

## Caring for the World

### Towards a Post-Heideggerian Concept of the Will

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#### Abstract

In the twentieth century, the concept of the will appears in bad daylight. Martin Heidegger for instance criticizes the will as a movement of reducing otherness to sameness, difference to identity. Since his diagnosis of the will, the releasement from a wilful manner of thinking and the exploration of the possibility of non-willing has become a prevalent issue in contemporary philosophy. This article questions whether this quietism is still possible in our times, were we are confronted with climate change and the future of mankind is fundamentally threatened. On the one hand, the human will to ‘master’ and ‘exploit’ the natural world can be seen as the root of the ecological crisis, as Heidegger observed. On the other hand, its current urgency forces us to evaluate the releasement of the will in contemporary philosophy.

Because also Heidegger himself attempted to develop a proper concept of the will in the onset of the thirties, we start our inquiry with Heidegger’s phenomenology of the will in the thirties. Although Heidegger was very critical about the concept of the will later on, we are not inclined to reject the concept of the will as he did eventually. In this article we show that Heidegger’s criticism of the will is not phenomenologically motivated, and we will develop a proper post-Heideggerian concept of willing. Finally the question will be answered whether this proper concept of willing can help us to find a solution for the ecological crisis.

## Introduction

In the twentieth century, the concept of the will appears in bad daylight. Already Nietzsche speaks negatively about a will to truth: “‘Will to truth’, you who are wisest call that which impels you and fills you with lust? A will to the thinkability of all beings: this *I* call your will. You want to *make* all being thinkable, for you doubt with well-founded suspicion that it is already thinkable”.<sup>263</sup> According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is the forgery of plurality into the same and the similar, the reduction of difference into identity: “Thinking is a forging transformation, feeling is a forging transformation, willing is a forging transformation -: all possess the ability to assimilate: it preconceives a will, something to even *us* (*etwas uns gleich zu machen*)” (KSA 11: 34[252]).

Yet Nietzsche remains rather positive about the will eventually. The reductive will is a necessary though insufficient condition for the preservation of life, which would otherwise evaporate in the face of relentless variability (the world of becoming). Together with the will to truth, he introduces the will to power as art. Art is the essence of willing, opening new perspectives and possibilities for the will. So for Nietzsche the concept of the will operates as a problem – the reductive and assimilating character of the will to truth – and as its solution: the essence of the will to power as art is the creation of new perspectives and possibilities for the will.

In the twentieth century the concept of the will is criticized in a more rigorous way. Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) for instance, criticizes the will as a movement of reducing otherness to sameness, difference to identity.<sup>264</sup> In his diagnosis of the will he follows one of the prominent critics of the will in the twentieth century: Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Since his diagnosis of the will, the releasement from a willful manner of thinking and the exploration of the possibility of non-willing has become a prevalent issue in contemporary philosophy. In case

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<sup>263</sup> Nietzsche, F. (1882/1887-1988) *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Band 4 (München/Berlin: de Gruyter), p. 146 (Hereafter: KSA 4: 146).

<sup>264</sup> Levinas, E. (1961) *Totalité et Infini* (Den Haag: Nijhoff Publishers); *Totality and Infinity*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburg: Duquesne UP 1987), pp. 216-253.

of Heidegger, the main question is how to think a mode of “thinking [which] would be something other than willing”<sup>265</sup>, a *gelassen* or non-willing mode of philosophical thinking.<sup>266</sup>

In recent years this quietism, resignation or even fatalism, has been subjected to many attacks. Herman Philipse comments for instance: “Heidegger claims that the age of technology is a fate, so that it would be naïve to think that we could avert destruction and meaninglessness by any concrete measures. The only thing that he advises us to do is to wait and to attempt to relate to Being in thought. Heidegger’s seemingly “deep” critique of technology is nothing but pseudo-religious quietism disguised as a radical critique. The morally undesirable effect of this critique is that it condemns all real and fruitfull criticism of technology as superficial, naïve, and insufficiently radical”.<sup>267</sup> In general, Heidegger’s concept of *Gelassenheit* is interpreted as ‘indifference’ to ethical duties, as a quietism that withdraws from the world. Or as Richard Wolin puts it: “Dasein is no longer responsible for its own fate. Instead, it must assume an attitude of passive obedience vis-à-vis the call of Being, to which it stands in a relation of impotent bondage”.<sup>268</sup>

The question arises whether this quietism is still possible in our times, were we are confronted with climate change, where the future of mankind is fundamentally threatened. Of course, the human will to ‘master’ and ‘exploit’ the natural world can be seen as the root of the ecological crisis, as Heidegger already observed: “The unnoticeable law of the earth preserves the earth in the sufficiency of the emerging and perishing of all things in the allotted sphere of the possible which everything follows, and yet nothing knows. The birch tree never oversteps its possibility. The colony of bees dwells in its possibility. It is first the *will* which arranges itself everywhere in technology that devours the earth in the exhaustion and consumption and change of what is artificial. Technology drives the earth beyond the developed sphere of its possibility

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<sup>265</sup> Heidegger, M. (1959) *Gelassenheit* (Stuttgart: Neske), p. 30.

<sup>266</sup> Heidegger, M. (1995) *Feldweg-Gespräche*, Gesamtausgabe Band 77 (Frankfurt a.M: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 67).

<sup>267</sup> Philipse, H. (1998) *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being. A Critical Interpretation* (Princeton: Princeton UP), p. 309).

<sup>268</sup> Wolin, R. (1990) *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia UP), p. 150).

into such things which are no longer a possibility and are thus the impossible” (my emphasis).<sup>269</sup> The will can be understood as the root of the ecological crisis and Heidegger’s philosophy can even be seen as a solution to the environmental crisis, as some of Heidegger’s commentators have suggested: “The solution to the environmental crisis, then, would involve an ontological shift: from an anthropocentric, dualistic, and utilitarian understanding of nature to an understanding which “lets things be”, i.e. which discloses things other than merely as raw material for human ends”.<sup>270</sup> Heidegger’s philosophy can be seen as providing such a non-anthropocentric conception of humanity and its relation to nature.

