

Reinach and Bolzano: Towards A Theory of Pure Logic

KIMBERLY JARAY, *Wilfrid Laurier University*

The work of Adolf Reinach (1883–1917) on states of affairs, judgment, and speech acts bears striking similarities to Bernard Bolzano's (1781–1848) work in the area of general logic. It is my belief that these similarities suggest that Reinach used Bolzano's logical work to assist with his own. Three considerations support this view. First, Bolzano's work in *Die Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science)* was considered by Husserl to be the necessary foundation for any work in logic. Second, Bolzano's logic was a suitable alternative to Immanuel Kant's in that he formulated his essential relations as inexistent yet real, not Platonic or belonging to a transcendental realm. Third, Reinach did not openly criticize Bolzano¹ in the manner he did the Austrians of the Brentano school, suggesting that Bolzano's logic was more complementary with his own.²

Due to his untimely death in 1917, Reinach's work on states of affairs and logic remains incomplete, some of it even lost or destroyed. I shall here offer a few brief remarks about Husserl as he was Reinach's mentor and friend, but an in depth discussion of the differences between Reinach and Husserl will not be offered in this paper. Secondary literature tells us that Reinach admired Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, in which phenomenology was said to concern itself with "primarily the discovery of the *terra firma* of pure logic, of the *Sachen* (things) in the sense of objective entities in general and of general essences in particular,"³ and further "this phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must *describe* in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences."⁴ These acts of discovering and describing essences or things themselves became the foundation of Reinach's realist ontology: things themselves surround us in the world and our access to them does not require a transcendental turn. It was precisely this realist foundation that allowed Reinach to develop and extend his phenomenological work to logic, legal philosophy, and speech acts as well. This conception of the nature and goal of phenomenology allowed Reinach and other phenomenologists a manner in which to analyze experience with its essential connections without either falling prey to psychologism or resorting to Platonism: phenomenology for them was truly a realist alternative.

Although Reinach took part in the famous "Munich invasion of Göttingen" in 1905, he could not formally join Husserl until 1909 when his law studies were completed, studies he felt compelled to finish before committing himself fully to phenomenology. In fact, this background in law was to play a very important role in Reinach's phenomenological work. By the time Reinach arrived in Göttingen, Husserl had already taken his transcendental turn toward a subjective philosophy, and this was a path down which Reinach would not follow him.⁵ Reinach sought to clarify and extend Husserl's original idea of phenomenology, and in doing so also sought to show that a transcendental turn was not only unnecessary for phenomenology but even potentially harmful. Reinach's realist approach is best illustrated in his conception of a phenomenological *a priori*. The *a priori*, as will be later discussed, was not a property of propositions or acts of knowing, but a property of states of affairs: the *a priori* in this light can be understood as a certain property necessarily entailed by the essential structure of an object.⁶

The intention of this paper is not only to investigate one likely influence on Reinach's work in pure logic, but also to address, and hopefully to correct, failures that have occurred in modern phenomenology and ontology. Much of the current work in the areas of logic and ontology, by most notably Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan, makes both implicit and explicit reference to the works of Bolzano and Reinach, but it fails to identify how the two authors' works are united and attend to the chief concerns that underlay their respective works. The present paper is intended to initiate a more thorough investigation of these features of their works. Furthermore, modern phenomenology has failed to recognize the full extent of Reinach's contribution as one of the most rigorous critics of Husserl's transcendental work in phenomenology, and as a result of this failure Reinach's work remains largely neglected when viable alternatives to Husserl's transcendental turn are discussed, and thus his contribution to realist ontology has gone largely unheeded.⁷ One can only surmise that this failure is due to a general lack of familiarity with Reinach's work. This paper, in providing the main features of Reinach's work on states of affairs, will hopefully serve to restore his position in the phenomenological tradition and at the same time present still unexplored avenues in phenomenological research, avenues that have been left dormant for the past seventy-five years.

As stated above, Reinach appears to have relied upon the logical works of Bolzano. There are three main areas in which Reinach and Bolzano are extremely similar in thought, and these three areas will provide the focus for our discussion: (1) Reinach and Bolzano share a critique of Kant's epistemologically conceived synthetic *a priori*; (2) the work of both Reinach and Bolzano concentrates on and emphasizes

relational aspects among such logical entities as judgments and propositions; and (3) the logical work of both Bolzano and Reinach successfully avoids psychologism. (At the end of the paper I include a glossary of terms used by both Bolzano and Reinach.)

The *A Priori*

Reinach and Bolzano offer a similar, and in some respects identical, critique of Kant's synthetic *a priori*. This critique of the synthetic *a priori*, and later its proper conception, lies at the foundation of their philosophical work in pure logic. Both Reinach and Bolzano criticize Kant not only in respect to his definition of synthetic *a priori* but also with respect to his view of its application and described domain. Both want to keep the synthetic and analytic division of the *a priori*, but along lines different from those suggested by Kant.

