

words, there could be a way to reintegrate the infinite and God as the “other than the given,” or “other than the realm of the finite where *Dasein* dwells.” If it is assumed that Heidegger’s ontology is not exhaustive and, in fact, a neglected “opening” to the possibility of a “non-finite Other” may have a place in the ontological, radical experience of “gratitude”—a possibility that Heidegger has not taken into consideration. Re-interpreting Heidegger’s use of the concept of “guilt” (*Schuldigsein*), as meaning “owing” or “being indebted,” (193) Hanley praises *Dasein*’s *being alive* because it did not have to *be*. By stressing this peculiarity of *Dasein*’s condition, Hanley wants the reader to note the debt that *Dasein* has contracted with the mysterious “thrownness” (Id.) of its own being. *Dasein* is thrown amid beings, thrown between mortality (as Heidegger points out) and being alive (as Hanley interestingly adds).

In conclusion, I can state that Hanley’s book is, on the one hand, a rich, interesting perspective on the history of philosophy. Aristotelian and, above all, Heideggerian scholars can surely find much well-documented, well-thought-through, and well-articulated material on the relationship between Heidegger’s ontology and Aristotle’s onto-theology. On the other hand, Hanley’s brief theoretical venture, as it is outlined at the end of her work, is indeed still too embryonic to be seriously regarded. Optimistically, it might develop into a more powerful reinterpretation of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* in a future writing. Nonetheless, there are some fundamental problems with the author’s approach. First, it is objectionable that *Dasein* would have any grasp of a non-finite Other. Second, the possibility of a non-finite Other does not imply this Other to be God (whether this is understood in personal or non-personal terms). In truth, this Other could be mere otherness, as the totality of what is not the individuated *Dasein* (whether conceived as a plurality of gods, a boundless field of consciousness, a law-body of spatio-temporal instances, or a chaotic flux of colliding atoms). Third, the experience of gratitude seems to be overly episodic, anthropological, and psychological to be granted a place in a serious phenomenological ontology of *Dasein*. We can easily imagine that thinkers such as Giacomo Leopardi, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Emile Cioran would probably dissent over the feasibility of such a positive experience.

GIORGIO BARUCHELLO, *University of Guelph*

Gilles Deleuze. Une Vie Philosophique.

ÉRIC ALLIEZ, ed.

Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo pour le Progrès de la Connaissance, 1998.

With the exception of four contributions, this collection of thirty-three essays represents the intellectual labour of those who participated in the June 1996

conference, *Recherches Internationales Gilles Deleuze*, in Brazil. The editor, Eric Alliez, an attentive reader of Deleuze and an accomplished philosopher in his own right, has collected in this volume a set of first-rate essays which succeed in offering the reader a useful chart for the navigation of often turbulent waters. The collection presupposes a certain familiarity with the texts of Deleuze and Guattari; but, given some familiarity, the essays fully compensate for the effort of going through more than five hundred pages of challenging writing. The anthology is divided into four parts: *Philosophical Variations*, with René Schérer, Arnaud Villani, Luiz Orlandi, José Gil, Peter Pál Pelbart, Jean-Clet Martin, Jean-Luc Nancy, François Wahl and Giorgio Agamben—all seasoned readers of Deleuze—discusses the ontology of the singular, the logic of sense and the distinct temporalities of events and states of affairs; *History and the Becoming of Philosophy*, with Deborah Danowski, Gérard Lebrun, Scarlett Marton, Éric Alliez, David Lapoujade, Véronique Bergen, Bento Prado Jr., and Isabelle Stengers, insightfully discusses the encounters between Deleuze and Hume, Nietzsche, Maimon, Bergson, William James, Sartre, Wittgenstein and Whitehead; *Politics and Clinic*, with François Zourabichvili, Michael Hardt, Fredric Jameson, Renato Janine Ribeiro, John Rajchman, Laymert Garcia dos Santos, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Suely Rolnik, Joel Birman and Eduardo A. Vidal, comments upon Deleuze's designation of our societies as societies of control and canvasses political and artistic movements for new lines of resistance and flight; finally, *Aesthetic Varieties*, with Pascale Criton, Jacques Rancière, Raymond Bellour, Haroldo de Campos, André Parente and Julio Bressane revisits Deleuze's preference for the "hystericized" over the organicist art work, and makes it clear that this preference does not commit Deleuze to the usual aesthetics of the sublime; it rather turns his attention to emerging intensive forces and affects, capable of inflecting both power and servitude.

