Search narrowed by:



Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 81-100 of 412 documents

0.087 sec

81. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
J. A. Cover Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations
82. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Brandon C. Look Leibniz and the Shelf of Essence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper addresses D. C. Williams’s question, “How can Leibniz know that he is a member of the actual world and not merely a possible monad on the shelf of essence?” A variety of answers are considered. Ultimately, it is argued that no particular perception of a state of affairs in the world can warrant knowledge of one’s actuality, nor can the awareness of any property within oneself; rather, it is the nature of experience itself, with the flow of perceptions, that guarantees our actuality. A consequence of this view is that no non-actual individuals can truly be said to experience their worlds, nor can they ask the question if they are actual or not.
83. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Vincenzo De Risi Leibniz on Geometry: Two Unpublished Texts with Translation and Commentary
84. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Patrick Riley Leibniz’ Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice: A Reply to Andreas Blank
85. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Stefano Di Bella Leibniz’s Theory of Conditions: A Framework for Ontological Dependence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of this paper is to trace in Leibniz’s drafts the sketched outline of a conceptual framework he organized around the key concept of ‘requisite’. We are faced with the project of a semi-formal theory of conditions, whose logical skeleton can have a lot of different interpretations. In particular, it is well suited to capture some crucial relations of ontological dependence. Firstly the area of ‘mediate requisites’ is explored - where causal and temporal relations are dealt with on the basis of a general theory of ‘consequence’.Then the study of ‘immediate requisites’ is taken into account - a true sample of mereological inquiry, where Leibniz strives for a unitary treatment of part-whole relation, conceptual inclusion and inherence. Far from simply conflating these relations one with another and with causality, therefore, Leibniz tried to spell them out, while at the same time understanding them within a single conceptual framework.
86. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Stephen M. Puryear Was Leibniz Confused about Confusion?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Leibniz’s physicalism about colors and other sensible qualities commits him to two theses about our knowledge of those qualities: first, that we can acquire ideas of sensible qualities apart from any direct acquaintance with the qualities themselves; second, that we can acquire distinct (i.e., non-confused) ideas of such qualities through the development of physical-theoretical accounts. According to some commentators, however, Leibniz frequently denies both claims. His views on the subject are muddled and incoherent, they say, both because he is ambivalent about the nature of sensible qualities, and because he gets confused about confusion, losing sight of his own distinction between the confusion proper to perceptions and that proper to ideas. In opposition to this, I argue that the critics have misunderstood Leibniz’s views, which are both consistent over time and coherent. The key to understanding his position is toappreciate what he characterizes as a kind of redundancy in our ideas of sensible qualities, a crucial feature of his view overlooked by the critics.
87. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Massimo Mugnai Calculus Universalis: Studien zur Logik von G. W. Leibniz
88. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
(LH XXXV, I, 14, bl. 23-24)
89. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Recent Works on Leibniz
90. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Herbert Breger News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
91. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Ohad Nachtomy Leibniz on the Greatest Number and the Greatest Being
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In notes from 1675-76 Leibniz is using the notion of an infinite number as an illustration of an impossible notion. In the same notes, he is also using this notion in contrast to the possibility of the ‘Ens perfectissumum’ (A.6.3 572; Pk 91; A.6.3 325). I suggest that Leibniz’s concern about the possibility of the notion of ‘the greatest or the most perfect being’ is partly motivated by his observation that similar notions, such as ‘the greatest number’, are impossible. This leads to the question how Leibniz convinced himself that the notion of the greatest number is self-contradictory and that of the greatest being is not. I consider two suggestions, one that stress the difference between beings and numbers and one that stress the difference between two notions of infinity, and conclude that neither of them provides a satisfactory solution to this question.
92. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Marleen Rozemond Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
93. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Yitzhak Y. Melamed Causa sive Ratio: La Raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz
94. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
(LH XXXV, I, 14, bl. 57)
95. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Acknowledgements, Abbreviations Used in Articles and Reviews
96. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Paul Lodge Garber’s Interpretations of Leibniz on Corporeal Substance in the ‘Middle Years’
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In 1985 Daniel Garber published his highly intluential paper “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years”. In two recent articles, Garber returns to these issues with a new position - that we should perhaps conclude that Leibniz did not have a view concerning the ultimate ontology of substance during his middle years. I discuss the viability of this position and consider some more general methodological issues that arise from this discussion.
97. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Herbert Breger News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
98. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Glenn A. Hartz Reply to Philip Beeley
99. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Acknowledgments, Abbreviations Used in Articles and Reviews
100. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 16
Andreas Blank Reply to Brandon Look