In 1914 Reinach gave a lecture in Marburg, the seat of Neo-Kantianism in Germany, titled "What is Phenomenology?" a large portion of which was devoted to a discussion of how the *a priori* had been misunderstood, restricted, and utterly impoverished by Kant and the Neo-Kantians.⁸ In order to rectify this error, Reinach spoke of the necessity for philosophers to reject two motifs found in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*: that of the subjectivization of the *a priori* and that of its arbitrary restriction only to a few realms, such as mathematics and natural science, in spite of the fact that its governing influence extends absolutely and universally.⁹ In the end, Reinach and the Neo-Kantians did come to agree that *a priori* knowledge was not *derived from* experience, a claim that Kant himself had emphatically asserted. Yet there was to be no agreement reached on Reinach's position that states of affairs, which included the *a priori*, existed independently of our activity of constitution.¹⁰ Briefly, *a priori* knowledge, for Reinach, involves the subject viewing and knowing essences through intuitional acts; no sense perception is involved or necessary. Reinach advocates that one can come to intuit and see *a priori* connections through using the phenomenological method, and from this one can come to study essential connections among phenomena.¹¹ As Dubois writes, "Yes, we may speak of *a priori* knowledge, and *a priori* judgments. But these are so called because the instance of knowledge stems from the apprehension¹² of an *a priori* state of affairs, or the judgment has as its objectual correlate such a state of affairs."¹³ For Reinach, *apriority* was a property of states of affairs and was so by virtue of the essential connections that existed among states of affairs; in other words, the essential connections among states of affairs act as the carriers of the *a*

priori property. Thus, for Reinach, the *a priori* was an ontological rather than an epistemological phenomenon.

Reinach further illustrates his point, that Kant overly restricted the *a priori*, in his paper titled "The *A Priori* Foundations of Civil Law":

Insofar as philosophy is ontology or the *a priori* theory of objects, it has to do with the analysis of all possible kinds of object.... The laws, too, which hold for these objects are of the greatest philosophical interest. They are *a priori* laws, and in fact, as we can add, synthetic *a priori* laws. If there could hitherto be no doubt as to the fact that Kant limited much too narrowly the sphere of these laws, there can be even less doubt after the discovery of the *a priori* theory of right. Together with pure mathematics and pure natural science there is also a pure science of right which also consists in strictly *a priori* and synthetic propositions and which serves as the foundation for the disciplines which are not *a priori*, indeed even for such as stand outside the antithesis of *a priori* and empirical.¹⁴

In other words, the scope of the *a priori* extends far beyond the natural sciences and mathematics to the realm of legal philosophy: the foundations of the law are synthetic *a priori* propositions, and the natural consequence of this extension is that many other disciplines not thought to have anything *a priori* about them must now be recognized as having an *a priori* foundation. Configuring the *a priori* as ontological rather than epistemological allows Reinach to correct the gross errors committed against the *a priori*, thus allowing it to occupy its proper domain.

For Reinach, the *a priori* and its connections obtain whether or not men or other subjects acknowledge them, and "In and for itself, the *a priori* has not even the least thing to do with thinking and knowing.... But, in truth, our problem has nothing to do with laws of thought. Rather, here we have to do with the fact that such and such a property or event is grounded in the nature of something."¹⁵ Here, once again, Reinach reiterates his point that the *a priori* must be ontological in nature and cannot be merely epistemological, since conceiving it epistemologically would inhibit its independence and its objectivity. Reinach further tells us that *a priori* connections are universal in scope and strictly necessary, this necessity deriving from being and not merely thought.¹⁶

Bolzano had numerous criticisms of Kant's philosophy, but the most important for our present purpose was his criticism of Kant's conception of the synthetic *a priori*. Like Reinach, Bolzano saw Kant's conception of the *a priori* as too narrow and lacking. Bolzano wrote that Kant's account was directed mainly toward the disciplines of logic, mathematics, physics,

and metaphysics, thus failing to provide a satisfactory explanation of the origin of practical judgments, which must also be synthetic, and of the judgments of certain other theoretical sciences, such as aesthetics.¹⁷ This criticism runs along the same lines as Reinach's maintaining that in defining the parameters of the synthetic *a priori* too narrowly, Kant's conception leaves out important judgments that can be synthetic *a priori* in nature. Practical judgments, here, would be very similar to Reinach's legal entities discussed in "The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law," legal entities such as obligation, promising, and claim. Bolzano also criticizes Kant for excluding some judgments from the domain of synthetic *a priori* that rightfully belong there. Bolzano perceived Kant as assuming that logic (i.e., general logic) consisted of nothing but analytic judgments and took this to be false, counting among propositions of logic such assertions as: "there are ideas," "there are simple and complex ideas," "there are intuitions and concepts."¹⁸ In addition, while the proposition "if all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal" might reasonably be called analytic in the wider sense, the rule itself, namely that from two propositions of the form "A is B" and "B is C" a third proposition of the form "A is C" follows, is a synthetic truth.¹⁹ Thus, Bolzano's second critique also runs along the same lines as Reinach's criticism of Kant: the synthetic *a priori*, and the *a priori* in general for that matter, as conceived by Kant was far too restricted and excludes things that rightfully are synthetic *a priori*.

