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81. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Gilles Deleuze, Claudio Rozzoni Corso Vincennes – Saint Denis (20/01/1987)
82. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Breve Nota Sulla Piega: “Una storia come quella di Merleau-Ponty”
83. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Lo Spazio Estetico: Il “rovesciamento del cartesianismo” in Deleuze e Merleau-Ponty
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L’espace esthétiqueLe « renversement du cartésianisme » chez Deleuze et Merleau-PontyCet essai se propose de développer le rapport entre Deleuze et Merleau-Ponty à partir de la tentative des deux philosophes français d’aller au-delà du courantde pensée qu’on pourrait qualifi er, comme le fait Merleau-Ponty lui-même, de « cartésianisme ».Nous commençons notre itinéraire avec la critique que les deux philosophes adressent à la notion cartésienne de « ligne » – passage obligé pour penser, à travers Leibniz et sa notion de « point », la ligne en tant qu’« ensemble de points ». On cherche ensuite à penser une ligne qui ne serait plus tracée dans un espace objectif présupposé, mais plutôt qui « se trace » dans un « espace expressif ».Un tel renversement de la « ligne cartésienne » produit, comme on le verra, des effets qui intéressent également la représentation de la ligne du temps. Émanciper cette dernière du modèle cartésien signifi e la penser par-delà toute référence chronologique, toute dépendance du temps de Kronos. On peut lire dans ce sens la tentative des deux philosophes pour penser le temps de l’événement, le temps de l’Aion. On verra enfin comment, d’un espace et d’un temps anticartésiens, doit naître, pour Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze, une nouvelle grammaire porteuse d’une nouvelle compréhension de la métaphore. Ni l’idée de métaphore proposée par Merleau-Ponty, ni le concept de devenir créé par Deleuze ne concernent une ressemblance fondée sur une identité donnée. Si la métaphore merleau-pontienne et le devenir deleuzien doivent être en mesure de restituer l’essence d’une chose, une telle essence se trouve, ou mieux se crée,à partir d’un mouvement vers « ce que la chose n’est pas ». C’est précisément dans ce sens que Merleau-Ponty lit la métaphore proustienne et que Deleuze cherche à rendre compte des ressemblances créées dans l’oeuvre de Gombrowicz.The Aesthetic SpaceThe “Reversal of Cartesianism” in Deleuze and Merleau-PontyThe present essay proposes to explore the relationship between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty from the attempt they make to go beyond the current of thought thatwe may qualify, like Merleau-Ponty does it himself, as Cartesianism. We begin our itinerary with the critique that both philosophers direct at the Cartesian notion of the line. The passage through the Cartesian notion of the line is “obligated” in order to think – by means of Leibniz and his notion of point -- the line as a “set of points.” The Cartesian passage is obligated moreover in order to think a line which could no longer be drawn in a presupposed objective space but, rather, which would be “drawn” in an “expressive space.” Such a reversal of the Cartesian line, as we shall see, produces effects that concern also the representation of the line of time. To emancipate the line of time from the Cartesian model means we must think beyond all chronological references, beyond all dependence on the time of Chronos. We are able to read, in this way, both philosophers’ attempt to think the time of the event, the time of Aion. Finally we shall see how, for Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, a new grammar carrying a new understanding of the metaphor must be born from an anti-Cartesian space and time. Neither the idea of metaphor proposed by Merleau-Ponty nor the concept of becoming created by Deleuze speaks of a resemblance founded upon an identity that is given ahead of time. If Merleau-Ponty’s idea of metaphor and Deleuze’s concept of becoming must be able to produce the essence of a thing, such an essence finds, or better, it iscreated on the basis of a movement toward “what the thing is not.” It is precisely in this sense that Merleau-Ponty reads Proust’s metaphors and that Deleuze will seek to give an account of created resemblances in the work of Gombrowicz.
84. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Elena Tavani Il mondo e la sua ombra: estetica e ontologia in Hannah Arendt e Merleau-Ponty
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Starting from a specific critique of the traditional «metaphysical mistake» (i.e., the distinction between being and appearing), Hannah Arendt comes to supporta “phenomenalism” that is not only radical but also spectacular in the sense that it enhances, not appearances that would replace an unknown being or substance, but an appearing as a unique exhibition on the world stage in view of an opinion to communicate or an action to perform. Along this path, an encounter with Merleau-Ponty’s thought can occur at several levels. Specifically, the thesis of the ‘spectacular’ character of the world is presented in Arendt’s political theory as intimately linked to the thesis of an aesthetic and, at the same time, ontological basis of experience, which relates her thought to the Merleau-Pontian theory of vision as “thought conditioned” by the world and “which advents” as “instituted” in a body that is properly its own (Eye and Mind). For Arendt, thought is not only invisible (“not manifest even when it is actualized,” The Life of the Mind), it is also ontologically visible as “doxa” in which it is divided into “aspects of world” that are revealed in a “specular” fashion as positions to take and show “outside,” to present and defend. This is a valuable asset in the context of political “advertising.”
85. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Jakub Čapek, Ondřej Švec Introduzione
86. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Stefano Micali Il giudizio riflettente estetico nella Critica del Giudizio. Una ripresa fenomenologica
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In this essay, the author intends to show the reasons for the interest on the Critique of Judgment, and especially to aesthetic judgment of taste within thephenomenological context. The study is divided into four sections: at first the concept of aesthetic reflective judgment will be introduced, highlighting the crucial role it assumes within the Kantian critical project as a whole (I). In a second step the specificity of the judgment of taste will be studied with particular attention on its character of Zweckmässigkeit and its universal voice (II). In the third section it will be shown how the judgment of taste introduces a new paradigmatic articulation of the relationship between feeling and thinking, which is further explained through a critical comparison with the interpretations of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Marc Richir (III) of aesthetic judgment. In the last and more extended section, the affinity of the disinterested character of the judgment of taste with the phenomenological attitude will be at the center of the research (IV).
87. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Faustino Fabbianelli Dalla “riflessione radicale” alla “superriflessione”. La fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty tra Hegel e Schelling
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In this essay, I intend to show the evolution that the thought of Merleau-Ponty undergoes from the Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I do so by employing the Merleau-Pontyian notions of “radical reflection” and “hyper-reflection,” which I will consider as expressions of two alternative ways of resolving the task of philosophy: to highlight, in the first case, the immediate relation between the subject and the world, in the second case, the chiasm between the thinking and the Being of the world. There are three main stages to my reasoning: 1) to show the conceptual differences that obtain between the first Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology and the Hegelian philosophy; 2) to illustrate the insufficiency, recognized ex post by Merleau-Ponty himself, of the existential analyses contained in the Phenomenology of Perception; 3) to identify the concept that allows him to formulate a new ontology, and to go beyond the Hegelian dialectic, in the “nature” which is spoken of in the positive philosophy of the late Schelling.
88. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Presentazione
89. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Introduzione. Un altro inconscio
90. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Jennifer McWeeny Introduzione. Il corpo del nostro tempo
91. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Ted Toadvine Presentazione
92. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Emmanuel Alloa, Judith Revel Introduzione
93. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Marie-Eve Morin Introduzione
94. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Rajiv Kaushik Introduzione
95. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Prisca Amoroso, Gianluca De Fazio Dall’arca Terra allo Spielraum: Natura, corpo, spontaneità
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Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie.
96. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Elena De Silvestri L’apparizione del nibbio: una lettura del fantasma tra Freud e Merleau-Ponty
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In Un ricordo d’infanzia di Leonardo da Vinci Freud delinea un profilo della personalità di Leonardo a partire da un fantasma del suo passato, da un ricordo in cui egli rinviene “la sintesi” della sua intera vita. Nella parte finale de Il dubbio di Cézanne Merleau-Ponty recupera questa stessa analisi freudiana, per farne emergere, più che una contestazione o una critica, un vettore eccentrico: se il fantasma del nibbio – come Merleau-Ponty lo definisce – può rappresentare il monogramma della vita e del passato di Leonardo, è unicamente in quanto ne esibisce la “ripresa creatrice”. A partire da quest’idea di un continuo scambio tra presente e passato, in cui si offre la possibilità stessa di un avvenire creativo, è possibile pensare ad una differente lettura del concetto psicoanalitico di fantasma. Esso fa parte di quelle realtà immaginarie che Merleau-Ponty, nell’ultima fase del suo pensiero, descriverà come inerenti alla struttura stessa del reale, e che testimoniano, a un tempo, di un momento essenziale nel processo di soggettivazione. Attraverso la lettura merleau-pontiana la nozione di fantasma sembra quindi sottrarsi ad ogni deriva deterministica, per configurarsi piuttosto come l’effetto di una risonanza in cui “fedeltà all’infanzia” e “ripresa creatrice” convergono senza contraddizione.In Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, Freud outlined a profile of the personality of Leonardo starting from a fantasy of his past, a memory in which he found “the synthesis” of his entire life. In the last part of “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty takes up this same Freudian analysis in order to bring to light, rather than a challenge or a criticism, an eccentric vector: if the fantasy of the vulture – as defined by Merleau-Ponty – can represent the monogram of the life and the past of Leonardo, it is precisely insofar as it manifests “creative revival.” From this idea of a continuous exchange between present and past, in which the very possibility of a creative future arises, it is possible to conceive of a different reading of the psychoanalytic concept of fantasy. The latter makes up part of those imaginary realities that Merleau-Ponty, in the last phase of his thought, will describe as inherent in the very structure of the real, and which testify, at the same time, to an essential moment of the process of subjectivation. Through Merleau-Ponty’s reading, the notion of fantasy seems to evade any deterministic derivation, instead configuring itself as the effect of a resonance in which “fidelity to childhood” and “creative revival” converge without contradiction. Dans Un souvenir d’enfance de Léonard de Vinci, Freud décrit un profil de la personnalité de Léonard à partir d’un fantasme de son passé, d’un souvenir dans lequel il trouve « la synthèse » de sa vie entière. Dans la dernière partie du Doute de Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty reprend cette même analyse freudienne pour en faire émerger, plutôt qu’une contestation ou une critique, un vecteur excentrique : si le fantasme du vautour – comme le définit Merleau-Ponty – peut représenter le monogramme de la vie et du passé de Léonard, c’est uniquement en tant qu’il en manifeste la « reprise créatrice ». À partir de cette idée d’un échange continu entre présent et passé, dans lequel s’offre la possibilité même d’un avenir créatif, il est possible de penser à une lecture différente du concept psychanalytique de fantasme. Ce dernier fait partie de ces réalités imaginaires que Merleau-Ponty, dans la dernière phase de sa pensée, décrira comme inhérentes à la structure même du réel et qui témoignent d’un moment essentiel du processus de subjectivation. À travers la lecture merleau-pontienne, la notion de fantasme semble en effet se soustraire à toute dérive déterministe pour se configurer plutôt comme l’effet d’une résonance dans laquelle la « fidélité à l’enfance » et la « reprise créatrice » convergent sans contradiction.
97. Chiasmi International: Volume > 6
Leonard Lawlor Presentazione
98. Chiasmi International: Volume > 6
Carmine Di Martino Gesto e Parola in Merieau-Ponty
99. Chiasmi International: Volume > 6
Leonardo V. Distaso L’Ascolto della Differenza: Aisthesis ed Ethos dell’Orecchio
100. Chiasmi International: Volume > 6
Lucia Angelino Note sul Dialogo tra Merleau-Ponty e Melanie Klein