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Res Philosophica

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published on August 9, 2019

Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, Javier González de Prado Salas, Manuel Heras–Escribano
DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1794

Not Expressivist Enough
Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution

The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face.