise on Freedom]
96. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jan A. Kłoczowski Leszek Kołakowski (1927-2009)
97. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Marie Duží St. Anselm’s Ontological Arguments
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In the paper I analyse Anselm’s ontological arguments in favour of God’s existence. The analysis is an explication and formalization of Pavel Tichý’s study‘Existence and God’, Journal of Philosophy, 1979. It is based on Transparent Intensional Logic with its bi-dimensional ontology of entities organized in the ramified hierarchy of types. The analysis goes as follows. First, necessary notions and principles are introduced. They are: (a) existence is not a (non-trivial) property of individuals, but of individual offices to be occupied by an individual; (b) the notion of requisite is defined, which is a necessary relation between an office O and a property R: necessarily, if a happens to occupy O then a has the property R. (c) I demonstrate that an argument of the form “R is a requisite of O, hence the holder of O has the property R” is invalid. In order to be valid, it must be of the form “R is a requisite of O, the office O is occupied, hence the holder of O has the property R.” Finally, (d) higher-order offices that can be occupied by individual offices are defined. Their requisites are properties of individual offices. Then the analysis of Anselm’s arguments is presented. The expression ‘God’ denotes an individual office, a ‘thing to be’, rather than a particular individual. Thus the question whether God exists is a legitimate one. I analyze the expression ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’. Since ‘greater than’ is a relation-in-intension between individual offices here, the expression denotes a second-order office, and its requisites are properties of first-order offices suchas necessary existence. The second of Anselm’s assumptions is that individual office that has the property of necessary existence is greater than any other office lacking this property. From these it follows that the first-order holder of the office denoted by ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (that is God) enjoys the property of necessary existence. Thus God exists necessarily, hence also actually. Anselm’s argument is logically valid. If it were also sound, then an atheist would differ from a believer only by the former not believing whereas the latter believing in a tautology, which is absurd. Yet we may doubt the validity of Anselm’s assumption that a necessary existence makes an office greater than any other office lacking this property.
98. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Renata Ziemińska Was Pyrrho the Founder of Skepticism?
99. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stephen Palmquist The Kantian Grounding of Einstein’s Worldview: (II) Simultaneity, Synthetic Apriority and the Mystical
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Part I in this two-part series employed a perspectival interpretation to argue that Kant’s epistemology serves as the philosophical grounding for modern revolutions in science. Although Einstein read Kant at an early age and immersed himself in Kant’s philosophy throughout his early adulthood, he was reluctant to admit Kant’s influence, possibly due to personal factors relating to his cultural-political situation. This sequel argues that Einstein’s early Kant-studies would have brought to his attention the problem of simultaneity and the method of solving it that eventually led to the theory of relativity. Despite Einstein’s reluctance to acknowledge his Kantian grounding, a perspectival understanding of Kant’s philosophy of science shows it is profoundly consistent with Einstein’s views on both synthetic apriority and the nature of scientific theory. Moreover, Kant and Einstein share quasi-mystical religious tendencies, relying on an unknowable absolute as the ultimate boundary of our scientific understanding of nature.
100. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stamatios Gerogiorgakis Omniscience in Łukasiewicz’s, Kleene’s and Blau’s Three-Valued Logics
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In this paper several assumptions concerning omniscience and future contingents on the one side, and omniscience and self-reference on the other, areexamined with respect to a classical and a three-valued semantic setting (the latter pertains especially to Łukasiewicz’s, Kleene’s and Blau’s three-valued logics).Interesting features of both settings are highlighted and their basic assumptions concerning omniscience are explored. To generate a context in which the notion of omniscience does not deviate from some basic intuitions, two special futurity operators are introduced in this article: one for what will definitely take place and another one for what is indeterminate as to whether it will take place. Once these operators are introduced, some puzzles about omniscience in combination with future contingents are removed. An analogous solution to some puzzles concerning omniscience and selfreferentiality is also provided.