Although Heidegger’s diagnosis of the ecological crisis might be correct, does its current urgency not force us to evaluate the releasement of the will in contemporary philosophy? Do we not require human interventions to protect and take care of the future of our planet? And do these interventions not presuppose a concept of willing? Do we not have to find a path between Scylla – the reductive will – and Charybdis – the quietism that withdraws from the world?<sup>271</sup> This path cannot be found in an uncritical embrace of the will nor in its blunt rejection. As we know, Scylla lies perilously close to Charybdis. Where do we steer? What compass-point lies between them, the concept of the will itself?

Less known is that Heidegger also attempted to develop a proper concept of the will, to characterize his philosophical method in the onset of the thirties.<sup>272</sup> In the opening paragraph of

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<sup>269</sup> Heidegger, M. (2000), *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Gesamtausgabe Band 7 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 96).

<sup>270</sup> Cf. Zimmerman, M. (1993) “Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship”, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 196 (Hereafter: Zimmerman (1993), 196). Michael Zimmerman is one of the leading Heideggerian environmentalists who is connecting Heidegger’s thought and the deep ecological movement. According to radical environmentalists, “the environmental crisis stems from the anthropocentric humanism that elevates humanity to the status of God and reduces everything else to raw material for human needs” (Zimmerman, M. (1983) “Toward a Heideggerian *Ethos* for Radical Environmentalism”, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 101 (Hereafter: Zimmerman (1983) 101)). Later on he nuanced this relationship again (vgl. Zimmerman (1993) 195-224).

<sup>271</sup> According to Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger’s quietism implies a certain disinterest in the future of mankind (Schürmann, R. (1980) “Questioning the Foundation of Practical Philosophy”, *Human Studies*, p. 365 ff).

<sup>272</sup> Although the concept of the will already plays an implicit and ambiguous role in the time of *Sein und Zeit*, in the beginning of the thirties Heidegger confronts himself explicitly with the concept of the will. In this article, we focus on Heidegger’s concept of the will in the beginning and mid-thirties. For the am-

his Rectoral Address (1933) for instance, he starts with the ‘spiritual mission of the university that must be *willed*’<sup>273</sup> and he ends this lecture with the remark that ‘it is our will that our people (*Volk*) fulfill its historical mission’: “We will ourselves” (GA 16: 117).<sup>274</sup> As I argued elsewhere, Heidegger’s embrace of the will doesn’t testify for a ‘massive voluntarism’ in thought, as Derrida<sup>275</sup> and others suggest<sup>276</sup>; it is rather due to a phenomenological destruction of the concept of the will<sup>277</sup>. Could Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will help us to find a compass-point that lies between Scylla and Charybdis, and ultimately, to help us develop a proper concept of willing, suited to deal with the current ecological crisis? In this article we shall critically inquire into Heidegger’s phenomenology of the will formulated in the early thirties.

In section 1 we start with Heidegger’s phenomenology of the will in his lecture course of 1936/1937, in which Heidegger confronts himself (*Auseinandersetzung*) with the will to power as art of Nietzsche. We will discern two main characteristics of Heidegger’s concept of the will. Both will subsequently be traced in his phenomenology of willing in the mid-thirties.

In §2 the question will be answered whether Heidegger’s concept of the will can help us to find a path between Scylla - the reductive will - and Charybdis - the quietism that withdraws from the world. Although later on Heidegger was very critical about the concept of the will and although it is clear that Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will falls victim to the same

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biguous role of the will in *Sein und Zeit*, see Davis, B. (2007) *Heidegger and the Will. On the Way to Gelassenheit* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press), p. 21-59 (Hereafter: Davis (2007) 21-59).

<sup>273</sup> Heidegger, M. (2000) *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*, Gesamtausgabe Band 16 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 108 (Hereafter: GA 16: 108).

<sup>274</sup> For Heidegger’s destruction of willing in his Rectoral Address, see Blok, V. (2010), „Heideggers “National Sozialismus” oder die Frage nach dem philosophischen Empirismus“, *Studia Phaenomenologica*, p. 273-292 (Hereafter: Blok (2010) 273-292).

<sup>275</sup> Derrida, J. (1987) *De l’esprit. Heidegger et la question* (Galilée: Paris); *Vom Geist. Heidegger und die Frage*, translated by Alexander Düttmann (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp 1992), p. 46.

<sup>276</sup> In his monumental study on Heidegger’s treatment of the problem of the will, Brett Davis discerns between a period of *political* and *existential voluntarism* in which Heidegger embraces the will in a non-critical manner – “the absolute zero point in Heidegger’s (lack of) thought with regard to the problem of the will” – followed by a period in which he is attempting to think a proper sense of the will – Will as reservedness (*Verhaltenheit*) – although he is already twisting free toward something other than the domain of the will (Davis (2007) 73). But in his study of the twists and turns in Heidegger’s thought with regard to the problem of the will, he doesn’t take into account the possibility that Heidegger’s profound *Auseinandersetzung* with the concept of the will is phenomenologically motivated.

<sup>277</sup> REF

criticism, we are not inclined to reject the concept of the will as he did eventually. We will show that Heidegger's destruction, and later on his criticism on the will, is not phenomenologically motivated, making way for the development of a proper post-Heideggerian concept of willing. In the epilogue we will return to the question whether this proper concept of willing can help us to find a solution for the ecological crisis.

## §1 Heidegger's phenomenology of the will in his confrontation with Nietzsche (1936-37)

In the mid-thirties, we find a lecture course from 1936-37 on Nietzsche's will to power as art. In the second chapter of this lecture course, Heidegger develops his phenomenology of the will in confrontation with Nietzsche's concept of the will<sup>278</sup>. In this section we will discuss Heidegger's phenomenology of the will in his lecture course of 1936/37. On the basis of this elaboration, we are able to understand what Heidegger had in mind with his destructed concept of willing in the thirties.

According to Nietzsche, will doesn't indicate a psychological phenomenon, but rather the Being of beings: "Only where there is life is there also will; not will to life but – thus I teach you – will to power" (KSA 4: 149).<sup>279</sup> In his lecture course Heidegger stresses the ontological status of Nietzsche's concept of the will: if, according to Nietzsche, will to power is the basic character

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<sup>278</sup> I argued elsewhere that we can find Heidegger's destructed concept of willing already prior to his *Rectoral Address*, in a lecture course from 1930 on the essence of human freedom, in which he appropriates the 'pure will' of Kant's practical philosophy [REF].

