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81. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Virgil Ciomoş Phénoménologie et Théologie: sur les deux sens de la sécularisation selon Hegel
82. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Cristian Ciocan La Vie et la Corporalité dans Être et Temps de Martin Heidegger: Ière partie: le problème de la vie. Ontologie fondamentale et biologie
83. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Emilio Brito Déification, Dédivinisation, et Divinisation selon Heidegger
84. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Philippe Capelle Phénoménologies, Religion et Théologies chez Martin Heidegger
85. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Ion Copoeru Centration et Décentration dans la Phénoménologie Pure Husserlienne: le cas du noyau noématique
86. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3/4
Jocelyn Benoist Sens et fonctions de l’intentionnalité dans les Recherches Logiques
87. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3/4
Françoise Dastur Espace et intersubjectivité
88. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3/4
Cristian Ciocan La Vie et la Corporalité dans Être et temps de Martin Heidegger Iième partie: Le problème de la corporalité
89. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Emre Şan Corporéité et existence: Patočka, Merleau-Ponty, Maine de Biran
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We propose here to analyze Patočka’s dialogue with Merleau-Ponty and Maine de Biran with regard to the reciprocal implication of the body and existence. Patočka’s gesture seeks to discover the condition of existence and its effectiveness, named by the concept of flesh for Merleau-Ponty. What is the meaning of existence as constitutive flesh? The analysis will consist of three parts. The first part of the article presents the meaning of embodiment characterized by Merleau-Ponty in the analysis of the experience of the body as a sexed being. In the second part, we will analyze the corporeal movement that shows existence in its specificity. In the third and final part, we will analyze the original relationship of subjectivity to corporeal movement through Patočka’s reading of Maine de Biran.
90. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Dan Arbib Donner la mort ? Phénoménologie et sacrifice Note sur une interprétation de Derrida
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This article claims to dispute Derrida’s interpretation of Isaac’s sacrifice proposed in Donner la mort by means of three sources: 1) midrashic sources, which impose to read the sacrifice not as a requirement of murder, but as sacrifice of the sacrifice; 2) the phenomenology of Levinas which allows to measure the violence of the interpretation of Derrida and to return the biblical episode to the complications of the relationships between ethics and rationality; 3) the phenomenology of Marion, which, by refusing to interpret this biblical episode as a sacrifice following its common concept, proposes a phenomenological interpretation which returns the sacrifice to the conceptuality of the gift and donation, considered as impossible by Derrida. Far from being conflicting ways, these three layers of analysis can be capitalized and mutually validated.
91. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Luka Nakhutsrishvili Corps propre et corps technique(s): Jean-Luc Nancy et la phénoménologie
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This essay deals with Jean-Luc Nancy’s ambivalent philosophical relationship to the phenomenological perspective on the problem of corporeity. The present analysis aims to point out how within the framework of a critical rejection of some of the fundamental elements of the phenomenological tradition, Nancy adopts some of its other elements in order to forge his own approach to corporeity. While traversing Nancy’s thinking from his critique of the Leib to his concept of technique and ecotechnics, the essay engages in a critical discussion of diverse phenomenological motifs from Husserl’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Heidegger’s oeuvre.
92. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Gunnar Declerck Incarnation, motricité et rapport au possible
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For Husserl, kinaesthetic capability is a key piece of the process of perception. By ensuring the junction between the actual and the potential, it allows the exhibition of an object that is always more than what appears. Kinaesthetic capability preserves the transcendence of the object by preventing the phenomenon from being confined to pure actuality. This idea, however, poses significant challenges when one questions the nature of the possibilities that are at stake here. Especially, the perceived seems to enjoy a kind of emancipation from these capabilities as they actually are. How can one justify that the structures of the perceived world are the intentional correlate of the kinaesthetic skills of the subject if such structures continue to regulate the sense of the appearing objects when those skills are neutralized? We will see that only a genetic perspective, assuming the intrinsically historical character of the subject, provides a satisfactory answer to this question, and that this perspective leads to placing into question the actualist position that Husserl sometimes tends to adopt.
93. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Jan Bierhanzl Signifiance éthique et corporéité dans Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence
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The paper here presented deals with ethical signifying as happening in corporeity. The starting point is a provisional definition of ethical signifying as a process and a relation to the other. In the first part I attempt to describe precisely this process and distinguish two aspects: concretization and hyperbole. In the second and main part I try to outline concretization and hyperbole in the corporeal relation to the other. The modalities of ethical signifying are caress, vulnerability, maternity and last but not least the voice of the self.
94. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Anne Gléonec Corps animal et corps humain: l’« eff acement » de la propriété. À la naissance de l’institution chez Merleau-Ponty
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The purpose of this article is to show that in Merleau-Ponty’s lesser known works, one can find a path leading toward a phenomenology of the body that would not risk the “ambiguity of the flesh,” as The Visible and the Invisible is often charged with, but instead would sustain the ontology of nature that one finds in the “Working Notes” added to Merleau-Ponty’s last writings. Analyzing first his concept of nature, as it was developed in his courses at the Collège de France, the proposed aim of this text is to question anthropological difference by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the contemporary sciences, whereby the Ineinander between the physical, living, and human orders is re-founded by a new, negative concept of nature. By deconstructing classical ontology and its understanding of space, time, and objectivity, and by returning to the domain of perception, this new concept offers a novel way to reveal the advent of life in nature, its institution, and the emergence of a new corporeity in life itself. The model of Merleau-Ponty’s essential concept of institution becomes birth, and therefore the human body will no longer be interpreted as “one’s own body,” but rather will be understood, in a radically a-subjective way, as from, and based on, the participation of our perception with animality. Thereby, the concept of “ownness” becomes secondary; however, the notion of institution, established against the lexicon of consciousness and subjectivity, opens another sense of anthropological difference, one that is based only on the experiences of corporeity.
95. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Carlos Lobo La « résistance de Derrida à la psychanalyse » et la phénoménologie transcendantale
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Following Derrida’s late analysis of the multifarious concept of resistance, this article aims at detecting the motives that lead him to install from the start a tension between two methods of analysis of consciousness (phenomenological and psychoanalytical), that many would have considered, if not affectively unbearable, at least logically unsustainable. Yet this general logical and affective attitude remains describable, and in order to do so, the author proposesto delve into some underestimated and hence underexploited resources of transcendental phenomenology, particularly those related to the analysis of affectivesyntaxes of consciousness, which are part of the “realm of positionality”.
96. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Lorenzo Altieri Genèse d’une hérésie : la phénoménologie herméneutique de Paul Ricœur
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In this essay I revisit Ricœur’s famous greffe in light of Husserl’s method. In other words, I try to highlight the anti-idealist interpretation of phenomenology exposed by Ricœur in his early project (Philosophie de la volonté) and in some later works, in order to present the necessity of the graft of hermeneutics onto the worn out body of western reflexive philosophy. This surgery has a radical effect on the “Subject”: far from provoking a “rejection crisis”, the hermeneutical graft provides the Cogito with a new heart, and gives new life to Ricœur’s homme capable – the ultimate character of his long philosophical journey. The essay closes with an alternative interpretation of this “capability”.
97. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron Les formes du temps et la vie spirituelle selon Paul Ricoeur
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In order to identify the role that temporality plays for Ricœur’s view on the spiritual life, I will start my analysis from his interpretation of the Augustinian Confessions (book XI, ch. XXX). In his reading, Ricoeur makes use of the notion of extension to which he accords multiples meanings (spatial, categorical and existential) and he also points out the conceptual couple of distensio / extensio. I will bring forth Ricoeur’s misinterpretation that consists in strongly relating the discovery of this conceptual couple to the distinction between the three inner dimensions of time. I will end with a discussion of Heidegger’s analysis of the Confessions and his tentative to temporalize Dasein starting from the future.
98. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Natalie Depraz D’une science descriptive de l’expérience en premiere personne : pour une phénoménologie expérientielle
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I would like to propose an interpretation of Ricœur’s first phenomenological works in the light of what I call an “experiential phenomenology”, by answeringthree important questions. The first is a factual and historical interrogation: why has Ricœur abandoned his project of a descriptive phenomenology after publishing his first volume of the The Voluntary and the Involuntary and why did he afterwards direct his philosophical research towards the problem of interpretation? The second interrogation is an epistemological and a methodological one: in what way is the Husserlian phenomenology a first-person approach and how does Ricœur’s phenomenology of the will lead us towards an experiential phenomenology in first person? The final question is heuristical: what criteria should we point out in order to establish a phenomenological science that is 1) descriptive and 2) approaching the experience in first-person?
99. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Pol Vandevelde Le fondement ontologique du récit selon Ricoeur : mimesis, dette et attestation
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I examine the problem of what Ricœur calls représentance, which is a stand-in narratives offer of what took place (in the case of historical narratives) or actions (in the case of the re-telling of what people did). Ricœur rejects as insufficient two naive options: first, a simple adequacy between what took place and the historical narrative about it and, second, a simple heterogeneity between them so that historical narratives would be mere “possible versions” of what took place. I explore further why Ricœur brought into consideration the attitude of the one offering the narrative, what he calls a “being-in-debt” or “attestation”. I then offer an assessment of Ricœur’s success in still claiming that what actually happened serves as the ultimate referent of the narratives given of the past event or the action.
100. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
David-Le-Duc Tiaha La réserve de sens de la Lebenswelt. Enjeu de l’entrecroisement de la phénoménologie et de l’herméneutique
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The hermeneutic turn in Ricœur’s phenomenological ontology of the 1960 cannot be considered a break with his methodological approach of philosophy. In fact, as early as 1950 he had already initiated a first attempt to conjoin phenomenology and hermeneutics by relating eidetic description and explanation. The main purpose of the present analysis is to clarify the constellations constituting the structure of mutual determination between phenomenology and hermeneutics. The paper will focus on the question of the Lebenswelt, as reserve of meaning, a concept requiring a structural conjunction of the phenomenological (perception, imagination, re-presentation) and hermeneutical arcs (explication, interpretation, understanding).