Relations Between

Both Reinach and Bolzano emphasize relational aspects between things like judgments and speech acts. Bolzano's *ideas in themselves* and *propositions in themselves* resemble Reinach's *states of affairs* in that they too substantiate the relationship between judgments and the objects judged. They also act to relate propositions together, and subsist in a way that is neither real nor ideal. States of affairs are essential connections that exist between the thing judged and the properties judged—the being red of the rose—and thus are different from the actual rose and also different from the proposition "that rose is red." Much of Reinach's work on judgment revolves around his work on states of affairs. Reinach gives six essential characteristics of states of affairs, which by no means are exhaustive or constitute a definition, yet prove sufficient in that every entity to which they apply would be a state of affairs. These essential marks are meant to distinguish states of affairs from ordinary propositions and objects.²⁰ Reinach sees states of affairs as: (1) those entities which are believed or asserted and thus are the objectual-correlates of judgments; (2) the bearers of ontological modalities such as

possibility and necessity; (3) those entities which stand in the relation of ground and consequent; (4) those entities which stand in the relation of contradictory positivity and negativity; (5) obtaining or not obtaining (as opposed to existing)²¹—and given (4) above, either a state of affairs obtains or its contradictory opposite obtains; (6) neither sensually perceived nor intuited, but apprehended or discerned on the basis of perception and intuition.²²

Being *a priori* in nature entails not only that states of affairs are independent of any judgment or cognition in our minds but also that they follow strict laws that exist independently of our acknowledgment as well. As Reinach explains: "In immersing ourselves in the essence of these entities (states of affairs), we spiritually see what holds for them as a matter of strict law; we grasp connections in a manner analogous in the nature of numbers and of geometrical forms: that a thing is so, is grounded here in the essence of the thing which is so."²³ Once again, Reinach emphasizes the kind of immaterial existence that states of affairs have, and also that states of affairs and the laws they follow are, like the principles of mathematics, immutable and strictly necessary. Later, in his lecture *Concerning Phenomenology*, he reiterates this exact point: "The laws in question hold of the essences as such, in virtue of their nature (*Wesen*). There is no accidentally-being-so in essences, but rather a necessarily-having-to-be-so, and an essentially-cannot-be-otherwise."²⁴

A key distinction Reinach draws is that between judgments and states of affairs: an object itself cannot be judged, only the *being-such-and-such of an object* can be judged. Thus my judgment is not truly directed at the physical rose, but only at the *being-red* of the rose, or the *being-white* of the rose. To judge that the rose is red is to posit the *being red of the rose*, which is a state of affairs, and this differs from the rose itself: "The red rose, this concrete unity-complex, is the thing which underlies all these states of affairs. In the case of the rose, we can speak of existence; in the case of the states of affairs based on it, it would be better to speak of obtaining"²⁵ In other words, the rose itself might be fragrant or might wilt or become diseased, whereas the *being red of the rose* cannot change at all. This discussion illustrates not only how states of affairs differ from judgments, but also how perception differs from apprehension; I *perceive* the physical rose, whereas I *apprehend* the state of affairs of its *being-red*.

Judgments about the rose—such as "the rose is red," "the rose is the substantial bearer of the red," or "redness inheres in the rose"—all pick out a state of affairs, namely, the *being-red* of the rose. Even though all the judgments listed differ slightly in meaning, they are all grounded in the same factual material: the rose being red. However, as each judgment approaches this factual material in a different way, they must be

recognized as distinct: only in the judgments "the rose is the substantial bearer of the red" and "redness inheres in the rose" do objective relations occur—that is, relations of subsistence and inherence between the judgment and the thing being judged—but the same cannot be said for "the rose is red," for no relation is posited here at all.²⁶ This further establishes the difference between the physical red rose (the object) and the *being-red* of the physical rose (the state of affairs).²⁷

Here we arrive at Reinach's view of relations, ontological in nature, and states of affairs. The relation expressed in the proposition "k is similar to m" is one that can take on modalities, one that may stand in the relation of contradictory opposition, and one that may be asserted or apprehended; it is, in short, a state of affairs. The other relation cited, i.e., "k has a similarity with m," is substantivized and thus cannot take on modalities, cannot stand in the relation of contradictory opposition, and cannot be asserted or apprehended.²⁸ Relations of this kind are not states of affairs, but rather are contained in states of affairs as objectual elements.²⁹ From what has been said, one can clearly see not only what states of affairs are, but also how they function as relational material.

