Search narrowed by:

Narrow search

By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:

Displaying: 91-100 of 412 documents

0.067 sec

91. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 14
J. A. Cover Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations
92. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Brandon C. Look Leibniz and the Shelf of Essence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper addresses D. C. Williams’s question, “How can Leibniz know that he is a member of the actual world and not merely a possible monad on the shelf of essence?” A variety of answers are considered. Ultimately, it is argued that no particular perception of a state of affairs in the world can warrant knowledge of one’s actuality, nor can the awareness of any property within oneself; rather, it is the nature of experience itself, with the flow of perceptions, that guarantees our actuality. A consequence of this view is that no non-actual individuals can truly be said to experience their worlds, nor can they ask the question if they are actual or not.
93. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Vincenzo De Risi Leibniz on Geometry: Two Unpublished Texts with Translation and Commentary
94. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Patrick Riley Leibniz’ Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice: A Reply to Andreas Blank
95. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Stefano Di Bella Leibniz’s Theory of Conditions: A Framework for Ontological Dependence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of this paper is to trace in Leibniz’s drafts the sketched outline of a conceptual framework he organized around the key concept of ‘requisite’. We are faced with the project of a semi-formal theory of conditions, whose logical skeleton can have a lot of different interpretations. In particular, it is well suited to capture some crucial relations of ontological dependence. Firstly the area of ‘mediate requisites’ is explored - where causal and temporal relations are dealt with on the basis of a general theory of ‘consequence’.Then the study of ‘immediate requisites’ is taken into account - a true sample of mereological inquiry, where Leibniz strives for a unitary treatment of part-whole relation, conceptual inclusion and inherence. Far from simply conflating these relations one with another and with causality, therefore, Leibniz tried to spell them out, while at the same time understanding them within a single conceptual framework.
96. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Stephen M. Puryear Was Leibniz Confused about Confusion?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Leibniz’s physicalism about colors and other sensible qualities commits him to two theses about our knowledge of those qualities: first, that we can acquire ideas of sensible qualities apart from any direct acquaintance with the qualities themselves; second, that we can acquire distinct (i.e., non-confused) ideas of such qualities through the development of physical-theoretical accounts. According to some commentators, however, Leibniz frequently denies both claims. His views on the subject are muddled and incoherent, they say, both because he is ambivalent about the nature of sensible qualities, and because he gets confused about confusion, losing sight of his own distinction between the confusion proper to perceptions and that proper to ideas. In opposition to this, I argue that the critics have misunderstood Leibniz’s views, which are both consistent over time and coherent. The key to understanding his position is toappreciate what he characterizes as a kind of redundancy in our ideas of sensible qualities, a crucial feature of his view overlooked by the critics.
97. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Massimo Mugnai Calculus Universalis: Studien zur Logik von G. W. Leibniz
98. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
(LH XXXV, I, 14, bl. 23-24)
99. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Recent Works on Leibniz
100. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 15
Herbert Breger News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft