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The Last Objectivism Adds an Actor to a Given Act

Fritz Marti

(Editor's Introduction: The *Owl* is pleased and proud to honor Fritz Marti, America's pre-eminent Schelling scholar, on his ninetieth birthday, January 1, 1984, by publishing the following essay as testimony to the uncommon depth, breadth, and originality of his thought.

Doctor Marti was born in Winterthur, Switzerland, served in the Swiss Army, attended the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the University of Zürich, received his doctorate at the University of Bern in 1922, and emigrated to America the following year. In his extraordinarily long and fruitful career, he has been affiliated with Columbia University, the University of Oregon, Goucher College, Haverford College, Hollins College, the University of Maryland, the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Graduate School, the University of Chicago, Marietta College, the Marti School, Hiram College, Washington University, and most recently, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, from which he retired in 1974—in his eightieth year!

Although having long been an American citizen, Doctor Marti still treasures the memory of his birthplace and its cultural heritage, especially its Latin origins, of which he wrote in 1983:

When as a young Swiss I would look across the Rhine, I felt like saying proudly: *Civis romanus sum*.—In his first year as governor of the Provence, Caesar forced the emigrating Helvetians back into the now Swiss lands, after having wiped out two thirds of their 300,000. Since then the Rhine has been the dividing line between the marked cultural difference of linguistic backgrounds, Latin versus Germanic.—Of course, largely owing to Christianization, after the so-called Dark Ages all of Europe used Latin as the written language, from Portugal to Poland, and from Sicily to Ireland and Scandinavia. Augustine, the great authority of the Middle Ages (notwithstanding his own warning in the proemium to Book III, *On the Trinity*: “Do not make use of my writings as if they were canonic scripture”), confessed he had “not the sufficient habit of mind of Greek to make out” the precise meaning of the “books in that language which must be read and understood.” Greek was preserved for a time only in some Irish monasteries. But Latin became the international European language, so that, for instance, the

proudly independent peasants of Schwyz, Uri, and Nidwalden, only six weeks after the death of the peace-and-order emperor Rudolf von Habsburg, wrote their mutual defense charter of August 1, 1291, starting: *In nomine domini, amen. Honestati consuliter et utilitati publice providetur dum pacta quietis et pacis statu debito solidantur.* "One keeps in mind honor and one provides for the public welfare by making firm pacts of proper maintenance of orderliness and peace."—It was quite natural that this international Latinity should come across the Atlantic and remain uncontested into the early years of our twentieth century. When Antioch College opened in 1853, ambitious young men, eager to be accepted as students, would wander to Yellow Springs, Ohio, to be examined by the president himself, Horace Mann (1796-1859), who would reach back of his chair, almost at random, and take down some tome, open it at some page or other and ask the applicant to take his time reading the long Latin passage in its context and then, without having taken notes, tell in clear English what it said.—I still believe that Mann's college entrance test is the most thorough and fairest yet devised, though I would add some tricky formulae of mathematical physics. Also, the test language need not be Latin, provided the passage is genuine and difficult. Nowadays, how many college graduates could pass Horace Mann's test?

In the decade since his retirement Doctor Marti has remained remarkably active. For example, in 1980 Bucknell University Press published a volume of his Schelling translations, *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796)*. James Collins, reviewing this book in *The Modern Schoolman*, 60 (November 1982): 65-66, praises Marti for having "judged correctly that further work on Schelling depends on putting into English the early essays that undergird and guide Schelling's later writings," and affirms that "Marti's translations, introductions, and notes maintain a consistently high level of scholarship and good judgment." Also, in 1982 University Press of America published a translation of his own student notes, *Lectures on Logic by Fritz Medicus*—for, like his contemporary, the theologian Paul Tillich, Marti had profited from studying with this noted Fichte scholar.

The essay that follows presents in succinct form the fundamental philosophical themes which appear throughout the wonderfully complete and insightful annotations to Marti's Schelling translations. The reader may at first be a bit surprised, since it is not the usual piece of scholarship chewing over original texts and secondary literature, but rather, a meditation, a bold and free attempt to associate and comprehend together the many philosophical traditions with which Marti is conversant. It is a personal testament of philosophical conviction, the harvest of a long lifetime of grappling with the philosophers and issues of German Idealism. For Marti the main axis of influence runs from Augustine through Fichte to Schelling, with Fichte's non-objectifiable, transcendental "I" always the central concern. Committed Hegelians may

disagree with some of Marti's conclusions, but should find his essay stimulating and challenging. It belongs to that genre of romantic philosophical writing which Hegel himself sometimes practiced and which has become so rare today, i.e., a creative engagement with tradition, having as its goal a direct statement of fundamental truth as the author sees it.)

*

1. *Philosophical Discipline Rejects Objectivism*

Objectivity is a scientific virtue, objectivism a philosophical vice. Kant has taught us that objects are conditional. Whatever is unconditional cannot be objectified.

In the lectures on the history of philosophy (XIII, 296f.) Hegel said genuine philosophizing started with Parmenides. As reported by Clemens, the decisive sentence was: *tò gār autò noeîn estîn te kai êinai* (*Strom.* vi, 23). Diels translates: *Denn das Seiende denken und sein ist dasselbe* (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I, 152, 5.) "To think what is is the same as to be it." Thus translated it sounds like Berkeley's *esse est percipi*, to be is to be perceived. But Parmenides meant the very opposite of such a relativistic psychologism. The other version of his sentence as it has come down to us may be more precise: *Tautôn d'esti noeîn te kai hoûnekên esti nôema* (Diels 157, line 34; from *Simpl.phys.*) Hegel translates: *Das Denken und das um weswillen der Gedanke ist, ist dasselbe*. "Thinking and that at which thought is aimed are the same." Parmenides talks about the cogency of thought. A mere guess grasps what might be, thought however what cannot not be. And whatever really *is* manifests the same necessity. — Parmenides borrows the mythological figure of *Anāngkē*, the Greek supergoddess whose power none of the gods can resist. He says, "strong necessity holds thinking firm within the bonds of the limit that keeps it back on every side" (translation by Kirk and Raven: *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 276, item 351). From the mythological image Parmenides slips into a stereometric picture and says Being is "like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere" (*ibid.*, item 351). Kirk and Raven see in Parmenides a Pythagorean. That however could not explain the aim of his argument. Consequently Hegel is right, for without our post-Kantian critical insight we could make no cogent sense of the Parmenidean sentence. After all, we moderns do not hesitate in making use of recent biological insights in order to understand what prescientific physicians correctly found in their patients, though their diagnosis lacked the more precise knowledge that came later. Likewise we are under intellectual obligation to use our more up to date philosophical insight to do justice to the truths expressed in myth, instead of calling myth sheer superstition.

From our modern point of view we must object to the objectivism of Parmenides when he turns the act of thinking into an *objective* reality, using the infinitive of the verb *noeîn* like a noun or replacing it by the noun *tò eôn*. If, as Kirk and Raven suggest, Parmenides stood under Pythagorean influence, it was only a small step from that *eôn* to the spatial *sphaîre*, the sphere.

Much later, under Plotinian influence, the *eôn* or *ôn* turned into the divine *lógos* of Christian doctrine. That is also an objectivism unless a

philosophically mature theology guards against it. Parmenides did not theologize. In theology objectivism becomes even more objectionable than in the philosophical scrutiny of the sheer Being of Parmenidean early Greek ontology.

Speaking of the "transcendental idea" of God, Kant wrote that "reason, in employing this idea as a basis for the complete determination of things, has used it only as the *concept* of all reality, without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and be itself a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction (*Erdichtung*) in which we combine and objectify (*realisiren*) the manifold (*das Mannigfaltige*) of our idea in an ideal, as an individual (*besonderes*) being. But we have no right (*Befugnis*) to do this, nor even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 608, N. K. Smith translation with one retouch of mine: 'objectify' instead of 'realise'). Every careful reader of Kant knows that his language does not always heed his own emphatic warning against objectivism.

What Parmenides meant by his *noein*, "to think," anticipates Plato's distinction between *epistēmē* or "undeniable knowledge," and mere opinion or *dōxa*. Kant went beyond Plato by sharply distinguishing between reason (*Vernunft*) and ratiocination (*Verstand*). The task of the latter is to ascertain the conditions of things, while reason seeks the unconditional. Thinkers who cannot distinguish between the two are bound to follow ratiocination alone and so land in objectivism.

Let us not objectivistically misinterpret Kant's distinction as if reason and ratiocination were two objective psychological facts like sight and hearing, or smelling and tasting. To be sure, these four kinds of sensation are functions, not things. Physiology studies the things, eyes and ears, nose and tongue, while psychology tries to be objective with regard to the functions. This objectivity has its limits. Our eyes and ears are there when we sleep and neither look nor listen. If objectivity with regard to seeing and hearing means to ascertain the physical stimulus that affects our eyes and ears then such objectivity is impossible when, in deep sleep, our eyes are closed and no air oscillation reaching our ears has awakened us. Yet if sleepers dream, they do see figures and hear sounds. Then the psychologist must ask the physiologist to look for occurrences in the brain which could stimulate the brain centers of vision and hearing. Still there is a radical difference between physical stimuli and mental perceptions. The latter are not objects and cannot be objectively ascertained. In Fichtean language, only I can know what is the meaning of "I" and what I really am.

As Augustine has stressed, the real question is not whether I dream or am awake, but whether or not I am alive. And "the innermost knowledge we can have is our knowledge that we are alive" (*De Trin.* XV, xii, 21).

2. *Philosophy Must Start from the Alive "I"*

This critical and fundamental philosophical insight has been formulated by Augustine, Descartes, Kant and Fichte.

AUGUSTINE wrote in *De Vera Religione* (XXXIX, 72): *Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas. Et si tuam naturam mutabilem*

inveneris, transcede et teipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. . . . Cum ad seipsam veritas non utique ratiocinando pervenit, sed quod ratiocinantes appetunt, ipsa sit. Vide ibi convenientiam qua superior esse non possit, et ipse conveni cum ea. Confitere te non esse quod ipsa est, siquidem se ipsa non quaerit; tu autem ad ipsam quaerendo venisti.—“Do not go outside, go back into your self; truth dwells in the inner man. And if you find your nature inconstant, go deeper, beyond yourself. But remember that, in so transcending yourself, you transcend the ratiocinating soul. . . . Truth does not come to itself by seeking arguments but is itself what those seek who argue. Behold there the togetherness higher than which there is none, and do come together with it. Confess that you are not truth, for truth does not seek itself, but you have come seeking it.”—Erich Przywara speaks of *creatura rationalis*, “be it in an angelic spirit or in the human soul” (*Ep.* 140, xxiii, 56) and we owe him the striking translation, “a creature fit to inquire into its own ground,” or *ratio essendi* (*Augustinus. Die Gestalt als Gefüge.* 1934. 134:24). This inquiry, however, is not the same as seeking arguments in the plural, which is what ratiocination or *Verstand* does. Of course Augustine does not yet make the sharp conceptual distinction of Kant between reason (*Vernunft*) and ratiocination. But he does say that the ratiocinating soul can and ought to be transcended; Kant would say by reason, Augustine implies by our innermost, because God is “closer to myself than my innermost” (*Conf.* III, vi, 11).—*Haec est enim vis verae divinitatis, ut creaturae rationali iam ratione utenti, non omnino ac penitus possit abscondi* (*Tract. in Jb.* 106:4). “For this is the power of true divinity that it cannot be hidden entirely and inwardly from the creature that can inquire into its own ground and already does so inquire.”

DESCARTES does not call himself a disciple of Augustine, but like Augustine he does stress the systematic importance of doubt. (Compare Augustine’s *De Trin.* X, x, 14.) Doubt seeks certainty. And the first indubitable certainty is found in the simple *cogito sum*, “I am thinking—I am.” (The *ergo* is Descartes’ own later and regrettable insertion into the immediacy of the “I am.”) My being is a reality, *res*, the first reality of which I can be certain. In this sense the word *res* does designate the alive “I am.” But *res* could also mean a thing, even matter. And Descartes does not protest against the Duc de Luynes’ translation of *res cogitans* as *une chose qui pense*, a thinking thing. As a typical objectivism of ratiocination this turns the immediacy of the I into a dubitable because mediated entity. It turns unconditional certainty into a conditional. Thus, for Descartes, the knowledge of God likewise becomes something mediated. Possibly as late as 1854 Schelling wrote: “One can see that Descartes wanted to posit the existence of God in *pure thinking*. But this thought proved abortive because he inserted a mediating concept (the concept that existence is a perfection; its shortest expression, by Malebranche: *l’existence étant une perfection, elle est nécessairement renfermée dans celui qui les a toutes*) and thus furnished a mere inference. That, however, cannot touch the topic of which Plato said that reason itself touches it; *Rep.* 511b: *hoū autōs ho lōgos hāptetai*” (Schelling XI, 270). “God’s existence is at once and immediately specific. From an indefinite being of God one can go nowhere. Therefore neither Descartes nor those who followed him on this path could reach a viable philosophy (*Wissenschaft*)” (XI, 274).

What was needed was KANT's explicit distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. Ratiocination investigates whatever is conditional. But it is the "peculiar principle of reason to discover the unconditional wherewith the unity of ratiocination itself is completed" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 365). In Kantian jargon, ratiocination deals with *phenomena*, reason seeks the *noumenon*, that is, the truly knowable, as the Greek word says. The noun *phenomenon* comes from the verb *phainein*, to appear. Appearance however has two meanings. An actor appears on the stage, in the flesh, but he merely appears to be Henry V; the real king is long dead. — The *Critique of Pure Reason* is a tough book that retains many a pre-Kantian passage. Many have misread it and honestly believe Kant taught that objects are mere appearances. That was the teaching of Berkeley which Kant wanted to annul in order to confirm natural science in its realism. When a critically confirmed ratiocination studies the conditions of objective existence its task is endless but by no means hopeless. It leads from condition to condition. All objects are conditional. The unconditional is not an object. For an uncritical rationalistic mind it does not exist. Traditionally we call it God. Kant says the concept of God does "not belong to physics but to morality (*zur Moral*)" (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Cassirer ed., V, 152). For "if the empirically valid law of causality were to lead to the original Being (*Urwesen*) that Being would belong to the chain of objects of experience and then, like all phenomena, it would in turn be conditioned" (*Cr. Pure R.* B 664). For a reasoning that seeks objective knowledge the concept of God becomes "extravagant" (*überschwenglich*), that is, a *vagary* strolling into the unthinkable, and "the traits attributed to a Being so conceived amount to an anthropomorphism if used objectively" (*Critique of Judgment*, Cassirer ed., V, 538). An objective use would seek "a knowledge of the necessary Being as given outside of us. . . . Only the concept of freedom enables us to find the unconditional without going outside ourselves. For it is reason itself which, through the supreme and unconditional practical law, is aware of itself and of the being which knows this law (our own person) as belonging to the pure world of understanding" (*Cr. Pract. R.*, Cass. ed., V, 115; cf. L. W. Beck transl., p. 109f.). Kant says *zur reinen Verstandeswelt gehörig*, yet he does not mean the objective world of ratiocination (*Verstand*), but the world of reason (*Vernunft*), and here specifically the world of "practical reason," that is, moral obligation. In Kant's jargon, "practical" does not mean pragmatic, not "what works," not what one *can* do, but what one *ought* to do. *We ought* to heed what conscience tells us. Conscience is not a whim to be indulged. It commands. Tradition says it tells us the "Will of God." Ratiocination would infer a commander speaking "from on high." Kant however warns against the misunderstanding "that the assumption of the existence of God is necessary as a ground of all obligation as such, for this ground rests solely on the autonomy of reason itself" (*Cr. Pract. R.*, Cass. ed., V, 136; cf. Beck, p. 130). It is Kant's point that responsibility cannot be given, it must be taken. A truly responsible person makes himself or herself responsible. Nobody else can do it, not even a commandeering God. (I should note, of course, that tradition is right when it sees in the personal act of taking responsibility a state of grace. But that does not mean God *makes* us responsible. God invites us to *take* responsibility. We can always renege, and that is what tradition calls falling from grace.) Already in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 857) Kant said the conviction that God exists

"is not a *logical*, it is a *moral* certainty," nor "must I say it *is* morally certain but rather *I am* morally certain that God is." This is why Kant speaks of the concept of God as a "postulate of pure practical reason" (*Cr. Pract. R.*, Cass. ed., V, 143). In his late treatise on *Eternal Peace in Philosophy* (1796) he defines a postulate as "an *a priori* given practical imperative lacking any explanation of its possibility and therefore without proof" (Cass. ed., VI, 509*). In the *Critique of Practical Reason* a long footnote of the Preface winds up calling the assumption of the existence of God "a merely necessary hypothesis" (Cass. ed., V, 12*). Yet hypotheses have their place only in a science which can then perform crucial experiments.

In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) Kant declares that the book "is a treatise of the method, not a system of the science itself" (p. xxii) and in the book itself he speaks of "a system of pure reason" (p. 109). In his seventy-fifth year, on September 21, 1798, he wrote to Christian Garve that, "while fairly well in body," he is "like paralyzed for intellectual work. I am seeing before me the completion of my accounts regarding the whole of philosophy, yet am never seeing the end of it, though being well aware of the feasibility of the task. It is a Tantalus pain, but nevertheless not without hope" (Cass. ed., X, 351). Therefore systematic thought must go beyond Kant in the direction indicated by the key passage of the first *Critique* (B 429): "In the consciousness of myself, in sheer thought, I am the essence (*Wesen*) itself. . . . Insofar as the proposition 'I think' means 'I exist thinking' it is not merely logical, but it determines the subject (which is simultaneously object) with regard to its very existence" (cf. N. K. Smith transl., p. 382). The subject is the one who is thinking. What it means "to think" can be known only by thinking. Thus the object (the topic) is the subject whose essence *is* the aliveness of thinking. Kant goes on, speaking about the "I not only referring to itself as object-in-itself but even determining the mode of its existence, that is, recognizing itself as noumenon" (B 430). An orthodox Kantian would remind Kant that objects are phenomena, not noumena. But Kant here no longer speaks of objects in the ordinary sense of conditional objects, for instance the objects of natural science. Nor does he speak of a *noumenon* in his own yet uncritical sense of an unknowable *thing* in itself. The Greek word *noumenon* means what can be fully known, and that is the case with the "I."

This was the clue for FICHTE (and independently for the young Schelling, who had started to read Kant at sixteen). — In 1797 Fichte wrote: "Watch your own self. Turn your attention away from everything that surrounds you. Turn it to your innermost. This is the first summons with which philosophy addresses its apprentice. At this point philosophy talks of nothing outside of you but only of yourself" (I, 422). The year before he had written: "It is not worth the trouble to argue about this point. This insight [into the meaning of "I"] is the exclusive condition of all philosophizing, and as long as one has not risen to this insight one is not yet mature enough for philosophy" (III, 2). I believe Fichte did not know Augustine but he could have heartily agreed with Augustine's saying that in an immature one there "arises the shameful error that he cannot set himself apart from the images of things of sense and cannot see himself alone, for those images stick to him with the glue of love" (*De Trinitate* X, viii, 11).

The same paragraph of Augustine opened with the question: *Quid enim tam in mente quam mens est?* "After all what is so much in mind as the mind

itself?" Except for the objectivism *mens* (mind) this expresses the same meaning as Fichte's "I am I only for myself." Like Augustine, Descartes also uses the noun *mens*. But he too means cogent evidence, not some object. In his *Second Meditation* he writes: *Nam quod ego sim qui dubitem, qui intelligam, qui velim, tam manifestum est, ut nihil occurrat per quod evidentius explicetur.* "That it is I who am the one who doubts, who understands, who wills is so obvious that nothing can occur that would make it more evident." True, his word *explicetur* sounds objectivistic, as if ratiocination could explain what reason alone can sense.

3. Philosophy Furnishes Negative Theology

In the *Soliloquies* of 387, Augustine said what he really wants to know is God and the soul. He has his interlocutor ask: "And nothing else?" and he replies: "Nothing at all" (I, ii, 7). The year before, in the treatise *On Order*, he spoke of the discipline of philosophy, "whose question," he said, "is twofold, the one about the soul, the other about God. The first lets us know ourselves, the second our origin" (II, xviii, 47). And in the *City of God* (413-426 AD; VIII, viii) he said Plato "does not doubt that to philosophize means to love God." That raises the methodical question: "By what intellect can a man grasp God if he does not yet grasp his own intellect by which he wants to grasp Him?" (*Trin.* V, i, 2). For "by what stipulation could the mind know that it knows anything at all if it did not know itself? For it is itself that knows, not some other mind" (*Trin.* X, iii, 5).

The methodical priority of the philosophically explicit knowledge of self induces ratiocination to objectify self-knowledge by attributing it to an objectified God who must therefore be introduced as a person. This attribution may take the form of one of Malebranche's perfections. But the notion of a perfection, like any similar mediating concept, introduces into the godhead the very kind of whatness or *quidditas* which Aquinas rightly and emphatically denied of God. Already in the treatise *De Ente et Essentia* we read: *quia illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per definitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quidditatis mutatur.* "That by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species, is what is signified by the definition which indicates what (*quid*) the thing is. Therefore the philosophers replace the term essence by whatness (*quidditas*)" (*loc. cit.*, I, c). Thomas adds that Aristotle coined the term "that which was the being" (*quod quid erat esse—tò ti ên einai*).

If we know *what* something is, we do not necessarily know *that* it is (its existence). We can only infer either that its existence is possible (for instance a flying machine heavier than air) or else that it is impossible (like a machine that requires no energy). The essence of an object does not necessarily imply its existence. Aquinas says: "Any entity whose existence (*esse*) is not the same as its essence (*essentia*) has its existence caused by something else. That, however, cannot be said of God, for we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God existence be one and essence something else" (*S. Th.*, I, Q3, A4, resp.). God's essence is nothing but God's existence.

I have no evidence that Schelling knew these statements of Aquinas when he wrote: "God is at the very first not present at all except in the form of sheer existence. I might say his essence is only after his existence" (XIV, 96).

Both Augustine (*in Ps.* 134, 6 and *De Vera Religione*, XLIX, 97) and Schelling (XI, 171; XII, 33) well know that the identity of essence and existence in God tallies with Exodus 3:14, the one passage in the Bible where God states his own name. The Vulgata translates *ego sum qui sum*, Luther *ich werde sein*, *der ich sein werde*, and Martin Buber *ich bin da*. I would replace the latter phrase by the one Latin word *adsum*.

This sheer presence of God baffles ratiocination which seeks an objective essence behind the presence. Not finding it, ratiocination quite logically decides that God must be an essentially hidden God though endowed with an outright magical power to break out of his prison and reveal himself. Hence comes the notion that God is a power or force. But these words designate what is measurable. A power may meet a greater one, and for a force there is a counterforce. Abstract logic furnishes the Manichaeon god of justice and light and his opponent, the god of evil and darkness. Ratiocination finds no refuge in the notion of infinite power which is a contradiction in terms. Ratiocination is the discipline that investigates the conditional. For dogmatic ratiocination only objects are real. For skeptical ratiocination the unconditional, not being an object, is nothing. The endeavor to objectify it makes it look like a dark boundary which impenetrably hides the essence or whatness of God. Popular ratiocination declares rightly that God is beyond human knowledge, that is, beyond ratiocination.

In mere words we can ask *what* God is, but no objective answer can be found. Schelling's Aphorism 52 says: "In no kind of knowledge can God occur as known, as object. As so known he ceases to be God. We are never outside of God so that we could set him up in front of us as an object" (VII, 150).

Our being "in God" is the very root of religiosity. The Latin verb *ligere* means to tie. Religion ties us back to the ground of our being, to its *ratio essendi*. Hence Przywara's translation of *rationalis* as "capable of inquiring into its own ground." If Parmenides had theologized he could have said that to think at all means to live in God.

Augustine wrote: "I understand that I cannot understand unless I live. And I understand with greater certainty as the practice of understanding makes me more alive. The eternal life however surpasses temporal aliveness in vivacity. Nor can I get sight of what eternity is except by understanding it. . . . In eternity itself I do not discern any temporal distances. Therefore only eternity itself can say to the human mind, in fullest truth, *I am who am*. And only of eternity it can be truthfully said, *the one who is sent me*" (*De Vera Religione*, XLIX, 97). Here Augustine uses the impersonal word 'eternity' as a synonym for God. He then goes on to say: "If we cannot yet inhere in eternity, let us at least subdue our phantasms, and eject from the spectacle of our mind such nugatory and deceptive games" of words and pictures (*ibid.*, L, 98). I am translating *ludus* as 'game'. I might also say 'pastime'.

I have no evidence that Schelling knew this sentence of Augustine. In 1795, at twenty, Schelling wrote: "Because you believed you could not act without an objective God and an absolutely objective world one had to put you off with the phrase about the weakness of your human reason in order to tear

away more easily this toy (*Spielwerk*) of your reason. One had to console you with the promise you would get it back later, and one had to hope that meanwhile you would learn to act on your own and would finally have become men. But when will this hope be fulfilled?" (I, 291).

The summons to eject our phantasms voices the concern of negative theology. This is not the same as the Enlightenment which merely rejects superstitions without filling the resulting gap in tradition. Negative theology is the positive discipline of not asserting of God anything God is not. Of this positive accomplishment Augustine says: "whosoever thus thinks God—though he could not yet find in every way what He is—piously refrains as best as he can from attributing to Him anything He is not" (*De Trinitate*, V, i, 2).