<sup>279</sup> Nietzsche's characterization of Being as will, is rooted in German philosophical tradition. Not only Schopenhauer, whose main work was of major importance for the thinking of Nietzsche, understood Being as will. Also Schelling says in his *Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*: "Es gibt in der letzten Instanz und gar kein anderes Sein als Wollen. Wollen ist Ursein" (Schelling, F. Von (1856) *Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände, Sämtliche Werke*, Band 7, Stuttgart, p. 350). In the end, this characterization of Being as will goes back on Leibniz, who saw it as the original unity of *perceptio* and *appetitus*, so as the unity of representation and willing.

of all beings, then its definition cannot appeal to a particular being or a specific circumstance in the world<sup>280</sup>. Heidegger illustrates this with an example.

Normally the will is taken to be a faculty of the soul.<sup>281</sup> The soul is a particular being, distinct from body and mind. However, if the will provides the essence of *every* being, then it does not pertain to the soul. Rather, the soul, the body and the mind pertain to the will, inasmuch as such things *are*. If every being is willing, then it cannot be derived from the soul. Neither can the will be understood as an ability or power of the soul, in contrast to, for example, the ability to perceive. According to Heidegger, each ability is already a power to do something, and as such already a will to power. The will can therefore not be further characterized by defining it as a faculty of the soul, because the essence of every faculty is grounded in the essence of the will to power already: "If will to power characterizes Being itself, there is nothing *else* that will can be defined *as*. Will is will" (GA 43: 45).<sup>282</sup>

Because will cannot be identified with a being that is willing something, or with something that can be willed, Heidegger's phenomenology of the will starts with the phenomenon of *willing*. Willing is a kind of behaviour directed towards something, a going after. Now it seems to be obvious that the essence of willing as directedness towards something, would be grasped most purely by distinguishing it from other modes of directedness towards something,

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<sup>280</sup> Heidegger, M. (1985), *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*, Gesamtausgabe Band 43 (Frankfurt a.M: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 44 (Hereafter: GA 43: 44).

<sup>281</sup> This characteristic of the will is founded on Aristotle. He defines will (*boulèsis*) as a striving (*orexis*) which is connected to a rational representation and is located in the rational part of the soul (Aristotle, *de Anima* III, 9 (432b5-7)). According to Heidegger, this definition of the will is decisive in the philosophical tradition. For Nietzsche destructed the will as a characteristic of the soul, see: F. Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Kritische Studienausgabe Band 5 (München: DTV 1988), nr. 19 (Hereafter: *JGB*: nr. 19). For a comprehensive study on the will in Western philosophical tradition, see: T. Pink, M.W.F. Stone (ed.), *The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present* (London/New York: 2004).

<sup>282</sup> Although Heidegger is not explicitly referring to the issue, his discussion on Nietzsche's concept of the will implies much more than it seems at first sight. According to Heidegger, it is typical for metaphysical tradition from Plato on, that beings have priority in the determination of the Being of beings. Also Nietzsche uses concepts which seem to be derived from a psychological state, when he characterizes the will; the will as an affect or passion. However, Heidegger makes clear that Nietzsche doesn't derive Being from beings. This means that Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, already said farewell to the metaphysical way of asking for Being (without implying that Nietzsche found the appropriate way of asking for Being) (vgl. GA 43: 46): „Nietzsche hat zwar diese Sachlage nie grundsätzlich und systematisch entfaltet, aber er weiß doch klar, daß er hier steht“ (GA 43: 44; vgl. 59).

like representing or wishing for instance.<sup>283</sup> However, this approach is inappropriate according to Heidegger: „No, willing is not wishing at all. It is the submission of ourselves to our own command, and our exposure (*Entschlossenheit*) to such self-command, which already implies our carrying out the command“ (GA 43: 47).

Heidegger recognizes that this account of willing seems to be unphenomenological at first sight, that it cannot be derived from the willing directedness towards something. But according to Heidegger, it is rather the isolation of willing (relation) of the one who wills, and that which is willed (relata), and the comparison of this ‘pure’ relation with other relations – the representing or wishing relation for instance – which is unphenomenological. Willing doesn’t exist without the one who wills and that which is willed; what is willed and the one who wills are brought into the willing, “although not in the extrinsic sense in which we can say that to every striving belongs something that strives and something that is striven for” (GA 43: 48). For Heidegger, the one who wills and that which is willed are *interconnected* in willing.

The question is this: how does the one who wills and that which is willed belong together in willing according to Heidegger? How are the one who wills and that which is willed related? Heidegger explains this interdependency by discussing Nietzsche’s characterisation of the will as affect and feeling.

When Nietzsche defines will in relation to concepts such as affects and feelings, there’s a temptation to connect the psychological quality of these terms with man as the subject of the will. Yet Heidegger keeps open the possibility that the will is not primarily the will of the subject: „Will as mastery of oneself (*Über-sich-Herrsein*) is never the encapsulation of the ego

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<sup>283</sup> This is for instance the approach of Husserl in his lecture course on the will from 1914. The starting point for his phenomenology of the will is the distinction between wishing and willing directedness (Husserl, E. (1950-) *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908-1914*, *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke*, Band 28 (Nijhoff: Den Haag), 105). For Husserl, the will is a type of act embedded in consciousness. To distinguish between the act of willing and the desiring acts (joy, wish), he shows that both are an act of reaching for..., but in case of willing, something is missing: “Das Wünschen vermeint ein “<Es> möge sein”, das Wollen ein “Es soll sein”, wobei das “Es soll” freilich in bestimmten Sinn zu nehmen ist. Der Wille, sagt man, geht auf Verwirklichung”. For Husserl, not the *actual willing* is characterized by the fact of the ought, but the *willed object* ought to be. The further comparison of Heideggers’ and Husserls’ phenomenology of the will is beyond the scope of this article.



from its surroundings” (GA 43; 56).<sup>284</sup> Just as Heidegger tries to conceive the will apart from the willing relation, and not apart from the relata (the one who wills or that which is willed), he also understands affects and feelings primarily as *relational*: “We must above all see that here it is not a matter for psychology .... It is a matter of the basic modes that constitute Dasein, a matter of the ways man confronts the *Da*, the openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands” (GA 43; 52). An affect is primarily a mode of being (*Seinsweise*), in which the one who wills and that which is willed are interconnected. We follow Heidegger's lecture course for a moment to develop an answer to our question.