Reinach died at thirty-four years of age in World War I, and thus did not live long enough to finish his work on states of affairs. The only clues one can gain as to where Reinach intended to take his work on states of affairs lie within his personal notebooks (those that survive) and between the lines of the published articles he wrote. The furthering of Reinach's project could benefit from Bolzano's work on logic mainly in the area of triadic relations of compatibility. The relation stated above that is a state of affairs, expressed in the proposition "k is similar to m," bears much similarity to Bolzano's work on logical relations among propositions that are compatible. The clearest way to see how Bolzano's work involves relations is by analyzing the inter-relatedness of his terminology. First, there is the relationship between *ideas in themselves* and *propositions in themselves*: to form a concept of a proposition in itself, one must form the concept of an idea in itself, since the latter is a part of the former³⁰. There is also the relationship between ideas in themselves and subjective ideas: the idea in itself is the matter or stuff of a subjective idea.³¹ Ideas in themselves are related to subjective ideas in much the same way as a person is related to their painted portrait.³² A relationship also exists between *proposition in itself* and *truth in itself*: when a proposition is verified, whether immediately or in the future, it is said to contain an objective truth (or a truth in itself), and since a spoken proposition is constituted by a proposition in itself, there is a direct relationship between truth in itself and proposition in itself. As Bolzano writes: "Once it is recognized that it is necessary or even simply useful to speak of *truths in themselves*, i.e., to speak of truths irrespective of whether or not they

have been recognized by anyone, and *especially of the connections between them*, then it will not be denied that the concept of *sentences in themselves* in the indicated sense deserves to be introduced into logic."³³ In other words, once logicians recognize the necessity of objective or essential truths and the connections said truths establish between judgments (or what he calls propositions) and things in the world, their rightful place can no longer be denied in logic.

Further, there is Bolzano's work on triadic relations of compatibility described in his essay titled "On Mathematical Method". In §8, Bolzano speaks of examining the behavior of propositions when parts of them are substituted, or rather, how the truth of a proposition is affected when parts of it are seen as variable, in that the proposition either holds or does not hold. This examination of a proposition's behavior when parts of it are assumed variable leads Bolzano into a discussion of the compatibility and incompatibility of propositions. Bolzano's relation of compatibility states: "The first noteworthy case that can hold occurs when the propositions to be compared with each other *A, B, C, D, ...* and the components in these are assumed variable *i, j, ...* make all of *A, B, C, D, ...* true. And in this case I would say that the propositions *A, B, C, D, ...* are *concordant* or *compatible*."³⁴ Bolzano includes under compatibility relations those of deducibility, equivalence, subordination, and overlapping. Conversely, a relation of incompatibility occurs "when the propositions *A, B, C, D, ...* and the components in these assumed to be variable *i, j, ...* are so constituted that it is not possible to replace these components with any ideas that render all propositions true."³⁵ Thus, for a relation to be compatible one must be able to substitute the variable parts and still have the propositions involved turn out true. For a relation to be incompatible the contrary must occur: the parts substituted must render all propositions involved false.

Rolf George's paper "Bolzano's Programme and Abstract Objects" criticizes Bolzano scholars for occupying themselves with the ontology of propositions in themselves, ideas in themselves, and truth in itself, in so doing ignoring the relations that exist between them. Scholars have spent much time elucidating what Bolzano's propositions in themselves and ideas in themselves are, things that Bolzano only gave explicative definitions for, instead of looking to the various relations obtaining among propositions and ideas. George's point is important: when one focuses too intently on the definitions or explanation of terms, rather than on how they work in a relationship with other elements in a given theory (thus isolating the terms completely), key ideas about those terms are lost or misunderstood. On the idea of relation, George writes:

What would be left of Bolzano's logic if we just said that *P* follows from *A* with respect to certain variands, instead of saying that the *proposition P* follows? ... Almost everything [T]he business at hand is to investigate the relations between propositions without asking for the nature of the relata. The various relations investigated will tell us all we can say with assurance, or at all, about propositions.³⁶

To illustrate his point regarding the investigation of relations without inquiring into the nature of the relata, George discusses money and relations of monetary exchange. Units of currency, like the Canadian Dollar, are abstract objects, and as such pose obvious problems of existence and reference. What actually is money? What is its definition? When do those coins and notes or the check I write become money? Do you actually own the money in your pocket? Money, it seems, is brought into existence during exchange, when converting credit into debit or debit into credit. But what are credit and debit? "Monetary units, I suggest, are abstract objects that are what I like to call radically contextual. We all understand phrases like 'my savings,' 'my dollar,' 'the national debt' ... without demanding identification conditions for the objects under discussion. When we focus on them and analyze them, all we get is relations of various kinds, no relata, it seems."³⁷ As George illustrates, we find out what money is only by looking at the conventions that govern the monetary system; we come to understand what money is by looking at relations of borrowing, exchanging, taxes and such, and what we discover is that money itself actually exists only by virtue of the relations obtaining in monetary exchange.