Perhaps one should say that negative theology started with the Second Commandment which Martin Buber translates: *Trage nicht Seinen deines Gottes Namen auf das Wahnhafte* (*Die fünf Bücher der Weisung*, Hegner, Köln und Olten, 1968, p. 205; Exodus 20:7). Do not misuse the name of your God to designate what is illusion or *Wahn*. The threatened punishment could be *Wahnsinn*, insanity.

We are in danger of insanely replacing diplomatic patience and restraint by an immature and amateurish fixation on the contest between the two myths, occidental theism and "godless" Marxism. That contest is not a matter of negotiations but of the mental discipline of mutual understanding, a discipline still lacking in too many occidental theologians and in most American voters. The personal possession of that discipline would get a Soviet functionary in trouble with his hierarchy. For the time being, we had better leave the negotiations to the diplomats, and the study of the two myths to philosophical theologians. Meanwhile we might seriously ask how to introduce the discipline into our schools.

Are we quite sure that there are no acts of God among infidels, *in partibus infidelium*?—In a Parisian cemetery, the almost horizontal tomb plate of a priest showed a chalice carved in the stone. Dust had gathered in the little hole. After a rain, a woman with some skin ailment smeared some of the mud on the sore spot. The next day it had healed. Desirous of similar miracles, people began to flock to the cemetery. Louis XIV, who at that time could not afford public commotions, had the cemetery locked. At night, a wit sneaked past the guards and hung up a poster that said in big letters: *Par ordre du Roi—défense à Dieu—de faire miracle en ce lieu!*—Have we the arrogance which the wit attributed to the king?—One sign of insanity is that the afflicted one is not aware of his affliction.

Negative theology was the lifelong concern of the great cardinal Nicholas Cusanus (1401-1464). Having found what looked like an unobjectionable term in one treatise, in the next he would look for the inappropriateness of that term when applied to God. Unfortunately the Reformers and the Counter-reformation ignored him, and we have heavily paid for it ever since. It is high time that our schools and churches heeded Augustine and Cusanus.

4. The "Positive" Philosophy of the Old Schelling

On one of the first pages of the last volume of the *Philosophy of Revelation* Schelling wrote "if one distinguishes between positive and negative

qualities, the negative ones are *a priori* and the positive ones *a posteriori* qualities" (XIV, 7).

Kant's critical reflections ascertained the *a priori* forms of objective knowledge, the categories, such as substance, cause, measurability. However, experience alone can furnish what is knowable only *a posteriori*. Every beginner in the study of Kant will mention qualities like colors and flavors as *a posteriori* knowledge. Yet Kant himself emphasized that moral obligation can be known only by and in the act of *taking* responsibility which can never be *given* but only offered. This act establishes what Kant calls the "primacy of practical reason." This means that thinking itself is a moral act. Our mere guessing pops up much in the same way as dreams. But thinking occurs only owing to the act of making oneself responsible for ascertaining truth. Guessing comes naturally, thinking however only by responsible act. Acts cannot be known *a priori*, but only *a posteriori*, after they have occurred.

Dealing with the antinomies, Kant had already warned against conceiving of "the I that thinks as an absolutely simple substance" and thus "thinking it as a mere object," merely because "the subject which thinks is at the same time its own object" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 471). The key sentence of the first *Critique* explained: "In the awareness of myself in sheer thinking I am the essence (*Wesen*) itself. . . . The statement 'I think' however, insofar as it states the same as 'I exist as thinking', is no mere logical function but determines the subject (which is at once also object) with regard to its very existence" (*ibid.*, B 429). As I said above, this was the clue for the post-Kantian speculation for which Kant even furnished the term 'subject-object'.

Only the individual act of thinking yields the insight that, as "I," I am for myself alone—the insight of Fichte and the young Schelling. Replace the pronoun 'I' by the noun 'mind' and you have the objectivistic riddle which the objectivist can solve only by declaring quite correctly that an objective I or mind is nothing at all. In his treatise of 1795, *On the I as Principle of Philosophy*, Schelling wrote: "We have determined the I as that which can in no way be an object for itself, and which, for anything outside of it, . . . cannot be anything at all" (I, 177).

The identity of subject and object in the self-positing I is certainly not an *a priori* deduction but an insight *a posteriori*, after the act of the I. The I does posit itself freely; Kant says by autonomy. Yet that freedom must have a ground of possibility. Tradition calls that ground "God."

Christian tradition, speaking on the home ground of its own myth, quite naturally asserts that man is naturally a Christian—*homo naturaliter Christianus*. Schelling, however, says: "It is not my purpose to be in line with any ecclesiastic doctrine. I have no interest in being orthodox. . . . For me Christianity is only a phenomenon which I am trying to *explain*" (XIV, 201). His explanation has the form of a philosophical anthropology.

He writes: "What we attribute to the original man is neither a communicated (*mitgeteilte* [e.g., by revelation]) knowledge of God nor one produced by man himself, it is a ground (*Grund*) that antecedes all thinking and knowledge, it is man's very essence (*sein Wesen selbst*) which binds him in duty to God, in advance, and before any actual consciousness" (XII, 121). He adds somewhat mystically: "In this way, man's essence coalesces with that of God, so that it cannot move unless, in its view, God himself moves" (XII, 125). And he concludes that there is "no mere contingent knowledge of God. . . . The

deepest in original man is what, merely by itself, posits God—not by act but by not acting” (XII, 126).

What is so posited is no God-object, such as, in the old metaphysics, ratiocination tries to excogitate. God is not a matter of ratiocination. Schelling had long learned that from Kant. A week after his twentieth birthday, on February 4, 1795, he wrote a letter to Hegel who at that time was a private tutor in Bern. Using the word ‘theoretical’ in the Kantian sense of being objective, Schelling said that, “in theoretical philosophy, God is equal to zero” (Plitt I, 77).

Ratiocination ascertains what *is*, reason seeks what *ought* to be. And what ought *not* to be is the denial of human autonomy. Lest the mere idea of God implied such a denial, “it is the I which says: I want God outside the idea” (XI, 570). “If God stands in relation not only to whatever is in the idea but also to whatever is outside the idea, that is, to what exists (for what exists is outside the idea) . . . then he shows his reality which is independent of the idea and therefore exists even when the idea is set aside, and thus he reveals himself as the real *Lord* of being” (*Herr des Seins*; XI, 571).

The word ‘Lord’ might tempt the reader to think of a power that lords it over things and selves. But the notion of such a power is utterly misleading. Here, ‘Lord’ means undeniable yet uncoercive authority. Not a tempest but a soft wind symbolizes God. Augustine said *Deus cum quiete operatur, et semper operatur, et semper quietus est*—“God works quietly and always works and is always quiet” (*In Ps.* 92, 1).

The word ‘Lord’ indicates independence. God does not depend on the logical or illogical constructions of ratiocination. While being the very ground of our being, God himself is groundless, not dependent on anything beside or beyond him. “Kant calls *that* in God owing to which God is the groundlessly existent the abyss for human reason” (XIII, 164; see *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 641). “Yes, this existence is incomprehensible if, by incomprehensible, one means what is not comprehensible *a priori*. Negative philosophy is concerned with whatever is comprehensible *a priori*, positive with the *a priori* incomprehensible. But positive philosophy deals with it only in order to make this *a priori* incomprehensible comprehensible *a posteriori*. In God the *a priori* incomprehensible becomes comprehensible” (XIII, 165). But what does the phrase ‘in God’ mean? Surely not anything comprehensible *a priori*, nothing within reach of negative philosophy.

Already in the *Critical Fragments* of 1806 Schelling had written: “The existence (*Dasein*) of God is an empirical truth, nay it is the ground of all experience. In one who has grasped and inwardly understood this, a sense for *Naturphilosophie* has arisen. The latter is not a theory but an actual (*reales*) life of the spirit in and with nature” (VII, 245f.). And Schelling compares the inexhaustibility of nature with the richness of poetry which is whole in each poem yet never completed by any sum of poems.

Even the yet undisciplined reason of the religionists senses the empirical nature of the multiform presence of God, and this sense makes them declare that God can be grasped only by what they call an act of faith, not by ratiocination (which their philosophically undisciplined minds call reason).

Among Schelling’s *Aphorisms* of 1805, number 31 says: “One cannot describe reason for anybody; it must describe itself in each and by each one”

(VII, 146). What Kant calls practical reason senses what, as an individual, I *ought* to do, and entitles me to do it. In my present enterprise I ought to think clearly, and my reader ought to check whether or not I do. — Aphorism 46 says: “Reason is not an ability, not a tool, nor can it be used. There is no reason *we* could have, but only a reason which has *us*” (VII, 148f.). Ratiocination, however, is the tool of reason and also our tool. And each of us has an “intelligence quotient,” is smart or dull.

Ratiocination would like to find a proof for the existence of God. Yet “there is no proof for God’s existence as such, *for there is no existence of God as such*. God’s existence is at once and immediately specific” (*eine bestimmte*; XI, 274). Using a crude picture, one might say God’s presence comes in pulses. Objectifying ratiocination would then want to fill the gaps between the pulses with a steady substance called God’s essence. That would cancel the identity of essence and presence. More precisely, Aquinas and Schelling teach that God’s essence *is* his existence, not some substance behind the existence.

“In his highest self God is not a necessarily real being but rather the eternal freedom to be,” said Schelling as early as 1811, in *The Ages of the World* (VIII, 237). He added: “According to his highest self, God is not revealed, he reveals himself, he is not real, he becomes real, precisely in order to appear as the very freest being” (VIII, 308). In the *Philosophy of Mythology*, possibly as early as 1828 and maybe as late as 1845 (see XII, v) he formulates “the *a priori* concept of the divine being, that is, the concept we have of this being still before its actual being” and says that “God in himself (*an sich*) is not existing (*seiend*) but is the pure freedom to be or not to be *zu sein oder nicht zu sein*), *above* being (*der Überseiende*) as some ancients called him” (XII, 58), “as *ousía hyperousios*, supersubstantial being” (XII, 100²—this footnote names several ancient authors and gives page references). Monotheism “has the particular meaning that God is One only according to his Godhead” and “according to this concept is not *overall* (*überhaupt*) only One but admittedly (*allerdings*) several” (XII, 66). Schelling talks about God as absolute spirit: “The absolute spirit goes beyond every manner (*Art*) of being, it (*er*) is that which it (*er*) wills. The absolute spirit is free even of itself, free of its being *as* spirit. *For it (ihm)*, even the being-*as*-spirit is only one kind or manner (*Art oder Weise*) of being. This not being tied even to itself is what alone gives it that absolute, that transcendent over-bounding (*überschwengliche*) freedom. . . . Freedom is our highest, our Godhead, this is what we want as last cause of all things” (XIII, 256).

Thus we “must start from the existence (*vom Sein*), without the concept, and that is what we want to do in positive philosophy” (XIII, 164). Yet God’s existence is not an existence for the human kind. “The kind or the species has only an indirect relation to God, precisely in the *law* in which it finds God in potency and that means locked up (*eingeschlossen*). Only the *individual* has a direct relation to God, it can *seek* him and receive him when he reveals himself” (XI, 556³).

In 1836, in the *Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism*, Schelling wrote: “God is really quite nothing *by himself* (*an sich*). *He is nothing but relation and pure relation*, for he is only the Lord. Everything we add to that makes him a mere substance. As it were, he is really good for nothing else than for being Lord of being. For *He* is the only nature not concerned with itself, rid of itself, and therefore is absolutely free. Everything substantial is concerned with itself,

caught in itself and constrained by itself. God alone has nothing to do with himself; he is *sui securus*, certain of himself and therefore rid of himself. Consequently he is concerned only with other entities. He is, so one might say, entirely ec-static, *outside* of himself, hence free of himself, and thus is the one who frees everything else" (X, 260).

Possibly as late as 1854, Schelling wrote: "There is no doubt regarding the will which gives the signal for the turn-about and therewith for positive philosophy. It is the I at the point where it must dismiss contemplation and where the last despair gets hold of it. . . . For now only it recognizes the abyss between itself and God. It acknowledges that the basis for *all* moral action lies in the falling away from God, the being outside of God. . . . This is why the individual now desires God himself. Him, Him it wants, the God who acts, with whom there is a providence, who *as himself actual can stand against the fact of the fall*, in short the one who is LORD of being" (XI, 566).

"The desire for the real God" voices the human "need for religion. . . . Without an active God (who is not merely an object of contemplation) there can be no religion, for religion presupposes an actual, real relation of man to God. . . . Consequently in the discipline of reason (*Vernunftwissenschaft*) there is no religion, nor is there any *religion of reason* (*Vernunftreligion*). At the end of negative philosophy, I have only a possible but not a real religion, only religion 'within the limits of pure reason'. [The title of Kant's treatise of 1793 was *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*.] If one sees as the end of the discipline of reason a religion of reason, that is an illusion (*Täuschung*). Reason does not lead to religion, and Kant's theoretical finding (*Resultat*) is that there exists no religion of reason. The result of any genuine rationalism, of every rationalism that understands itself is that one does not *know* anything of God. Only with the transition into positive philosophy do we enter the territory of religion and of the religions, and only now can we expect that the *philosophical* religion comes into existence for us, . . . that is, the religion whose task it is really to understand the real religions, the mythological and the revealed" (XI, 568f.).

5. The Last and Decisive Objectivism

In 1788, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Cassirer ed., V, 111f.; Beck transl., p. 106) Kant wrote: "the concept of creation does not belong to the sensuous mode of conceiving of existence or to causality but can refer only to noumena. Consequently, if I say of beings in the world of sense that they are created, I regard them only as noumena. Just as it would therefore be contradictory to say God is the creator of appearances, it is also a contradiction to say that He, as the creator, is the cause of actions in the world of sense, as these are appearances; yet at the same time He is the cause (*Ursache* [but not in the sense of the category "cause"]) of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena)."

To create means to bring into existence, to cause only to bring about a change in what already exists. Human language says there are natural *causes* but it is God alone who *creates*. A realistic and reasonable language would replace the phrase "God creates" by the statement "there is creating," thus replacing the existence of the "acting God," as *subject*, by the existence of creating *acts*, as sheer *predicate*.

This would not "solve" the mystery of creation, it would save it from a hopelessly inquisitive intrusion and from a rash skepticism. It would humbly express what the religiosity of reason senses, and what ratiocination cannot reach.

It is the nature of ratiocination, when confronted with a deed, to posit a doer who did it. Every detective story springs from the question "Who has done it?" Does that question apply to *every* occurrence? It applies not to all events in nature. One cannot ask "Who rained?" or "Who brought spring again?" Only a still mythological thinking claims that Donar thunders and Freya brings blossoms. But the weather is not an act, and it is problematic in what sense plant life is actions.

My present problem is both logical and linguistic. When I am asked to name the one who is responsible for this writing, I must answer "nobody but I." Yet if my ratiocination should call my "I" a Somebody, reason will remind me that there are *not* two, both I *and* that Someone whom language calls my mind. The word 'mind' is a questionable and unnecessary objectification of I. And 'I' is a pronoun, not a noun. I ought to address "you," not "your person" or "your majesty."

The theologian Catherine LaCugna was asked how she addresses God. Does she think of God as he or she, or a mere it? She replied that she uses none of the three pronouns, only the word 'God'.

Thus the word 'God' stands to the reality it designates as the word 'I' stands to the alive reality linguistically expressed by the *pronoun* 'I', but not by any noun like 'mind' or 'consciousness' or 'person'.

Now if God were a person He would hardly say "God" when He meant His own selfhood, unless he were conceited and were concerned about His majesty. Conceit is a sign of feeling inferior and of being concerned with one's self. Yet God is sure of Himself and therefore not concerned with His self and free of Himself, says Schelling (X, 260; 1836).

On our part, notwithstanding our autonomous act of positing our own "I," we are concerned with the ground of our freedom which we seek in God, who is unconditionally free. We cannot find that ground as long as we let the word 'God' designate an actor behind the manifest acts, as long as we conceive of the acts as if they were the mask through which the acting but hidden Godhead is speaking or *per-sonans*.

What I propose is a reconsideration or our theological and philosophical speech. We had better drop nouns like 'mind' and 'person' and 'spirit', and restrict ourselves to the three words 'I' and 'you' and 'God'. Of course I assume that the three designate nothing but what is deed, *not* doer—action, *not* actor. In other words, the actor exists only *in* the act, not behind or before it.

The Old Testament God names himself, "I am" (Ex. 3:14), which means *adsum*. I say that should suffice us. At all events we should never forget it. We should not let our ratiocination add anything to it that could confuse us. In 1836, Schelling wrote: "One might say, God is really quite nothing *in itself* (an sich). *He is nothing but relation and pure relation*, for he is only the Lord. Everything we add to that makes him a mere substance" (X, 260).

I submit that the religiosity of reason is content with the *acts* of God. Add to these acts an actor, and you have the familiar sacred secret. Posit an objectified God, and you have a "master" instead of the "Lord God." Insofar as, by

intellect, we mean the power of objectifying ratiocination, there is good sense in the phrase *sacrificium intellectus*.

I can summarize my thesis in fairly traditional language. The religious soul is satisfied with the *acta Dei*, and with the recognition of God as "Lord." But the ratiocinating soul posits God as "King" and ties him to his royalty. Owing to his own "Covenant," it makes him predictable. The outsider, who "has no religion," has no use for such legalistic language. Also, he may see in the *amor Dei* a fatalistic *amor fati*. But faith pierces fate. Faith means trust, not petulant expectation of benefits. For faith, even the wrath of God is an act of love. If a father is angry at his son, he loves him, he does not hate him.

For unbelievers, as well as for believers, the word 'God' should mean unconditional freedom, which we are meant to have too, in our measure. To say that God is transcendent can mean simply that we cannot and do not know the next acts of God. But to posit an actor, before the act, implies a fatalistic kind of transcendence which makes man an unfree victim of the whims of a God, of any God. Whims are not divine; care is.

How do we *know* God? Surely not by any rationalistic objectification. Ratiocination *must* posit God as an object, that is, as conditional. And an objective God would have to make us purely conditional entities lacking freedom and reason. The unconditional appeal of God is apprehended by reason. *Vernunft vernimmt*. Reason *senses* the unconditional "idea of God." With a touch of mysticism, Schelling says "reason does not *have* the idea of God, it *is* that idea" (VII, 149). — To say God *is* love may sound all-too-human. At our best we do love. Augustine says: "Whatsoever can love loves God, knowingly or unwittingly" (*sive sciens, sive nesciens*; *Sol.* I, i, 2). He also says, if there were nothing more excellent than truth, the "truth itself is God" (*Lib. Arb.* 11, xv, 39). And since we love truth, we can say God *is* an ever new act, not an actor.

Postscript

At the end of his *Historico-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology* (XI, 250) Schelling wrote: "The philosophical religion, far from being able, from its stand, to do away with the antecedent religions, would owe to that stand its own task, and it would owe to its own content the means to fulfill that task. It is the task of comprehending (*begreifen*) those religions which are independent of reason, comprehending them in their independence and therefore in their whole truth and particularity. . . . However *this philosophical religion does not exist*. . . . Consequently we may well ask where the philosophy could be found that would make comprehensible, that is, could show as possible that which we discovered in mythology and, in mediated form, also in revelation, namely a *real* relation of human consciousness to God."

In order to show that such a real relation is possible, one would have to get rid of the obstruction produced by objectivism's notion of an objective God. If, like the Apostles, the Quakers and other childlike souls, one could be content with the manifest *acts* of God, one could leave the toy of an objective God, ex-cogitated by mere ratiocination, to the kind of theologians who are caught in the meshes of mere rationalization and systematization of mythological imagery. One could also leave it to those "grown-ups" who are no longer childlike

but have become childish and for whom disciplined thinking is abhorrent. They find thinking painful because it is not the mere pastime they desire to fill the void between the present moment and their own death.

While, over a century ago, Schelling said the philosophical religion did not exist, meanwhile historians of religion and philosophers and theologians who have read Schelling or are of a kindred mentality seem to have demonstrated the possibility of which he spoke. At least, as a mere reader of printed books, I can submit the evidence presented in this paper.

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Responses to Doctor Marti

With regard to the *acta Dei*, Fritz Marti rightly tells us that God named himself "I am," the One who is present, *adsum*, the One who Acts. Could we not add that God is the One who forces us to act, whose very presence is the necessitating ground of our being? How deeply Augustine grasped this reality of being before God, how intensely he felt the desire to believe in the reality of his unbelief. "For I kept saying within myself, 'Lo, let it be now, let it be now' *ecce modo fiat, modo fiat*, and as I uttered the phrase I was on the brink of resolution. I was on the point of action and I acted not and yet I did not fall back to my former state but stood hard by and drew breath. And I tried again and came a little nearer, yet a little nearer, and now I was all but touching and grasping it; and I did not reach or touch or grasp it, as I shrank from dying unto death, and from living unto life and the worse which was ingrained grew stronger in me than the better which was untrained, *plusque in me valebat deterius inolitum, quam melius insolitum*, and that very instant which was to make me another man struck greater terror into me, the nearer it approached; but neither repelled nor daunted me but kept me in suspense" (*Confessions*, VIII, 11, trans. C. S. C. Williams, Blackwell, 1953). Before God the opposites that control our existence are felt with pain and fear, the longing to turn toward God is challenged by the forces that turn us from God, the movement toward bears within it the movement away, the escape, the need to flee and reject. How weak we discover our faith to be, how powerful we find our fear and distrust. How easily we realize the vanities of vanities, *vanitates vanitatum*, the

childishness of our being compared to God. Deep within the experience of the "I" we see the conflicts that drive us from doubt and force us to that despair of sin that has so deeply separated us from God. The "religiosity of reason," can it be any other than this struggle of opposites that we bear in the self and know in revelation?

Not in the abstractness of philosophical terminology but in the lived experience of conflict we discover the meaning of finitude before God. Augustine goes on: "I cast myself down under a certain fig-tree somehow and gave free rein to my tears and the floods of mine eyes gushed forth, an acceptable sacrifice to Thee, and I besought Thee at length, not indeed in these words but to this effect, 'And Thou O Lord, how long? How long wilt Thou be angry, forever?' *Et tu, domine, usquequo? usquequo, domine, irasceris in finem?* Remember not our iniquities of old times, for I felt that I was held by them. I continued to utter my sorrowful cries. 'How long, how long, tomorrow and tomorrow? Why not now? Why not an end to my uncleanness this very hour? *Quamdiu, quamdiu, cras et cras? Quare non modo? quare non hac hora finis turpitudinis meae?*' (*Ibid.*, VIII, 12). In these sublime and agonizing words Augustine not only expresses the sadness and despair of finitude touched by the light of the infinite, but that dialogue of hearing and silence that fills every religious confrontation, that tense and grasping bond that links and threatens to unlink the speakable and the unspeakable. The inner experience is a listening one in which silence overwhelms speaking and where speaking conceals a silence that engulfs the word, the melancholy that encompasses all being. Whatever philosophy says about the faith of reason seems to hover over the primordial conflicts of being from which consciousness emerges as the expression of a dialectic of existence. Augustine knew that existence grew in awareness when it confronted God, the abysmal opposite of all finitude; he felt the shock and truth of its presence, the awe of the majesty and the forlornness it created in finitude, in the individual as sin.

Before God there was a love which the individual knew could not be denied. Augustine could say with faith: "*Non dubia, sed certa conscientia, domine, amo te.* My love of you, O Lord, is not some vague feeling: it is positive and certain" (*Ibid.*, X, 6, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin, 1961). To listen to these words is to have heard the voice of eternal silence, to feel a love which is awakened by a greater love and to feel the need to respond in love, the need to expand and deepen the love which is loved by love. "But what do I love when I love my God? Not material beauty or beauty of a temporal order, not the brilliance of earthly light of a certain kind, a voice, a perfume, a food, an embrace, but they are of the kind that I love in my inner self, when my soul is bathed in light that is not bound by space, when it listens to sounds that never die away; when it breathes fragrance that is never consumed by the eating; when it clings to an embrace from which it is not severed by fulfillment of desire. This is what I love when I love my God" (*Ibid.*). A language of such sensual representations infuses the senses with passion and intense desire and yet refuses to allow these senses to be more than vehicles that give us glimpses into their eternal meaning. What arises and passes away in earthly reality reflects the unchanged and permanent when referred to God. The finite and infinite have dialogue with each other, but refuse identification and similarity. The divine remains the unspeakable in a speaking world; it is that eternal silence that

limits the words of individuals and reveals in and through them the mystery they have not grasped, and cannot, will not, know.

But the boundless question always appears: "But what is my God, *Et quid est hoc?* I put my question to the earth. It answered, 'I am not God', and all things on earth declared the same. I asked the sea and the chasms of the deep and the living things that creep in them, but they answered, 'We are not your God. Seek what is above us'. I spoke to the winds that blow, and the whole air and all that lives in it replied, 'Anaximenes is wrong, I am not God' . . . Since you are not my God tell me about him . . . Clear and loud they answered, 'God is who made us, *ipse fecit nos* . . . We are not God and God is he who made us'. The inner part of man knows these things; I, the soul, knows them through the senses of my body, *ego, ego animus per sensum corporis mei*. I asked the whole mass of the universe about my God, and it replied, 'I am not God. God is he who made us'. *Non ego sum, sed ipse me fecit*" (*Ibid.*, X, 6). From it all emerges the declaration that God is for me the life of my life. *Deus autem tuus etiam tibi vitae vita est* (*Ibid.*). To that boundless question about God we attach the one about man. Here we discover the eternal dialogues that circle about man's soul, and that ineradicable light in which he sees and hides his being. The world has a creator and each creature strives to find its place and responsibility in this created universe. He learns to be receptive, to hear the silence of the creator, to learn from each creation its limits and purpose, to know where each belongs and to whom and to what. The eternal community of inquiry and interpretation begins in this discourse of creation and the created. Here we discover the demonic, that inordinate desire of the created to become the creator, the dependent to be autonomous, the needful to declare independence. Where else can the spoken know that silence of the unspoken and the unspeakable but in that dialogue of finitude with the infinite? Everything seeks its just limits, all declare they are not divine, that modesty and moderation are the individual's prerogatives and wisdom. With divinity we explore our existence, we question our actions, we seek our purpose, we draw forth the meaning of our separation from the truth, we suffer the pain and anxiety of our inherent sin. "You have walked everywhere at my side, O Truth, teaching me what to seek and what to avoid, whenever I laid before you the things that I was able to see in this world below and asked you to counsel me . . . I probed the depths of my memory, so vast in its ramifications and filled in so wonderful a way with riches beyond number. I scrutinized all these things and stood back in awe, for without you I could see none of them, and I found that none of them was you. Nor was I myself the truth, I who found them . . ." (*Ibid.*, X, 40). The truth of man's discourse lies neither in its rationality nor its reasonableness, but in a light which is not his but from which he emerges and begins to think: to think in dependence and receptivity, to know finitude.

