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81. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Кривых Елена Моральные ценности в контексте эволюционной этики.
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The author considers positions of evolutionary ethics from the point of interaction with defining ideas of " big science ", and also on a material of concrete ethical concepts. As a program principle the statement about a substantiation of moral principles as congenital biological structures is accepted. Based on concrete positions of works of D. Dennet and I. Merkulov, the author addresses to concept of rationality which "works" as one of the reasons both in evolutionary process and in development of culture. Appearance of special human models of behaviour during evolution can be presented as selection of some conditions focused on efficiency which in the world of culture gets valuable senses of mutual aid, cooperation, altruism.
82. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Donald C. Hubin The Limits of Consequentialism
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Modern consequentialism is a very broad theory. Consequentialists can invoke a distribution sensitive theory of value to address the issues of distributive justice that bedeviled utilitarianism. They can attach intrinsic moral value to such acts truth-telling and promise-keeping and, so, acknowledge the essential moral significance of such acts in a way that classical utilitarianism could not. It can appear that there are no limits to consequentialism’s ability to respond to the criticisms against utilitarian theories by embracing a sophisticated theory of value. But there are limits. They are imposed by consequentialism’s commitment to ground considerations of rightness solely on considerations of goodness. Some consequentialists have attempted to incorporate elements of guilt and desert into the theory of value. This can be done, consistent with consequentialist scruples, only if these notions can be analyzed without appeal to deontic concepts such as right and wrong. I analyze the problem consequentialists face and suggest a way incorporate notions of guilt and desert in a theory of value without relying in any fundamental way on concepts of right and wrong action.
83. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Sunny Yang Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts: A Critical Notice of Gibbard’s Non-Reductive Noncognitivism.
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My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify moral considerations with anger in particular, it overly emphasizes one seemingly arbitrary emotion. In other words, I doubt whether ‘other’s anger’ can be the general concept corresponding to thick concepts such as courage or generosity. My doubt about the objectivity of Gibbard’s moral emotion depends on Bernard Williams’doubt about ethical objectivity in terms of a critical notice of the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts. Finally, I shall pose a challenge to the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts on the ground that it is not in fact a clear one. I shall argue that it is impossible clearly to classify various ethical concepts either as thick or thin. This is because, I shall argue, as Scheffler points out, “any division of ethical concepts into the two categories of the thick and the thin is itself a considerable oversimplication.” Indeed, I shall argue, our ethical vocabulary is tragically rich with an irreconcilable plurality of values. If my analysis is right, I argue Gibbard’s attempt to appeal to thick concepts to explain the rationality of moral emotion is open to question.
84. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Heiner F. Klemme Hume’s Law reconsidered
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In this talk, Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the Treatise of Human Nature will be discussed. It will be argued that Hume accuses previous moral philosophers neither of committing a logical error in their reasoning, nor of falling short of a possible deduction of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ because of false assumptions. Rather, Hume argues that these philosophers have an incorrect notion of reason: By means of reason, we do not discover eternal moral truths, and also, reason does not motivate us. According to Hume, reason reveals only causal relations that exist between external facts and our emotions, which are facts as well. The ‘ought’ is located just in our emotions and not in the things which evoke the moral emotions inside us.
85. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kyungsuk Choi “Bioethics” as a New Challenge to Philosophy
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The advance of medical and biological science and technology has presented us with new ethical and legal issues. Is embryonic stem cell research morally justified and legally allowed? What moral status do embryos have? Who can be a morally appropriate user of In Vitro fertilization? Who can use donated sperm and/or egg? What is the scope of reproductive liberty?” What is the meaning of a family and that of reproduction? How far does our genetic intervention go?”Scientists, lawyers, and laymen are waiting for clear answers from philosophers. Unfortunately, philosophers have not seemed to give satisfactory answers to them. We may have various reasons. One of main reasons, however, seems to me that the above philosophical questions have not been the main research topics for philosophers since philosophy gave up metaphysical and/or religious questions. Thus, I argue that biomedical ethical issues urge philosophers tochange the philosopher’s attitude of doing philosophy. Those issues make them consider and rethink our fundamental concepts of life, death, family, and values pursued by human beings. In addition, it is easy to find conflicting ethical and philosophical answers to the above questions. Thus, it is very hard to reach consensus on the above ethical issues. This makes philosophers consider how we make a group decision over ethical issues showing conflicting but reasonable ethical answers in a plural society. This requires philosophers, especially scholars of ethics, develop a new ethics and its relevant concepts. This ethics must be able to work in a plural society where reasonable comprehensive belief systems coexist. In these respects, I argue that bioethics has to struggle with a newchallenge to philosophy.
86. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Artemov The Prerequisites of the Responsibility: The Liberty and the Morality
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The responsibility of the subjects is the most important basis of the social life. Recurrences of irresponsible behaviour on the all levels of the modern society do the problem of the purposeful cultivation of the liberty and the morality to be more actual nowadays. The liberty and the morality realized by any personality become the prerequisites of the responsibility that are so necessary for the society. Became the true reality the responsibility provides the sustainable reproduction of all system of feelings, convictions and actions and raises the liberty to the higher and more deliberate stage. Responding to the changes of the time the philosophy has to be urged to clarify the idea of the closing of the social anthropology, aksiologiya and ethics.
87. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kenneth Shockley The Agent Relativity of Directed Reasons
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Directed reasons are reasons that rely for their normative significance on the authority one individual has with respect to another. Acts such as promising seem to generate such reasons. These reasons seem paradigmatically agent relative: they do not hold for all agents. This paper provides a defense of the claim that theform of agent relativism seemingly required by directed reasons is innocuous, and poses no general problem for a practice dependent account of directed reasons, and, therefore, for consequentialism. While the position I present does not constitute a complete teleological account of value, it points toward a way of integrating directed reasons into a practice-based account of value. The position presented also remains consistent with the so called Compelling Idea that often motivates consequentialism: it is always permissible for an agent to do what will lead to the outcome that is best.
88. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
О.В. Артемьева Аретический подход к исследованию общественной морали
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Traditionally virtue ethics was considered as a theory about personal perfection. So it may seem that virtue theory hardly can be adopted to the study of social morality which, as some researchers demonstrate, is formalized and institutionalized, effect-oriented and presupposes not personal but shared imputation. However, as impartial analysis of the history of moral philosophy displays, virtue ethics has always had social dimension and has never existed out ofit. For example, Aristotelian ethics extends to politics and his politics is considerably mediated by ethics. And many of modern virtue ethicists proclaim the social orientation of their theories as of high priority. Today social virtue ethics is making substantial progress in applied and professional spheres. My aim is to demonstrate which peculiar basic features of virtue ethics make it effective in dealing with the most urgent social problems.
89. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Zihu Liu 生命起源的理论模型和生命力延伸理论
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This paper adopted a constructive thinking model which is highly abstract and summary to investigate the life phenomena. It is more inclined to avoid detailednonessentials to grasp macroscopic outline trend, which is like: clearly see the direction of mountain range only by climbing to a height and looking forward; the more you enter into the braches and knots of trees, the more difficult to distinguish the general picture of the forest. Adopting this macroscopical mode of thought, it will be easier to break away from the limitation of life body to grasp the inherent essence and common property of life. Any life is like a “running machine” and the running and living life state is the essential property of life. This life state isn’t windy; instead, it is a state of life material system and a state which could makematerial synthesis and energy transfer to keep automatic circulation and linkage running. When this state is established, life is formed. When this state is destroyed, life will be perished, when this state is restored, life could relive. It is the task of chemist and biologist to clarify precise material structure. From the property and characteristics of the life state, we could unearth the common connection and profound value meaning of movement development of objective world. It is Philosopher’s task to make it as the doctrine to guide the development of life world. On the basis of this life state, this paper put forth a theoretical model of life origin, so as to find answer of life origin theoretically. It opened passage between physical world and life world and made the life generated inmaterial system under specific condition to become an inevitable law. It will indicate orientation and a way out for the practical activity of exploring life origin. Meantime, this essay also found the vitality, which created life and push life to continuously run and develop, in addition, it created a significant theory of vitality extension. By means of life body, it downwardly connected with natural science law and upwardly connected with truth and doctrine of human society through life activity. It organically connected with material world, life world, human society and human spirit, offering an explanation to the world. It makes beautiful and simple world weltbild, which is like a developing and rising monument: A stele of weltbild.
90. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Lambert Nieme Par-delà Kant et Hans Jonas: L’Éthique de la Visibilité dans l’Invisible
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L’existant humain est par essence un être-au-monde. Cette dimension ontologique (pré)suppose une réalité ontique, à savoir la nature comme espace de visibilité de notre existence. Cependant, le pouvoir technologique défigure cette nature et se retourne contre l’homme au point que même l’éthique traditionnelle devient inopérante face aux défis de ce pouvoir. C’est à juste titre que Hans Jonas soutient que la réflexion éthique doit cesser de s’occuper uniquement de l’action humaine en rapport avec les hommes entre eux pour s’intéresser à l’homme comme une force agissante au sein de la nature. Ainsi, contrairement à Kant, Jonas pose les effets de l’acte comme condition de sa moralité. Et pourtant, il nous semble que la disposition intérieure du sujet agissant, la volonté bonne,n’est pas non plus à négliger. D’où la pertinence de l’impératif de l’éthique de la visibilité dans l’invisible qui réconcilie les deux positions : Agis de telle sorte que ton acte, sous-tendu par une intention pure, produise des effets compatibles avec la permanence d’une vie authentiquement humaine sur terre en assurant ainsi ta visibilité dans l’invisible. L’inflexion de cet impératif dans la praxis quotidienne passe par l’éducation ; laquelle doit s’organiser autour de trois principes cardinaux, à savoir : le principe de préséance de la vie, le principe d’interaction des générations et le principe de discontinuité des antivaleurs.
91. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Mohsen Javadi Moral Epistemology in Islamic Theology
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In this paper I will discuss the main approaches of moral epistemology in the major sects of Islamic theology; the Mu’tazilah and Shi‘ite, who formulated rationalistic ethical system between the eighth and tenth centuries, and the Ash‘arites, who developed a voluntaristic system of morality. At first the answer of Mu’tazila and Shi‘ite to the main question of moral epistemology namely the justification of moral beliefs will be discussed and compared with the intuitionism of Western ethics. Secondly the voluntarism of Ash‘arite concerning the moral knowledge will be discussed and rejected.
92. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Joon Ho Kang Utilitarianism: A Standard of Rightness or a Decision Procedure
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Exploiting the apparent paradox that utility maximization will not be achieved by adopting the strategy of maximizing utility, Indirect Utilitarianism denies that the right decision which maximizes the probable good can always be identified by the direct application of the criterion of rightness. In this view, generally speaking, Utility is characterized as providing merely a standard of evaluation or an “esoteric” criterion of right conduct, and not a substantive decision procedure in practical situations. This characterization of utilitarianism as an esoteric morality may have certain advantages for avoiding central objections to utilitarianism that arise when the Principle of Utility becomes a decision procedure which governs the moral deliberation of most people, i.e., when it becomes an “exoteric” morality. If a utilitarian takes seriously the “publicity condition” or being the “public moral basis of society” which Rawls has held to be a conceptual condition for a plausiblemoral theory, however, the indirect view of utilitarianism may not be seen as so attractive to the utilitarian. For the damage to utilitarianism as a whole inflicted by giving up on being a public moral basis of society, from a strategic point of view, may be greater than the protection the indirect view has hopefully promised.
93. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Xinyan Jiang Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension
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Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral perception i.e., moral perception's making a certain feature of a given situation salient for the agent, but there is not much that has been said about the evaluative nature of moral perception, i.e., moral perception's offering the agent a certain evaluation of the saliently perceived feature of a given situation. This paper is intended to show that moral perception has both cognitive and evaluative dimensions. More specifically, it argues that moral perception is not only a matter of saliently seeing certain features of a morally significant situation but also a matter of evaluating these features. It is such an integration of cognitive and evaluative dimensions of moral perception that provides with the agent motivational power and makes her action possible.
94. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Ryan Tanner Ouch, That Doesn’t Fit There: A Problem for Fitting-Attitudes Accounts of Value
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According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny that just any such reasons suffice to ground a thing’s value. The reasons must be of the right sort. If I threaten to stab you in the face unless you become favorably disposed toward Rob Schneider movies, you now have a reason to do just that. But it seems clear that while my threat does make Rob Schneider movies to you worth liking, it does not make them valuable or good. The difficulty then is to distinguish the right kind of reasons from the wrong kind. Several writers have recently tried to offer principled ways of resolving the so-called “wrong kind of reasons” (WKR) problem, though I will not closely examine them here. Instead I wish to focus on one particular FAaccount of value whom some have suggested is immune to WKR-style problems, specifically the one Michael Zimmerman offers in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. I argue that even Zimmerman’s account incurs WKR difficulties, and that it can actually help illustrate a certain deep problem with FA accounts in general.
95. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Nguyễn Thị Phương Maii Tolerance – Foundation of Social Solidarity in Hồ Chí Minh’s Spirit
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Solidarity is a valuable tradition of Vietnam Communist Party and Vietnamese people and Ho Chi Minh is the personification of the great national Solidarity. Ho Chi Minh Solidarity is reflected by tolerant, which is not tight in national matter but also extends to the contemporary world. This is the foundation of national Solidarity as well as international Solidarity to the liberating, building and developing carier of a country. It is difficult to reach a common point between 54 minority ethnics in all around Vietnam with different culture, custom, religious beliefs. However, Ho Chi Minh, by his thinking and action, he was successful in establishing a great united bloc of all the minority ethnics in Vietnam. It leads to a happy, comfortable and peaceful life. That is the reason why people said that: “In the past, there were few men could be a part of legend when he was still alive, but Ho Chi Minh extremely did it”.
96. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jason J. Howard The Trouble with Our Convictions: Re-thinking the Role of Conscience
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In recent decades few moral concepts have suffered as much neglect at the hands of ethicists as the notion of conscience. My paper argues that this neglect is largely in reaction to an ‘authoritarian’ conception of conscience that is outdated and based on a naïve faculty psychology. When construed in terms of a narrative of self-integration, in which conscience designates our struggle to balance the affective and cognitive dimensions of moral experience, its neglect appears unjustified. It is my contention that the phenomenon of conscience discloses the experience of moral agency in a way that is highly instructive, and that we miss a valuable window into moral behavior by ignoring it. In order to make this case I argue that the most serious criticisms of conscience—that it has no justifiablemoral criteria, clear distinguishing ‘identity,’ or motivating power—are leveled against a largely obsolete and essentialist reading of conscience. Once we see that ‘having a conscience’ refers to how people contend with the multiple moral warrants that anchor their own sense of accountability, and not some timeless moral intuition, the indispensability of the concept becomes clear.
97. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michael Wreen Three Related Objections to Relativism
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The most frequent charges brought against moral relativism are probably that it is inconsistent, that it has morally repugnant implications, and that it leads to amoralism, or the breakdown of morality altogether. A less frequent but still common objection is more conceptual in nature: relativism cannot make any sense of a certain species of comparative moral judgment, namely those that morally compare two moral codes. The general form of this kind of judgment is: ‘Moral code A is morally superior to moral code B.’ Stace lodges this objection, and others have as well. Is it cogent? Using Stace as a springboard for discussion, I critically examine three related arguments against relativism that claim that comparative judgments of the sort in question are impossible on relativism.
98. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Thomas Peard Is There a Right of National Defense?
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In his influential work War and Self-Defense, David Rodin ably challenges the view that the moral right of national defense can be grounded in the right of self-defense. He rejects the “reductive strategy” on which national defense is viewed as a “collective form” of self-defense. He also objects to the “analogical strategy” on which national defense is analogous, rather than reducible, to self-defense. Under the analogical strategy, the end of the right of national defenseis the common life of the state. I argue that while Rodin has fully refuted the reductive strategy, there is a promising analogical strategy he overlooks for grounding national defense in self-defense. On this strategy the end of the right of national defense is not the common life of the state but the state itself. This strategy is wholly consistent with our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning the right of national defense.
99. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Toshiro Terada Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals as Global Ethics
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In this paper I explore the possibility of reading Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics of morals as a proposal of global ethics, that is, ethics of the globalizing world. We have a good reason to undertake this exploration because Kant suggests that the earth being a globe with a finite spherical surface is a fundamental condition ofrealization of the universal principle of right among the world citizens. Unfortunately, however, Kant did not develop a theory of cosmopolitan rights as far as he could have. The reason is that he faced with a serious question which originated from his realistic judgment of his time, that it would be almost impossible to establish a cosmopolitan constitution without constraint of power. Today, however, we can hope to find an answer to this question in the development of global civil society and by virtue of this hope we can conceive global ethics which is further developed from Kant’s metaphysics of morals.
100. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Jian Hu “平等”视角下的人权、民权与国权 ——孙中山的“三民主义”之价值
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Sun Yat-sen’s superior position in modern Chinese history is represented in the movement of the modernization of China with him as a representative went from the stage of ‘imitation’ to the stage of ‘creativity’. He put forward, China, as a country engaging in modernization late, could draw on Western experience and lessons, run (“突驾”) from capitalism directly into socialism, and realize ‘accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution at one stroke’. He designed the modernization program of ‘accomplishing both at one stroke’ as the Three People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood); each separately connects with Human rights, civil rights and national sovereignty pursued by modern Chinese and the essence of them develops around the value of equality approved by socialist thoughts of the day. According to Sun’s thinking: 1. People’s livelihood is the root of the Three People'sPrinciples, which involves most primary human rights --- right of survival because the value of human’s seeking survival necessarily directs to ‘equality and helping each other’, which is the law of the evolution of humanity. So the justice of socialism lies in ‘Leveling out the differences between the rich and the poor’, which can be realized with many ‘artificial’ elements such as nation and morality, etc. What must be done by People’s livelihood in contemporary China are ‘equalizing landownership’, ‘regulating capital’ and ‘developing industry’. 2. Democracy is the request of ‘civil rights’ in the sense of modern democracy. In the special national situation of China, it presents itself as the specific political framework ‘balancing people’s civil rights with elite administration’. 3. The essence of nationalism lies in constructing modern Chinese national country to save the nation from crises. Sun Yat-sen pointed out: First, the foundation on which Chinese nations build up their country is totally different from that of the West. So the country must take ‘collectivism’ as its value direction. Secondly, the ethos of the Chinese nation is different from that of the West. Chinese national country must take ‘morality first’ as the direction of value. Sun’s point of view is unique and single-eyed but contains unavoidable historical limits.