Bolzano can provide some insights into the ontological problem of money illustrated by George above. Money seems to have a type of non-existence like propositions in themselves; money does not physically exist, but it has some sort of being nonetheless. The coins or notes in the drawer are not actually money but are "warrants that an account has been debited."³⁸ In this respect, a coin is a token or sign pointing to something else; it is a relation of a real thing to an unreal thing. This relation is not unlike the one between a subjective proposition and a proposition in itself. As Bolzano stressed, entities like propositions in themselves cannot be properly understood in pure isolation but must be understood in the system of relations in which they participate. The same can be said for Reinach's theory of states of affairs: states of affairs are best understood within the system of relations in which they participate, as an essential connective material between the properties judged and the object judged.

Against Psychologism

Briefly, psychologism argued that laws of logic were derived from psychological laws, thus rendering logical laws no more than probable inductive generalizations with skeptical and relativistic consequences.³⁹ Both Reinach and Bolzano conceived and constructed their logic in a manner contrary to that of psychologism, proceeding ontologically and objectively rather than epistemologically and subjectively. Reinach saw states of affairs as subject to essential and necessary laws, *a priori* laws in fact, that immaterially obtained in the world, and these laws are said to apply to all things in the world regardless of whether they are recognized by human beings, from mathematical principles to social acts to natural events. Bolzano aligned his logic with his mathematical theory; since mathematical objects or propositions also had independence and objectivity, both logic and mathematics were considered by him to be a part of the sciences.⁴⁰ To summarize, in constructing their logic and its terms, such as "states of affairs" and "propositions in themselves," as ontologically independent of human thought or recognition, both Reinach and Bolzano escape the problems of psychologism. By constructing their logic on the foundation of essential relations and objectivity, both were successful in entirely detaching logic from psychologism.

A further strike against psychologism can be found in both Reinach's and Bolzano's reconstruction of the synthetic *a priori*, in that its existence was located outside the mind and did not depend on the mind's recognition of it, and its scope extended well beyond that of the Kantian conception of the *a priori*. In connection with this it should be noted that a central task of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* was to prove logic's separation from human cognition and experience, and to show psychologism's arguments were flawed. Both Reinach's and Bolzano's contributions to pure logic add weight to Husserl's arguments against psychologism and further prove that logic, like many other sciences, is not simply reducible to laws of thought.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has sought to draw attention to the similarities that exist between the work of Reinach and Bolzano, and did so for three reasons. First, current work in ontology and logic neglects the connections between Reinach and Bolzano. This should not be the case. It is a deficiency that needs to be addressed in order to achieve an accurate picture of the early stages of the phenomenological movement, one that includes the work in logic and ontology that permeated the early movement. Second, to reintroduce to philosophy one of the most important early critics of

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, one who is a realist and ontologist whose work does not fall prey to subjectivism. Third, to revive the work of Bolzano, work that has been almost forgotten today, having been excluded from the subsequent course of phenomenological research and history. The works of both Reinach and Bolzano were very important to Husserl's work in logic. Much of the work today in phenomenology favors the experiences or being of the individual rather than the essential and necessary connections that exist in the surrounding world. This current research constantly fails to recognize *a priori* structures that exist apart from our thoughts and us, and thus falls prey to subjectivism or worse, solipsism. This kind of work is so introverted or so centered on the individual that it fails to contribute to theories of meaning, theories of ontology, theories of epistemology, or any theory of metaphysics for that matter. A return back to the roots of phenomenology, to such realist alternatives as that proposed by Reinach, may save phenomenology from itself.⁴¹

Aside from their work sharing a critique of Kant's conception of the synthetic *a priori*, along with a proper reconstruction of its domain, an emphasis on relational aspects in logic and speech acts, and also a logic that escapes psychologism's grasp, Reinach and Bolzano actually share much more philosophically. In his book *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*, Barry Smith lists seven essential features of Austrian philosophy, and what is important for our present purpose is that Bolzano played a large role in establishing these key features that one day characterized the Brentano School. Briefly, the seven features are:

1. The attempt to do philosophy in a way that is inspired by or closely connected to the empirical sciences, which is associated with a concern for the unity of science. In the work of the Brentano School, this is related to a unity of method between philosophy and other disciplines.
2. Sympathy towards and in many cases a foundation in British Empiricist philosophy.
3. A concern with the language of philosophy. This sometimes amounts to a conception of the critique of language as a tool or method; sometimes to attempts at construction of a logically ideal language. Often it takes the form of an attempt to employ clear and concise language for the purposes of philosophical expression so as to avoid sloppiness or abuses that have occurred in the past.
4. A rejection of the Kantian revolution and of the various sorts of relativism and historicism that came in its wake. In its place we find forms of realism or objectivism in such areas as logic, value theory, etc.