Quia lux est tu permanens. Knowing that all begins in the permanent light of divine truth is the source of the oppositional thinking that comprehends man, the creature. This finitude of human existence is man's distinctness, wretchedness, and glory. It is here that he discovers the dependence that is the source of his independence, the love that responds to a Love that is the ground of his love. Is it not before God, the creator, that man unveils the agony of his finitude, the world of opposites that drives him from temptation and vanity to contrition and forgiveness? Knowing that God is the "truth that

presides over all things" man seeks the truth of self and the limits of his creativity. I offer these remarks in appreciation of Fritz Marti's words: "Reason senses the unconditional idea of God."

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An "objectified God" does not satisfy. On this point, surely all will agree with Doctor Marti. To seek an "objective essence" behind God's presence is implicitly to deny the reality of that presence. In subjecting the idea of God to ratiocination, the absoluteness and infinity of God are compromised, for a God-object must assume a particular existence over against the divine essence, and thereby abandon God's freedom to be, the divine essence as pure relation. On this, reason and faith are in perfect harmony: when God is reduced to an object, it is no longer *God* that is in view.

The corollary follows: if we are to seek God at all, it must be in that murky realm of "subjectivity." But what is subjectivity? Is it, with Augustine, the "inner person" in whom truth dwells? Descartes' *res cogitans* has a self-certainty which strikes an unfamiliar chord in relation to more recent views of subjectivity as quasi-solipsism. So-called "Kantian agnosticism" is not, Doctor Marti argues, really Kantian at all, which neatly eliminates the possibility of a Kantian subjectivism. However, the precise nature of the subjective self remains unclear. And if, as Augustine observed, the self cannot grasp itself, then how can the self ever hope to grasp God? From Kant's stipulation that God's existence has the character of a postulate or a necessary hypothesis, not that of something given with a set of positive attributes, Doctor Marti moves easily back to the tradition of negative theology, which offers a method for distinguishing between the objectified God of ratiocination and the true God in whom we have our being. But the role of such negative theology is merely critical: it exposes the inadequacy of concepts of God without attempting to offer more satisfactory alternatives.

Indeed, it cannot. To attempt to do so would simply bring us back to a God-object. For the idealist tradition, knowledge of God is based not upon observation but upon our own self-consciousness. The self-positing "I" is the

starting point for all reason; it is that subject-object identity which alone is capable of "sensing" without objectifying. And, according to Doctor Marti, God is the ground of this freedom to posit oneself in thought.

The subjectivity in which God is to be found is, then, the self-consciousness of the thinking person. It is perhaps better to speak of "the idea of God" than to presume to discuss directly God *per se*. The idea of God grounds the autonomy of reason, and every notion of God which threatens that autonomy is "utterly misleading." Doctor Marti still wishes to refer to God as Lord, but only with the qualification that God's "undeniable" authority is thoroughly "uncoercive." Likewise, he rejects the appeals to faith made by the "undisciplined reason of the religionists" (no one in particular is mentioned), yet seems to affirm with Schelling the human "desire for the real God," a desire which Schelling attributes to the recognition by the "I" of "the abyss between itself and God." What is this abyss? How can there be any abyss between God and the self if God is the ground of the self's autonomy and reason? Indeed, if such autonomy is real, how can there be any talk at all about God as "Lord"?

Doctor Marti's identification of his idea of God as the ground of reason's autonomy with the God of "the tradition" is also open to question, unless by "tradition" he means the speculative idealism of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. The tradition of Judeo-Christian faith, it seems to me, can claim a certain priority in terms of formative influences on "the idea of God," and that tradition, as I understand it, differs from Doctor Marti's position in at least two important ways: first, in its conception of the problem of false (objectifying) understandings of God; and second, in its search for a true (subjective) conception of what it means to know God.

Doctor Marti alludes to the first of these traditional positions in his ironic call for a *sacrificium intellectus*. As he puts it, what must be sacrificed is the intellect—understood as "the power of objectifying ratiocination." Thus the call is really to sacrifice ratiocination on the altar of reason, which will hardly scandalize many Hegelians. But this in no way resembles the *religious* sacrifice that stands at the heart of Judeo-Christian tradition. From Abraham to Job to Jesus and Luther, the God of that tradition has been much less interested in our reason than in our will. The *sacrificium intellectus* is not the victory of one kind of thinking over another, even less so if the victor claims autonomy in the process. The sacrifice is of autonomy itself, of the independent selfhood that almost every self-positing "I" in our modern world considers a birthright. Freedom, according to this view, is not autonomy from God as Lord; it is submission to God as Lord. St. Paul's talk about being "slaves" to God may jar philosophic ears, but that jarring is simply a testimony to the distance between most modern philosophy and the tradition of Judeo-Christian faith. A brief excursion in the literature of religious poetry or autobiography will surely show that Paul's language expresses very well the self-understanding of those for whom religion is a relationship rather than a philosophic problem (the autobiography of the late Dorothy Day is an example).

This brings me to the second important difference between Doctor Marti's position and the traditional view. If God is truly unconditional, we are told, then it is inappropriate to posit an actor behind the acts, a person behind the deeds. To do so objectifies God, making God predictable and binding God to a legalistic covenant. But, in his attack upon objectifying God, Doctor Marti

has also denied any possible otherness to God. To speak of God as other is, presumably, to fall into language that is the crudest form of ratiocination—the language of myth. Yet religious experience, as witnessed in the Judeo-Christian tradition, has been overwhelmingly expressed as an encounter with an other, a being so unlike ourselves that we call that being “divine,” yet who, in self-revelations, has become so like us that we inevitably think of that being as a “person.” Doctor Marti does not mention the otherness of God, and criticizes speaking about God as a person or actor. The irony is that, without some sort of distinction between objects and other selves, virtually all human social experience is surrendered to ratiocination, and reason is left with the Pyrrhic victory of an abstract (in Hegel’s sense of the term) self-certainty.

To be sure, there is an alternative. Buber writes of the “eternal Thou,” which recalls Kierkegaard’s insight that inwardness is ultimately “the eternal in man.” This sort of language is predicated upon the assumption that God (the eternal) is an other, a subject or “person” who can be known—like all other persons—only insofar as God chooses to reveal the divine nature. Neither God nor God’s revelations can be considered mere objects, available for the scientific investigations of the ratiocinating mind. But neither can they be reduced to the inexorably abstract notion of absolute, universal relationality. God is that divine person who alone is fully and freely subjective, and who accordingly enters into personal (“particular”) relations with other selves. The religious person encounters in God a being who loves and wills and suffers, not simply the ground of autonomy and reason.

It is true that this way of putting the matter leads to a very mythological mode of discourse, and thereby appears, at least to speculative philosophy, to be a form of ratiocination. But nothing could be further from the truth. The language for speaking *about* God is conceived in Judeo-Christian tradition as language *from* God, indeed, as language given by God to those who would hear and respond to God. Such knowledge of God is not to be found in a miscellany of acts with no discernible center, but in the actor who speaks, and who, by that word, grants knowledge of the actor to all who seek God.

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Doctor Marti is to be commended for compressing such a rich variety of historical reminders and flashes of philosophical insight within the scope of his brief and suggestive paper. Among the important reminders culled from the tradition are, first of all, the pivotal importance of St. Augustine's fusion of philosophical inwardness and Christian doctrine, then a correct and careful estimation of Kant's location of the ethically active self within the noumenal order, and finally a lucid synthesis of Schelling's insights into the possibility of a philosophical religion. Marti understands that to repeat the tradition philosophically is to renew and restore it. But he also brings novel insights to bear upon the Kantian-Hegelian tradition, the most striking of which are the assertions that the work of ratiocination (*Verstand*) is guesswork, and that obligation becomes objective only in and with the act of taking responsibility. Each of these gems deserves to be cut, polished, and set within its own extended treatment.

Marti's "Last Objectivism" is an allusive paper, a tissue of glimmering insights, not an argumentative exposition. Accordingly, I find I must, perhaps contrary to Marti's spirit and method, prosaically list what I take to be his claims before I can reply. I am not perfectly confident that I have understood all the nuances of his position, but the following seem to be his major contentions:

(1) Both the self and God are "entities" of the same sort, that is, non-entities, non-substances, non-actors. Each is a creative agency, a relationality, and an outcropping of spontaneity, and each is fundamentally for the other.

(2) The self lives "in God." Its freedom, inwardness and self-identity are apparently limitations of, instances of—or better—qualities and events evoked by their divine counterparts.

(3) Ratiocination or analytic intellect can only reify both self and deity in its attempt to explain, analyze, and establish conditional relationships between conditioned objects. Reason can intuit or "sense" in a non-objectivistic manner, and is thus fitted for cognizing the unconditional.

(4) A "religion of reason" ought to be confined to the individual self's recognition of divine or creative acts and its creative response to them (for example, will to truth in thinking, acceptance of moral responsibility), accompanied by the recognition of ultimate spontaneity or freedom as in some sense their source.

Ad (1): A dialectic of devotion and idolatry is involved in every attempt to name the divine, for the human spirit simultaneously feels itself elevated above itself and yet tempted to understand and control the power that tears it out of the ordinary. Marti rightly stresses the moment of negative theology in the pious use of intellect, as did Aquinas and Cusanus. But perhaps he is extreme. Schelling's notion of the infinite non-objectivity of the absolute makes sense only in the context of a philosophy of nature and of spirit wherein the absolute is seen to objectify or give form to itself and thus become a subject that suffers and enjoys a finite world. Marti's negative theology seems to divorce the object of religious devotion and intellectual contemplation from any specific or describable relation to worldly being, precisely as the price for not blasphemously ascribing conditional predicates to the divine. In simply and ultimately contrasting the conditional and the unconditional, Marti veers toward the paradox Plato voiced in *Parmenides* 133a-134e; if we simplistically

conceive the divine as sheer otherness, then religious phenomena such as trust in providence, care, and devotion go out the window—things which Marti, I suspect, would find essential to religion.

As for his suggestion that we abolish the grammar of “self,” “person,” and “spirit,” allowing only “I,” “you,” and the devotional pronoun “God” in their stead, I find the idea not only awkward but misleading. The pure “I,” Fichte’s spontaneous self-positing, Kant’s noumenal agent which comes to itself only in recognizing and accepting moral responsibility, exists nowhere but in a finite setting, and apprehends and acts only within a finite history of objective circumstances. The “I” of Fichte’s and the young Schelling’s transcendental idealism is indeed not “of this world,” but it certainly is *in* this world. Hegel rightly saw that spirit first comes to itself as a return from and out of a world that is both objective and, at least in its general features, rational. To divorce “reason” and the objectivity of the world in so pronounced a manner as Marti does perhaps invites the equation of religion with emotionalism and anti-intellectualism.

Ad (2): Marti reproduces most of the ambiguities of Schelling’s doctrine of God, which cannot conveniently be labeled either theism or pantheism, or said to stress consistently divine immanence over transcendence or the reverse. But ratiocinative convenience is not what is at stake in philosophy of religion, as Marti correctly sees. Schelling’s theology was anthropological in its method: In one sense, self qua spirit lives “in God,” or it is God that acts in the self; in another sense, what makes the self *its own* self blinds its vision of its divine ground of possibility and tempts it to its fall into singularity. But in the moment of religious recognition, the self wills that it not be God, that God be more than its philosophical idea, that God be the “Lord of being,” that is, the absolutely free one, consequently the liberator. All of this follows from the interrelation of the human and the divine which Schelling builds into his doctrine of the Creation: “Created from the source of things and kindred to it, the human soul has a con-science (*Mitwissenschaft*) of the Creation. This knowledge encloses the supreme lucidity of all things, and it is not so much the cognitive (*wissend*) agent as it is science itself.” (*Nachlassband* 5).

If we object that these Schellingian assertions all fudge on the question of the identity or non-identity of the self and the deity, Marti would maintain, I think, that the religious *relation* is what is central to religion, that God is pure relation, secure of self and caring of others, and so radically free and malleable as to be free from being anything at all. As Charles Hartshorne has argued so clearly, divine transcendence is not well described in terms of immutability, identity and disrelation, but is better defined as an unsurpassable degree of sensitivity to, care for, and harmonious interadjustment of, finite beings. But while process theologians thus define the consequent deity as the limit case of *affectivity*, Marti seems more successful in preserving the traditional notion of God’s infinity with his insistence that *freedom* is the mark of transcendence. His inspiration, Schelling, despite his persistent taste for metaphysical monism, had managed to preserve the “distance” required of orthodox theism and the centrality of the concept of the Creation to Christian thinking when he observed of the God-human relation, “. . . there is love neither in indifference nor where opposites are combined which require the combination in order to

be; but rather . . . this is the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other.” (7:408).

Ad (3): Throughout the paper, Marti employs the Kantian distinction of reason and ratiocination in many varied, and some distinctly non-Kantian, senses. In general, they parallel Schelling’s distinction between “intellectual intuition” and discursive intellect, or Hegel’s more subtle distinction between reason and reflection. At various points Marti contrasts *reason* and *ratiocination* as, respectively:

thinking with necessity	versus	guessing at possibilities
Platonic <i>epistēmē</i>	versus	Platonic <i>doxa</i> and <i>orthē doxa</i>
action	versus	comprehension
sensing or intuiting	versus	explanation
will to truth	versus	guessing
grasping what ought to be	versus	grasping what is

With all this terminological slippage, it is not clear whether reason’s function is to think, or to intuit, or to act, nor whether ratiocination’s task is really to explain or ignorantly to latch onto the first pseudo-explanation available. One can infer that for Marti the telling contrast is between the “reason” that intuits the unconditional (self, freedom, God) and the ratiocinative processes suited to explaining finite things. Yet when Marti says things such as, “the real question is not whether I dream or am awake, but whether or not I am alive,” he seems to simply juxtapose reason and ratiocination as the practical and the theoretical spheres. He aims, in good Kantian (but nonetheless philosophically disputable) fashion, to isolate his claims about the uniqueness of the mental, freedom, and God’s existence from all theoretical inspection. Paradoxically, the objects of reason are made incomprehensible, located beyond the reach of thought. In 1802 Schelling himself denounced such moves as “fear of reason.” (4:308).

It is plain that I do not find the whole of Marti’s critique of objectivism compelling, but I am struck by the wisdom of his remark that ratiocination *guesses*. Indeed it does, but cogently, consistently, and methodically—yet somehow always merely hovering on the surface, for causal or nomic interrelation is ultimately non-knowing, non-comprehension, the flight from one item to another, a merely conditional cognition of the conditioned. But such cognition guesses and errs in another way as well. The will to explain is often accompanied by the will to accept an explanation, and the history of philosophy is littered with repetitions of the same basic fallacy, the acceptance of a partial or one-sided account as a complete explanation. Since Hegel we have become a bit more suspicious and Popperian, but “all-sidedness” is an elusive goal—for philosophy as well as for science.

Ad (4): As for Marti’s contention that “the religious soul is satisfied with the *acta Dei* and with the recognition of God as ‘Lord’,” I shall merely translate some remarks (which Wallace failed to provide us and) which Hegel made in introducing the second and third editions of the *Encyclopaedia*. Hegel was as concerned as Marti is about the damage that abstractive intellect could do to

religious life, yet he was equally adamant about rejecting an anti-theoretical "religion of the heart" as an alternative. In the second Preface Hegel says:

In recent times religion has ever more contracted the expansive domain of its contents and withdrawn into the intensive dimension of piety or feeling, oftentimes indeed into such a form as manifests a very impoverished and barren substance. But as long as religion has a creed, a doctrine, a dogmatics, it has the same concerns as philosophy has, and the latter is as such capable of being united with religion in these concerns. . . . Genuine religion, the religion of spirit, must have such a creed, a content; spirit is essentially conscious, so its content is fashioned from the objective; on the level of feeling, spirit is the content itself, but not objective (it is simply *anguished*, to use a phrase of Jacob Boehme); feeling is but the basest level of consciousness, indeed one located in the form of soul common to the animals. *Thought* first transforms soul, with which the animal too is endowed, into spirit, and philosophy is just a consciousness of this content, spirit and its truth, precisely in the form and manner of this its essence; for it is thought which distinguished spirit from the animal and makes spirit capable of religion. The contracted religiosity which is narrowed down to the one point of "heart" must make broken-heartedness and brokenness essential moments of its rebirth; at the same time it must remember that religion's concern is with the heart of a spiritual being, that mind is ordained to be master of the heart, and that this mastery is possible only insofar as spirit itself is reborn. This rebirth of spirit out of natural ignorance and natural error takes place through instruction and through the sort of belief in *objective truth*, in the substantial contents, which follows upon the testimony of spirit. (Nicolin and Poeggeler edition, pp. 12-13; translation mine).

In the third Preface, Hegel discusses the general state of contemporary religious life and links the decay of religious life with the decline of philosophy itself:

This poverty of scientific and, in general, intellectual content is what separates this piety from the position it directly makes the object of its accusation and condemnation. The enlightenment of the understanding emptied religion of all content through its formal, abstract, contentless thinking, just the way that piety does with its reduction of the Faith to the watchword, "Lord, Lord." Therein neither position has any advantage over the other and, inasmuch as these antagonists coincide, there is nothing substantial at hand wherein they could come into contact with one another, find a common ground, secure the possibility of investigating this ground, and finally bring it to the point of knowledge and

truth. . . . Enlightenment theology remained entrenched in this formalism of the negative and of freedom, and filled out the content of this freedom according to its whim and fancy, so that, on the whole, it was unconcerned about its own contents. But for that very reason, Enlightenment can do no violence to the content of the Faith, since the Christian community must be and evermore ought to be united through the bond of a doctrinal outline, a creed. In contrast, the generalities and abstractions of the stagnant, not living, waters of rationalistic understanding will not admit the specificity of a self-determined and articulated Christian content or body of doctrine. Meanwhile, the other position, relying on its cry of "Lord, Lord," bluntly and outspokenly rejects the completion of the development of faith into spirit, substance, and truth. . . .

Because the rich, profound content of the most sublime and unconditional interests of human nature has decayed and religiosity, the pious together with the reflective, has sunk to the point of discovering its greatest satisfaction in lack of content, philosophy has become an accidental and subjective need. These unconditional interests have been conformed by both sorts of religiosity to nothing more than superficial explanation that it no longer requires philosophy to satisfy these interests; indeed, philosophy is held, and rightly so, to be destructive of these newly created satisfactions and of such a finely cultivated sort of gratification. Philosophy is thus entirely left to the voluntary and subjective desires of the individual. (*op. cit.*, pp. 26-27; translation mine).

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Fritz Marti is a "true believer" in the transcendental method of philosophy pioneered by Fichte and modified by Schelling. With it he links the Augustinian religious theme that at the very center of our own self-conscious life we can

encounter God who is our ground. Marti ranges freely between these Augustinian and idealist anchors, reading intervening figures such as Descartes and Kant in their terms. The result is his own vital personal testimony, a philosophico-religious "profession of faith" that illumines the powerful attraction this strand of German idealism had, and still has, for many. Marti began his philosophical education with Fichte (via his teacher, Fritz Medicus), and still employs Fichte's insights to carry out transcendently the analysis of the free, self-conscious "I" that Augustine initiated. But Marti also turns to Schelling for what Fichte's analysis largely neglects, namely, a developed idealistic account of God as ground of the self's freedom, and serious attention to human encounters with God in the history of religion.

Two interconnected themes run throughout the paper. One is that the human self or "I" discovers its ground, the true God, only by turning within, and that this God sustains rather than competes with its autonomy as a self-conscious, freely acting "I." The other theme is that God is unconditional, non-objectifiable, non-existent in the way that particular beings exist, is pure presence that cannot be rationally anticipated or prescriptively described. I will comment briefly on several combinations of these themes.

1. An unconditional God does not "exist" in the way that physical objects or phenomena are said to exist. Thus the classical proofs for God's existence are misleading. Also potentially misleading, however, are passages in which the German idealists, who grasp more clearly than others that, strictly speaking, God does not "exist," nevertheless go on to speak of God's existence and even to interpret the classical proofs sympathetically. So we must tread carefully here. There are at least two senses in which Marti (and Schelling) must deny God's "existence." The first is very clear: God is not a being within the causal network linking all members of the phenomenal order (Kantian expression); nor is God a being in a hierarchy of beings natural and supernatural, not even the first or highest member (Aristotelian expression). "Exist" might be stretched to provide a second sense, applicable to the noumenal "I" as a center of free will distinct from any other such "I" or center. Marti's God is not an individual in quite this sense, not a particular noumenal being of whose reality we are confident even though we only glimpse pointers to it in its observable acts. In fact his God seems not to be "noumenally objective" at all (if I may be allowed that odd phrase), for he holds that in revelation there are episodes of God's "existing" or being present with no objectifiable (for thought) actor behind the act. Such a position needs to be sustained by a wider investigation into the various senses in which for Schelling (and Hegel, too) it is and is not appropriate to attribute "existence" to God, and by a fuller account of how the true God can be the non-objectifiable, non-existing ground for us as selves, and yet also be a self-revealing individual.

2. "Negative theology is the positive discipline of not asserting of God anything he is not" (p. 140). Marti counsels and exemplifies a posture of restraint rather than a zealous piling up of privative predications, as *via negativa* enthusiasts typically do. His approach also rules out the Pseudo-Dionysian move of suggesting, after the negating has been finished, that one does after all apprehend the divine being as having ("superessential") attributes. The distinction between "not asserting" and "asserting that . . . not" is a nice one. But is it a matter of style alone, or one of substance as well? Marti intends the latter. A fuller discussion of the point would be informative.

3. God is the ground of the possibility of our freedom; reflecting on the conditions of the possibility of our freedom is the way we truly become aware of God. According to Marti, the God as ground discovered by looking within is no threat to human autonomy, to the genuineness of our free will. It is rather the other approach to God, as an objectified, all-powerful being, that casts God in competition with us, that threatens to swallow up our freedom. With this stance I am personally sympathetic. But Marti makes no mention of another (less frequent) strain in Schelling's writings, that there is in the overall history of the creation, including human acts of will, a reconciliation or synthesis of freedom and necessity. I do not find this theme successfully integrated into Schelling's philosophy of freedom (nor do I find it appealing in Hegel, where the meaning is somewhat different). For Schelling to say, as he sometimes does, that we are truly autonomous or free, and also that there is an overarching necessity to the way in which freedom is exercised, is to give freedom with one hand and take it away with the other. I would like Marti to remark on his omitting (rightfully, I think) of this second theme from the Schelling he endorses.

4. The God who is the ground of our being is in fact groundless, not dependent on anything other than God. Yet there is another sense in which for Schelling God has within God a ground of God. In *The Ages of the World*, for instance, God is complex, bipolar in structure. Here Schelling generates a speculative "ontology" of God at the culmination of the negative philosophy. Although more an eternal process than a transcendent being in the classical sense, this divine complexity definitely can be taken as an object of thought (and rather extended philosophical exposition!). Furthermore, this turns out not to be just an empty exercise, for Schelling evidently thinks that the historical data examined in the positive philosophy confirms the adequacy of this speculative portrait of God. Although religious persons may, as Marti proposes, simply encounter God as a kind of Buberian presence or as a relatedness to them (act without actor behind it), the philosophical theologian sees in accounts of these revelatory episodes confirmation of a God who is not just disclosed as relation to us, but is transcendent self-relation as well. Has Marti simply dropped the self-relation aspect of God, in the effort to be more emphatic about a phenomenology of religious experience as encounter with presence rather than with *a* being?

5. God's existence is always specific, occurring only when and where God as Lord of being freely chooses to exist. This is not just God's freedom vis-à-vis the world, but also a freedom vis-à-vis God. Marti stresses statements of the very late Schelling to the effect that God as free has no being of God's own to which God is bound, not even a being as spirit! Such a God would be truly ecstatic, the only nature not concerned with itself. However, I do not take Schelling to be denying that God therefore has no nature or being at all. Instead I think he must mean only that, as the absolutely free will, God is not bound—by that nature which God does eternally though freely will for God—to will in any particular way, is not bound to create a world, is not bound to any particular regimen of self-actualization or revelation in and through the world God does freely create. This is why the positive philosophy is indispensable—not because God has no nature, but simply because it cannot be anticipated philosophically what God does will and do in the world. That is why for Schelling there cannot be a "religion of reason" in the Kantian sense, since

the content must come from God's "existence" in revelation. But there also cannot be one in the Hegelian sense, since that content is finally determined to be what it is by a free divine will, not by a rationally comprehensible, self-actualizing spirit.

