Faith and Philosophy

Volume 33, Issue 2, April 2016

Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong

This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument (1999, reiterated in 2011) against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof of the “power entailment principle.” The paper closes with a critical examination of ideas about free will and the past history of the world that might be supposed to support Hasker’s conviction that Molinism is incompatible with a libertarian view of free will.