5. A special relation to the *a priori* conceived not in Kantian terms but in terms of a willingness to accept disciplines like phenomenology and Gestalt theory which are seen as a midpoint between logic and physics.
6. A concern with ontological structure, and especially with the issue as to how the parts of things fit together to form structure wholes. This can involve the recognition of different ontological levels revealed to us through various sciences and also a readiness to accept a stratified reality.
7. An over-riding interest in the relation of a macro-phenomenon (like social sciences or ethics) to the mental experiences or micro-phenomenon that either underlies them or is associated with them.⁴²

The reason I cite these features, and also note that Bolzano played a key role in their establishment, should be fairly obvious: Reinach's philosophy demonstrates all of the features listed and thus, like the early Husserl, Reinach follows the Austrian tradition (even though he was not Austrian-born). One could convincingly present the case that phenomenology's slip into subjectivism coincides with the abandonment of most, if not all, of these seven features. This is demonstrated in Husserl's work after 1905 and in the work of those students of his who took the transcendental turn with him, not to mention his post World War I and World War II students whose work is completely based in subjectivism and which has fallen prey to extreme political bias. Regardless, the point I wish to make is that the comparative work of Bolzano and Reinach has brought to light the extent to which Reinach actually fits within the Austrian tradition, extends that tradition into phenomenology, and one could also say sought to further the main ideas of the Austrian tradition even after Husserl had left them behind. One might even say that Reinach was more an Austrian than was Husserl, philosophically speaking.⁴³

kjaray@mac.com

Notes

1. In a lecture given in 1914 Reinach says that Bolzano and the Austrian school "confuse propositions (*sätze*) and states of affairs (*sachverhalt*) continually" (Ana 379 B II 5, 375). This is the only criticism of Bolzano I have been able to find from Reinach. This criticism seems to point to the mistake, or rather failure to distinguish in the work of Austrians like Bolzano, Brentano, and Meinong on judgments, between meaning-entities and object-entities as correlates of judgments. For Reinach, object-

entities or states of affairs are the proper correlates of judgments. This is fairly minor compared to the open and lengthy criticism Brentano and many of his students received in Reinach's essay "Toward a Theory of Negative Judgment," where he points out the lack of clarity or equivocation on "judgment": judgment seems to mean at times conviction, at other times belief, positing, and asserting, as well as conscious validity. Here he also points out the sloppiness of using conviction and assertion interchangeably, showing just how dissimilar conviction and assertion really are. Reinach also criticizes the Brentano School for maintaining that every judgment is grounded in a presentation, and the view that negative judgments are simply in opposition to positive judgments, meaning that they are essentially a rejection or negation of a positive judgment.

2. It is entirely plausible that Reinach had to seek inspiration outside of his own circle, for by 1909 Husserl had already taken his transcendental turn, and with the exception of Alexander Pfänder very few were working in the area of pure logic. Pfänder was commissioned by Husserl in 1906 to write a textbook of logic for phenomenology and did not complete it until 1921. Upon its completion this text was less than warmly received by Husserl, as it was far more systematic rather than philosophical. Johannes Daubert, a peer and friend of Reinach in the Munich Circle, also did some work in pure logic, but nothing of a consistent effort was made and the efforts he did make will remain vague until his rough notes can be translated into readable form. Daubert concentrated mainly on speech act theory, concerning such topics as negative judgment and the act of questioning, but sadly he failed to publish any of his work in phenomenology.

3. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, third revised edition (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), 193.

4. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. 1, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 249.

5. In the introduction to his translation of Reinach's "Toward a Theory of Negative Judgment" (*Altheia: An International Journal of Philosophy* vol. 2, 1981; cited in what follows as **TNJ**), Don Ferrari writes that shortly after arrival in Göttingen, Reinach began to differ from Husserl regarding their ideas of what the future of phenomenology should be. Reinach was very aware of this growing divergence, and so were Husserl's students at that time. Ferrari further says, "In this crucial question of idealism/realism, most of the first phenomenologists in Göttingen were much closer to

Reinach than to Husserl, for most of them understood phenomenology as the study of essential structures which are independent of any subjectivity, whether empirical or transcendental. In this they were to no small extent influenced by Reinach. Indeed, some of them, such as von Hildebrand and Edith Stein, looked more to Reinach than to Husserl as to their master in philosophy" (TNJ, 9–10).