Happy ninetieth birthday, Fritz! You have made us youngsters think more deeply and also left us some problems to continue working on, for which we are grateful.

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Doctor Marti's Response to His Critics

In 1920, at the University of Bern, the psychological seminar of Paul Häberlin (1878-1960) spent six weeks, May 14 to June 25, on Augustine's *Confessions*, which we bought for 25¢ in the Reclam paperback of Otto F. Lachmann's German translation. Neither my memory nor my dozen pages of notes indicate that we ever checked Augustine's Latin, as a thorough seminar would require. The subtlety and incisiveness of his language might have helped us in our endeavor to understand Augustine's tortured soul. My notes show a number of approaches. But we seem to have gone little beyond the mother-son relationship. I was disgusted with Monica. As for Augustine himself, the page he wrote about his son (X, vi, 14) should have made me pause. Not the detestable revivalist display of the "sin" (*peccatum*) of having begotten the boy. But the fact that Augustine faithfully lived with his common law wife and named the boy "a gift of God," Adeodatus. Augustine praises God alone for the boy's talent. Did he himself have no hand in the boy's upbringing? And what about Augustine and Adeodatus being baptized together?

Did Häberlin not raise such questions? Was mine the only dense mind? I do not blame Häberlin. I disliked his touch of smugness. My friend and classmate Gustav Emil Müller had a keener sense of human potential and even then thought most highly of Häberlin. Häberlin acquired his fame as a philosopher while teaching at the University of Basel, 1922-44. I left the

seminar of 1920 with the schoolboy feeling that "this disgustingly mawkish book of Augustine dispenses me from ever reading anything else by him."

Fortunately, in the 1930s, on the coffee table of the scholarly Swiss ambassador in Washington, Dr. Bruggmann, I found Erich Przywara's book, *Augustin: Die Gestalt als Gefüge* (Leipzig: Hegner, 1934), which quickly made me see the philosophical and theological importance of Augustine and his place in our time.

Of course I have dealt with the *Confessions* since then. It is a surprising coincidence that William Kluback should offer melodies from the *Confessions* as illustrations of my (quite serious) play with the German phrase *Vernunft vernimmt* and my sentence "reason senses the unconditional idea of God."

Kluback's second sentence made me jump. "God is the One who forces us to act." A capitalized noun for a thing that uses force? And an act that could be enforced? But Kluback does not insist on such dubious language. Instead he brings forward the indecisive restlessness of Augustine's mind just before his calming conversion. It is the very suspense which, in 1920, struck me as mawkish. I have never understood why he should have experienced the switch from philosophical to mythological terms as a turn from turmoil to mental peace. Today, mythological language no longer shocks me. When things tell us that God *ipse fecit nos* (X, vi, 9) the verb "to make" has no literal and objectivistic sense. It is one of those stammering words which minds tied to ratiocination must use. And Kluback knows we are not tied to those words. Augustine himself helps us free ourselves. "*Deus autem tuus etiam tibi vitae vita est*" (X, vi, 10). The word 'life' does not designate a thing, and only as a metaphor does it seem to add an actor to an act, the way in which Greek says there is a *psyche* wherever there is life. "*Vivit enim corpus meum de anima mea et vivit anima mea de te*" (X, xx, 29). "*Sed nec anima es, quae vita est corporum . . . sed tu vita es animarum, vivens te ipsa et non mutaris, vita animae meae*" (III, vi, 10). "*Tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*" (III, vii, 12).

Perhaps Hegel would permit me to claim that here Augustine has arrived at a *Begriff*, at the concept of "life of lives," *vita vitarum*, out of reach of mere metaphors. Augustine himself is convinced. At the end of Part One of my paper (p. 134), I referred to the decisive passage which I will here give in full, in the translation of Haddan and Shedd (New York: Random House, 1948), II, 849: "The knowledge by which we know that we live is the most inward of all knowledge, of which even the Academic [skeptical] cannot insinuate: Perhaps you are asleep, and do not know it, and you see things in your sleep. . . . But he who is certain of the knowledge of his own life, does not therein say, I know I am awake, but, I know I am alive; therefore, whether he be asleep or awake, he is alive" (*De Trinitate* XV, xii, 21).

Another metaphorical word is 'light', the light of understanding which shines forth when we have been in the darkness of incomprehension and ignorance. The *Confessions* say "*quia lux es tu permanens*" (X, xl, 65). What is permanent is the validity, not the contingent shining in the given historical moment. As a person, I *in* whom the truth shines, am not permanent. Augustine says "you" to the truth, which he has been hearing as teaching and bidding (*audiebam docentem et iubentem*). He says "*hoc me delectat*" with *nescio quam dulcedinem*"—"this delights me with I know not what sweetness" (*ibid.*) In the book on the Trinity, Augustine says "*Deus autem dilectio est*"

(VIII, vii, 10). We do indeed find delight in the truth. But we *are* not the truth. We find it or, rather, it finds us.

The metaphoric *lux* and the still erotic *dilectio* are vivid psychological descriptions, but they make good sense only insofar as they point at the philosophico-theological concept *vita vitarum*. Among religionists, metaphors may suffice. For interfaith discussion we need philosophical insight, the concept. A merely negative theology does not suffice. It cannot stress the positive finding which Schelling voiced, possibly as late as 1854, saying that, as I quoted on pp. 135 and 143, "God's existence is at once and immediately specific" (XI, 274). This tallies with the view of all those who plead for a personal relationship of the truly religious soul with God. The church is secondary and, in order to remain sound, it needs philosophy, a philosophy always brought up to date. That is the mission of us scholars.

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In the top paragraph of p. 152, Stephen Dunning claims that I do "not mention the otherness of God." I admit that I did not use the word 'otherness'. Some speak of an absolute, total otherness, so different from anything else, that the very word is void of any meaning. It could only tell us not to look for anything in the direction of that otherness. God's real otherness, however, is manifest as soon as you "confess that you are not truth" (p. 135; Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, XXXIX, 72). God is not available as something we have and can manage, is therefore "hidden," yet "cannot be hidden entirely and inwardly" (p. 135; Augustine, *Tract. in Jb.* 106:4). Objectivistic ratiocination seeks "a knowledge of the necessary Being as given outside of us" (p. 136; Kant, *Pract. Reason*, V, 115). That kind of Being is a non-existent object and therefore essentially hidden, a mere postulate of ratiocination, a merely hypothetical *adest*, not God's *adsum* (p. 139). Augustine uses the word *eternity*. He distinguishes the eternal life of God from the kind of immortality which we acquire from God's by mere participation (*De Trinitate*, I, vi, 10). (To distinguish does not mean to separate.) "Therefore only eternity itself can say to the human mind, *I am who am*" (p. 139; *De Vera Religione*, XLIX, 97). The mere idea of God is not God; "it is the I which says I want God outside the idea" (p. 142; Schelling, XI, 570). "Kant calls *that* in God owing to which God is the groundlessly existent the abyss for human reason" (p. 142; XIII, 164). And indeed, "this existence is incomprehensible if, by incomprehensible, one means what is not comprehensible *a priori*" (p. 142; XIII, 165). It all boils down to what the young Schelling wrote in 1805: "There is no reason *we* could have, but only a reason which has *us*" (p. 143; VII, 148). Thus while not using Stephen Dunning's word 'otherness', I have throughout granted his point. I hope he will forgive me this piece of professorial prolixity.

Incidentally my prolix paragraph may have answered the first of two questions Dunning asks on p. 151. "How can there be any abyss between God and the self if God is the ground of the self's autonomy and reason?"

The second asks, if our autonomy is real, "how can there be any talk at all about God as 'Lord'?" — There can be none if the word 'Lord' means a boss who can grant favors, pronounce prohibitions, decree punishments. The power of such a Lord is limited. He has it in the degree in which you believe in him. But the word *kýrios* can mean the indisputable authority of the truth. In

philosophy we meet it when we discover that no one can think or act for us. It is up to me to distinguish between true and false, right and wrong. No boss can *make* me do it. There is no such power in heaven or on earth. Only I myself can make myself responsible. Responsibility cannot be given, it must be taken. And the taking is a free act. Nor is this a mere theory of mine. It is no obsession. It is the *kyriotes*, the Lordship over my life, the "ground" of my freedom. It is the authority of reason. And reason is no talent of ours, like ratiocination which we have in degrees. Again, "there is no reason *we* could have, only a reason that has *us*." This is why the old Schelling wrote in 1836 what I quoted at the bottom of p. 143 (X, 260).

To be sure, the word 'God' sounds mythological. But those who restrict its meaning to mythology are likely to say "Lord, Lord," without thereby entering into "the kingdom of Heaven" (Matthew 7:21).

To use the word 'Lord' as an incantation or as an appeal to a higher legal court is a mark of a mind whose thinking is restricted to ratiocination. This restriction marks and mars one strand in the web of occidental civilization. It leads to idolatry. Truly religious minds sense that. But if they are entangled in the same strand, they must seek a remedy "by faith." The word 'faith', so used, means an abstention from pertinent thinking, a "sacrifice of the intellect."

When I used the Latin phrase, Dunning heard an ironic overtone. I however intended no irony. In my subsurface manner of a mole I was merely digging for a verbal root of *sacrificium*, in the phrase *sacrum facere*. Ratiocination does not vanish like a completely consumed burnt offering but, on the contrary, is "made sacred" in the service of reason which cannot do without ratiocination but needs it as a tool.

Dunning and I disagree with regard to the sweep of tradition. As he points out, I do include in occidental tradition "the speculative idealism (—and how I hate that professorial phrase!—) of Kant, Fichte," Hegel, "and Schelling" (p. 151). Dunning seems inclined to exclude it, because he believes it is far from "the *religious* sacrifice that stands at the heart of Judeo-Christian tradition" (p. 151). I am not unaware of the psychological relief furnished by "the sacrifice of autonomy itself," such as witnessed at Augustine's final surrender at his conversion or, less mawkishly, at the purer and childlike plunge of Francis unto utter poverty. History is full of such scenes where a human being sighs, "thank you, Lord, for having taken unconditional charge of me!" Remember that Paul's *doûlos* expresses liberation, not enslavement. Dunning says the word 'slave' may jar a philosophic ear. I say, on the contrary, it requires a genuinely philosophical ear to hear the sigh of relief and liberation. Therefore what we require is the kind of philosophic and strictest self-discipline found, for instance, in Kant and his followers.

Dunning seems to believe that "tradition" in the narrower sense can suffice. I admit it can, in individual cases. In *principle* it does not. The principle of the matter, that is, the indispensable autonomy of a responsible being, must be stated explicitly, in some philosophical terms. Tradition includes philosophy.

An ecclesiastical stand that would exclude it, will prove wobbly in the long run. Initially mythological language may convey enough. In that respect, "the language for speaking *about* God is conceived in Judeo-Christian tradition as language *from* God, indeed, as language given by God" (p. 152). Ratiocination *must* posit such a giver. A childlike mind does not need that interpretation; it already feels and is at home in the gift. But growth comes upon the childlike

mind, and it would be childish to resist the growing and petulantly to cling to the child-phase. The comfort of reason is needed: "You are *already* in good hands; calmly take your responsibility; God *knows* you are not infallible."

When I include the religious insights of philosophy in the tradition, I do by no means exclude the Judeo-Christian forms of it, not even the pseudo-Christian forms. Take my own case. I have never been a Christian. I do not believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation, nor in any adoptianist deification of Jesus. Jesus' mission was to voice the presence of the "Kingdom." The phrase Christ the King denies almost everything he taught.—Yet I would not deny that, such as I am, I am at home in the tradition. Some of it I think I know better than do those Christians who never bothered to study the writings of the great Christian theological thinkers.

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Michael Vater helps the discussion by listing my "main contentions," under four headings. I can readily agree with all of his formulations except the phrase "divine counterparts." That sounds objectivistic, as if theology were a museum of hypothetical models with which the visitor could compare the specimens he brought along from the wayside, from real life. When Vater himself brings in specimens, he finds he has more than four questions. For the sake of brevity, I must pick the ones that look most important.

I sense a further objectivism near the bottom of p. 153 where, speaking of Schelling, Vater writes, "the absolute is seen to objectify or give form to itself and thus becomes a subject that suffers and enjoys a finite world." What kind of incarnation is that? It sounds more like Hegel than Schelling. True, the young Schelling wrote a lot about *The Absolute*. But this kind of objectification is precisely what I object to. I stick to the sentence of the old Schelling: "God's existence is at once and immediately specific" (p. 135; cf. p. 143; XI, 274).

God, not being concerned with God, is therefore concerned only with what is not God. God is "ganz *ausser sich*" (X, 261), outside of God, and has no need of a substantial permanent existence which would tie God to God and make God unfree. God is "nothing but relation and pure relation" (X, 260), pure *adsum*. God's being "Creator" is no incidentally undertaken job. God is God *in* creation. For many, so close an *adsum* seems too uncomfortably close, being not only morally close.

(Soothingly, ratiocination steps in and constructs the image of a safe and distant God, the God of the religions, who also opens the business of religion. The distance of this God of ratiocination is guaranteed, because that existence can remain putative, known *sola fide*, by "faith alone." The religions are hypothetical constructions of an objectifying ratiocination, which can and often do destroy them again. They borrow their reality from myth, the natural form of *adsum*.)

Vater is right when he stresses my desire of "not blasphemously ascribing conditional predicates to the divine" (p. 153). But that does not at all mean that my "negative theology seems to divorce the object of religious devotion and intellectual contemplation from any specific or describable relation to worldly being." On the contrary, I find the *adsum* only *in* "the world." And it is precisely the "last objectivism" to send God into an "otherworldly" exile.

Vater writes, "Marti veers toward the paradox Plato voiced in Parmenides 133a-134e." I have carefully reread the four pages and compared their very disciplined language with the French of Auguste Diès, the German of Kirchmann (1881) and the English of Jowett. On those pages I find Plato—or rather Socrates and Parmenides—caught in the snags inevitable if, as in this instance, an epistemological puzzle caused by sheer ratiocination bogs down in paradox. I do not believe my anti-objectivism is a passkey that opens every hidden door in philosophy, nor would I have the audacity to say that Plato's paradoxes simply vanish as soon as one stops treating ideas (that is, the form which Plato calls *eidos*) as objects set up facing things and compared with them. I do not "veer" toward this sterile ratiocination of the four pages in the *Parmenides*. Nor do I "simplistically conceive the divine as sheer otherness" (p. 154).

It is half a century since I was tempted to "divorce reason and the objectivity of the world." I saw it could not be done. And I hold with Vater that "the I of Fichte's and the young Schelling's transcendental idealism is indeed not 'of this world', but certainly is *in* this world." I would also call as a witness Hegel's respective dialectic.

On p. 155 Vater writes, "it is not clear whether reason's function is to think, or to intuit, or to act, nor whether ratiocination's task is really to explain or ignorantly to latch onto the first pseudo-explanation available." I'll try to make it clear by using Vater's own words and, of course, falling back on Kant. Yes, "ratiocination's task is really to explain." Conscience (or reason) strictly forbids "to latch onto" uncritical verbiage. Instead it demands incessant critique and therefore objectivity. It demands that we "think" scientifically. Even in science such thinking must *beware* of objectivism. But in philosophy the critical thinking of ratiocination attains awareness of its own function, that is, it "intuits" what *self-awareness* is. And owing to the "primacy of practical reason," "to think" is a way "to act." Both, ratiocination and reason, are acts of conscience, but reason "intuits," it is explicitly aware of acting and of the freedom of acting.

In his *Aphorism* 35 of 1805 Schelling says: "Reason carries in itself sense (*Sinn*), ratiocination (*Verstand*) and imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) as that many finitenesses" but is not identical with any one of these three. The objectivity of ratiocination and the subjectivity of imagination are usually taken for a sheer contrast. But Augustine long ago reminded us that both are intense forms of being alive. Is that Vater's clue for suddenly switching to Augustine's sentence (not mine)? "The real question is not whether I dream or am awake, but whether or not I am alive" (*De Trin.* XV, xii, 21). But why should that induce me "to simply juxtapose reason and ratiocination as the practical and the theoretical spheres"? On p. 134 I warned against the misinterpretation of Kant "as if reason and ratiocination were two (separate) psychological facts."—Furthermore, why should any philosopher worthy of that name isolate "freedom and God's existence from all theoretical inspection"? I believe my paper *is* such an inspection.

I am grateful to Michael Vater for having me get up and take down from my shelves Volume VI of my precious score of volumes of Hegel's works brought out in 1832 and after. The *Encyclopedia* has been gathering dust. Fifty years ago it was on my desk daily. But I may then not have read carefully enough Hegel's Introductions to the second and third editions. Vater treats us to his own translations of pp. xxi-xxii and xxxii-xxxiii. What Hegel said May 25,

1827 and September 19, 1830 could still be said of our own time's attitude toward philosophy.

On p. xxii Hegel borrows a word from Jakob Boehme which is no longer in the German dictionary and may never have been there. Boehme shaped the words he needed. Hegel speaks of the lowest form of consciousness, which as yet is the non-objectified content of feeling, "*qualirt nur.*" Only a quality? Or does Boehme extract a non-existent verb from the noun *Qual*, pain? Vater opts for the latter, and elegantly translates "it is simply *anguished.*"

I wish Vater had not omitted Hegel's sentence which runs from p. xxi to p. xxii and says "that religion can have its own being without philosophy, but philosophy not without religion." This is one of those truths which should be framed and hung on the wall of every academic classroom and catechism room, maybe also in high school rooms and in rooms where teachers and preachers have their guild gatherings.

Philosophical sentences like this one of Hegel might be called public, because they need persistent repetition. Other sentences would then be professional, because they require rewording rather than schoolish repetition. At times I blame my own repetitiveness on my age. At other moments I suspect it is sheer laziness.

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Robert Brown says I began my "philosophical education with Fichte." This is quite true if "education" means the deliberately undertaken self-discipline by systematic reading of texts and thus means *intro*-duction into the respective field of scholarship. But in the wider sense of the word *e-ducere*, to lead forth from "normal" darkness into dazzling daylight, two great spirits among the "dead" lit my way. After the death of the God of my childhood, a casualty of the first winter of the war (1914-15), I needed no funeral for a corpse but instead a cleansing of my mind, and Nietzsche, whom I discovered in fall 1915, became my great liberator. Within a year I read all his works. Still unshaken in my determination to become an engineer, I needed a firm foundation for fascinating physics and thought I found it in Spinoza's *Ethics*. Among the living I had the great luck of finding Fritz Medicus, the brilliant and lucid lecturer. After his Introduction to Philosophy I was hooked by the intoxicating and ever more brightly shining light of his vast philosophical scholarship. In 1915 he was no longer just a Fichtean. (His re-edition of Fichte's works had brought him, in 1911, from Halle to Zürich, to the chair of philosophy at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology where he taught till 1946.) I decided to read Fichte. Humanities professors had neither office hours nor offices. But Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday evenings at six I waited for Medicus at the south door of the Institute and, Indian fashion, 100 steps walking, 100 running, we raced for his suburban train, I asking questions, he answering. Once, maybe in 1916, he stopped dead and sternly asked: "Now, what have you read?" I meekly said: "Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1804." And he: "*Alle Achtung!*" (That is: You have my respect!) And we raced on. Medicus was no missionary. I converted myself to philosophy, in 1918. But without Medicus I'd never have become what I am. In summer 1918 the topic of his reading exercises was Schelling's *Weltalter*. A decade before, in Halle, Medicus had shoved another student's nose onto Schelling. That student was Paul Tillich. To the

end of his life Medicus who, at the Institute could not have philosophy majors, maintained he had had only two students who became professional teachers of philosophy, Tillich and me. Tillich has often publicly expressed his gratitude to Medicus. I who earned no big name must praise Medicus at every opportunity.

Robert Brown's response has five sections, and I will use their numbers. With the first I agree verbatim, except for the last line which calls God "a self-revealing individual." In my eyes that is a "last objectivism." Why not an indeed mysterious string of revelations? Flowers are alive; bouquets are man-made.

Section 2 ends saying "a fuller discussion would be informative." I hope someone will furnish it. At this point I am not ready.

In Section 3 Brown names another desideratum which might interest some candidate for the master's or the doctorate, a special study of Schelling's works with regard to "a reconciliation or synthesis of freedom and necessity." Brown wants me to "remark" on my omitting this theme. My paper omits so many themes that I can only say I do not know. But I will refer to a few passages in Schelling where he has in mind the question of freedom and necessity. In 1801 Perthes in Hamburg published the German translation of a Swedish book by Benjamin Karl H. Höyer, on construction in philosophy. Schelling reviewed it. According to Höyer, "in human intelligence freedom and necessity are only two points of view whose point of indifference lies in the original action which as yet has no modification" (V, 144). Schelling says higher than the two points of view there is "the philosophical reflection which unites them." Its system "brings Nature to the highest consciousness and presents it in its clearness" (V, 146).

In 1803, at the end of the first of his lectures *On the Method of Academic Studies*, Schelling said: "There is no true freedom except through absolute necessity¹, and between that freedom and this necessity there is in turn a relationship like that between absolute knowing and absolute acting."² And he adds the two footnotes: "¹Freedom must integrate itself with necessity." — "²In freedom, that is in action itself necessity comes about, just as, on the other side, a truly absolute knowledge is a knowledge with absolute necessity and with absolute freedom." In the tenth lecture he said: "It is the ordinary view of nature and of history that in nature everything occurs owing to empirical necessity, in history owing to freedom. Yet these two themselves are only the forms or manners of being outside the absolute" (V, 306). "As phenomenon (*Erscheinung*) freedom cannot create anything; there is but one universe, which expresses the twofold form of the phenomenal (*abgebildeten*) world, each for itself and in its own kind" (V, 306f.). — In 1842-46, the *Philosophy of Mythology*, at the end of its first part on *Monotheism*, sees necessity and freedom as aspects of the theogonic process in which we find ourselves (XII, 121-131). — Yet I would not advise the student to ignore earlier and plainer statements of Schelling, for instance the 1809 treatise, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*: "After all what is that inner necessity of the essence of man? Here is the point where necessity and freedom must be united if they can be united at all. . . . That inner necessity is freedom itself" (VII, 385). And in 1816-17, in the dialogue, *On the Relation of Nature to the Spirit World*: "Freedom is the true, genuine presence of spirits (*Geistererscheinung*)" (IX, 39). — These are mere hints. Let somebody write the study Brown proposes.

At the end of his Section 4, Brown asks whether I have “simply dropped the self-relation of God.” And Brown grants me a good reason. With regard to that I can answer yes. But with regard to the very notion of a “self-relation in God” I do not drop it, for I do not understand it. Whenever we humans silently think, we think something, no matter how vaguely. We may give (as yet silent) voice to our thought in words, in (mental) sketches, in (as yet purely mental) dance movements, in short, always specifically. The last year or so I have been awakening at night with verbalized sentences. And I am told that I may yet be heard talking to myself, if I get really old. Even in this sense I am a person, or rather *personans*, sounding through my sense equipment. But how can God be a person? And in what language is God to talk to God? Yes, I do call such a God-person a last objectivism, even an idol. And yet, is “God’s self-relation” a mere anthropomorphism? The only alternative I can see is God “talking things over” *through us*, in actual human history. That should make us watch our steps. They might be fateful.

Section 5: “God’s existence *is* always specific.” Does God have any “nature or being at all”? Brown’s affirmative answer is “the absolutely free will.” That is the “nature God does eternally though freely will for God.” I like Brown’s sentence. However it could be read objectivistically and idolatrously, if ‘eternal’ meant ‘all the time’. Then God would don a kind of uniform of freedom. But ratiocination, the maker and breaker of the religions, points out that the uniform covers nothing, like “the emperor’s new clothes.” I prefer to stop at the *adsum*, at real history. That, I should say, is the “nature” of God. Spinoza spoke of *deus sive natura*, and his God was *quod in se est et per se percipitur*, that is, spirit, which is always history in the making.



The Whole Truth: Hegel's Reconceptualization of Trinity

Dale M. Schlitt

So pervasive has been G. W. F. Hegel's general impact on modern culture and apparently so persuasive his particular dialectical interpretation of Trinity that one would be hard pressed to name a significant 19th or 20th century western philosopher or theologian not in some way influenced by Hegel's reconceptualization of the trinitarian God. This impact and influence come as little surprise in view of the insight and industry with which Hegel, in developing his trinitarian theory, handled such universal themes as alienation, personhood and subjectivity, freedom, history, universality and particularity, community, infinity, revelation and knowledge of God. These themes will be touched upon in the course of this overview of how and why Hegel developed his trinitarian thought as he did. Such a summary presentation may contribute to an appreciation of Hegel's thought itself while providing background for and further facilitating access to subsequent reconceptualizations of God and Trinity. It may, as well, make more available conceptualities useful in contemporary constructive philosophy and theology.

It will be necessary to leave aside any lengthy discussion of and reference to relevant secondary literature. References to the Hegelian corpus itself will serve more to exemplify and indicate general source areas rather than either to provide a final documentation for the statements made or to follow in any detail the systematic shifts and developments occurring during Hegel's "mature" period from about 1807.¹ Hegel's mature systematic reinterpretation of Trinity will be presented in three steps. Part One will survey what was the shape and final result of Hegel's efforts. In a sense this is already a response to the question of how Hegel reconceptualized Trinity. Part Two will examine more specifically how he argued his position by grounding it in logic. Part Three will explore why Hegel elaborated Trinity as he did.