What this anthology does best is distinguish Deleuze's thought from earlier and contemporary ways of thinking. According to John Rajchman ("Y-a-t-il une intelligence du virtuel?"), for example, behaviourism was the type of philosophy best suited to productivist societies endowed with a taylorist discipline, while today's cognitivism best suits the tastes of a technicist society. Deleuze, by contrast, juxtaposes to the brain-computer of our cognitive neurosciences a vitalist and "pragmatist" brain—reminiscent in many respects of W. James and Whitehead—a brain which is able to interact with a pluralist and unpredictable world. Instead of being a centre mastering the world, this brain stands for the power of the virtual to make connections. The result of this new way of thinking is a veritable anomaly, attempting to build metaphysics upon multiplicities and singularities, instead of essences and universals (A. Villani, "Deleuze et l'anomalie métaphysique"). According to Jean-Luc Nancy ("Pli deleuzienne de la pensée"), the result is also a virtual philosophy, which actualizes the philosophical real—a philosophy of nomination (it names what it actualizes), rather than a philosophy of

discourse and communication. This philosophy, according to Villani, presents us with a metaphysical idealism of the singular, which replaces the Platonic *auto kath' auto* (it itself) with the *heteron kath' heteron* (the different itself). In the centre of Deleuze's thought, difference is no longer a relation but rather a thing in itself—no longer the “different than” but “difference in itself.” The fact is that this substitution would not have worked without Deleuze's distinction between the virtual and the possible—and Rajchman's essay discusses this distinction very effectively: the virtual unlike the possible is real and actualizable—the way the *langue* of the structuralist is virtual and real, although actualizable only in speech and writing. It is only at the level of the internally differentiated virtual—which is further differentiated throughout its actualizations—that the different in itself (the real target of the philosophies of difference) can be discussed with precision. Only at this level, singularities, events and haecceities (the real elements of the transcendental field) assemble themselves in series and resonate with one another as they form planes of consistency.

A metaphysical anomaly of this magnitude requires a motive for being appropriated, a new image of thought, as well as a rigorous theory for the production/productivity of sense. Sense, for Deleuze, is neither designation nor manifestation nor signification, but rather something akin to Husserl's noematic nucleus with antecedents and connections as far back as the *complexe significabile* of Gregory of Rimini, expressed through infinitives and accompanied by question marks. Two strong essays address the issue of sense. José Gil's “Un tournant dans la pensée de Deleuze,” discusses Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense* (the companion volume of *Difference and Repetition*) as the response to a quest for a new way through events and series—of thinking the production of sense (or rather of infra-sense) which can best be witnessed in the experience of madness. (This essay is also a superb discussion of the evolution of Deleuze's notion of the “body without organs” from *The Logic of Sense*—where it does not yet reach its real potential—to *Anti-Oedipus*). In the sequence, a masterful yet difficult essay by Jean Wahl, “Le Cornet du Sens,” further investigates the genesis of sense, making it clear that sense, for Deleuze, must be produced, not discovered. As he develops his argument, Wahl shows that Deleuze's is a philosophy with no room for a nostalgia of Being. Rather, it is a philosophy that understands spacing as distribution—neither as explosion nor as fragmentation—a philosophy of speed and traversing, rather than of territoriality and sedentarism.

Now, a philosophy of difference which seeks the different in itself runs the risk of becoming incoherent unless it successfully addresses the question of the co-ordination of the disparate it encounters. Deleuze calls the successful co-ordination of disparate the “plane of immanence”; and Bento Prado's essay, “Sur le ‘plan d' immanence’,” sheds light on it through an appeal to Wittgenstein's *Weltbilden*. A *Weltbild* is the amalgam of pseudo-propositions crystallised at the base of a language-game. Coming as it does before the alternative true/false, it

functions nevertheless as the condition of both. Concepts presuppose it, and philosophy misrepresents it each time it understands itself as a theory of representation; for, in this case, it interprets the plane of immanence as a set of propositions which refer to empirical or transcendental objects. It is Giorgio Agamben's excellent essay ("L'Immanence absolue") which further elucidates the plane of immanence, reading it as the field where concepts are produced, circulate and collide. In a sensitive discussion of Deleuze's last published work before his death, "Immanence: A Life," Agamben claims that the ultimate gesture of philosophy is to think of immanence as *a* life. A life is a figure of absolute immanence because it cannot be attributed to a subject—it is an infinite de-subjectivation. The question, of course, can still be raised as to whether de-subjectified life is ultimately able to escape reterritorialization. Indeed, Laymert Garcia dos Santos' essay, "Code primitif/code génétique," raises few sceptical questions about this issue. The genetic code, he argues, having been decoded, becomes the object of an enormous axiomatization, the aim of which is the forced reterritorialization of the code and its insertion in the circuits of private property. Later on, in his effort to answer those who charge that Deleuze's conceptual constructivism may result in a debilitating form of relativism, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in "Les Pronoms cosmologiques et le perspectivisme amérindien," argues that Deleuze subscribes to a non-relativist perspectivism: all beings see (represent) the world in the same way; what changes, though, is the world they see. But a perspective should not be confused with a representation, because the latter is a property of the mind, whereas the former is a point of view of the body. Furthermore, Prado, in the same essay, points out that the plane of immanence, which is Deleuze's absolute horizon independent of all observers, renders virtual events and concepts independent of all actual states of affairs.

