Narrow search

By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:

Displaying: 81-100 of 1237 documents

0.087 sec

81. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Mohsen Javadi Moral Epistemology in Islamic Theology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I will discuss the main approaches of moral epistemology in the major sects of Islamic theology; the Mu’tazilah and Shi‘ite, who formulated rationalistic ethical system between the eighth and tenth centuries, and the Ash‘arites, who developed a voluntaristic system of morality. At first the answer of Mu’tazila and Shi‘ite to the main question of moral epistemology namely the justification of moral beliefs will be discussed and compared with the intuitionism of Western ethics. Secondly the voluntarism of Ash‘arite concerning the moral knowledge will be discussed and rejected.
82. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Joon Ho Kang Utilitarianism: A Standard of Rightness or a Decision Procedure
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Exploiting the apparent paradox that utility maximization will not be achieved by adopting the strategy of maximizing utility, Indirect Utilitarianism denies that the right decision which maximizes the probable good can always be identified by the direct application of the criterion of rightness. In this view, generally speaking, Utility is characterized as providing merely a standard of evaluation or an “esoteric” criterion of right conduct, and not a substantive decision procedure in practical situations. This characterization of utilitarianism as an esoteric morality may have certain advantages for avoiding central objections to utilitarianism that arise when the Principle of Utility becomes a decision procedure which governs the moral deliberation of most people, i.e., when it becomes an “exoteric” morality. If a utilitarian takes seriously the “publicity condition” or being the “public moral basis of society” which Rawls has held to be a conceptual condition for a plausiblemoral theory, however, the indirect view of utilitarianism may not be seen as so attractive to the utilitarian. For the damage to utilitarianism as a whole inflicted by giving up on being a public moral basis of society, from a strategic point of view, may be greater than the protection the indirect view has hopefully promised.
83. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Xinyan Jiang Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral perception i.e., moral perception's making a certain feature of a given situation salient for the agent, but there is not much that has been said about the evaluative nature of moral perception, i.e., moral perception's offering the agent a certain evaluation of the saliently perceived feature of a given situation. This paper is intended to show that moral perception has both cognitive and evaluative dimensions. More specifically, it argues that moral perception is not only a matter of saliently seeing certain features of a morally significant situation but also a matter of evaluating these features. It is such an integration of cognitive and evaluative dimensions of moral perception that provides with the agent motivational power and makes her action possible.
84. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Ryan Tanner Ouch, That Doesn’t Fit There: A Problem for Fitting-Attitudes Accounts of Value
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny that just any such reasons suffice to ground a thing’s value. The reasons must be of the right sort. If I threaten to stab you in the face unless you become favorably disposed toward Rob Schneider movies, you now have a reason to do just that. But it seems clear that while my threat does make Rob Schneider movies to you worth liking, it does not make them valuable or good. The difficulty then is to distinguish the right kind of reasons from the wrong kind. Several writers have recently tried to offer principled ways of resolving the so-called “wrong kind of reasons” (WKR) problem, though I will not closely examine them here. Instead I wish to focus on one particular FAaccount of value whom some have suggested is immune to WKR-style problems, specifically the one Michael Zimmerman offers in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. I argue that even Zimmerman’s account incurs WKR difficulties, and that it can actually help illustrate a certain deep problem with FA accounts in general.
85. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Nguyễn Thị Phương Maii Tolerance – Foundation of Social Solidarity in Hồ Chí Minh’s Spirit
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Solidarity is a valuable tradition of Vietnam Communist Party and Vietnamese people and Ho Chi Minh is the personification of the great national Solidarity. Ho Chi Minh Solidarity is reflected by tolerant, which is not tight in national matter but also extends to the contemporary world. This is the foundation of national Solidarity as well as international Solidarity to the liberating, building and developing carier of a country. It is difficult to reach a common point between 54 minority ethnics in all around Vietnam with different culture, custom, religious beliefs. However, Ho Chi Minh, by his thinking and action, he was successful in establishing a great united bloc of all the minority ethnics in Vietnam. It leads to a happy, comfortable and peaceful life. That is the reason why people said that: “In the past, there were few men could be a part of legend when he was still alive, but Ho Chi Minh extremely did it”.
86. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jason J. Howard The Trouble with Our Convictions: Re-thinking the Role of Conscience
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In recent decades few moral concepts have suffered as much neglect at the hands of ethicists as the notion of conscience. My paper argues that this neglect is largely in reaction to an ‘authoritarian’ conception of conscience that is outdated and based on a naïve faculty psychology. When construed in terms of a narrative of self-integration, in which conscience designates our struggle to balance the affective and cognitive dimensions of moral experience, its neglect appears unjustified. It is my contention that the phenomenon of conscience discloses the experience of moral agency in a way that is highly instructive, and that we miss a valuable window into moral behavior by ignoring it. In order to make this case I argue that the most serious criticisms of conscience—that it has no justifiablemoral criteria, clear distinguishing ‘identity,’ or motivating power—are leveled against a largely obsolete and essentialist reading of conscience. Once we see that ‘having a conscience’ refers to how people contend with the multiple moral warrants that anchor their own sense of accountability, and not some timeless moral intuition, the indispensability of the concept becomes clear.
87. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michael Wreen Three Related Objections to Relativism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The most frequent charges brought against moral relativism are probably that it is inconsistent, that it has morally repugnant implications, and that it leads to amoralism, or the breakdown of morality altogether. A less frequent but still common objection is more conceptual in nature: relativism cannot make any sense of a certain species of comparative moral judgment, namely those that morally compare two moral codes. The general form of this kind of judgment is: ‘Moral code A is morally superior to moral code B.’ Stace lodges this objection, and others have as well. Is it cogent? Using Stace as a springboard for discussion, I critically examine three related arguments against relativism that claim that comparative judgments of the sort in question are impossible on relativism.
88. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Thomas Peard Is There a Right of National Defense?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In his influential work War and Self-Defense, David Rodin ably challenges the view that the moral right of national defense can be grounded in the right of self-defense. He rejects the “reductive strategy” on which national defense is viewed as a “collective form” of self-defense. He also objects to the “analogical strategy” on which national defense is analogous, rather than reducible, to self-defense. Under the analogical strategy, the end of the right of national defenseis the common life of the state. I argue that while Rodin has fully refuted the reductive strategy, there is a promising analogical strategy he overlooks for grounding national defense in self-defense. On this strategy the end of the right of national defense is not the common life of the state but the state itself. This strategy is wholly consistent with our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning the right of national defense.
89. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Toshiro Terada Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals as Global Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I explore the possibility of reading Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics of morals as a proposal of global ethics, that is, ethics of the globalizing world. We have a good reason to undertake this exploration because Kant suggests that the earth being a globe with a finite spherical surface is a fundamental condition ofrealization of the universal principle of right among the world citizens. Unfortunately, however, Kant did not develop a theory of cosmopolitan rights as far as he could have. The reason is that he faced with a serious question which originated from his realistic judgment of his time, that it would be almost impossible to establish a cosmopolitan constitution without constraint of power. Today, however, we can hope to find an answer to this question in the development of global civil society and by virtue of this hope we can conceive global ethics which is further developed from Kant’s metaphysics of morals.
90. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Jian Hu “平等”视角下的人权、民权与国权 ——孙中山的“三民主义”之价值
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Sun Yat-sen’s superior position in modern Chinese history is represented in the movement of the modernization of China with him as a representative went from the stage of ‘imitation’ to the stage of ‘creativity’. He put forward, China, as a country engaging in modernization late, could draw on Western experience and lessons, run (“突驾”) from capitalism directly into socialism, and realize ‘accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution at one stroke’. He designed the modernization program of ‘accomplishing both at one stroke’ as the Three People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood); each separately connects with Human rights, civil rights and national sovereignty pursued by modern Chinese and the essence of them develops around the value of equality approved by socialist thoughts of the day. According to Sun’s thinking: 1. People’s livelihood is the root of the Three People'sPrinciples, which involves most primary human rights --- right of survival because the value of human’s seeking survival necessarily directs to ‘equality and helping each other’, which is the law of the evolution of humanity. So the justice of socialism lies in ‘Leveling out the differences between the rich and the poor’, which can be realized with many ‘artificial’ elements such as nation and morality, etc. What must be done by People’s livelihood in contemporary China are ‘equalizing landownership’, ‘regulating capital’ and ‘developing industry’. 2. Democracy is the request of ‘civil rights’ in the sense of modern democracy. In the special national situation of China, it presents itself as the specific political framework ‘balancing people’s civil rights with elite administration’. 3. The essence of nationalism lies in constructing modern Chinese national country to save the nation from crises. Sun Yat-sen pointed out: First, the foundation on which Chinese nations build up their country is totally different from that of the West. So the country must take ‘collectivism’ as its value direction. Secondly, the ethos of the Chinese nation is different from that of the West. Chinese national country must take ‘morality first’ as the direction of value. Sun’s point of view is unique and single-eyed but contains unavoidable historical limits.
91. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Robin Geiß Shifting Frontiers on the Delineation of War and Peace
92. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Cristian Rojas, Marco Galetta Indigenous Rights in The Venezuelan Legislation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper is emphatically focused in the analysis on the indigenous problem such as it had been ruled by law in the different Venezuelan Constitutions since the foundation of the Republic in 1811. Our purpose does not go as far as to treat the ancestral indigenous problem in Venezuela because this would exceeds the limits of our study; although, we will do some references in relation to this question.
93. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
DongKai Li 民主是为了保护人权
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Freedom is natural, Human rights come from nature, human strive for happiness, in a civilization society, how to protect human right? how to help people strive for happiness? The answer is the democracy. Democracy is not simply a kind of political system, but the essence way to protect human right, the best way to help people get the happiness. So, the democracy political system, is used to protect people’s human rights, protect equality. To assist people get happiness, it is not only the political game frame rules. So, the way to judge a country’s political system democracy or not, is to see if that system could protect peoples’s human rights, if it could assist people’s working for happiness in economy and political, if it goes in the direction of human’s civilization. To judge democracy is not by the shape, but the essence inside. So, in different place /country, probably the democracy shape is not the same, but the democracy value, the democracy essence could be the same. Only the democracy political system is the only correct political system in civilization time. The root basis theory of my democracy come from my new ontology and cognition, as following : New ontology: The Onto is the uniform contradiction being. The essence of people: The uniform contrast body within people’s body, is “ ego and nonego.“ New Cognition: Cognition course moves by the force from the contrast between the Ego and Nonego within an exist being live body. “EGO” + “Nonego” →→ Force to move(N times) →→Feeling(N times) →→ Idea(N numbers) + thinking(N times) →→Knowledge (N numbers) ≈ Object →→ =Object
94. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Jurate Morkuniene Human Rights and Human Security
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The main aim of the paper is to reflect the problem of the concept of human rights as well as to make analysis from the perspective of human security. The principal attention is paid to the fundamentals of human rights, first of all, to the human security. Only the world that ensures personal and national security and creative development for its entire people can be world of the real embodiment of human rights. Author considers the education as one of the backbones of human security due to the fact that education fulfils its true purpose by allowing individuals to make their own decisions and take control of their own lives; and creates persons identity. The possibility to develop a human and social identity means a real implementation of human rights. Human rights, based on human security and development, is a permanent process that takes its point of departure in human and social needs within cultural characteristics. So it means that human rights can not be defined once and for all.
95. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Josef Bordat Humanitarian Intervention and Human Rights Education
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
To ensure the protection of the human rights, the role of world community, confronted with a new kind of military violence and terrorism, is discussed under the concepts reaction and prevention, for on the one hand there is the attempt to protect human rights by humanitarian interventionism, that leads to so called“human rights wars” (Beck), on the other hand the UNO shows increasing efforts in preventative means like “human rights education”. These two aspects shall be discussed in the article by analyzing particularly the report The Responsibility To Protect (2001) by the International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty (ICISS) as well as the latest activities and plans of the United Nations concerning human rights education.
96. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Plamen Makariev Group-Specific Rights: A Non-Essentialist Approach
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper is dealing with a contradiction in the theory and policy of minority rights: on the one hand the claims for such rights are justified by recognizing the value of the cultural identity of minority groups, on the other – the recognition of such a value implies an acceptance of a conservative and isolationist view onminority identities. Characterizing the latter view as essentialist I explore several alternatives for approaching the issue of minority rights in a different way and finally I reach the conclusion that one more convincing method of identifying the cultural needs of minority groups and the rights necessary for satisfying these needs could be the technique of public deliberation. Its application for this purpose could make the negotiating of group-specific rights much more flexible and politically unproblematic than at present.
97. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Zhenrong Gan The Politically Pluralistic Conception of Human Rights
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper is a sketch of the politically pluralistic conception of human rights. The conception will be illustrated by a basic characteristic of human rights under the constraint of the fact in the political. It is pluralistic because it is compatible with different moral values and cultures with qualification. It is also political because it considers political actions in practice and it does not follow from any moral doctrine which may be more generally or intrinsically related to human rights. I attempt to propose that the politically pluralistic conception of human rights can response to a challenge from the fact of reasonable pluralism in international discourse and practice. The steps of my argument will be constructed as follows: first, I will propose that the point in the political is to solve the first political question (Q) whether we consider the situation of a state or of international societies; secondly, I will identify that the most important characteristic of human rights is that individuals should be treated equally in certain proper ways (C), and will argue that C can make a contribution to solve Q; thirdly, I suppose human rights can be accepted by different political arrangements or cultures with C qualification if they do not become part of the problem while solving Q; finally, I will propose that political arrangements or cultures with C qualification do not have to limit to liberalism. If these four steps are successful, then there is a politically pluralistic conception of human rights which is constructed without a moral doctrine and is compatible with reasonable pluralism in human rights practice.
98. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Charles Courtney On Not Excluding the Poor Yet Again
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Many philosophers agree that human rights are helpful for defining poverty (poverty is a violation of human rights) and for overcoming poverty (human rights provide a standard for measuring progress). I briefly examine the recent contributions of Paul Ricoeur, who sees human rights declarations as the occasion for aconversation leading to practical wisdom, and Thomas Pogge, who argues for a reform of the global institutional order that has done much harm and prevented billions of people from having secure access to the objects of human rights. As a complement to the important contributions of Ricoeur and Pogge, I pose the question, Who should be the actors in the struggle against poverty? My answer, drawing on recent work by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, is that it is a violation of the human rights of those living in poverty if they are not full participants in the working for the eradication of poverty.
99. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
João Cardoso Rosas Human Rights: The Very Idea of a Short List
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I submit that, if one takes seriously the distinction between citizenship rights and human rights, the list of the latter must be minimized. Many of the rights that we are used to call human rights are, in fact, citizenship rights and they belong to a history of citizenship in some specific states around the world. Thelist of human rights must be much shorter than the list of citizenship rights, whatever that list may be in accordance with the grounds attributed to human rights by different philosophical approaches. My plea for a qualification of which rights should count as human rights and the idea of a short list challenges the consensus among international lawyers. Nevertheless, it does not aim at a critique of human rights as such. On the contrary, the general intention of the very idea of a short list is to strengthen the moral force of human rights in order to make them meaningful in different political contexts.
100. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Saladin Meckled-Garcia How to Think about the Problem of Non-state Actors and Human Rights
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
International Human Rights Law is clear in holding only states or state-like entities responsible for human rights abuses, yet activists and philosophers alike do not see any rational basis for this restriction in responsibility. Multi-national corporations, individuals and a whole array of other 'non‐state actors' are capable of harming vital human interests just as much as states, so why single-out the latter as human rights-responsible agents? In this paper I distinguish two ways of looking at human rights responsibility. One is simply in terms of the outcomes that are deemed desirable to avoid (or secure), and the other is in terms of the relationships one sees these moral standards as governing. I argue that the peculiar form of responsibility and responsiveness (the way of 'holding to account')inherent to human rights principles is directed at establishing a particular type of relationship: one in which individuals are empowered in the face of a very special form of communal power. Other kinds of relationship and potential transgression are more appropriately governed by different kinds of moral principles, such as those relating to criminality. The outcomes view fails to incorporate this insight and for that reason fails to see the distinct role played by human rights standards in our moral reasoning: they are precisely valuable because they provide a way to judge the relationship of individuals to the peculiar kind of power exercised by the state. Part of this project is a re-assessment of the methodology employed by philosophers in establishing moral principles and concepts, such as those relating to human rights standards.