1. For an internal critique of Hegel's reconceptualization of Trinity, fuller reference to the Hegelian corpus and secondary literature, as well as for some initial remarks on the shifts and development during Hegel's work from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) on, see Dale M. Schlitt, *Hegel's Trinitarian Claim – A Critical Reflection* (Leiden: Brill, 1983). For a historical review of important literature see Walter Jaeschke, *Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), pp. 83-86. I would like to acknowledge my general indebtedness to studies by Reinhard Heede and Walter Jaeschke.

1. *The Shape and End Result of Hegel's Efforts*

What the immediate results of Hegel's philosophical efforts to reconceptualize Trinity, i.e., to develop a trinitarian philosophy, were can be summarized conveniently by sketching briefly several of his more significant explicit treatments of Trinity. It will be helpful to indicate that in these explicit treatments of Trinity Hegel elaborates what, with certain qualifications, can conveniently be referred to by using terminology current in contemporary trinitarian theology. In current theological usage "immanent" Trinity refers to distinction within the divine itself and "economic" Trinity correlatively refers to the externalization of this distinction in human history. Though what has come to be identified as "immanent" and "economic" Trinity had regularly enough been discussed by Hegel throughout his writing and teaching,² his explicit trinitarian thought can best be grasped initially by selectively reviewing his positioning and structuring of Trinity in three of the texts where Hegel deals with the "realphilosophical"³ spheres: the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; the 1830 *Encyclopedia*; and his four series of *Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*⁴ was published in 1807. Within the context of his mature systematic position it can be seen as a "first work" — perhaps overly ambitious, surely the most debated but in some ways also the most fertile of his works. It was a sort of "first love" to which he returned time and again, at least for examples. The *Phenomenology* presents the long journey from consciousness to self-consciousness as a series of shapes or figures of consciousness which have come to be seen as the self-manifestation of absolute spirit. The point of view from which the author writes is that of the final chapter, "Absolute Knowledge," where concept and self are identical. Hegel sees Trinity as the penultimate figure or shape of consciousness in this journey.⁵ Here Trinity is the explication of the prior incarnational immediacy of a sensuously perceived divine-human self. It is the shape or figure of revelatory religion developed by Hegel as the progressively more explicit presentation of trinitarian divine subjectivity: first as the immediacy of thought as such; then

2. "Trinity" is to be taken in an inclusive sense to indicate both "immanent" and "economic" Trinity unless otherwise indicated. For a helpful survey of Hegel's discussions on Trinity see Jörg Splett, *Die Trinitätslehre G. W. F. Hegels* (Munich: Alber, 1965), esp. p. 78 on "immanent" and "economic" Trinity. Note that "immanent" Trinity will be used at the end of Part One of this study to refer as well to Hegel's logic. For an example of the use of "immanent" and "economic" Trinity in contemporary theology, see Karl Rahner, *The Trinity* (London: Burns and Oates, 1970), esp. pp. 21-24, 99-103.

3. A term used technically to indicate all the Hegelian spheres of philosophy (here including his presentation "prior" to absolute knowledge in the *Phenomenology*) other than that of logic.

4. *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 9: *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), hereafter GW 9 with reference by page and line. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford, 1977), hereafter *Phen.* and cited by page and at times line from the top.

5. GW 9: 409.3-421 end (*Phen.* 464.37-478 end).

secondly as the otherness of representation; and thirdly as the inclusive element of self-consciousness itself, spirit in and as community. Each of these three moments of revelation is distinct in that it has its own internal structural configuration and dynamic. Each is in its own way the momentary totality of revelation as reconciliation, that is, of Spirit. It was apparently in the *Phenomenology* that Hegel first clearly elaborated the basic syllogistic structure of these momentary totalities.⁶ Among these totalities community does represent an enriched return to the immediacy of "immanent" Trinity. But community as well as the previous two momentary totalities remain, on the level of religion, the true content representationally expressed as other than the self. According to Hegel the very inadequacy of this reconciliation realized in and through full divine self-revelation brings about the inner dynamic transition to the final shape of self-consciousness, absolute knowledge, where form and content are adequate in the identification of self and concept.

Hegel's 1830 *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*⁷ begins in logic, understood as pure thought, with the initial logical moment of pure being and ends in an enriched resultant return in the philosophy of spirit to that moment as philosophical concept where form and content are truly and fully adequate. As its title indicates, the *Encyclopedia* constitutes an outline of Hegel's entire mature philosophical system. It does this however not as the mere juxtaposition of philosophical sciences but in that it presents absolute spirit as idea developing from the immediacy of logic to its self-othering in nature and finite spirit and returning through finite spirit in philosophic thought to the renewed and enriched immediacy of the idea. Within the process of this self-determination by absolute spirit Hegel again places revealed religion as the penultimate sphere. He presents revealed religion schematically in the form of a syllogistically structured "immanent" and "economic" self-revelation as self-development of trinitarian divine subjectivity.⁸ Hegel employs an explicitly religious or representational but nevertheless always philosophically informed language to lay out Trinity as three syllogistically structured moments of universality, particularity and individuality with the last itself again internally developed as a movement of three self-mediating

6. See the background study by Hermann Schmitz, *Hegel als Denker der Individualität* (Meisenhan/Glan: Hain, 1957), pp. 118-146. Note Hegel's own description of his trinitarian thought as a "syllogism of absolute self-mediation itself made up of three syllogisms." See Hegel's own review of 1. "Über die Hegelsche Lehre oder: absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus," 2. "Über Philosophie überhaupt und Hegels *Enzyklopädie* der philosophischen Wissenschaften insbesondere. Ein Beitrag zur Beurteilung der letzteren. Von Dr. K. E. Schubarth und Dr. L. Cargonico," in *Berliner Schriften 1818-1831*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 240), ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1956), p. 352.

7. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, third original edition 1830, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 33), ed. by Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969), hereafter E and cited by paragraph. *Hegel's Logic*, trans. of E, Part One, by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975); *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. of E, Part Three, by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971).

8. E §§ 564-571, explicitly on syllogisms §§ 567-571.

syllogisms.⁹ In the *Encyclopedia* the moment of individuality climaxes as the effective self-revelation of absolute spirit in and through finite spirit in community, the final moment of syllogistically structured divine trinitarian reconciliation. Still this reconciliation remains the movement of self-determining divine subjectivity not explicitly established as the absolute self or concept in philosophical thought.

Hegel lectured throughout his Berlin years on various sections of the material outlined in the *Encyclopedia* (first edition 1817, second and third original editions 1827 and 1830). The *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*¹⁰ contain his 1821 manuscript as well as transcripts of his 1824 and 1827 lecture series with fragments from his 1831 lectures. In the 1821 lectures Hegel had treated the absolute or consummate religion as the last of the determinate religions, while from 1824 on he placed it more independently and prominently as the third, unifying moment bringing to fruition the initial unity of the concept of religion and the reality already achieved in the second moment, that of the determinate multiplicity of world religions. In 1824 Hegel simplified his 1821 doubly triadic structure of the absolute religion itself into a single triad of three elements in the development of the idea of God. This resulted in a return to the exact structure of the revelatory religion as found in the 1807 *Phenomenology*, a structure discernible in the *Encyclopedia* as well.¹¹ Hegel followed the same organization in the 1827 lectures, where religion, the consciousness of the all-encompassing object or God, has become the fully inclusive self-consciousness of absolute spirit. This inclusive self-consciousness is trinitarian divine self-positing subjectivity as a movement from universality to particularity to individuality.¹²

Although Hegel apportioned theological content somewhat differently in various presentations of the second and third moments in the movement of inclusive self-positing trinitarian divine subjectivity, the basic progression of this

9. The first sentence in E § 571 referring to three syllogisms constituting one syllogism is variously interpreted to indicate either all three moments of the concept or merely the three syllogisms constituting the moment of individuality. On the basis of a consideration of the overall structural dynamic of Hegel's thought, of the immediate context and of other descriptions of Trinity by Hegel as syllogism, this writer is interpreting the disputed phrase to mean directly the three syllogisms making up the moment of individuality and through them as well all three moments of the concept.

10. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vols. 59, 60, 61 and 63 all bound in 2 volumes), ed. by Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1974). Of particular interest, vol. 63: *Die absolute Religion*, hereafter AR and cited by page and line from the top. *The Christian Religion. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Part Three. The Revelatory, Consummate, Absolute Religion*, trans. by Peter C. Hodgson (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Scholars, 1979), hereafter CR. Walter Jaeschke's forthcoming German edition of Hegel's philosophy of religion lectures was unfortunately not available at the writing of this paper.

11. Allowing, of course, for the elaboration of the *Encyclopedia* moment of individuality itself in terms of three syllogisms. See E §§ 569-570.

12. E.g., AR 198.19-31 (CR 256-257). See also the text following, AR 198.32-199.18 (CR 257). Both texts from the 1827 lectures. Note that in view of AR 29.35-37 (CR 37) the third element or community is to be identified as individuality or the individual.

movement is consistently describable in terms of moments of the concept as universality, particularity and individuality.¹³ Indeed, the richness of Hegel's thought allowed him to speak of these three moments or elements in many ways and on many levels. For present purposes it will be sufficient to summarize in the briefest of fashions the way in which Hegel in the 1827 lectures structured these elements of "immanent" and "economic" Trinity so that they would each develop according to and therefore manifest a specific syllogistic structure. These syllogistic structures can, when allowance is made for the further elaboration in the *Encyclopedia*, be seen to have remained constant and consistent in the various presentations from 1807 on.

In the 1827 lectures the first element is describable as the overall appearance of the divine idea in the realm of thought as universality, the immediacy of the "in itself."¹⁴ This self-enclosed movement of "immanent" Trinity is for Hegel the concrete universal containing otherness within itself. It contains a moment of judgment or separation as negation within itself, but only as a sort of play since the distinguishing is itself, as difference, nevertheless the entire idea. In line with Hegelian dialectic, the universal and its negation, i.e., its other, have become an identity. This inner dynamic recognizable as otherness or particularity functioning as a mediating totality inclusive of the extremes of universality and the resultant identity as individuality reveals in itself the triadic structure of inclusive and here absolute subjectivity in the form of the thought determination seen in the *Logic* to be Hegel's categorical syllogism (A-B-E).¹⁵

The second element is the appearance of the divine idea in the doubled movement of diremption and reconciliation.¹⁶ It is the sphere of particularity and objectivity, the movement of judgment in which the divine idea comes into existence "for itself." In this element, characterized by contradiction, the divine idea others itself as an independent world out of which there arises the finite spirit, distinguishing itself from nature and from its own nature. This distinguishing within finite spirit gives rise to the contradictory reality of finite spirit as both good and evil, an exigency for reconciliation. Such a reconciliation has to occur in an exclusive individuality, in the mediating death of Christ, an individual divine-human self. Reconciliation continues to be presented in

13. On the question of the development of Trinity in the *Phenomenology* in terms of self-consciousness and then in the later writings in terms of moments of the concept see Jaeschke, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 90.

14. AR 74.12-77.5, 47.11-48.10, 77.6-84.7 (CR 85-99). Also AR 237.13-14.

15. A = universality (*Allgemeinheit*); B = particularity (*Besonderheit*); E = individuality (*Einzelheit*). On the categorical syllogism see *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 12: *Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Band. Die subjektive Logik* (1816), ed. by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1981), pp. 119.13-121.15, hereafter GW 12 and cited by page and line. *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. by A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities, 1969), pp. 696-698, hereafter GL.

16. AR 92.16-95.19, 112.36-121.24, 126.38-129.40, 138.36-142.29, 154.7-155.21, 150.31-151.11, 151.22-24, 151.34-152.15, 153.12-154.6, 169.4-15, 170.26-172.32, 173.20-174.24 (CR 116-120, 137-142, 147-152, 158-161, 177-182, 193-199, 214-221). Also AR 237.15-16.

the particularity of the community's consciousness of an immediate existence spiritually interpreted as the risen Christ. This historical appearance of the divine idea has occurred as a triadically structured movement from God as presupposed universality to the particularity of the community's spiritual consciousness of the risen Christ by means of mediating individuality (the doubled individuality of nature and finite spirit) culminating in the death of Christ. For the philosophically informed religious consciousness this triadic structure of the absolute subject reveals the form of Hegel's hypothetical syllogism (A-E/E-B).¹⁷

The objective reconciliation achieved in Christ has in the third element, spiritual community,¹⁸ become for Hegel the subjective relationship of the individual subject to this objective reconciliation with the truth. The previous two elements and now this third element are for Hegel the very progression of the idea of God,¹⁹ the absolute eternal idea in itself, for itself and now "in and for itself." These elements are the very life and activity of God now in the third element consummated as the community or unity of the individual empirical subjects who are filled by the Spirit of God, individuals who live in the Spirit of God and with whom the Spirit of God is dialectically identified. God existing in and as the community of finite subjects is the very realization of God as spirit, the Holy Spirit or reconciling return of the divine idea out of the self-othering of judgment. This third element develops as the reconciliation of the individual believer with the life, death and resurrection of Christ in three stages: the origin of the community in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit; the realization or actualization of the community through faith, doctrine, church and eucharist; and, the realization of the spirituality of the community in universal actuality as philosophy. The community originates in the particularity of a shared religious consciousness. In the second stage Hegel sees the various theologoumena there discussed as the reconciling active presence of the spirit, of the objectively presented universality of truth mediating the objective reconciliation obtained in Christ to the individual subjects. The third stage is for Hegel the movement from the shared conscious inner enjoyment of the presence of God achieved in the second stage to an adequate mediation in self-knowledge, in philosophical thought. The knowledge of being at peace with God has become a knowledge of being at peace with oneself. Knowledge or subjectivity is recognized as developing out of itself and reconciling itself with itself. This rationality is true freedom. Philosophy is the comprehending thought which, as essentially concrete, determines itself to its totality, the idea. It is absolute spirit, the very peace of God, true individuality. This mediation of particularity with inclusive individuality by means of objective universality (B-A-E) is, as religious reconciliation in community, the realization of Hegel's disjunctive syllogism.²⁰

17. On the hypothetical syllogism see GW 12: 121.16-123.31 (GL 698-701).

18. AR 194.27-196.18, 198.19-199.18, 202.18-204.34, 205.15-206.25, 207.29-208.19, 214.19-215.12, 216.28-219.5, 225.16-228.31, 232.8-17 (CR 254-257, 263-268, 275-276, 278-281, 287-289, 291-293). Also AR 237.17-26 and the overview in AR 29.18-25, 30.17-20 (CR 36, 37).

19. AR 28.2-8 (CR 35).

20. On the disjunctive syllogism see GW 12: 123.32-126.11 (GL 701-704).

Reconciliation or the realization of trinitarian self-determining subjectivity as divine self-revelation is, in the realphilosophical spheres of the *Phenomenology*, the *Lectures* and the *Encyclopedia*, always positioned as the penultimate but indispensable systematic sphere in which reconciliation truly occurs, but still in the form of religious representation where form is inadequate to the true content, achieved reconciliation. Reconciliation indeed takes place in God, but still in God as Other. Though by the time of the *Encyclopedia* and the *Lectures* Hegel values this representational form as the truth for all humanity,²¹ he constantly retains the view that this true content must on the basis of the inner dynamic tension between content and form sublimate itself into the true form of philosophical thought, of the self-thinking idea as absolute spirit in which form and content, self and concept coincide. Though Hegel has always, from the beginning of the philosophy of religion, interpreted the religious name or term, 'God', from the perspective of the concept, it is in this sublation of trinitarian divine subjectivity in philosophical or self-identical thought that Hegel, systematically speaking, formally and explicitly reconceptualizes Trinity and retroactively grounds his previous interpretation of Trinity in the philosophy of religion from the perspective of the concept.

In Hegel's encyclopedic system as a whole, this final moment, philosophical thought, is for Hegel the truth or perfect correspondence of subject and object, or better, of self and concept. It is absolute spirit, this infinite or inclusive totality, only as the end result inclusive of the whole process of the logical idea's differentiation into nature and finite spirit and its return to itself in and through while then sublating finite spirit.²² As the final moment philosophy is for Hegel the grounding return to the immediacy of logical thought. Though many other reasons could be cited, it is this enriched, grounding return which finally justifies not only seeing Hegel's realphilosophical spheres, and in particular his philosophical thought or concept, as his reconceptualization of Trinity, but also recognizing in his logic the appropriate systematic logical reformulation of "immanent" Trinity with "immanent" carefully nuanced so as not to insinuate an independently *existent* reality. This grounding return on the part of philosophical thought justifies Hegel's own use of philosophically reinterpreted representational language to describe logic as the presentation of God as God is in the divine eternal essence before the creation of nature and finite spirit.²³

In looking then at his encyclopedic system as a whole, it becomes clear that Hegel systematically speaking appropriately treats of "immanent" Trinity twice: as movement of self-determining inclusive subjectivity in the form of pure thought or logic; and, in the realphilosophical sphere of the philosophy of religion as moment of universality. He treats of "economic" Trinity twice as well: in the realphilosophical sphere of the philosophy of religion as including

21. E.g., E § 573 remark; E § 1. And already in the *Logic*, GW 12: 236.27-29 (GL 824-825).

22. On philosophy see E §§ 572-577.

23. *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 11: *Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objektive Logik (1812-1813)*, ed. by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1978), p. 21.16-21, hereafter GW 11 and cited by page and line. English translation of the text here cited, GL 50.

“immanent” Trinity; and, in philosophical thought as the grounding return both to the immediacy of the “immanent” Trinity on the level of philosophy of religion and to the immediacy of logic on the level of spirit as a whole. The encyclopedic system in its totality is Hegel’s philosophically reinterpreted presentation of “economic” Trinity inclusive of “immanent” Trinity as initial moment structuring the overall dynamic of divine self-revelation. In this way logically reformulated as inclusive subject and philosophically reconceptualized as absolute spirit, Trinity is for Hegel the whole truth.

2. How Hegel Argued His Trinitarian Position

Since Hegel is always doing philosophy ultimately from the perspective of the concept (*Begriff*), a presentation of his realphilosophical trinitarian thought is in a very real sense itself already a response to the question of how he argued his trinitarian position. Nevertheless, it is important to turn to the 1812-1816 *Logic*²⁴ for two reasons. First, because for Hegel it represents the appropriate logical reformulation of “immanent” Trinity as self-determining, triadically structured inclusive subjectivity. Secondly, because of his conception of the systematic relationship between the realphilosophical spheres and the sphere of logic as the movement of pure thought, a series of self-positing thought determinations. For Hegel logic both is discovered and “contained” in the spheres of nature and spirit as their “inner formative principle” (*innern Bildner*) and itself is and “contains” the spheres of nature and spirit as their “archetype” (*Vorbildner*).²⁵ Specific logical thought determinations are not merely externally or formalistically applied structures. Rather, they arise and are revealed as inner formative principles to be examined as well in the clarity of their archetypal expression as moments in the dialectical movement of pure thought, which is its own content and therefore absolute form. Hegel’s construction of a dynamic logic, a post-Kantian replacement for traditional metaphysics, forms his strongest and most prolonged argumentation for his trinitarian envisionment. He reconceptualized Trinity by means of an onto-logical reinterpretation of “immanent” Trinity.

Before turning directly to the *Logic* it will be helpful to recall that Hegel’s reconceptualization of the triune God is a process of sublation (*Aufhebung*) in which there has occurred a triply structured transition of negation, preservation and development. The Trinity of religious representation retains for Hegel the characteristics of three independently represented subjects in an inadequately purified parental and filial relationship. This is particularly true for popular piety but also for dogmatic theology.²⁶ Hegel’s reconceptualization negates

24. *Logic* so underlined refers to the published text of the *Science of Logic*. ‘Logic’ not underlined refers to the dialectical movement of thought determinations as Hegel proposes them in the *Logic*. In addition to GW 11 and 12, Hegel’s later revision of the first part of the *Science of Logic*, the logic of being, will be cited from *Wissenschaft der Logik*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 56), ed. by Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1975), hereafter L 1. Unless otherwise noted, the translation in GL will be cited for both the original and revised editions of the logic of being.

25. GW 12: 25.29-33 (GL 592).

26. See Jaeschke, *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 89-90.

such a representation. It negates as well the continuing projection of reconciliation as achieved in a divine subjectivity over against the self. The true content of this religious reconciliation is preserved, according to Hegel,²⁷ in the move to philosophical thought as the full mediation of subject and object, self and concept in self-determining conceptual thought. As purification this transition not only negates but preserves in a truer form and therefore develops the true content expressed as Trinity. Nowhere can this sublation be more clearly seen than in Hegel's proposal to translate what appears on the level of religious representation as the divine freedom to create or not to create into a logically necessary self-othering of the absolute idea in and as nature. This self-othering as logically necessitarian self-determination is called by Hegel "free self-release."²⁸

Hegel understood logic to be an immanent and consistent internally justified progression of thought determinations in three successive spheres: the logic of being; the logic of essence; the logic of the concept. He chose to work with reflexively available conceptual thought so as to argue not on the basis of opinion but in the public realm. Already in the philosophy of religion Hegel had in principle elaborated creation and crucifixion within "immanent" Trinity by means of his understanding of difference as negation. Now in the dialectical movement of self-positing and self-determining logical thought Hegel has integrated positivity by defining it as otherness characterized as negation. It is then the overcoming of this negation in the realization that the other is the other *of* the initial identity which constitutes the fundamental dynamic of self-determining pure thought. Logic presents the structure of inclusive subjectivity as self-relationality.

This dialectic of self-relationality is what underlies all of Hegel's mature systematic thought, including his reconceptualization of trinitarian divine subjectivity. The dialectic can be summarized by referring to the movement of Hegel's first logical thought determinations, being/nothing/becoming,²⁹ exeged in the light of his final remarks on method.³⁰

In the first logical triad, being becomes determinate, through nothing, in that resultant becoming, that is, the explicit, positive thought that nothing is, settles in determinate being, *Dasein*. This Hegelian dialectic is a movement from the positive to a negation to the negation of this negation and thus to a

27. The question whether Hegel's reconceptualization of Trinity is compatible in general with the general Christian trinitarian dogma or in particular with one or more specific Christian trinitarian theologies will not be discussed here.

28. See especially at the end of the *Logic*, GW 12: 252.25-253.34 (GL 842-844). Unless this change from free creation to logically necessary self-othering is designated only as a change of form, it would seem necessary to speak of a "dialectical" identity of content between religion and philosophy in Hegel's system. The sublation in question is not simply a move interpretable as identical to the classical *bonum est diffusivum sui*, overflowing goodness or fullness. One could speak of the absolute idea's fullness in relation to its logically prior development and as the enriched return to the immediacy of the first moment of logical thought. However, the motor force in the self-othering here in question is the characteristic of the absolute idea as renewed *immediacy*, a "lacking" (*mangelhaft*) vis-a-vis the realphilosophical spheres.

29. GW 11: 43.17-44.29 and 56.21-57.37 (GL 82-83 and 105-106).

30. GW 12: 236.1-253.34 (GL 824-825).

renewed positive. It is a movement from beginning through progression to result. In this totally immanent, consistent and self-grounding movement of pure thought the initial positive, in this instance being, is an immediacy with a content and a determination as yet *an sich*, a unity unposited, still only implicit and therefore not yet available to itself. In this sense the initial, positive beginning (being) is characterized by a lack, the thinking of which gives rise to the negation of that beginning, that is, to nothing and to the contradiction that nothing is. Negation's arising remains immanent; this thinking is the movement of thought itself. The motivating force behind this progression lies for Hegel in the inability of immediacy to rest in its lacking, to be thought through adequately without a transition to the negation of itself, which is its other inclusive of itself, *für sich*. This other, established on the basis of the internal inadequacy constitutive of immediacy, is difference, the other of initial identity and identity's determinate negation through which indeterminate identity is to become determinate.

This immediate dialectic of being and nothing and Hegel's dialectical thought as a whole are so constructed that immediacy requires a mediated and mediating difference arising out of itself in order to come to itself, to be *an und für sich* what it was originally only implicitly. Thinking through the contradiction constitutive of difference (exemplified in the first logical triadic by "nothing is") overcomes that contradiction by bringing to expression in thought the unity (becoming settling in *Dasein*) already contained in the contradiction itself. The result is self-mediation in which immediacy and difference, the positive and its negation, *an sich* and *für sich*, implicit and explicit arrive at a higher unity containing them as its moments.

This logic of Hegel's can be described as the speculative dialectical method in and through which the concept determines itself as a non-temporal movement of ever more determinate thought categories. Whereas Hegel's earlier discussed philosophy of religion and especially his philosophy of the absolute religion could well be termed a *phänomeno-theo-logik*, logic was constructed as an *onto-theo-logik*.³¹ The logical transition from one thought determination to another has taken place in the logic of being as thought categories "having gone over into" the other. In the logic of essence the transition constituting determinations of reflection occurs as "appearing in" the other. And in the logic of the concept each determination of the concept develops into its other. The thought determinations or categories are themselves, in the logic of being and in the logic of essence implicitly or in the logic of the concept explicitly, non-temporal "momentary" totalities of the concept. There is no underlying subject or thinker. Each thought determination arises as a "momentary" totality within Hegel's triadically structured method (beginning/progression/result).

31. Reinhard Heede, "Die Göttliche Idee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Logik und Religionsphilosophie bei Hegel" (Ph.D. dissertation, Philosophical Faculty of the Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster/Westfalen, 1972), pp. 52-73, esp. pp. 55-57 with literature on the term *onto-theo-logik* on p. 55. Note Martin Heidegger's particular reference to Hegel's logic as *onto-theo-logik: Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 35-73; *Identity and Difference* (New York: Harper, 1969), pp. 42-74.