6. Spiegelberg, *Phenomenological Movement*, 195.

7. Jeff Mitscherling has called attention to this contribution in passing in *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1997).

8. Kant's transcendental deduction as detailed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was intended to demonstrate that the pure concepts of the understanding have objective validity because they are the determinants of all objects of possible experience. This demonstration relies on two points: (1) All synthesis of the manifold in sensation proceeds from the spontaneous activity of the subject, and this spontaneous synthesizing takes place through the faculty of the understanding; and (2) Objective reality first arises when the understanding reduces the manifold to the unity of experience. From this, Kant concludes that the functions of the subject's understanding constitute objective reality.

9. Adolf Reinach, "Concerning Phenomenology," in *The Personalist*, trans. Dallas Willard, vol. 50 (1969), 210–11. Cited hereafter as **CP**.

10. Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, "Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography," in *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 24.

11. For an in-depth discussion of what the phenomenological method consists of, see Herbert Spiegelberg's *Phenomenological Movement* and Maurice Natanson's *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks* (1973). Reinach also sought to clarify the phenomenological method that Husserl had developed in the *Logical Investigations* and in lectures held from 1908 to 1913, but it is not clear how much of the method he felt needed to be changed.

12. Reinach's *apprehension* is similar to Husserl's *categorical intuition*. Apprehension is a *seeing-that* (*erkennen*) and is a special kind of intuition. One *perceives* material things in the world, like the rose, but the

state of affairs, the *being-red* or the *not-being-yellow* of the rose, is apprehended. How we come to know states of affairs differs from perception through the senses. As Smith puts it, apprehending is the core act in which we are related to states of affairs; it is the reading off of a state of affairs from the perceived surface of reality (*Speech Act and Sachverhalte*, 204). For an in-depth discussion of Reinach's apprehension and how it differs from regular perception, see also Smith's *Parts and Moments* (Philosophia Verlag: München, 1982).

13. James M. DuBois, *Judgment and Sachverhalt: An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's Phenomenological Realism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 80. Hereafter cited as **JS**.

14. Adolf Reinach, "The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law," in *Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy*, trans. J. F. Crosby, vol. 3 (1981), 6. Cited hereafter as **APF**.

15. Reinach, CP, 212–13.

16. Ibid., 213. A potential problem with Reinach's view, to the extent that it grounds itself on the critique of Kant, lies in the fact that he concentrated only on what Kant said in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, ignoring mention of what Kant details in *Critique of Practical Reason* and other works. But we have to note that Reinach sought to have practical judgments recognized as synthetic *a priori* and included in traditionalist logic, so it is only to be expected that he would concentrate on the first *Critique*. It should be noted that Reinach did read all three of Kant's *Critiques*, much of Kant's pre-critical writings and also the contemporary secondary literature of his time. In 1911, Reinach also became a member of Kant-Gesellschaft. I mention this to show that his criticisms were not arbitrary or rooted in ignorance. Reinach admired Kant in many ways, but found conceptual problems in his philosophy and felt a great need to correct these errors since Kant had such a pervasive influence in philosophy.

17. Bernard Bolzano, *Theory of Science*, trans and ed. Rolf George (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 353. Cited hereafter as **TS**.

18. Rolf George in Bolzano, TS, 353.

19. Bolzano, TS, 353.

20. There do exist similarities between Reinach's theory of states of affairs and Meinong's *Objektiv*. Reinach highly respected Meinong and gave him much credit for the formation of points 1–5.

21. Reinach explains that objects differ from states of affairs in that physical objects exist whereas states of affairs obtain or subsist.

22. DuBois, JS, 27–8.

23. Reinach, APF, 5.

24. Reinach, CP, 210.

25. Reinach, TNJ, 36–7.

26. Ibid., 32–3.

27. This is the difference between substantive *similarity* and *being similar* to another thing. See DuBois, JS, 29.

28. DuBois notes that one could object to Reinach's claim that such relations can take on modalities: "*K* has a *possible* similarity with *M*." Reinach would respond that it is not the substantivised relation, i.e., similarity, which takes on the modality. For Reinach, there is no *possible* similarity, but rather a possibility of *having a* similarity. The verbal element is the thing modified here, not the relation. Barry Smith further adds in *Parts and Moments* (Philosophia Verlag: München, 1982, 345–6) that the terms similarity and inherence can mean "that through which the being in the states of affairs becomes determined as being similar or as being inherent. In this sense we speak of *A* having [a certain] similarity with *B* ... so we can transform the sentence '*A* is similar to *B*' into '*A* has similarity with *B*'—and here too 'similarity' does not mean being similar but signifies rather the simple substantivisation of 'similar.'"