An affect, anger for instance, comes over us, seizes us, affects us. Our being is moved by a kind of excitement, something stirs us up and lifts us beyond ourselves. Heidegger conceives the first essential moment in the affect by appealing to popular speech: „Popular speech proves to be keensighted when it says of someone who is stirred up and acts in an excited manner, “He isn’t altogether himself”. When we are seized by excitement, our being “altogether there” vanishes; it is transformed into a kind of “falling apart” (*auseinander*)” (GA 43: 53). According to Heidegger, Nietzsche has in mind the first essential moment in the affect, when he calls the will an affect. Willing is being lifted beyond oneself (*über-sich-hinaus-wollen/sein*), insofar the one who wills and that which is willed “fall apart” in willing and as such is characterized by an *über-sich-hinaus-wollen/sein*.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche has also the other moment in the affect in mind when he calls the will an affect, the moment of seizure in the affect by which something comes over us. When the will assaults or comes over us, this doesn’t mean that we first exist and then will something. We are always in the scope of willing, even when we are unwilling. “That genuine willing which surges forward in our exposure (*Entschlossenheit*) to it, that “yes”, is what

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<sup>284</sup> According to Heidegger, it is not necessary to explain the will as subjective will, because Nietzsche himself says that the will is something very complicated, something that is a unity only as a word. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche doesn’t provide a clear answer to the question what an affect is. He only assumes that it is a configuration of the will to power. In fact, this finding is incorrect, because Nietzsche explains the will to power out of his reflections on the essence of the affective (vgl. *JGB*: nr. 36). In a note, he concludes: „Daß der Wille zur Macht die primitive Affekt-Form ist, daß alle anderen Affekte nur seine Ausgestaltungen sind“ (KSA 13: 14[121]). Gerard Visser has shown that Heidegger’s discussion of the affective in Nietzsche is insufficient (Visser, G. (1987) *Nietzsche en Heidegger. Een confrontatie* (Nijmegen: Sun), p. 53; vgl. 52-67). In this article, we constrain ourselves to the thinking of Nietzsche, as it is received by Heidegger.

instigates the seizure of our entire being, of the very essence within us” (GA 43: 54-55). Heidegger conceives the *being-beyond-onself*, which characterises the will (first essential moment in the affect), as ex-posure (*Entschlossenheit*).<sup>285</sup> *Ent-schlossenheit* means the will already said farewell to ‘the encapsulation of the ego from its surroundings’ (subjectivity) and exposes itself to ‘the *Da*, the openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands’ (*Dasein*). “Willing is the ex-posure toward oneself, but as the one who wills what is posited in the willing as willed” (GA 43: 48).

It is striking that not the one who wills or the willed is *entschlossen* (relata) according to Heidegger, but willing itself (relation). Willing ex-poses itself towards the one who *wills*, as the one who is *willed* in willing. And here we sense an answer to our question about how the interconnectedness of the one who wills and that which is willed, has to be understood. The one who wills and that which is willed are interconnected in the exposure (*Entschlossenheit*) of willing. Heidegger states that this interconnectedness has the character of law-giving; ‘Willing is the ex-posure to self-command’ (GA 43: 47). This exposure to self-command is on the one hand the exposure to the command of the one who wills to *be* what is willed. On the other hand it is the exposure to what is willed, as that on which the self-command of the one who *wills* is focused on; willing wills the one who wills as what is willed. It is in this sense, that Heidegger speaks about the *self-command* of the one who wills in willing, namely the self-command to the one who wills, to be that which is willed.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> With the concept of *Entschlossenheit*, Heidegger brings one of his own basic concepts of *Being and Time* in connection with Nietzsche’s concept of the will. Normally, this word means *resoluteness* and indicates the resoluteness of the will of the subject. Literally nevertheless, *Entschlossenheit* means *Ent-schlossenheit*, ‘unclosedness’, i.e., not exactly will as the resoluteness of the subject, but *exposure* to the openness and concealment of beings, in which the one who wills and what is willed are interconnected. “Das Wesen des Wollens wird hier in die Ent-schlossenheit zurückgenommen. Aber das Wesen der Ent-schlossenheit liegt in der Ent-borgenheit des menschlichen Daseins *für* die Lichtung des Seins und keineswegs in einer Kraftspeicherung des Agierens. Vgl. Sein und Zeit §44 und §60. Der Bezug zum Sein aber ist das Lassen” (Heidegger, M. (1983), *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Gesamtausgabe Band 40 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 23)(Hereafter: GA 40: 23).

<sup>286</sup> In 1930 already, Heidegger sees this character of the will: “Everyone who actually wills knows: *to actually will is to will nothing else but the ought of one’s existence*” (Heidegger, M. (1994) *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Gesamtausgabe Band 31 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 289 (Hereafter: GA 31: 289)).

Heidegger distinguishes two aspects of this self-command of willing to be what is willed. The one who wills can only *will* to be the willed, when both are not identical. I can only *will* something when it is not already there. If the one who wills would be identical to that which is willed, then there would be no necessity for him to be the willed in willing. *Ent-schlossen* is willing, when the willed is beyond the one who is willing and, as such, awakens the willing directedness towards what is willed<sup>287</sup>; in willing, the one who wills determines what is willed (*Sichbefehlen*). At the same time, the one who wills is not an isolated being who decides to will what is willed. “Only he can truly command ... who is always ready and able to place himself under command. By means of such readiness he has placed himself within the scope of the command as first to obey, the paragon of obedience” (GA 43: 49). It is not our decision to will the willed, according to Heidegger. Will itself has a moment of seizure, that comes over us: “That we can be beyond or outside ourselves in this or that way, and that we are in fact constantly so, is possible only because will itself - seen in relation to the essence of man - is seizure pure and simple” (GA 43: 54). In the self-command of willing, that which is willed determines the one who wills (*Sichbefehlen*). And here we get an answer to our question on how the character of law-giving of Heidegger’s concept of the will, needs to be understood.