Each is in its own way a form of becoming (*werdend*).³² To the extent then that the structure of “going over into” or self-donation is constitutive of all logical moments, Hegel’s ever triadically structured movement of pure thought is, from the initial moment of pure being to the resultant return as absolute idea, as a whole the systematic reformulation of “immanent” Trinity and the archetypal structure of “economic” Trinity. To the extent as well that such “self-donation” is the dynamic structure of personhood, or better, with reference to logic, of subjectivity, Hegel has managed to elaborate in a logical formulation what was for him represented in absolute religion as a “tri-personal” God.³³ Though Hegel carries out this elaboration in the singular and speaks simply of “person” or “subject,”³⁴ he is in regard to logic not referring to an existent. Speaking, in a post-nominalist framework, of the concrete universal as the structure of subjectivity, he can be seen as attempting to move beyond the dichotomy between what would today be termed monosubjectival and societal formulations of Trinity.

3. Systematic Concerns Motivating Hegel’s Reconceptualization

The question of why Hegel reconceptualized Trinity can be phrased more specifically in order to get at some of the systematic religious and philosophical concerns motivating his endeavor: What did Hegel see was at stake in his attempt to reconceptualize the trinitarian God from the perspective of the concept? So phrased, this question subsumes into one of why Hegel reformulated Trinity and why he did so in specific ways. It may now be answered briefly from within the framework and perspective of Hegel’s mature systematic position itself.³⁵ What is at stake for Hegel can be surfaced by reviewing religious-representational formulations of his claim that God can be conceived adequately as person, subject and spirit only if God is conceived as Trinity. The underlying philosophical concerns which pushed him to reinterpret Trinity and to do this in specific ways can be inferred as well from his resultant philosophical position as a whole.

In his manuscript for the 1821 philosophy of religion lectures on absolute religion Hegel wrote, “God is *spirit*—that is, that which we call the *triune*

32. Karl Heinz Haag, “Die Seinsdialektik bei Hegel und in der scholastischen Philosophie” (Ph.D. dissertation, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 1951), pp. 20-22.

33. On the questions of “tri-personal” and dyadic versus triadic interpretations of Hegel’s trinitarian thought see the helpful review and reflections with further references in Jaeschke, *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 87-91.

34. E.g., GW 12: 236.3-20, 246.23-27, 248.14-16, 251.8-13 (GL 824, 835-836, 837, 841).

35. To approach this question from a more historical-developmental perspective one could begin by consulting Schmitz, *Hegel als Denker der Individualität*, pp. 118-146, and Splett, *Trinitätslehre*, pp. 13-73, in conjunction with and in the light of the two studies by H. S. Harris, *Hegel’s Development. Toward the Sunlight, 1770-1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), and *Hegel’s Development. Night Dreams, Jena 1801-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).

God."³⁶ God is spirit because God becomes the other and sublates this other.³⁷ Hegel claims that God remains but an empty word if God is not grasped as triune.³⁸ He is concerned to establish a concept of God which does not leave personhood behind.³⁹ There is then a particular earnest with which Hegel allows his concerns to surface as he makes this claim that only if God is known as what would today be termed "immanent" and "economic" Trinity can God be known as spirit, inclusive subjectivity becoming absolute spirit finally as philosophical concept. These concerns are indicated by the consequences Hegel draws from the successful or unsuccessful establishment of that trinitarian structure. In the trinitarian divine self-othering and sublation of that otherness he identifies the principle and axis upon which history turns.⁴⁰ World history is for Hegel a history of God.⁴¹ This trinitarian dialectic is equally for Hegel the principle of freedom.⁴² the source of community,⁴³ the reason why God can be known,⁴⁴ and the justifying content of Christianity's distinctive truth claims⁴⁵ as the religion of absolute subjectivity⁴⁶ and freedom.⁴⁷ Trinity, the content of the true religion, is for Hegel divine self-revelation.⁴⁸ According to Hegel, without a trinitarian structure to the divine there could be no true reconciliation in Christ.⁴⁹ God would, as mentioned, be an empty name, one-sided and finite rather than inclusive and infinite.⁵⁰ There could be no truth as mediation for there would be no possibility of a transition from religion, with its true content but representational form, to philosophy, where form and content would be identical.

36. "Gott ist *Geist*, d.i. das, was wir *dreieinigen* Gott heissen." AR 57.1 (CR 67-68). Italics as in the manuscript.

37. AR 165.13-15 (CR 210) 1824 lecture transcript. Hereafter the lecture series will be indicated by date.

38. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 59), *Begriff der Religion*, ed. by Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1974), pp. 41.28-42.6, 1824.

39. See *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 124a), ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1967), p. 324, § 35. The phrase in question is not found in the English translation.

40. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Auf Grund der Handschriften herausgegeben*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 171b-d), ed. by Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976), p. 722.

41. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Auf Grund der Handschriften herausgegeben*, (Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 171a), ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1970), p. 74.

42. E.g., AR 225.16-226.14 (CR 287-288) 1827.

43. Note the variously stated dialectical interrelationship between spirit and community, E § 554 with remark; and, e.g., AR 182.4-12 (CR 238) 1821.

44. AR 225.35-226.14 (CR 287-288) 1827.

45. E.g., AR 184.6-16 (CR 240-241) 1821.

46. AR 10.38-11.16 (CR 31) 1827.

47. E.g., AR 35.1-4 (CR 13) 1821; AR 35.36-36.35 (CR 14-15) 1824.

48. GW 9: 405.16-25 (*Phen.* 459); E § 564.

49. AR 173.33-174.4 (CR 220) 1827.

50. God as totality is spirit, AR 70.29-34 (CR 79) 1831? See CR 105 n. 64. More philosophically formulated, E §§ 8, 74.

Whereas in religion alienation resolved in reconciliation is realized representationally in the trinitarian God as self-revelation, in philosophical thought that same content was to have been expressed in its necessity, to have received its adequate form, as a self-mediation which was to have been the identity of thought and reality, self and concept.⁵¹ In this sense Hegel's famous claim in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* that the true must be grasped not only as substance but also as subject⁵² becomes an appropriate philosophical reformulation of his trinitarian claim and reiterates his concern not to conceive of God as less than inclusive subject.

Hegel surmised that the orthodoxy of his day with its supernaturalistic theology tended to reduce God to an object and that its otherworldliness could lead to a this-worldly atheism. He realized as well that the developing bourgeois society might easily set itself over against the unified state and fragment it. This double estrangement in religion and society was for Hegel expressed paradigmatically in Kant's philosophical dualism. Together with that dualism this estrangement formed the alienation, grounded in the Enlightenment, which Hegel proposed to overcome by adopting, but more so adapting, Fichte's notion of the positing ego. If the self was the source for Kant of all but the thing-in-itself, it only took one more step to propose that thought was the source of both phenomena and noumena, appearance and essence.⁵³

Hegel's concept of inclusive subjectivity meant that he had to insist that truth could be mediated only by a content which was it itself.⁵⁴ Or, religiously expressed, in the God-world relationship God must be seen as inclusive of the world. Hegel gave logical expression to this inclusive relationship in his elaboration of the true infinite as the mediation of infinite and finite, and thus as the inclusive totality.⁵⁵ What he had termed the "bad infinite," or merely the infinite progression, had to go over into the concept of the true infinite, in which the thinking of finitude would result in the transition to the infinite and vice versa. For Hegel the true infinite is finally the process of mediation in which the infinite, having become finite, sublates itself as its own difference or finitude into its own self-affirmation, the posited negation of negation.⁵⁶ To be anything less than inclusive would be to remain one-sided and finite.

In the context of the present discussion it is this concept of the true infinite as concrete universal, the inclusive totality, or absolute spirit which provides the best access to the systematic religious and philosophical concerns lying behind Hegel's reconceptualization of Trinity. The true infinite as a movement from the positive to its negation to the negation of this negation recalls again how Hegel integrated the positivity of religion or positivity in general into a

51. GW 9: 427.28-31 (*Phen.* 485); E § 571 with remark.

52. GW 9: 18.3-5 (*Phen.* 10).

53. See in general Günter Rohrmoser, *Subjektivität und Verdinglichung. Theologie und Gesellschaft im Denken des jungen Hegel* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1961).

54. E § 74.

55. On finite and infinite as thought determinations in the movement of pure thought see L 1: 103-140 (GL 116-150).

56. L 1: 138 (GL 148).

widened notion of reason. To the Enlightenment mind, positivity had designated that which could not be deduced from universal reason. For Hegel, otherness, defined as negation, integrated within reason itself particularity as the other of universality.

To recapitulate, by his trinitarian reconceptualization Hegel was able to give content to the term 'God', understood in the philosophy of religion as absolute subjectivity and subject. History became the history of God and community the locus of spirit's self-realization. Freedom was understood ultimately as logically necessary but truly *self*-determination. Knowledge of God, Christianity's truth claim and truth itself were likewise grounded immediately in Hegel's reconceptualization of Trinity. In eliminating the need for a distinction in "immanent" Trinity between divine essence and divine person, Hegel continued the modern turn to the subject. He was able to avoid a Cartesian appeal to God for truth and certainty in knowledge by making of the trinitarian God the very structure of truth itself. Hegel claimed to recognize in Trinity in general, and in the "inner" or "immanent" Trinity in particular, a congruity with his dialectic of positive/negation/negation of negation. In the Christian doctrine of Trinity he discovered the means to give religious expression to mediation in the self as concept, his philosophical response to alienation. Perhaps in the post-Hegelian world it is still that philosophical response in the form of the true infinite as inclusive totality which, when appropriately adapted, will prove most fecund for the contemporary reconceptualization of Trinity as the whole truth.

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Conceiving Reality Without Foundations: Hegel's Neglected Strategy For *Realphilosophie*

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Although Hegel has frequently been granted felicitous insight into the rich detail of known facts, his strategy for conceiving reality has been roundly dismissed as a relic of philosophical hypertrophy. Such dismissal is certainly understandable considering how often Hegel's theory of reality has been interpreted to be the child of either a leviathan metaphysical construction or a demonically inventive transcendental constitution. Unfortunately, the weight of these interpretations has not just led to the general discrediting of Hegel's system. It has also virtually banished from view a central strand in Hegel's argument which suggests an entirely different approach offering a viable, yet ignored strategy for conceiving reality without falling prey to the foundational dilemmas afflicting metaphysical and transcendental argument. There is no better way of comprehending the significance and neglected promise of this strategy than first following in broad outline the path of inquiry which has led to the quagmire in which thought today confronts reality.

i) The Flight from Reality of Positive Science

In an age when philosophers proclaim their own inability to conceive reality, nothing seems more appropriate than simply taking up what is given and examining it as offered. With philosophical thought abandoning the real, and resigning itself to exercises in logical consistency and edification, positive science would seem to have been granted the domain of truth for its own. Since positive scientists address their subject matter only in so far as it can be taken for granted, they have felt little need to doubt its reality for science any more than science's access to it.

Nevertheless, however positive science rises to the task of enjoying the self-evidence of its subject matter, the result can be no more than the very same formal consistency to which an obliging philosophy stands condemned. Since positive science immediately considers a given subject matter, its analysis is relative to both the particular content it puts under investigation and its own given relation to this object. Whether it begins by turning to certain facts, meditating upon an inner experience, or simply defining its terms, positive science can never claim an absolute knowledge of reality as it is in itself, but

only an understanding of what it assumes to be given for it. Since its object is just as much an unjustified postulate as the validity of its knowing of it, positive science can arrive at no truth, but only the formal consistency of properly deriving conclusions from a given assumption according to some accepted procedure.

Thus positive science is left with the very same inability to know reality that has been ascribed to philosophy. This leveling of the two disciplines can hardly exclude the possibility of conceiving reality, however, for just as positive science cannot get at the truth of what is real, so it cannot legitimately claim that there be no other knowing than its own. The attempt of skeptical positivists such as Quine¹ to reduce philosophy to positive science founders on this very point. They have ignored that the doubly conditioned standpoint of positive science cannot be asserted to be the inescapable predicament of all discourse, since the acknowledged relativity of positive science leaves it itself unable to ground the universality they claim for it.

ii) Metaphysics and the Dilemma of First Asking, "What Is?"

Despite the recurring temptation, philosophy has never been able to restrict itself to the relative understanding which positive science properly pursues. From the start, philosophy has instead sought to conceive reality without forsaking truth.

When this calling emerged from passive wonder by asking, "What is?", it immediately took the form subsequently both hailed and branded as metaphysics. Given its constitutive question, this approach has inveterately conceived reality by first presenting some specific content and immediately claiming that it is not something merely stipulated by the philosopher as an object for his or her own knowing, but something in itself, given *in res* independently of any reference to it.

Since whatever thus gets taken to be true in itself is so by virtue of being immediately given, there can be no mediating principle by which the claimed reality of different contents can be judged. On these terms any given content is just as susceptible of being presented as something in itself as any other. Consequently metaphysics could not help but offer a sorry parade of completely different competing systems of reality, each equally claiming immediate and unqualified truth.

Of course, such conflict could not escape the eyes of metaphysicians themselves, and attempts were made to surmount the dilemma. Some thinkers sought an absolute first principle of reality which would overcome the competing claims of different given contents by deriving them all out of itself in an ordered construction of the totality of reality. However, once engaged, their attempts necessarily fell prey to disputes concerning not only what was the first

1. See Willard Van Orman Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in *From A Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) for a classic statement of this position.

principle, but also what constituted the criteria for the completeness and validity of its presumed derivation of all reality. A vicious circle always seemed to arise, where in order to judge the truth of the stipulated first principle, one already had to have true knowledge of the scope and interconnection of the full content of reality, something that should be unattainable without relying upon the first principle, if the latter were truly the basis of everything else.

In response to these difficulties, Socrates argued alternately that in order to answer the question, "What is?", one first had to call opinion into question, purge oneself of all assumptions concerning reality and reach the state of knowing nothing at all, where the quest for truth generically begins. From that putatively presuppositionless standpoint one could then directly proceed to know reality as it is in itself.

The problem with this alternative becomes clear when Plato takes up the Socratic program in the discussion of the divided line in the *Republic*, moving beyond the negative outcome of the dialectic of Socratic questioning. There Plato describes how, upon reaching that point beyond all assumption, one faces a content presupposing no other, out of which all true reality gets determined. This unconditioned givenness is the Good, and from it one can proceed without reference to anything else to conceive one idea after another of things as they are in themselves. Although Plato nowhere shows how the specific ideas immanently emerge from the Good, even if one allows that they do, the Platonic approach can never account for how one can decide what is the valid givenness beyond all assumption from which all reality derives, without already taking for granted what can and cannot be presuppositionless in itself. So long as *any* specific content is ascribed immediate and unconditioned reality, there is nothing that can legitimate it against the opposing claim of any other arbitrary assumption. Whether it be a particular fact, an all encompassing first principle, or the determining source of everything real, whatever is immediately put forward as true in itself can comprise no true reality, but only the referent of a knowing that takes the content of reality for granted.

This holds, even if one were to follow Aristotle, and undertake a study of being qua being, in recognition that being must first be conceived in its own right in so far as nothing real can lack being nor therefore be conceived without a prior understanding of being itself. Again, arbitrary assumptions would undermine the whole enterprise, for how could the study of being qua being stand as first philosophy without assuming in reality the primacy and elemental character ascribed to being?

By asking "What is?" as the first question of philosophy, metaphysics thus perennially commits the error of making immediate reference to reality. No matter what it gives in answer, metaphysical discourse is always left presupposing the correlation between the content of its conception and that of the real. The arbitrariness of such postulated congruence is insurmountable. Because metaphysics constitutively begins its inquiry with some presumed knowledge of what is in itself, it can never establish the correspondence of thought and reality which its own truth claims depend upon. As a result, the metaphysical conception of reality can never be more than a mere stipulation.

If this leaves metaphysics without any knowledge of what is, it does not mean that reality can not be known. On the contrary, the failure of metaphysics to know the real casts in doubt the presumed correspondence of thought and

reality while indicating that all immediate reference to reality must be ruled out.

Given, however, that all reference to reality occurs within knowing, the experience of metaphysics would seem to leave philosophy with not only doubt and suspicion, but also the positive task of first investigating the character and limits of knowing before asking, "What is?"

iii) The Self-Elimination of All Transcendental Theory of Reality

Once this now familiar transcendental turn is taken, the problem of conceiving reality is not simply put off till after knowing is certified ready and able. Rather, the conception of reality falls itself within the consideration of knowing—on two accounts.

To begin with, if the correspondence of thought and reality be called into question and all immediate reference to reality be proscribed, then an examination of the full character and limits of true knowing will have to consider the knowledge of reality to be determined in terms of the structure of knowing itself.

Furthermore, since the knowing under investigation claims truth for its knowledge only by both distinguishing and comparing its concepts with the objects to which they are to correspond, the critical assessment of true knowing will involve considering what knowledge refers to, and how it can be in accord with its concept.

Although this posing of the matter is predicated upon a rejection of all direct reference to reality, it would seem to involve metaphysical claims of its own concerning what knowing is in itself, and do so in such a manner that any knowledge of reality would be precluded from the start.

If knowing can be investigated in its own right, independently of any particular knowledge of reality, this would seem to assume that knowing is either an instrument or medium through which reality is encountered, or a structure of referring which constitutes the very object to which it refers.

In the first case, knowledge of reality as it is in itself would be impossible since what would be obtained by the act of the instrument or the transmission of the medium would be something already worked upon and distorted by knowing's process. If one attempted to get at the unaltered reality by somehow subtracting the effects of such knowing, one would only be left where one was before knowing, namely, with no knowledge of reality at all.²

If, on the other hand, one eliminates all reference to something in itself, and instead conceives knowing as referring to an object generated in the act of knowing itself, then one seems condemned to solipsism, where knowledge can never be of anything more than one's own subjective stipulation.

In face of these difficulties, any transcendental conception of reality would necessarily require solving a problem first posed, if not satisfactorily answered, by Kant in his transcendental deduction of the categories.

2. In the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel makes these arguments, without there taking up the other alternative notion of knowing as a structure of referring whose act generates its own referent.

As Kant recognizes, once metaphysical reference is excluded and objective knowledge is seen as something to be determined in terms of the structure of knowing itself, then solipsism can be avoided and knowledge of reality redeemed if two conditions be fulfilled.

First, the knowing in terms of which all reference proceeds must be such that what it refers to as the object of its knowledge is not merely its own subjective stipulation, but something given independently of its reference to it. Of course, if the referent of knowledge is just knowing's own stipulation, then one is left with the solipsism of positive science, where the known object has no more reality than what the knower assumes it to have.

Secondly, even if the object of knowledge be something in itself, and no mere stipulation of the knower, there will be no knowledge of reality unless knowing be such that its knowledge corresponds to what it knows. Since, however, all immediate reference to reality is illegitimate, the correspondence at issue cannot be validated by any comparison falling outside the structure of knowing, that is, between it and some thing in itself. Rather, the only way transcendental philosophy can escape solipsism and achieve knowledge of reality is if it demonstrates that the conditions for the conception of what is given at the same time provide the conditions under which objects can be given in correspondence with those concepts.

In the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories," Kant rightfully raises this very problem as the touchstone of his entire philosophical project. His particular solution, however, immediately goes awry due to the complementary metaphysical assumptions upon which it depends.

Through his openly "metaphysical" deduction of the categories (B95-B116), Kant supplies the content of these most essential elements of knowing's own structure by immediately referring to the cognitive reality of certain functions handed down traditionally from Aristotelian logic.

Then, having determined the conditions of knowing through a metaphysical reference, Kant proceeds to characterize the conditions of the objects of its knowledge in the same manner. What knowing refers to as its object is claimed to be an appearance of some thing in itself which is not known in terms of the knowing under critique, but in virtue of an immediate reference to reality.

Therefore, when Kant shows how the categories allow the conditions of a possible experience to coincide with the conditions for the possibility of the appearances to which knowing adequately refers, his argument is already undermined by the same metaphysical stipulation it seeks to avoid.

Clearly, if the problem of the transcendental deduction of the categories is to be resolved, with knowledge of reality secured, both the conditions of knowing and the conditions of what it knows must be determined independently of all immediate reference to reality. In face of this challenge, thinkers such as Fichte, the young Schelling, and Husserl have attempted to purge transcendental inquiry of all metaphysical vestiges by seeking to eliminate all immediate reference to a thing in itself and to derive the entire content of the conditions of knowing through its transcendental critique.

However persistently such attempts be pursued, they cannot possibly redeem any knowledge of reality nor any valid knowledge of knowing, for once transcendental philosophy becomes self-critical, its own constitutive framework collapses.

To see this, all one need do is consider what would happen if transcendental philosophy were to forsake all metaphysical reference to its own object of inquiry. For this to occur, the knowing which performs the critique of knowing would itself have to fulfill the conditions of the knowing under investigation. This means that if the transcendental philosopher is to avoid stipulating the conditions of knowing in a metaphysical manner, that philosopher must relate to the subject matter in just the same way that the knowing under critique properly relates to its object. Since what is to be known by the transcendental philosopher is the structure of knowing in terms of which all true knowledge of reality is possible, the transcendental inquiry can legitimately determine what such true knowing is only if its own discourse refers to true knowing just as true knowing refers to what is for it.

This requirement immediately offers its own solution. Because the knowing under critique is to be the knowing whose knowledge corresponds to its object and is certain thereof, while the critique of knowing is to have such true knowing as its object, the two can only coincide if true knowing *is* a knowing of true knowing. In that case, what the transcendental inquiry performs is precisely what it investigates, just as knowing is itself self-critique. Nevertheless, when transcendental discourse thus becomes fully consistent, with metaphysical reference giving way to a knowing which does its own critique, the achieved equalization of transcendental argument with the knowing it investigates has just as much eliminated all distinction between knowing and its object.

Knowing and the object of knowing are here identical because true knowing, the object known through transcendental investigation, is itself a knowing of true knowing, whereas the knowing exercised by the transcendental philosopher is nothing other than a knowing of true knowing as well. Since transcendental knowing is therefore no different than its object, true knowing, the former's identity with its object equally signifies that true knowing is indistinguishable from its object.

This resulting solipsism is of fatal consequence, for the ability to make a distinction between reference and referent, knowing and object known, is what first allows for true knowing and transcendental philosophy itself. If knowing and its object cannot be differentiated, knowing lacks the independent referent it needs to contrast against its knowledge, if the latter is to be the knowledge of something real, and not just of its own representation. In effect, the absence of such distinction leaves no knowing at all, for without any referent to refer to, there is no reference, nor any knowledge to be had.

Similarly, only insofar as knowing can be considered separately from its specific object can the conditions for knowing any object be investigated at all. When, on the contrary, knowing and its object have collapsed into identity, as happens when transcendental inquiry becomes self-referentially consistent, no *epochè* or transcendental reflection can be made. At one with its object, knowing can no longer be grasped by itself, for not only does it have no structure apart, but none whatsoever, insofar as its constitutive relation of reference has been eliminated.³

3. This self-elimination of transcendental cognition is precisely what Hegel observes phenomenologically in the chapter entitled "Absolute Knowing" in his *Phenomenology*

As a result, transcendental philosophy ultimately fails to secure the conditions for its own quest, just as much as the conditions for knowledge of reality.

iv) The Transcendental Impasse of Holism

In recent years, it has become increasingly recognized that the dilemma of transcendental argument does not concern the particular content ascribed to the transcendental condition, but rather the foundational claim of a transcendental condition in general. Whether the ground of objective discourse is characterized as Kantian noumenal subjectivity, an ideal speech situation of non-distorted communication, or the given practice of ordinary language, the same fatal problem arises of having to equalize the transcendental standpoint with its object in order to avoid metaphysical stipulation and achieve self-referential consistency.

Currently the program of philosophical holism has been drawing adherents as a solution to the foundational dilemmas of transcendental argument. Advanced in varying forms by such thinkers as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Richard Rorty, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Hilary Putnam,⁴ the holist strategy seeks to extricate philosophy from metaphysical and transcendental problems, by affirming that all truth claims proceed from pragmatic decisions that stipulate norms for justification and thereby provide the commensurable framework allowing for meaningful argument once they are accepted as a practice agreed upon by those in conversation. These underlying pragmatic decisions may already be enshrined in the normal discourse of a shared culture and tradition, or they may frame a new paradigm of science challenging the old. Whatever the case, holism argues, objectivity always consists in agreement rather than in the accurate mirroring of nature or in the constituting activity of a transcendental subject. Accordingly, the holist would argue, philosophy must restrict itself to interpreting and contrasting the different conventions of discourse, without imposing any preferred set of terms of its own. Instead of seeking a true knowledge of reality, philosophy can only aim at an edification which fosters a self-conscious awareness of the practices through which objectivity is construed.

By limiting philosophy to such edification, the holist claims to have avoided all reference either to reality or to transcendental conditions in his own discourse. However, precisely by making this claim, holism does not advance its own pragmatic characterization of knowing as a mere matter of agreement, as arbitrary as any other description. Rather, holism asserts it as a juridical conception that accurately represents the universal predicament of discourse and, on

of Spirit. As I have tried to show in "The Route To Foundation-Free Systematic Philosophy" (*The Philosophical Forum*, 15, 3, [Spring 1984]), this final collapse of the foundational quest for knowledge of consciousness leads directly to the starting point of the *Science of Logic*.

4. See Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translation edited by G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1981); Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

that basis, precludes the legitimacy of any systematic philosophy with truth as its aim. In so doing, holism ends up making a metaphysical claim concerning the reality of conversation, only to revert to transcendental foundationalism by treating this putative reality of conversation as the ultimate context in which justifications are constituted. In other words, holism's affirmation of the universality of its pragmatic description of discourse renders the latter a preferred set of terms, and thereby reintroduces the very same dilemmas it seeks to avoid.