Eight essays make up the section on Deleuze's encounters with the history of philosophy (those "unnatural nuptials," which, as Deleuze used to say, were the results of his encounters with the thought of others). These encounters, as Luiz Orlandi in "Lignes d'action de la différence" argues, cannot be spread over a space which would in turn, testify, to philosophemes being attacked and defended; they rather represent lines of flight which permit difference to modulate its many powers. A few of the essays in this section stand out as they address, in a novel way, issues emerging from Deleuze's thought in its dialogue with other philosophers: the essay of Gerard Lebrun, "Le transcendantal et son image," for its rehabilitation of Maimon's critique of Kant, and the impact of this rehabilitation on Deleuze's own writings; David Lapoujade's "Du champ transcendantale au nomadisme ouvrier," for its interesting rapprochement of W. James's pure experience and Deleuze's immanence; and Isabelle Stengers' "Entre Deleuze et Whitehead," for its judicious discussion of both, and its preference for the latter.

The problematization of psychoanalysis by Deleuze and Guattari also finds space in Alliez's collection. At issue here is Deleuze's theory of productive

desire which knows neither law nor lack, and which cannot exist except as in assemblages—the kind of desire which is turned against Hegel, Freud, and Lacan. In this section, Eduardo Vidal (“Hétéroénéité-Deleuze-Lacan”) attempts a reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s unconscious, which is populated with drives and intensities against Lacan’s unconscious, which is characterized by lack. Furthermore, Joel Birman (“Les Signes et leurs excès: la clinique chez Deleuze”) welcomes the Deleuzo-Guattarian body without organs, which occupies the space between desire and Oedipus; from this site, it dislodges Oedipus from his position of control in the formation of the subject and its accounts, albeit in a non-Freudian way, for the possibility of primary repression. This section also includes essays on Deleuze’s notion of the subject. The subject is not given; it has to be produced in a way that exceeds the individual—this is the argument of Suely Rolnik in “Schizoanalyse et anthropophagie,” where Brazil, schizoanalysis, the principle of anthropophagy (swallowing the other so that his particles and my particles mingle together) and fluid subjectivities are brought together in an intriguing way. The subject has to be produced on the basis of the impersonal and pre-individual singularities, which populate the virtual field. (J. Birman, “Les Signes et leurs excès”). Finally, Peter Pál Pelbart (“Le Temps non-réconcilié”) complains that as long as temporality and historicity are thought to be identical, the multitude of temporal figures populating psychotic experiences is lost; the distinction between Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming and history provides an invaluable tool for re-evaluating the temporal heterogeneity of psychoses.

The book includes a strong section on Deleuze’s minor languages and literatures and on his nomad arts. Nomad arts mobilize material and force, rather than matter and form, as they endeavour to place variables in a state of constant variation. As for Deleuze’s selection of minor speech and writing for the sake of *la prise de la parole*—that is, for the sake of those who do not yet have a language—it underlies his impatience with the timidity of linguistic, grammatological and literary theoretical models, which rest satisfied with the mere reproduction of discourse. Jacques Rancière (“Existe-t-il une esthétique deleuzienne?”) underscores Deleuze’s attempt to hystericize the work of art in opposition to the organicism of the Aristotelian poetics and to all notions of molar autonomy. Pascale Criton (“A propos d’un cours du 20 Mars 1984. La ritournelle et le gallop”) suggests that Deleuze’s writings on music do not propose a new discourse on music or a new model for its interpretation; they rather determine new angles of encountering concerns and ideas originating in other fields of experience and research, or of assembling potentialities and musical ideas which bond with other kinds of work. The way in which it articulates expression and content, music, according to Deleuze, highlights the “non-sonorous” forces of cosmos, earth and time. Witness, for example, the role of the gallop and the ritornello in musical compositions, which mark the continued passings of presents and the preservations of pasts. In a similar spirit, Raymond Bellour (“Michaux, Deleuze”) remarks that

Deleuze's references to literature are not designed—as in the case of Heidegger—in order to evoke Being, but rather to experiment with better responses to the univocity of being. André Parente, in “Le cinéma de la pensée ou le virtuel en tant que jamais vu,” revisits Deleuze's three stages in the history of cinema, and, with them in mind, he makes the point that, after abandoning the notion of the cinema as a door *behind which* there is something to be seen, and also the notion of the cinema as a framed plane *within which* something is to be seen, Deleuze invites us to think about the current stage of the cinema as an information table *upon which* images circulate in an undifferentiated way. The problem then is how to be among images, given the fact that the background itself is another image.