Is Heidegger’s destructured concept of the will in the thirties *new* when we compare it with other conceptions of the will in philosophical tradition? First of all, we recognise Heidegger’s general critique of the metaphysical tradition in his conception of the interconnectedness of the will. According to Heidegger, the question of Being in the metaphysical tradition does not ask thematically about *Being*. What is asked for, is *beings* as such; the point for departure in the metaphysical tradition is beings, and what is asked for is the Being of these beings (vgl. GA 40: 14). In the same way, beings are also the point for departure concerning the will in the metaphysical tradition; concerning the one who wills or that which is willed. Unlike the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger is asking for the will as such, i.e. *willing*. And because of this radically different orientation in his question of Being, Heidegger encounters the *interconnectedness* of willing, the one who wills and that which is willed. Also the second characteristic of willing – its law-giving character – is quite new when we compare it with the

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<sup>287</sup> “Im Willen als Mehr-sein-wollen, im Willen als Wille zur Macht liegt wesentlich die Steigerung, die Erhöhung” (GA 43: 70).

metaphysical tradition. Of course, also Kant and Nietzsche pointed to the law-giving or commanding character of the will, but the *interdependency* of *Sichbefehlen* and *Sichbefehlen* in willing signifies that the human being is not the subject nor the object of the will. According to Heidegger, the factuality of the ought of willing can never be encountered as long as our point of departure concerning the will is a being, i.e. a subject who wills or an object that is willed.

§2 Critical assessment of the self-interest of willing: towards a post-Heideggerian concept of willing.

Now we are sufficiently prepared to return to the main question of this article, namely whether Heidegger's destructed concept of the will, as discussed in the first section, can help us to find a path between Scylla – the reductive will – and Charybdis – the quietism that withdraws from the world.

In his later work, Heidegger is definitely negative about this possibility. In his lecture *Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist tot"* from 1943, based on the Nietzsche lectures delivered between 1936 and 1940, he writes the following about the essential character of the will: "To will is to will-to-be-master. ... Will strives for what it wills not just as for something that it does not yet have. What the will wills it has already. For will wills its willing. Will wills itself. It exceeds itself. In this way will as will wills above and beyond itself, and therefore at the same time it must bring itself beneath and behind itself".<sup>288</sup> Heidegger points to a circularity in willing, where the will always wills out beyond itself (ecstatic) and brings the other-than-itself back into the domain of this self (incorporation)<sup>289</sup>: "Since will is the overpowering of itself, no richness of life will satisfy it. It has its power in overreaching [*im Überreichen*] – namely, in reaching over its own will. Thus it, as the same, is constantly coming back unto itself as the Same" (GA 5: 237). He now understands the concept of the will as anchored in a 'menschlicher Vorgriff', i.e. in the

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<sup>288</sup> Heidegger, M. (1977) „Nietzsches Wort >>Gott ist Tot<<“, *Holzwege*, Gesamtausgabe Band 5 (Frankfurt a.M: Vittorio Klostermann), blz 234 (verder: GA 5: 234).

<sup>289</sup> "The *ekstasis* of willing is thus always incorporated back into the domain of the subject; the will's movement of self-overcoming is always in the name of an expansion of the subject, an increase in his territory, his power. ... I shall call this double-sided or "duplicitous" character of will: *ecstatic-incorporation*" (Davis (2007) 9).

human being as a *subject* that is willing something<sup>290</sup>: “With the subjectivity of the subject, will comes to light as the essence of that subjectivity” (GA 5: 243).<sup>291</sup> With this the reductive character of the will – the will as a movement that reduces otherness to sameness, difference to identity – comes to light.

The first question we have to ask, is whether Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will, as reviewed in §1, falls victim to the same criticism. We can trace the circularity of the will and its connection to subjectivity in Heidegger’s lecture course of 1936/37. His destructed concept of willing could be characterized by a circular movement: “Willing always *brings the self to itself*; it thereby finds itself out beyond itself. It maintains itself within *the thrust away from one thing toward something else*” (GA 43: 61 (my emphasis)). And although we stressed the interconnectedness and interdependency of willing, the one who wills and that which is willed in the previous section, we can nonetheless trace the subjectivity of willing in Heidegger’s lecture course of 1936/37.

To review this, we return to our earlier characterization of willing as ‘willing out beyond ourselves’. There we saw that the destructed concept of the will is not just ecstatic or lifted beyond itself. Heidegger is quite specific here and understands ‘being lifted beyond ourselves’ as a way of ‘losing *ourselves*’. So in one way or another, willing is connected with the question about *ourselves*<sup>292</sup>; the ‘falling apart’ of the one who wills and that which is willed in willing, is

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<sup>290</sup> „Jener erstanfängliche Vorgriff des Denkens als Leitfaden der Auslegung des Seienden kann freilich vom anderen Anfang her begriffen werden als eine Art der Nichtbewältigung des noch unerfahrbaren *Da-seins*“ (Heidegger, M. (1989), *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*, Gesamtausgabe Band 65 (Frankfurt a.M: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 179-186 (Hereafter: GA 65: 179-186). In this article, we do not elaborate the reason for Heideggers’ changed appreciation of the will. For this, see Blok, V. (2008), “Nietzsche as End and Transition – Heidegger’s Confrontation with Nietzsche in the Thirties”, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, nr. 4, p. 777ff.

<sup>291</sup> When Heidegger saw this, he began to argue for the *releasement* of the will, because the will itself is the main barrier for our *exposure* to the *Da*, the openness and concealment of beings, in which we stand. vgl. “Denn dieser Wille, der alles macht, hat sich im voraus der *Machenschaft* verschrieben, jener Auslegung des Seienden als des Vor-stellbaren und Vor-gestellten. Vor-stellbar heißt einmal: zugänglich im Meinen und Rechnen; und heißt dann: vorbringbar in der Her-stellung und Durchführung. Dies alles aber aus dem Grunde gedacht: das Seiende als solches ist das Vor-gestellte, und nur das Vorgestellte ist seiend” (GA 65: 108-109).