Consequently, holism presents no alternative to the problems of metaphysical and transcendental argument, but only one more example of their well-traveled path.

v) Starting With Nothing: The Development From Being To Categorial Totality

Can there then be any non-positive, non-metaphysical, non-transcendental conception of reality? In view of the encompassing character of these three failed approaches, it would be hard not to reject any affirmative answer out of hand. For if one is not to stipulate any content, nor make any immediate reference to what is, nor finally determine reality in terms of some conception of knowing, what is one left with but nothing at all?

Strange as it may sound, if there is anything that can lead to a true determination of reality, it will have to be nothing: nothing that is stipulated, nothing that is real in itself, nothing that can be claimed about knowing. The experience of positive science, metaphysics and transcendental philosophy leaves this one alternative, an alternative of simply considering the empty indeterminacy one is left with, when all stipulation is ruled out and all immediate truth claims about reality and knowing have revealed their bankruptcy and been eliminated.

The figure in the history of philosophy who has raised this alternative is Hegel. Although interpreters from Schelling, Marx and Kierkegaard onward have judged and condemned him to be the last great metaphysical system-builder who conceives reality as it is in itself from an absolute standpoint of subject-object identity, there is a neglected current in Hegel's thought which actually offers a unique attempt to forego metaphysical and transcendental arguments and instead begin philosophy without any specific preferred set of terms with regard either to method or to subject matter. With due attention to the systematic issues, his *Science of Logic* and *Encyclopedia* can be seen to take this radically anti-foundational course, and provide the basic outline of its strategy, if not its adequate realization. Although Hegel makes many a remark that can be taken metaphysically according to standard interpretations, what makes his work so philosophically significant for advancing the present state of thought are those of his arguments which break new ground for a non-foundational theory of reality.

Hegel recognizes that when ontological and epistemological truth claims are completely discarded in virtue of their own internal untenability,⁵ what is

5. Hegel attempts to document their internal collapse in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In "The Route To Foundation-Free Systematic Philosophy" (*op. cit.*), I have

left is an absence of all reference and referent, and not any reality or knowledge. Because there is no stipulated content, nor anything in itself, nor any determination of knowing, the indeterminacy resulting from their exclusion has no internal distinctions, no relation to anything else, and no quality of any sort. It is therefore not indeterminacy *in res* or a category of some knowing, but unanalyzable, undifferentiated, uncontrasted indeterminacy about which nothing specific can be said. Hegel calls this "being" and aptly points out that, in contrast to the traditional metaphysical usage of the term, such "being" has no ontological status, nor any status as a primitive term which receives further determination through other terms or provides the privileged principle for their specification.⁶ The being in question can play no such foundational role, for it would cease to be indeterminacy if it were further qualified as a foundation of something else, be it epistemically as a category of thought, or ontologically as the totality of all that is. Even if one were to take being to be merely indeterminate reality this would still involve beginning with more than just indeterminacy. Indeed, what allows the consideration of being to escape the pitfalls of positive science, metaphysics, and transcendental philosophy is precisely the utter indeterminacy at hand, which simply can contain no stipulated content or claims about reality or knowing.

Nevertheless, it is tempting to object that any attempt to begin philosophy with being involves stipulating its specific determinacy, and in doing so, presupposes that the category of being is the privileged starting point of philosophical investigation. This objection fails to recognize that indeterminacy is not the same thing as stipulated indeterminacy or indeterminacy taken as the immediate givenness addressed by the quest for truth. If one were to begin with stipulated being, and consider it as such, what would lie at hand would be the topic with which Hegel begins his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely, sense certainty. There, what is observed is precisely knowing's stipulation of being as what is immediately given for knowing. Hegel is fully aware that such a beginning cannot qualify as the starting point of philosophy, but rather comprises the most elementary shape of consciousness, whose knowing remains burdened by reference to some in-itself which it posits as the given standard of its knowledge. By contrast, being in its own right involves no stipulated content, nor any assumption concerning philosophy or reality simply because its indeterminacy would be violated if it contained any such further relations.

Be this as it may, the very indeterminacy of being would still appear to render it a dead end for all inquiry since it seems inexplicable how anything, let alone anything real, could arise from it. Because such being can only be considered if nothing else is admitted, any further determination would have to emerge from it alone, independently of any outside reference, be it to some given method or to some given content. Otherwise, the problems attending metaphysical reference and transcendental constitution would be reintroduced. On the other hand, since this being lacks all difference and relation to be what

tried to show how Hegel can present this self-elimination of metaphysical and transcendental discourse without making truth claims of his own.

6. G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, translated by A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 83f.

it is, it cannot be a ground or cause or determiner of anything, nor can it give rise to something whose own character involves difference or relation to something determinate.

Consequently, if anything were to arise from being, it could only do so in an utterly groundless manner and be just as uncontrasted and unmediated as being itself. In other words, nothing can arise from being.

Hegel recognizes that this does not mean that there can be no non-foundational development from being. Instead, it spells out the very terms of the advance, indicating that nothing does arise from being without any ground at all, that, in other words, a second indistinguishable indeterminacy follows as being's only possible successor, and does so without any cause or reason.

Being, which is neither something in itself nor a category of reason, but completely indeterminate, *is immediately* nothing, just as nothing *is immediately* the same absence of all determinacy that being comprises.⁷

Thus, instead of precluding further development, the very indeterminacy of being immediately allows the rise of a contrast that is no contrast at all, of being that is nothing and nothing that is being, where each is the groundless becoming of the other. With this passage that immediately cancels itself as a passage insofar as being and nothing are indistinguishable, being has in fact given rise to something other than itself, namely, the process of becoming within which being and nothing continually resolve themselves into one another.⁸

To the degree that this becoming is contrastable to the aspects of being and nothing contained within it, it comprises a specific determinacy which stands developed without reference to any determinate foundations. In effect, what Hegel offers in these considerations, in contrast to the foundational assumptions of metaphysical and transcendental thought, is a development of determinacy which takes no determinacy for granted.

Nonetheless, if this emergence of becoming indicates how being can be a starting point of further determination, it does not in any way signify that anything real will result. In fact, when one simply considers the character of the advance, one sees that the development from being has a radical formality allowing of no distinction between what would be a determination *per se* as opposed to one in reality or one in thought for that matter.

Since whatever here develops does so in complete absence of all positing of a given content, all reference to reality, and any predetermined notion of what constitutes true knowing, it must follow from being in a wholly immanent manner. Instead of arising through the application of some given method or the direct introduction of what is claimed to be, the development from being must be determined through nothing other than itself, that is, it must be self-developing.

Furthermore, because such development proceeds from nothing determinate, its process cannot be a self-determination of some content, such as thought, will, or reality. It must rather be self-determination *per se*. This means that the foundation-free theory of determinacy which issues from being

7. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

is a theory of self-determined determinacy, with no immediate ontological or epistemological application.

Admittedly, even if the dilemmas of basing the quest for truth upon some givenness are patent enough, it is difficult to imagine how the development of self-determination would not either collapse into nothing, due to the absence of any foundation to support it, or involve a completely arbitrary, open-ended series of determinacies.

That these alternatives do not apply becomes evident once it is recognized that *what* determines itself from being can only be manifest at the conclusion of the development, for only at its end does the self-determination fully determine its subject, namely itself, in its totality. Being is thus not the substrate of development, ever acquiring new determination for itself in the manner of fundamental ontology. On the contrary, being does not even stand as the beginning of what finally results until the very conclusion of the entire development where that of which being is a beginning first comes into view.

This signifies that the development of self-determined determinacy does in fact have a non-collapsing structure, which, however, is not immediately given, but produced through the mediation of its own self-determination. This structure is not arbitrary, for it does not issue from the arbitrariness of any given determiner. Precisely by comprising a self-development starting from nothing, it avoids all arbitrary assumptions as well as all arbitrary orderings. So, too, its self-development is not open-ended, for the unity of self-determination entails that that unity provide closure for itself.

It may be that not till the end can it be manifest what the determinations following from being are determinations of, but the character of the conclusion can still be anticipated. Since no other content or any separate knowing can be relied upon to establish the relation between the stages in the development from being or what certifies its completion, the development must itself come to a determination that presents the interconnection of all the categories and grasps them as a totality determined in and through itself. Only in this way will our exposition and reflection have no constitutive role to play in placing the different categories in relation to one another as elements of a whole.

Consequently, if the self-development is to come to any conclusion at all, this will have to comprise a final determination so structured as to relate all the preceding ones together as the specific components of the self-determined totality which is their result as well as their encompassing unity. Hegel recognizes, however, that, as such, the last category becomes their totality itself, precisely by being the entire retrospective ordering of all that has preceded in which every category figures as a constitutive stage in the concluded self-determination containing them all and to which they have led.⁹

This resultant self-ordering whole is then the actual subject of the development following from being to which Hegel devotes his *Science of Logic*. Insofar as the very totality of this resultant subject provides the ordering principle of its own developed content, it no less comprises the method by which all the categories are determined. Conversely, because it forms the ultimate subject of the development, this totality is what each and every category is a determina-

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 824-825.

tion of. Hegel calls this categorial totality the "Absolute Idea," and he appropriately concludes the *Science of Logic* with it, characterizing it as the method of the self-determined development of determinacy it itself comprises.¹⁰

In effect, both method and subject matter have here emerged at the end of the development, instead of being presupposed at the start in the fashion of positive science, metaphysics, and transcendental philosophy. Because such a development of categories proceeds with no primitive terms, no logical operators, and no foundations of any sort, it is genuinely self-grounding, exhibiting a self-ordered content relying on no exogenous criteria for its justification.

For just this reason, the categorial totality involves no referral of categories to anything distinguishable from them as reality, a knowing subject, or a thing in itself. Being, for example, is constitutively not a determination existing *in res*, nor something thought as a category of reason, but simply indeterminacy without further qualification than that it retrospectively be revealed to be the component starting point in the self-determination of categorial totality. Even the categorial totality itself refers to nothing given in reality, nor anything thought, but only to its own system of categories *per se*.

Consequently, what one is left with when one eliminates all positive science, metaphysics and transcendental inquiry is a development of categories more formal than any formal logic could be. For whereas formal logic proceeds by assuming certain logical operators and functions, as well as the logician in person, the categories following from being depend for their development upon no given knower nor any given content, be it a methodological principle or a reference *in res*.

Although they therefore provide no conception of reality, their concluded development does leave open one possible solution to the problem, a solution which Hegel briefly sketches in moving from his *Science of Logic* to his *Philosophy of Nature*.

vi) The Transition From Categorial Totality To Reality

Having come this far, if there is to be no return to the errors committed by positive science, metaphysics and transcendental philosophy, then the determination of reality must somehow follow from the categorial totality alone. Because the latter has so far shown itself to be the sole content to which reference can legitimately be made without recourse to presupposed foundations, any determination of reality will have to emerge immanently from the complete development of categories which Hegel calls the Absolute Idea.

If one were, for instance, to undertake a "logic of discovery" where one turns to what is given to one and conceives reality by finding the categories as they are there purportedly embodied, then the dilemma of metaphysical reference would reassert itself. Once again, one would be assuming the correspondence of categories and reality, while making immediate truth claims for which any adjudication would be excluded from the start.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 825.

To avoid this trap by following an immanent development from categorial totality does not mean, however, that reality is to be conceived as something determined *by* categorial totality. Although at one point Hegel himself lapses into characterizing the Absolute Idea as God before Creation,¹¹ giving much cited fuel to metaphysical misinterpretations, his whole argument runs counter to any such suggestion that categorial totality be thought of as the determiner of reality. If this be done, the system of categories gets illicitly assigned a primacy foreign to its own special unconstrasted formality. Instead of being taken as the *self*-determined whole it is, categorial totality would here be made the determiner of something other than itself. As such, it would effectively become a transcendental structure contrasted to "reality" as a positor stands related to what it posits. With this the case, one falls back into the dilemmas of transcendental argument, where "reality" can no more escape being a solipsist construction, than the constitution of reality in terms of the categories can escape being a subjective positing.

What saves an immanent transition beyond categorial totality from all these problems are the two sides of self-determination already revealed through the concluded development from being.

On the one hand, if categorial totality were to develop immanently into reality, this would involve no immediate reference to anything in itself. The transition would be made entirely on the basis of what categorial totality itself comprises, without any outside intervention. Consequently, the problem of metaphysics would not arise.

On the other hand, what results from immanent development is not determined *by* what it arises from. On the contrary, a fully independent development is a self-determination, and what determines itself is not already given at the start, but only comes to be at the end as the result. Thus, if reality emerges immanently from categorial totality, the actual subject of the self-development will not be the system of categories, but rather the completely determined reality. As a result of the development, reality will be what has actually determined itself in the process, whereas categorial totality will stand not as reality's determiner or as God before creation, but as the component starting point from which the determinacy of reality develops itself. Only in this way will reality be as free of foundations as the theory which conceives it. Furthermore, the relation of categorial totality and reality can not be based upon our reflection, but must be made within the development itself at the point it achieves its final and full totality.

On these terms, the possibility of a non-positive, non-metaphysical and non-transcendental conception of reality lies open. Given the nature of the problem, the first task is determining how categorial totality can result immanently in something which is other than itself and which actually is.

To begin with, what emerges from categorial totality must be irreducible to all and any of its constitutive categories. Otherwise it will simply fall back within categorial totality as a purely formal determination. Irreducibility must be achieved, however, without any introduction of stipulations, immediate references to reality, or acts of knowing. Because all there is is categorial totality

11. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

itself, the only otherness that could possibly emerge would have to be a pure other of categorial totality, pure in that it would refer to nothing else and nevertheless would rely on the content of categorial totality for its otherness. Furthermore, this pure other would have to be such as a self-development from categorial totality. Otherwise the required immanence would be broken.

The only way all these conditions can be met is if categorial totality develop into what is its own content external to itself. If what emerges be, in other words, the entirety of categorial totality related to itself as something given, then one will have what is specifically other to categorial totality, without entailing either a return to any particular categories or an illicit introduction of extraneous content.

At the very end of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel offers this insight, and observes that just such a transition immediately occurs once categorial totality itself emerges as the concluding determination of the development from being.¹² To be concluding, this final category is itself a retrospective ordering of all preceding ones as component stages in the development of the whole which incorporates them all by determining itself through them. Thus, the moment categorial totality arises, the entire development stands as something given to it, presenting it as something that has run its course, been achieved, and thus come into being. In other words, as soon as it has developed, categorial totality stands external to itself. Consequently, what one has is no longer categorial totality in all its radical formality, but rather the self-externality of categorial totality, or the self-externality of the Idea, to use Hegel's expression.¹³

Although this new structure incorporates nothing but the determinations of categorial totality, it does so as something given, and not in a manner which is itself a category, as was the case with the purely formal ordering comprising the concluding category of the system of categories. As a result, for the first time there is not just determinacy without further qualification, but a given determinacy. The latter is given not to some presupposed structure of knowing, but rather to the groundless, presuppositionless totality of determinacy it contains within itself as its structural element. Since such given determinacy is neither stipulated, nor metaphysically referred to, nor transcendently constituted, it provides a reality free of the dilemmas confronting all past candidates for what is.

Needless to say, the self-externality of categorial totality does not exhaust the determination of reality, but at best supplies the minimal threshold of given determinacy required for any further real structure. Hegel accordingly characterizes it as the most rudimentary and immediate content of natural givenness, which all others must presuppose and incorporate.¹⁴ What reality as a whole actually is must await the completion of a further development which can only arise out of reality's initial specification as the self-externality of categorial totality.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 843.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 843; G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), paragraph 247.

14. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, *op. cit.*, paragraph 254.

With all external stipulation still excluded, the real can come to its full determination only on the basis of self-development. Its self-determining process, however, like self-determination *per se*, can only reach a conclusion by arriving at a final determination relating all those that precede as elements in the development of the whole. Just as the development from being had to arrive at its own method to achieve closure, so the development from the self-externality of categorial totality must reach a real determination providing that ordering principle for all reality which allows it to seal its own totality.

If we are to follow Hegel's indications,¹⁵ such a consummating entity would seem to be nothing other than philosophy itself, taken as the real phenomenon it is appearing in the world with a history of its own. It could provide the element within reality determining how all structures of givenness are constitutive components in the self-determined totality of the real. In so doing, philosophy would not only allow reality to achieve totality by determining itself as a whole independently of anything else. Philosophy would further secure the truth of the conception of reality which must be distinguished from what reality is itself.

This would be accomplished on two fronts, both of which are internal to reality's own development, as they would have to be, if external stipulations were to be avoided.

On the one hand, the completed determination of reality would establish the full relation between categories *per se* and real determinations. This would happen not simply because the concluded development of reality would provide what is to be contrasted to categories, but rather because reality would make the contrast itself. Since the development from being to categorial totality would proceed no less immanently to a self-development from categorial totality to the whole of reality, there would actually be one continuous self-determination which runs from being through to the summit of reality. Consequently, at the very end of all this, the actual subject of the entire self-determination would first stand complete and show itself to be that totality of reality made manifest with philosophy's appearance.

On this basis, then, the entire sphere of categories would no longer be just an uncontrasted whole proceeding from being, but a categorial totality which figures as the component element for the minimal structure of the real. The application of the categories within the determination of reality would here lie established entirely in virtue of reality's own development, rather than in virtue of some given foundation. Hegel, who calls the totality of reality "spirit," suggests as much by arguing that the Idea is spirit in itself, that is to say, spirit implicit, insofar as spirit's self-determination incorporates the categorial totality of the Idea as the basic element of all its real aspects.¹⁶

As Hegel recognizes, what would permit knowledge of this relation between reality and categorial determinacy without recourse to a transcendent standpoint is the role philosophy would play as reality's own comprehending

15. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Spirit*, translated by William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), paragraphs 574-577.

16. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 381, 575-577.

component. In virtue of the retrospective ordering achieved by a philosophical thought unencumbered by ontological or epistemological assumptions, the relation of reality to categorial determinacy, that lies within the self-determination of reality, would also be conceived as such within that same self-determination. Through this real act of foundation-free philosophy, the non-positive, non-metaphysical, non-transcendental conception of reality would then secure truth for itself, not by presupposing the correspondence of thought and reality, but by arriving at it, no less in reality than in thought, as the final result of its labor. Without any immediate reference to reality, or any transcendental grounding of its knowledge, philosophy would here conceive reality as containing its own philosophical activity. In so doing, philosophy would conceive its own conceptions in distinction from both categories *per se* and reality as a whole, while grasping the unitary process in which all are bound together.

If this opens the possibility of a true knowing of what is, that must still remain only a possibility until the full development leading to this point has actually been given. No stipulated anticipatory schema can substitute for the immanent determining at issue.

Consequently, the strategy Hegel has offered for conceiving reality without metaphysical or transcendental arguments requires nothing less than first showing in full detail how indeterminacy does in fact give rise to a development leading to categorial totality. Once this be accomplished a complete account must follow of how categorial totality, with all its now unfolded content, freely releases itself into self-externality. Lastly, one must establish how the given determinacy of this result leads to a self-determination of reality that achieves totality with a final self-ordering element of its own.

Although Hegel has addressed all three of these tasks at great length, the results of his efforts have not been systematically evaluated. So long as that remains the case, and if no other attempts be made to fulfill these tasks, true knowledge of reality will be but a program for philosophy without foundations.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Hegel Contra Sociology. By Gillian Rose. London: Athlone; Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981. Pp. 261. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.50 pbk. ISBN (Humanities) 0-391-02289-X cloth, 0-391-02288-1 pbk.

Gillian Rose here follows her masterful critical exposition of Adorno and the Frankfurt School, *The Melancholy Science* (New York: Columbia, 1978), with a broad interpretation of Hegel focused on contemporary problems of method in the social sciences. Rose aims to retrieve the Hegelian speculative experience (p. 1), and the first chapter is devoted to the discovery, analysis and unmasking of the barriers which stand in the way of any such rereading. Rose argues that all forms of sociology operate within the narrow limits of a neo-Kantian paradigm of validity and value, first formulated by Lotze (p. 6). In this, Lotze attempted a Kantian grounding of knowledge via the dual criteria of validity and values; i.e., either theory may be grounded in the validity of necessary truths and given facts, or theory may be grounded in the values of absolute standards (p. 8). Rose suggests that each of these criteria was later given primacy. In late nineteenth century philosophy the criterion of validity was developed by the Marburg school of neo-Kantian philosophers (Cohen, Natorp). The criterion of values was given priority in the work of the Heidelberg school (Windelband, Rickert) (p. 11).

Rose argues that at the beginning of the twentieth century the neo-Kantian paradigm grounded in validity shaped the work of Durkheim and the sociology stemming from it. The paradigm grounded in values shaped that of Weber and those influenced by him (p. 18). More generally, Rose argues that the very idea of a scientific sociology, whether non-Marxist or Marxist, is only possible as a form of neo-Kantianism. Thus she views the critiques and alternative of the dominant perspective as equally enmeshed within the same circle of the neo-Kantian paradigm. As examples she treats Dilthey, Mannheim, Benjamin, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Schutz on the one hand; Simmel, Marcuse, Adorno, Lukács, and Habermas on the other.

Rose classes figures such as Lukács not as Hegelian Marxists, but as neo-Kantians. The central move of all neo-Kantian "improvements" on Hegel is to eliminate Hegel's concept of the Absolute from their analysis. The various neo-Kantian projects presuppose the actuality of their objects and seek to discover their possibility either in objectivity (validity) or subjectivity (values). As such, they fall into tautological or circular accounts (p. 1). Rose argues that Hegel had exposed the inadequacies of the neo-Kantian paradigm before it was formulated, and the body of the book is an exposition of Hegelian social thought in light of the Absolute without which, Rose believes, Hegel lacks any social import (pp. 42, 92, 204). This exposition treats Hegel's social theory as un-

changing from 1801 to 1831, takes the received text of the lectures as identical in theory to the works Hegel had prepared for publication (pp. 43, n. 6), and considers Hegel's social thought as incompatible with any method separate or separable from substantive social theory (p. 46). But above all, what is distinctive about Rose's interpretation of the Hegelian Absolute is that it identifies two conceptions of Hegelian theory: the view that it provides an immanent, artistic and religious critique of culture, and the view that it centers upon a critique of bourgeois property relations.

The fundamental thesis of Rose's reading of Hegel is the idea that "In general religion and the foundation of the state is [sic] one and the same thing; they are identical in and for themselves" (p. 48). The fundamental tool of her rereading is a speculative reading:

To read a proposition "speculatively" means that the identity which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate. This reading implies an identity different from the merely formal one of the ordinary proposition. This different kind of identity . . . must be understood as a result to be achieved (p. 49).

Thus the *speculative* identity of religion and the state expresses the *experience* of lack of identity. The idea which people have of God corresponds to that which they have of themselves, of their freedom. All societies have misrepresented their lack of freedom to themselves as religion; hence they have had bad states. Rose argues that for Hegel this misrepresentation and the separation of theoretical and practical reason derives from bourgeois private property relations in which the law is separated from the rest of social life (p. 56):

The overall intention of Hegel's thought is to make a different ethical life possible by providing insight into the displacement of actuality in those dominant philosophies which are assimilated to and reinforce bourgeois law and property relations. This is why Hegel's thought has no social import if the Absolute cannot be thought (p. 208).

Rose develops her reading along these lines, first with regard to the essay on *Natural Law*, and then according to the *System of Ethical Life*. For Rose, the core of Hegel's analysis is the view of bourgeois private property as contradictory, inasmuch as particular possession can only be guaranteed by the whole society, the universal, which in turn is inconsistent with particular possession (p. 73). This contradiction is then developed in an historical typology of different property forms which correspond to the fundamental forms of the misrecognition of the Absolute in art and religion (p. 75). More generally, Rose says:

The fundamental paradox of Hegel's thought is that he was a critic of *all* property forms, but his central notion of a free and equal political relationship is inexplicable without concepts of

property (*eigen, Aneigen, Anerkennen*), and hence incomplete without the elaboration of an alternative property relation (p. 81).

She schematically follows these issues through the lectures on history, art, and religion and the *Phenomenology* and *Logic*. She concludes that:

Hegel had no "solution" to the contradictions of bourgeois property relations . . . Marx did not resolve these aporias in Hegel's position. He inherited them and returned to a pre-Hegelian position by reading Hegel non-speculatively. . . . The principle of unity in sociology, its concept of law, reproduces and hence reinforces the dominant formally universal laws which correspond to particular property relations (pp. 209-213).

Although Rose writes clearly and extremely vigorously, yet, like Adorno, her style tends toward aphorism. Her "speculative reading" of Hegel sometimes approaches that caricature of dialectic in which everything in a dialectical argument means simply the opposite of what it says, and in which unresolved contradictions permit the dialectician to prove anything whatsoever. Nevertheless, Rose still employs her speculative reading to attempt to unite several traditions of Hegel scholarship. Despite all of her criticisms of the Frankfurt or critical school, Rose owes an enormous debt to them, especially to Lukács and Adorno, and so the main effect of this book will be internal to that tradition. A Marxianized Hegel is a weapon against Marx, and *Hegel Contra Sociology* may well come to serve as the skeleton account and a principal *haute vulgarisation* of Hegel for those in the critical school now moving away from Marx.