The section on politics is developed around the schizophrenia-inducing double bind of capitalism (its propensity to steadfastly liberate flows of desire, while continuously preventing new flows from escaping), the capturing pincers of the state-form, and the rhizomatic lines of flight that stake out a political project for the becoming-revolutionary and nomadic, rather than sedentary and *fascizant*. Fredric Jameson (“Les dualismes aujourd’hui”) chooses a more accommodating view towards Deleuze than the one that we would have expected from him a few years ago. He continues to lament the poverty of economic analyses during the 1960s and what he takes to be the unilateral emphasis on power and domination of that time. But he credits the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* with the search for criteria for the distinction between right and left—although he still expresses his concerns regarding the new ideologies to which this search may succumb. His essay ends by praising Deleuze and Guattari for having correctly foreseen the third stage of capitalism—globalization and cybernetics. By contrast, Michael Hardt (“La société mondiale de contrôle”), claims that in our societies of control, the dialectics of the inside and the outside no longer find application. So-called public spaces become more and more privatized. What was, only yesterday, operating through exclusion (for example, the exclusion of the other in racist ideologies) is today a strategy of differential inclusion. René Schérer (“*Homo tantum*. L’Impersonnel: une politique”) underlines approvingly the political decisions which account for the displacement of the subject: beyond the personalist frame of the *polis*, displacement allows for an appeal to the “*ethnie*,” that is, to those without country, without abode and without citizenship. Renato Janine Ribeiro (“‘Les intellectuels et le pouvoir’ revisited”) returns to the 1972 exchange between Foucault and Deleuze on the political responsibilities of intellectuals. François Zourabichvili in an important essay (“Deleuze et le possible [de l’ involontarisme en politique]”) highlights the Bergsonian inspiration of Deleuze's politics. He argues that the exhaustion of the possible does not climax at the triumph of the actual; it is rather the clarion call for the creation of the new. The possible is always conceived on the basis of what is actual; it is only the virtual/real that ushers in the new. Therefore, the exhaustion of the possibilities of the traditional left, far from sedimenting the programs of the

right, foreshadows the suffusion of the political unconscious with new intensive forces.

In conclusion, *Gilles Deleuze. Une vie philosophique* exhibits all the strengths and the occasional weaknesses of a collection of essays, authored by different people, but put together by someone who is an expert in the field. On the one hand, Eric Alliez has spared no effort to make the reader forget that these are the proceedings of a huge conference: essays have been carefully selected and arranged, with an eye to the outcome, continuity and saturation—as much as possible—of the entire field of issues and concerns that we can trace back to Deleuze's writings. A plurality of viewpoints, a variety of reading strategies, and a multitude of voices by believers and unbelievers alike have been made to begin to resonate in common. The payoff is a volume that is informative and thorough in its reach. On the other hand, if one wants to look for weaknesses, one would find the inevitable repetition that characterizes anthologies, along with some unevenness in the ambitions of the contributors, and the inability of a collective work of this nature to sustain any argument for as long as it is necessary to achieve final clarity. This said, the reading of this book is a “must” for those who want to have a better understanding of the French philosophies of difference that dominated the intellectual landscape from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Deleuze's particular version of the philosophy of difference was, until his suicide in 1995, rather intimidating for North American readers. His death prompted a dramatic rise in curiosity and an explosion of writings—not all of which measure up to the complexity and richness of thought that they confront. Alliez's volume is one of the significant exceptions to this state of affairs.

CONSTANTIN V. BOUNDAS, *Trent University*

How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics

N. KATHERINE HAYLES

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

It is said of the present, amongst other things, that it has abandoned any firm distinction between artifice and nature, abandoned it even to the point where the body—that most distinct of natural accomplishments—is itself threatened by technological obsolescence. Katherine Hayles' *How We Became Posthuman* is about how this present ever came about, how we brought the body to a point of almost total disappearance and how we might get it back. It is a story of our increased abstraction, and one that rests, she argues, on the scientific tendency towards the “privileging of informational pattern over material instantiation,” (2)