<sup>292</sup> Vgl. “Das Wesen der Person ist die Selbstverantwortlichkeit: sich an sich selbst, nicht egoistisch und in bezug auf das zufällige Ich, binden. Selbstverantwortlichkeitsein, nur antworten und d.h. zuerst immer nur

the falling apart or cleavage between ‘self’ and (authentic or original) ‘self’. And this cleavage or difference is the impetus for the directedness of willing to bring the self to the (original) self: “But such reaching out in passion does not simply lift us up and away beyond ourselves. It gathers our essential being to its proper ground” (GA 43: 56). Heidegger’s primary concern is self-assertion (*Selbstbehauptung*): “Power is will as willing out *beyond itself*, precisely in that way to *come to itself*, to find and *assert itself* in the circumscribed simplicity of its essence, in Greek, *entelecheia*” (my emphasis) (GA 43: 74).

Here we not only comprehend that the interest of willing is to bridge the gap between self and (original) self, and that it must be understood as the ‘gathering of our essential being to its proper ground’ or as “a *going back* into its essence, into the origin” (GA 43: 70 (my emphasis)). Moreover, it becomes clear that willing is primarily concerned with the unity of *self* and original *self* - ‘willing always brings the self *to itself*’ – and is characterized by self-interest. This self-interest of willing could be seen as the essence of subjectivity.

Do we agree with Heidegger’s subsequent critical remarks on the concept of the will? If he is right, we eventually have to conclude, that his destructed concept of willing bears witness to the reductive character of the will, and that it therefore isn’t suited to find a path between Scylla and Charybdis.

Instead we ask something else: when we accept that willing concerns the *self*, then it follows that this self-interest of willing is the essence of subjectivity. And the crucial question we have to answer is whether or not this connection between will and self is self-evident. Where does it come from, and is it phenomenologically motivated? For Heidegger, this is no question at all. When he characterizes the will in his lecture course of 1936/37, he self-evidently presupposes that the one who wills (self) is primarily willing *himself* as that which is willed (self), and not, for instance, the *other* of the one who wills, the *other* or the *world*.<sup>293</sup> Despite his

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fragen nach dem Wesen des Selbst. Diesem zuerst und in allem das Wort geben, das Sollen des reinen Wollens wollen“ (GA 31: 293).

<sup>293</sup> As we saw before, Heidegger’s concept of the self is not to be understood in an egotistically way, i.e. not in relation to the accidental ‘I’ (GA 31: 293). Heidegger stresses that the question about the self does not prefer the “I” over the “we” or “you”: “Das Selbst ist keine auszeichnende Bestimmung des Ich. Dies ist der Grundirrtum des neuzeitlichen Denkens. Das Selbst wird nicht vom Ich her bestimmt, sondern der Selbstcharakter ist auch ebenso gut dem Du eigen, dem Wir und dem Ihr. Das Selbst ist in neuer Weise rätselhaft. Der Selbstcharakter ist nicht gesondert dem Du, dem Ich, dem Wir zugehörig, sondern all dem

meticulous phenomenology of willing in his lecture course from 1936/37, a justification of this self-interest of willing is omitted.

According to Jacob Rogozinski, Heidegger's analysis depends on modern philosophical tradition: "The Heideggerian analysis depends upon, without ever calling into question, the dominant interpretation since Hegel of Kantian autonomy as 'will which wills will', as the power of the Subject to prescribe itself its own laws".<sup>294</sup> In modern philosophical tradition – from Kant to Nietzsche – the freedom, self-determination and selfhood of the willing subject is at the centre of philosophical attention. According to Fichte, to give only one example, the will is "the authentic basic root of human being". When we will something, we simultaneously will ourselves as a free being: "I find myself, as myself, only in willing", i.e. only in willing we have an experience of ourselves according to Fichte.<sup>295</sup> This example illustrates the connection between will and self as self-evident in modern philosophical tradition. And though we saw in the previous sections that Heidegger's destructured concept of willing is not the will of the subject, his presupposition of the self-interest of willing may nevertheless be rooted in this tradition.<sup>296</sup>

With respect to the main question of this article, it is far more important that the self-interest of willing is not phenomenologically motivated. The self-interest of willing rather

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in gleich ursprüngliche Weise" (M. Heidegger, *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, Gesamtausgabe Band 38 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1998), p. 38).

<sup>294</sup> Rogozinski, J. (2002), „Hier ist kein warum. Heidegger and Kant's Practical Philosophy“. In: Raffoul, F., Pettigrew, D. (ed.), *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy* (New York: State University of New York Press), p. 50 (Hereafter: Rogozinski (2002) 50).

<sup>295</sup> Quoted in Ritter, J. *et al* (1971-2005) *Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Band 12 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag), p. 784.

<sup>296</sup> In this article, we focus on our main question and leave the question about the explanation of the self-interest of willing in Heidegger's philosophy aside. For this, see the excellent article of Rogozinski, who admits the difference between the modern philosophical interest in the human subject and Heidegger's interest in *Dasein*, but nevertheless points to the "existential solipsism" in his understanding of *Dasein*: "A voice from Outside, which is nevertheless not the voice of Another, of "a foreign power which would penetrate *Dasein*", which is the call of No Other, that is, of Self: "in *Gewissen*, *Dasein* calls itself". It calls itself away from its inauthentic and fallen Self to its possible authenticity-it calls on itself to come back to itself from its alienation, its foreignness. Everything happens as if, having detected the original phenomenon of the call in its pure, indeterminate form, Heidegger rushed to submit it to a certain determination, to impose on it the structure of a recall to oneself, to either reappropriate it for or repatriate it to the Self. And this is because he understands the phenomenon of the call from within the horizon of being-toward-death, the "existential solipsism" where *Dasein*, isolating itself in its "ownness", projects itself toward its own-most possibility" (Rogozinski (2002) 52-53).

happens to undermine the findings of the first section of this article on the interconnectedness and interdependency of the one who wills and that which is willed and the law-giving character of willing. To what extent is this the case?

Inter-connectedness presupposes the remaining *inter* - *inter* as the in between, the principle and irreducible difference which pervades willing - between the one who wills and that which is willed, whereas the self-interest of willing reduces this *inter* to the same, this difference to identity. In the same way, the *actuality* of law-giving presupposes the remaining difference between the one who wills and that which is willed - the willing directedness is only *factual* when the one who wills and the willed are *not* identical –, whereas the self-interest of willing reduces this difference to identity. From a phenomenological point of view, we have to reject the self-interest of willing in favour of the interconnected and law-giving character of actual willing: The one who wills (self) is not primarily willing himself, but the *other* of the one who is willing (self), *the other* or the *world*.