29. DuBois, JS, 29.

30. According to what was written in *Theory of Science*, Bolzano preferred to use "proposition" instead of "judgment" or "assertion" because the latter two carried stronger overtones of agency, and since propositions in themselves enjoy an immaterial existence regardless of human acknowledgment, "proposition" seemed like the more fitting term. In an earlier note I cited a passage from Reinach concerning Bolzano confusing propositions and states of affairs, and while Bolzano did not

distinguish as Reinach did between meaning-correlates and object-correlates it seems that his intention is very much the same as Reinach's; the judgments we make correspond to objective entities in the world that make those judgments either true or false, make them obtain or not obtain. My point is simply that although Reinach and Bolzano do have terminology differences, their ideas for pure logic and the existence of objective essences seem to coincide.

31. Bolzano, TS, 62.

32. Bernard Bolzano, *On The Mathematical Method and Correspondence with Exner*, trans. Paul Rusnock and Rolf George (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 142. Cited hereafter as **MM**.

33. Bolzano, TS, 23. (This quote is taken from the original publication of *Theory of Science*, from volume 1 of a 4-volume set, §20; the second emphasis was added by George.

34. Bolzano, MM, 54.

35. *Ibid.*, 54.

36. Rolf George, "Bolzano's Program and Abstract Objects" in *Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy*, Wolfgang Künne, Mark Siebel, and Mark Textor, eds. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 172–4.

37. *Ibid.*, 177.

38. *Ibid.*, 176.

39. Spiegelberg, *Phenomenological Movement*, 44.

40. As George points out in his introduction to *Mathematical Method*, "Just as mathematical objects seem to have a certain independence and objectivity, so too, Bolzano thinks, do sciences. Our minds may come to understand, for example, that a certain result follows from certain assumptions, but it is not our understanding that makes it so. Rather, there is an intrinsic, objective relation between these assumptions and the result that the mind discovers. Bolzano thus breaks with the widespread view that mathematics is organized in accordance with human cognitive powers" (MM, 10–11). Bolzano is able to do this because he sees logic, like mathematics, as a theory of science, and thus shares the same goal as science—to organize all human knowledge and present it in

the form of treatises. Psychologism commits the reverse of this, how human knowledge organizes fields like logic and mathematics with laws of thought.

41. For further reading on the need for a return to things themselves in phenomenology, see also Josef Seifert's *Back to Things in Themselves*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul: New York and London, 1987).

42. Barry Smith, *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. (Open Court: Chicago, 1996), 2–3.

43. The terms listed below for both Bolzano and Reinach have descriptive definitions. Bolzano declined to give definitions for his terms, such as propositions in themselves, because he felt that definitions were not the best way for reaching an agreement on meaning. Entities like ideas in themselves or propositions in themselves also did not have real existence; nouns that indicate existence do not apply to propositions or ideas in themselves, and thus one can assert that there are propositions but not what they are. For Reinach, it is questionable whether a definition of things like states of affairs is at all possible.

Glossary

Propositions in themselves: The very entities that necessarily constitute or underlie general propositions, and are any assertion that something is or is not the case, regardless whether somebody has put it into words, and regardless even of whether it has been thought. They should not be thought of as the original sense of the expression, or as something actually proposed as they differ from a general or spoken proposition, which is a speech act or mental proposition that is actually proposed in words spoken, written, or thought.

Truth in itself: A kind of proposition in itself, in that when the proposition stated about something is as it *is* (in a figurative sense). If a proposition spoken is verified or *is* the way I assert, then this proposition spoken can be said to contain an objective truth, but this objective truth does not need my verification.

Idea in itself: Anything that can be part of a proposition in itself, without being itself a proposition. Ideas in themselves do not depend on living beings for their occurrence. Ideas in themselves are contrasted with subjective ideas and cannot be said actually to exist but act as an immediate material that constitutes or underlies a subjective idea.

States of affairs: That which is believed or asserted in judgment. They are the objectual correlates of all judgments, and take the form of *the being p of a* when they obtain or the *not being p of a* when they do not obtain.

Judgment (Reinach): A conviction or assertion directed at a state of affairs. Conviction arises in us as a feeling or as some kind of conscious disposition when we contemplate objects. On the other hand, assertion does not arise but is something performed by us and is best characterized as a spontaneous act. Both conviction and assertion occur in time; one can often cite the moment of happening, but only conviction has temporal duration.

Judgment (Bolzano): Every judgment contains a proposition which is either true or false. Every judgment has existence: a judgment does not have existence by itself but only in the mind of some being which forms the judgment, and there is an essential difference between a judgment and the mere thinking or representing of a proposition. Bolzano later says that every judgment is an appearance of some proposition in itself in the mind whereby the proposition is the content of the judgment.