If we take the interconnectedness and law-giving character of willing into account, and we concurrently drop Heidegger's presupposition of the self-interest of willing, we are able to develop a proper post-Heideggerian concept of willing. The two essential moments in the affect, as discussed in section one, can help us herewith.

In section one we saw that an affect, anger for instance, comes over us and seizes us. Willing is being lifted beyond oneself, insofar the one who wills and that which is willed 'fall apart' in willing, and are as such characterized by an *über-sich-hinaus-wollen/sein*. The being lifted beyond oneself demonstrates that willing is not the "encapsulation of the ego from its surroundings" (self-interest), but, on the contrary, the exposure (*Entschlossenheit*) to that which is beyond oneself, to the *other* of the one who wills, the *other* or the *world* (world-interest). This interest in the other or the world is confirmed by the second essential moment in the affect, the moment of seizure or assault. *If something comes over us, or assaults us in willing, than this is the other or the world itself. In willing, the other or the world assaults us in our ecstatic existence out into the world.*

Our rejection of the self-interest of willing doesn't mean we reject any connection of willing to the self. On the contrary, in willing, the one who wills *exposes* himself to the other of himself, to the other or the world (first essential moment in the affect), and the other or the world



*comes over him* at the same instance (second essential moment in the affect). The self is not rejected, but *involved* in the interconnectedness of willing.

This exposing involvement or participation of men's *ethos* is indeed *willing* the other or the world. But it is no longer *ecstatic-incorporating*. When we reject the self-interest of willing in favour of the interconnectedness of willing, we avoid the traditional dualism of men and world<sup>297</sup>, rejecting any commencement from where the one who wills can incorporate the willed. The one who wills and that which is willed have to be understood as knots in the willing relation. This willing relation constitutes the one who wills and that which is willed, and not the other way around. In this willing relation, the one who wills exposes himself to that which is willed, while that which is willed comes over the one who's willing at the same time. Our rejection of the self-interest of willing, therefore, ensures the superseding of the ecstatic-incorporating character of willing by a mutual ecstatic-involvement of the one who wills (self) and that which is willed (the other or the world) in the willing relation.

This is, however, merely the first step in the development of our post-Heideggerian concept of willing. To the critical reader the question may rise whether this concept of willing doesn't suffer from the same problem as encountered with the reduction of otherness to sameness, difference to identity. If the one who wills exposes himself to that which is willed and *vice versa*, our post-Heideggerian concept of willing is also dominated by a circularity, in which we cannot distinguish anymore between the one who wills and that which is willed; in the exposing involvement of the one who wills, he becomes 'nothing' and at the same time 'everything'. This circularity shows the *lust for unity* which is characteristic for all willing. So, although interconnectedness guarantees that willing is no longer *ecstatic-incorporating*<sup>298</sup>, the

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<sup>297</sup> In a way, Heidegger himself is still indebted to this traditional dualism of men and world. Whereas he opposes the traditional dualism between men (subject) and world (object) and the traditional view that human beings are unique because of the immortality of the soul, he maintains the unique relation between men and Being. On the one hand, "müssen wir die Hervorhebung von jeglichem besonderen, einzelnen Seienden unterlassen, auch den Hinweis auf den Menschen". „Aber insofern das Seiende im Ganzen jemals in die genannte Frage gerückt wird, tritt zu ihm das Fragen und es zu diesem Fragen doch in eine ausgezeichnete, weil einzigartige Beziehung. Denn durch dieses Fragen wird das Seiende im Ganzen allererst *als ein solches* und in der Richtung auf seinen möglichen Grund eröffnet und im Fragen offengehalten“ (GA 40: 6).

<sup>298</sup> Indeed, what is willed doesn't have to be *incorporated* at all, because the integration and harmony of the one who wills and what is willed are already presupposed in the interconnectedness of willing.

*inter* or difference threatens to eclipse by the same interconnectedness when the one who wills and that which is willed coincide in the willing relation. Just like Heidegger's concept of willing in the thirties, our post-Heideggerian concept of willing is likewise in danger to nullify the remaining *inter* or difference, because of the mutual involvement and integration of the one who wills and that which is willed.

If we recognize that the interconnectedness of willing presupposes the *lust for unity* of willing on the one hand, and is being destroyed by the same *lust for unity* on the other, we see the necessity to develop a second characteristic of our post-Heideggerian concept of willing; the *lust for difference*. The law-giving character of willing, discussed in section one, can help us to develop this second characteristic of willing.

As we discussed previously, for Heidegger, willing is the self-command of the one who wills, namely the self-command to the one who wills to be what is willed. If we take the law-giving character of willing into account and at the same time drop Heidegger's presupposition of the self-interest of willing, willing is not only characterized by the ecstatic involvement and integration of the one who wills (self) and that which is willed (the other or the world) (*lust for unity*), but also by the law to keep open the remaining *inter* or difference between the one who wills and that which is willed (*lust for difference*).<sup>299</sup> Why? On the one hand, the *interconnectedness* of willing *presupposes* the remaining *inter* or difference between the one who wills and that which is willed, as we saw before. On the other hand, because this *inter* threatens to eclipse by the same interconnectedness, only a law of willing is capable to command the self and the other of the self, the other or the world, *not* to be absorbed in the circularity of willing and to keep open the difference between the one who wills and that which is willed in the interconnectedness of willing. Therefore only a *law of willing* is able to guarantee the interconnectedness of the one who wills and that which is willed in the willing relation.

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<sup>299</sup> Because of this remaining *inter* or difference between the one who wills and what is willed, this *ethos* cannot be identified with a position in which the one who wills (self) and what is willed (world) are fundamentally identified – Merleau-Ponty's recognition of the non-distinction between our bodily existence and the 'body' or 'flesh' of the enveloping world for instance – nor with the position of the 'deep ecology' movement, in which the one who wills (self) and what is willed (world) are integrated and intrinsically worthy, independent of human interest, and humanity have to dwell on earth in *harmony* with other beings (see the *epilogue*).

Our rejection of the self-interest of willing doesn't include we reject any connection of the law-giving character of willing to the self. The *ethos* of men is not only characterized by the ecstatic involvement or participation in willing, but it is also *responsible* for keeping open the *inter* or difference in willing the other or the world. The factuality of the remaining difference does not stand over against us, but has to be *willed*; the one who wills and that which is willed are *responsible* to *keep open* this remaining difference *in* willing. Only in willing, the remaining difference is *factual*.

Of course this doesn't mean to say that the human being is responsible for the other or the world itself. It is impossible to take a responsibility for that which is not mine. The responsibility of the one who wills and the willed, is to withstand the totality of the lust for unity and to *establish* the *lust for difference* in willing, to *make* and *establish* the difference between the one who wills and that which is willed, between self and world. Only by establishing this difference in willing, self and world will not eclipse in the interconnectedness of willing, but will be *protected*.

Now we are prepared to focus on the main question of this section, namely whether our post-Heideggerian concept of willing is suitable for finding a path between Scylla – the reductive will – and Charybdis – the quietism that withdraws from the world. To put it negatively, the establishment of willing differs completely from Heidegger's new *ethos* of *openness* for the Being of beings and of *letting things be* (non-willing). We can also draw a positive conclusion. In the first place, our concept of willing doesn't withdraw from the world; what's more, it is characterized especially by an *interest* in the other or the world in a mutual involvement of the one who wills (self) and that which is willed (other or world) (world-interest). Secondly the lawgiving character of willing prevents the establishment of a conclusively reductive willing (lust for unity); the lawgiving character of willing establishes and keeps open the remaining *inter* or difference between the one who wills and that which is willed in the interconnectedness of willing (lust for difference). In this way our discussion of Heidegger's concept of the will and the development of a post-Heideggerian concept of willing can lead us to a rehabilitation of the will in contemporary philosophy.<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>300</sup> in this article, we leave the further elaboration on the *unity* of the lust for unity and the lust for difference in the willing establishment aside.

## Epilogue

We started this article with a discussion on willing in relation to the current ecological crisis. On the one hand we stated that the human will to master the world, can be seen as the root of the ecological crisis. On the other we wondered if the releasement of willing is the solution to the environmental crisis, when we are in need of a proper concept of willing to take care for the future of our planet. At the end of this article, we have to come back on this issue and answer the question whether our post-Heideggerian concept of willing can help us to find a solution for the ecological crisis.

First of all, we have to draw the negative conclusion, that our proper concept of willing has nothing to do with the human will to master and exploit the world. As we saw in section two, the self-interest of willing – which can be considered as the essence of human subjectivity – is not phenomenologically motivated and it has been resolved by the world-interest of willing. Men's *ethos* is indeed *willing* the other or the world, but no longer as ecstatic-*incorporating*, i.e. mastering or exploiting the world. Our proper concept of willing avoids the traditional dualism between men and world, and it has to be understood as the mutual ecstatic-involvement of the one who wills (self) and that which is willed (the other or the world) in the willing relation.

Can the mutual involvement or participation of men's *ethos* with the world be understood as radical environmentalism, and is this *ethos* comparable with the vision of the deep ecology movement? The deep ecology movement argues that the modern anthropocentric, dualistic and utilitarian *ethos* of men is responsible for the abolition of the ecosphere. Furthermore the deep ecologists maintain that we are in need of an ontological shift, i.e. a new understanding of what humanity and nature *are* in itself (ecocentric, non-anthropocentric and non-dualistic). They take the interconnectedness and interdependency of all phenomena into account. Warwick Fox for instance, one of the leading deep ecologists, argues that "there is no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. In other words, the world is not simply divided up into independently existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality between the human and

nonhuman realms. Rather all entities are constituted by their relationships. To the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of a deep ecological consciousness”.<sup>301</sup>

In the end, to the deep ecological experience, self and world are identical. If we experience the identity of self and nature, then our responsibility for the protection of nature *is* the responsibility for the protection of ourselves; “Care flows naturally if the “self” is widened and deepened so that protection of free Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves”.<sup>302</sup> In this respect, the deep ecology movement developed a human *ethos* in which men can dwell on earth in harmony with other entities on this planet by ‘letting things be’.<sup>303</sup> According to the deep ecological movement, only this ontological shift towards a non-anthropocentric and non-dualistic *ethos* can solve the current ecological crisis.

If we compare the mutual involvement or participation of the one who wills and that which is willed in men’s *ethos* as developed in section two, with the vision of the deep ecology movement, we signal a few similarities. We both agree that we are in need of an ontological shift, i.e. a shift from anthropocentrism, dualism and utilitarianism towards a non-anthropocentric and non-dualistic, yet interconnected and interdependent *ethos* of men.

Nevertheless contrary to the deep ecology movement, we sense a fundamental problem in the identity of self and world. The *inter-connectedness* of self and world presupposes the identity of self and world and at the same time, the *inter-connectedness* presupposes the remaining *inter* or difference between them. This *inter* or difference of the *inter-connectedness* threatens to eclipse in the identity of self and world, when the responsibility for the protection of nature *is* the responsibility for the protection of ourselves. Therefore, we reject the deep ecology *ethos* of ‘letting things be’ and stick to a proper sense of willing, in which the lust for identity is combined with a lust for difference; only the lust for difference is able to command men and world *not* to be absorbed in each other, and therefore exclusively the lust for difference can guarantee the interconnectedness of men and nature.

In this respect, our proper concept of willing gives another meaning to *buzzwords* of environmentalism like the *responsibility* for our *caring* and *protection* of nature. ‘We’ are not

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<sup>301</sup> Fox, W. (1984) “Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?”, *The ecologist* 14.5/6, p. 196.

<sup>302</sup> Arne Naess, quoted in Fox, W. (1990) *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* (Boston: Shambhala), p. 217.

<sup>303</sup> In this respect, the deep ecological movement is comparable with Heidegger’s position, as Michael Zimmerman pointed out (vgl. Zimmerman (1993) 203).

responsible for the protection of nature, but the one who wills (self) *and* the willed (nature) are responsible to *withstand* the lust for the identification of self and nature, and to *establish* the lust for difference between them. This *caring* for difference is not merely a certain reservation or humility of men's *ethos* with respect to nature, yet consists in *making* and *establishing* this difference between men and nature. Exclusively in willing, we establish the inter-connectedness of self and nature, so only in willing, we are able to *protect* and *take care* of the future of our planet.