Rose's argument is of relevance to other readers as well. Her book is a timely and useful contribution to the re-examination of the relationship between Hegel and existing social theory, stemming from the works of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Regardless of the adequacy of Rose's account of Hegelianism, it raises important questions about sociological standpoints and substance. Methodologically, empiricist and positivist underpinnings of social scientific methods of analysis and theory construction have eroded. Forms of empiricism and positivism still remain dominant among the Anglo-American theorists, and in any case the importance of substantive and empirical analyses is no simple function of the validity or popularity of the philosophical arguments which underpin them. Nevertheless, the growing erosion of empiricist positions has contributed to the debate about and the re-evaluation of the basic tasks of the social sciences, and this debate has been accompanied by the growth of philosophical standpoints whose historical and conceptual unity is only visible in the light of their relations to Hegel (relations of both agreement and antagonism). As an example, there has been a rapid growth not only of critical and non-critical Marxism, but also of interpretive and phenomenological positions stemming from German philosophy and social theory. Other kinds of social analysis in France, England, and the United States stem from ostensibly unrelated traditions (e.g., ethnomethodology, symbolic interaction, action theory, and structuralism). But, in fact they actually derive from theorists such as Mead, Dewey or Wittgenstein, whose approach was importantly shaped by

their reception of or opposition to some aspect of Hegelianism. Thus, what appears chaotic from a standpoint innocent of Hegel, yet turns out to have recognizable, historical and conceptual structure as a set of debates arising from a method and a substance within Hegel.

In Rose's discussion of sociology, she briefly treats Weber, Durkheim, Marx, and a variety of figures in the German tradition. Her treatment is incisive and important. However, there are significant limitations of her conception, regarding Hegel, modern social theory, and the relations between them. To that extent, her title, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, is triply misleading.

First with regard to *SOCIOLOGY*: Rose deals not with contemporary sociology but with Durkheim, Weber and the Frankfurt school, and she does not deal with their substantive theories but with one aspect of their methodological self-understanding, that related to Lotze. Despite her acute sensitivity to the dangers of separating methods from substance (pp. 32, 46), Rose yet reduces sociology to a single methodological conception. She treats no practicing sociologist, no works of Marx's maturity and, except for three pages on Althusser, no Marxism other than that of the critical school. Even if she has correctly formulated the first principle of modern social theory, this still forgets the difference between a first principle and a developed science, between an acorn and an oak.

With regard to *CONTRA*: If one does not restrict oneself to methods, it can be questioned whether the relationships to Hegel of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber are simply antagonistic. The debts of Marx and Weber to Hegel are relatively well known. Equally in the case of (the ostensibly positivistic neo-Kantian) Durkheim, substantive ideas involve a far more complex relation of debt and antagonism than Rose's argument permits her to consider. Durkheim's life work was predicated upon an immense expansion of historical, philosophical, psychological, and anthropological theory concerning comparative ethics, religion, literature, culture, and law. This whole torrent of nineteenth century scholarship derived major impetus from the host of concrete analyses which Hegel arranged under the heading of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. Certainly, Durkheim's work received methodological foundation partly from the neo-Kantian principle of validity associated with Renouvier, Boutroux, Brunschwig, and Hamelin. Rose is quite correct to stress this in opposition to the received account of Durkheim as a positivist. The French battle between Kantian and Hegelian ethics was fundamental to Durkheim's sociology. Durkheim's foundational concepts of social facts, collective consciousness, and collective representations, as well as a host of specific theories concerning religion, art, law, punishment, ethics, ritual, etc., synthesized streams of scholarship which developed during the nineteenth century and had been importantly shaped by Hegel. Rose's self-restriction to points of methodological opposition stands in the sharpest possible contrast to Hegel himself, who mastered and took up positions at the cutting edge of substantive social theory in very many different places.

Finally, with regard to *HEGEL*: Rose treats the development of the social sciences and humanities over the course of the last century and a half as a misunderstanding and a mistake—albeit a necessary mistake which is/was unavoidable, given the property relations of bourgeois society. Most practicing social theorists will not recognize themselves within Rose's account, and Rose's

picture of Hegel is thereby significantly narrowed. Her account of his social theory omits discussion of the concrete structures of organization, rationality, force and influence, taken up by Weber. It omits Hegel on value, ritual and motivation, taken up by Durkheim. It omits Hegel on production, parties, and struggle, taken up by Marx. Separated from later developments in Weber, Durkheim, Marx, or the traditions they founded, *Hegel Contra Sociology* tends to portray Hegel's own social theory as a simple stamping of philosophical positions by property relations, a picture which is vulgar-Marxist and ultimately anti-Marxist.

Rose's account is a contribution to the general project of the critical school to describe capitalism as a culture. Her methodological discussion defines an important position concerning the relation of philosophy to the special sciences. But that relation was problematic a century ago, and it is even more problematic today. Rose's conception of the unity of theory and practice will be accepted mainly by those who wish to separate speculative theory from empirical analysis, but it can yet be of interest to several other circles of scholars concerned with philosophy, social theory, and with Hegel's relationship to them.

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Two Views of Freedom in Process Thought: A Study of Hegel and Whitehead. By George R. Lucas, Jr. (AAR Dissertation Series, 28). Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 174. \$14.00 cloth, \$9.95 pbk. ISBN 0-89130-285-9 cloth, 0-89130-304-9 pbk. LC 79-12287.

To include Hegel as a process philosopher is not common, but is perfectly correct. Becoming, the unity of Being and Nothing, is the pervading principle of the dialectic, which, Hegel assures us, is in its turn "the principle of all movement, all life and all activity in the actual world" (*Enc.* § 81 *Zus.*). The revival of Hegel studies in America and Britain is well under way and process studies have persisted healthily ever since the heyday of Whitehead, but this book is the first attempt, to my knowledge, to bring the two together and to establish their unity of outlook. The attempt may cause some process

philosophers a degree of unease, because Hegel has so long been misunderstood as advocating an Absolute exclusive of all but apparent movement and change; and some still do similarly misunderstand Whitehead as rejecting all ultimate wholeness and finality. A book which corrects these errors and stresses the similarity and close parallelism between the thought of these two great philosophers is to be welcomed.

"This work," its author tells us, "is intended as a demonstration of the similarity of methodology, content and results exhibited in the metaphysical systems of Whitehead and Hegel" (p. 1). It fulfills this intention admirably, setting out the main features of both systems accurately, pointing out the underlying identity of principles persuasively, and above all, doing all this with a clarity of exposition which is no mean achievement for a commentator concerned with two writers both, in different ways, notorious for the obscurity of their own several styles. Dr. Lucas makes the concept of freedom the focus of his comparison, pointing out that both philosophers defend a conception of freedom as teleological self-determination which is in harmony with modern scientific thinking. For contemporary science, with the abandonment of materialism and mechanism in physics, has rendered the old dispute between determinists and libertarians obsolete. It was, moreover, Hegel, long before the development of the physics of relativity and quanta, who ensured its obsolescence.

The choice of freedom as the central issue is sound tactics, and the recognition of freedom as teleological self-determination insightful, on the part of the commentator as well as of the two philosophers concerned. For teleological self-determination is derivative from the dominance of the whole, which is fundamental for Hegel and no less so, though less obviously, for Whitehead.

It would not be profitable in a review such as this to summarize Dr. Lucas' summaries of the two philosophical systems. Sufficient to say that he does this with perspicacity and soundness of interpretation excelling many recent discussions, at least of Hegel. He also avoids the not infrequent mistake of interpreting Whitehead as an unregenerate pluralist eschewing all finality. ". . . it was Whitehead's peculiar genius," he writes, "to demonstrate how a doctrine of metaphysical holism, stressing interdependence and reciprocal relatedness, could be developed without sacrificing freedom, pluralism, and a relative individuality for every actual entity in the system" (p. 34). Sometimes he seems to be somewhat too uncritical of what appear to be, at least superficially, inconsistencies in his authors, but his purpose of overall comparison makes it difficult for him to give exegeses sufficiently elaborate to iron out every apparent difficulty in the exposition, without swelling the volume inordinately.

One could wish that the author had done more, however, to show the internal identity of function of various principles in the two philosophies. It might have been argued more incisively that Whitehead's notion of the Primordial Nature of God is in principle the same as Hegel's absolute Idea, which differentiates itself into categories, as the Primordial Nature differentiates itself into eternal objects, and is immanent in all the finite forms of Nature, as the eternal objects are prehended (and so by implication the Primordial Nature of God as a whole) by every actual entity.

Likewise, the Consequent Nature of God, in Whitehead's theory, plays the same part as does Absolute Spirit in Hegel's, although Whitehead leaves

more obscure the actual process by which this consummation is reached. That that process is one of concrecence we are not left in doubt, and the Hegelian dialectic is unquestionably a process of increasing degrees of concreteness. But it is always difficult to work out just how the actual entity in Whitehead's system, which is momentary and transient, attains self-consciousness, or precisely how human individuality is constituted through the complexity of *nexūs* and the intertwining of historic routes. Here perhaps one might recommend to Dr. Lucas, and any who feel disposed to follow his example, a second comparison of these two philosophers with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, whose concepts of self-enfoldment and radial energy seem to mediate, as it were, between Hegel's *Aufhebung* and dialectical transformation with its *nisus* to the whole, on the one hand, and Whitehead's concrecent process and historic routes of actual occasions with their successive *nexūs*, on the other.

Lucas' procedure of expounding each of the two philosophers in tandem is liable to leave the more incredulous reader with the impression that the similarity between the two philosophers is only superficial and possibly accidental, whereas I am convinced that it is not—although Whitehead never read Hegel and was influenced by him, if at all, only indirectly through secondary sources (and then apparently adversely). The truth is that the cast of thought determining the systems of both philosophers is the same. But this can be conclusively demonstrated only by making more intimate and analytic comparisons than are to be found in this book. Yet I have little doubt that it can be so demonstrated and that the stimulus given to the project by Dr. Lucas and his persistent enthusiasm for pursuing it are all to the good.

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Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece. By Philip J. Kain. (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas, 4). Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982, Pp. xii + 179. \$25.00. ISBN 0-7735-1004-4.

The Paris manuscripts made Marx's humanism into a controversy. Louis Althusser argued that these early works were irrelevant to the mature work of *Capital*, while Shlomo Avineri contended that they were essential. In this book

the thesis is that there is a continuous and complex development in Marx rather than Althusser's *coupure épistémologique* or Avineri's seamless web.

Alienation is the central problem. According to Kain each writer was inspired by ancient Greece as a society free of alienation, where each individual felt everything—social and natural—to be a part of himself and felt himself to be a part of everything. Because so much of Marx's work is fragmentary, Kain uses the more complete and explicit accounts of Schiller and Hegel as the intellectual backdrop. Together with an introduction and conclusion, there is one chapter each on Schiller and Hegel with two on Marx covering the periods 1835-1848 and 1849-1883.

The division of labor is the cause of alienation. For Schiller the division of labor began in the most primitive society. Although the division of labor was not something invented at one moment in time, it apparently emerges as men club together sharing burdens at the expense of independence. The natural division of labor produced by child bearing and rearing is ignored. The individual personality is deformed and the society divided by the division of labor.

Kain suggests that the division of labor involves both a hierarchy of functions and a lateral distinction of specializations within each function. In the hierarchy mental activities dominate physical ones and lay the basis for the formation of classes. Fragmentation is the result for Schiller. Reason and sense are separated. An aesthetic education in the appreciation of beauty is necessary to surmount alienation.

For Hegel the simplicity of natural harmony had to be broken so that rational and productive social harmony could be formed. Hegel recognizes not only the economic power of the division of labor but also the order it can bring to society. Alienation is the consciousness that subject and object are separate. Only if this self-consciousness exists can the subject be free and purposeful. In the exchange of the products of labor there is an expression of both our independence of each other in having property to sell and our dependence in that we need others to make our own labor productive. Hegel conceived of the laborer alienating labor, but not citizenship or personality (p. 64). The result would be alienation without estrangement. Of course, Hegel was also required to acknowledge the persistence of poverty and the alienation it causes, but this point is not emphasized by Kain.

Kain follows Marx's critique of Hegel. Alienation inevitably leads to estrangement. Hegel tries to overcome alienation with pure thought and this is inadequate to Marx. If alienation produces estrangement, the rational cannot be the real.

That alienation and estrangement are conceptually distinct but causally connected is the key to Kain's Marx. All alienation traced back to the material re-production of the society and not to Schiller's aesthetics or Hegel's rationality. Between 1835-1848 Marx conceived of a division of labor that retained productive power without estrangement by ending specialization. Every job would be inter-changeable, thus combining the material needs of production with the psychological needs of personality. Marx's famous remark in the *German Ideology* on the socialist man's day sums up this line of thought.

Kain suggests that even if the exchange of specialities occurred within a division of labor there is no reason to suppose that it would make work either productive or pleasant. If alienated labor is not to estrange, it must be mater-

ially productive, develop the laborer's personality, and be pleasant. Kain assumes that the unfettered exchange of specialities would develop the personality. In this period Kain sees in Marx a dawning realization that all three of these requirements cannot be reconciled with a division of labor.

In the next period Marx conceded that labor cannot necessarily be pleasant. The aesthetic character of labor is dropped (p. 122) and the needs of production take precedence. Estrangement can be prevented only if the worker is rationally self-determining. Self-determination occurs where the worker can derive intellectual satisfaction from labor by knowing its value and by knowing that it is this value that is appreciated by consumers. Moreover, the work must be compensated for its unpleasant nature by leisure time. A communist state is necessary to bring this all to pass.

The emphasis that Marx came to place on the state, Kain notes, brings him close to Hegel (though Hegel's elaborate account of government is not mentioned). "Reconciliation now occurs through scientific knowledge and rational control. It is not achieved through a return to unity with nature, nor does it directly involve aesthetic contemplation" (p. 152). Kain is satisfied to accept Marx's denial that political institutions powerful enough to do all that he requires would not themselves be alienating (p. 143).

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Hegel, Marx, and Dialectic: A Debate. By Richard Norman and Sean Sayers. (Philosophy Now, 10). Brighton: Harvester Press; Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 188. \$37.50 cloth, \$12.00 pbk. ISBN (Humanities) 0-391-01779-9 cloth, 0-391-01874-4 pbk.

The philosophy of Hegel had been dominant, in a Neo-Hegelian decaying form, in Great Britain at the end of the last century. It was then challenged there by the neo-empiricisms of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Development in the United States was parallel, except that Neo-Hegelianism (Josiah Royce principally) was knocked from its citadel by William James (and his students), Dewey, and to a much lesser extent by Peirce. Dewey retained some

Hegelianism in his new naturalistic approach. (Dewey also, of course, incorporated some of Marx's ideas into his largely idealistic instrumentalism.)

From the early 20th century until the late 1960s, the most pervasive and powerful movement (even though it was descending to a decayed scholastic non-approach to philosophical problems) in Britain came to be called the analytic movement (neo-positivism, neo-empiricism). It was the ruling philosophic non-system, and it came to dominate the American scene also. But the world's Heraclitean flux is not to be denied, nor could the tremendous Third World revolution and the growth of actual socialism be kept out of the consciousness of the young philosophers, who, traditionally, have been trained to rebel, to question, to probe underneath the appearances. The younger British thinkers did rebel and they tried to break out of their Anglo-American philosophic provincialism.

In England the journal of the young rebels appeared under the title *Radical Philosophy*. They had turned away from positivistic and "fetishized" linguistic outlooks; they looked to Sartre's continental brand of "Marxism," they sampled Gramsci, Mao Tse-tung, Trotsky, Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Louis Althusser, *et al.* Philosophy had become exciting again, a living force.

In a sense, Hegel and dialectics had appeared on British shores for the first time in the late 1960s. In the 19th century Bradley and others had interpreted Hegel through the eyes of formal logic. They had lived in the shack beside the castle. Now, Hegelian dialectics (the *core* of his philosophy) entered via Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and the world revolutionary movement. Vietnam, and earlier, Algeria, China, and Cuba, symbolized the new set of Stalingrads for imperialism. If Lukács is correct, that Hegel was the last of the truly great bourgeois philosophers, then the upheavals brought on by world revolution would once again highlight the greatness of the German revolutionary thinker, due to his vital connection to Marx.

In contrast to Marxist-Leninist philosophers (with exceptions like the late Maurice Cornforth, who followed Lukács' lead in downplaying major applications of dialectics) who appreciate Hegelian dialectics in the most profound way, thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre did not possess in their philosophy a really dialectical foundation—rather, the foundation was laid in subjectivism and in the *loss* of religious faith. Louis Althusser, though a Party member in France, attempted to cut Marxism loose from its anchoring in dialectics and Hegel. In several French bourgeois trends, which we can somewhat unscientifically lump together as "Structuralism" (Bachelard, Lévi-Strauss, etc.), Althusser saw the *key* in applying the revolutionary science that Marx had discovered. There were other trends, too, such as the Frankfurt School (Marcuse, Adorno, Habermas, etc.). All these trends saw the others (rightly) as antagonistic to one another. British philosophers seeking a radical outlook absorbed these contrary, competing trends. And the book under review, *Hegel, Marx and Dialectic: A Debate*, reflects some of these trends.

As the two editors, Norman and Sayers, state in their preface, emphasizing the area of their agreement:

First of all and most importantly, we agree that dialectic—the philosophy of Hegel and of Marxism—is a vital . . . area of philosophy. . . . The issues and ideas raised by dialectic . . .

have for too long been dismissed and ignored by the mainstream of British academic philosophy (p. vii).

Sayers defends classic formulations of dialectics and dialectical materialism by showing the continuity and correctness of its presentations in Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong). Like the veteran Marxist George Thomson (who, along with Maurice Cornforth, Britain's most famous Marxist philosopher, is not mentioned in the book, by either the Maoist Sayers or the hybrid analyst Norman!), Sayers suggests that Marxism in our times culminates in Maoism (which history's development rendered theoretically nugatory at least—like Trotskyism before it, for Maoism appeared as a middle class intellectual phenomenon with little appeal to workers). What Marxism has in common with Trotskyism and Maoism is that all find it necessary to include dialectics in both the larger nature and in *social* nature (human history and society). Sayers states part of dialectics quite well when he observes: “. . . as well as recognizing the positive existence of things, we must also see in things the forces opposing and negating them which lead to development and change. Concrete things are not just related to each other, they are in a constant process of conflict and interaction, which is at the basis of all movement and change” (p. 7). Here we see enter the Maoist overemphasis on *conflict*, i.e. not also properly emphasizing the *unity* of opposites, as a lesser, though vital principle. Sayers' explication of dialectics, however, does not rise above a short, simple presentation; his target is the critics of dialectics.

We can see, for example, in his review of some of Marxism's and dialectics' critics, a continuity between the old Eugen Dühring and the modern neopositivist knight Karl R. Popper. Here dialectical contradictions are seen simply as logical absurdities. Quite correctly, Sayers observes in Popper's technique of “interpreting” his enemies a “travesty.” Popper cannot differentiate between formal and dialectical contradiction. Sayers stumbles somewhat in trying to explain the Hegelian dialectical notion of *Aufhebung*, but he does portray the *dynamic* character of historical change. Marx and Engels had eschewed utopian thinking and used (and transformed) Hegelian dialectics to see how history would develop. As Lenin is cited by Sayers: “There is no trace of an attempt on Marx's part to make up a utopia, to indulge in idle guess-work about what cannot be known . . .” (p. 14). Sayers also sees through the Italian leftist (formerly in the Italian Party) Lucio Colletti's confused attempt to purge Marxism of Hegel's legacy. It is also to Sayers' credit that he sees just how difficult it is for British thinkers to comprehend the *necessity* in things when their inherited *Weltanschauung* is a Humean one (as Hume puts it, of “entirely loose and separate” events). But there is a deeper fear of dialectics which goes right to the heart and soul of those thinkers who attempt to maintain the status quo. As Marx is cited by Sayers:

In its rational form [dialectic] is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement . . . (pp. 23-24).

Unfortunately, Sayers fails to mention (due to his standpoint) the primitivization of Marxism by Mao and the disastrous economic and foreign policy positions of the "Helmsman."

Richard Norman, on the other hand, focusses on the two forms of dialectic as he sees it, i.e., the conceptual dialectic (Hegel) and the temporal dialectic (Marx and Engels, even though, contrary to Norman, they could think in either category). In his confused essay Norman rejects Engels' move of seeing *all* of reality as dialectical merely because breakthroughs in each realm of science, natural and social, point in that direction (cf. pp. 37ff.). Norman indulges in obscurantism in his essay in order to accommodate his less murky project, viz., attempting to undermine the extension of dialectics to nature (cf. pp. 145ff.). Norman travels the same non-dialectical path as Richard Gunn (*Marxism Today*, 21, 2, [February 1977]:—"Is Nature Dialectical?"), previously an obscure British "Marxist" thinker, who, according to Norman, has been the only one he knows who has attacked the dialectics-of-nature concept frontally. (Norman does not know about Sidney Hook and several others, who have also "refuted" the dialectic in nature, or Eduard Bernstein himself!). Gunn, Norman realizes (and concurs), must undercut Marx's and Engels' theory of reflection if he is to reject a dialectic in nature. Norman does not want "contradiction" applied to nature, and he believes that Gunn is right in seeing the reflection theory as "fallacious" (p. 161). Norman is not quite as amateurish as Gunn, and thus allows "interpenetration of opposites" as the only sense of appropriately applying dialectics as an *interpretation* of nature (cf. pp. 161-162). Soaked as he is in the British analytic tradition and yet still trying to *transcend* it, Norman protests that we do need "contradiction" and "negation" to "describe the relations between *dialectical concepts applicable to nature*" (p. 163; Norman's emphasis). Due to the contradictions of Norman's own consciousness, however, the thesis of Gunn, that any use of dialectics in understanding nature and its processes must by definition invoke Hegelian idealism, is easily seen through by Norman:—" . . . I see absolutely no reason to *confine* dialectic to the subject-object dialectic. On the contrary, I would suggest that one cannot understand what is *dialectical* about the subject-object relation unless one sees it as just one instance [*nota bene*] of the general dialectical relation between polar opposites" (p. 167; Norman's italics). Thus, Norman's even mediocre analytic understanding can see through Gunn, Lukács, and Alfred Schmidt. But the eclectic Norman hastens to add ". . . I am not straightforwardly defending Engels" (p. 168). Norman's essay ends the book with a whimper.

Earlier, in his essay, "The Problem of Contradiction" (pp. 47ff.), Norman discusses various examples of dialectical contradiction, but he wishes to retain the absolute validity of the law of identity. His presentation certainly reflects British analytic training, and it shows just how difficult the *qualitative leap* into Hegelian or Marxist dialectics is for Anglo-Americans. The motive force to move into eclecticism seems irresistible in that context. Hegel and Marx seem to lose their lustre at the hands of Norman, but there is some *joie de vivre* in Sayers' presentation.

As Sayers says of Norman's approach: "Indeed, a part of Norman's purpose is to reconcile dialectical and analytical philosophy; and he goes out of his way to emphasize that his account of dialectic involves no rejection or even questioning of the basic assumptions of the analytical approach" (p. 68). Sayers'

critique of Norman's approach to Marxism and dialectics is frequently (and correctly) interrupted by the excursive critiques of Lucio Colletti and Louis Althusser; Sayers does a fine job of criticizing their erroneous objections to and interpretations of Marxism. (Here Sayers joins the ranks of John Hoffman, and his brilliant refutation of Marxism's ideological barnacles; cf. J. Hoffman, *Marxism and the Theory of Praxis: A Critique of Some New Versions of Old Fallacies* [New York: International, 1975]).

Certainly, Sayers has mastered many of the rudiments and texts of the dialectical tradition, but his own apparent option to Maoism has cut him off, practically as well as scientifically, from the interesting and more advanced Marxist dialecticians of not only Germany (both West and East), Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, the United States, etc., *but also his own country*. The advanced work of these Marxist-Leninists could serve to provide examples of dialectics and of his own proletarian internationalism. But this apparent sectarian blindness cannot occlude Sayers' ability, nor do we lack here in the United States, our "own" analytic "Marxists" such as Norman.

Their book can be seen as a gill slit in the evolution of radical British philosophy, a footnote perhaps in the difficult, dialectical path of the U.K.'s philosophies away from the analytic-linguistic, obsolete outlook to a philosophy bent on changing the world. Spiritually, it may be as difficult for them to drop this analytic-linguistic tradition, as it is difficult, practically, for British imperialism to be pushed out of Ireland.

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Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians. By Thomas F. O'Meara, O.P., Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 231. \$20.00. ISBN 0-268-01610-0. LC 81-40449.

This book is a study of Roman Catholic intellectual history in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Our focal point will be the German philosopher Schelling, for in the history of his thought the reader can find a schema for the history of German Catholic life at that time. Schelling was the mentor

of German Catholic intellectuals. In his perduring influence upon German Catholicism, his long career gives us a framework, the outline of a chart for early nineteenth-century Roman Catholic thought. (p. 4).

In these words from the Introduction, Thomas O'Meara, currently associate professor of theology at the University of Notre Dame, makes clear that his basic interest in this book is in early nineteenth-century Roman Catholic thought and not in Schelling as such. All the individuals treated in the book, to be sure, were related to Schelling either as colleagues, disciples or critics. But it is the entire movement of thought within German Catholicism of that period that is O'Meara's principal concern, not the particular contribution made by any single individual, even by Schelling himself as its chief inspiration. Accordingly, even though one might in various places yearn for a fuller development of this or that topic, more coverage for this or that individual, one has to bear in mind that this is an account of a movement of thought which embraced three generations of philosophers and theologians. Hence a detailed treatment of any single individual, even of Schelling himself in the various stages of his intellectual career, has to be sacrificed in order to keep one's focus on the broader picture.

In the Introduction, O'Meara first makes clear the peculiar attractiveness of Schelling's thought for imaginative Roman Catholic intellectuals of the early nineteenth century. For, much more than Hegel, Schelling reflected in his thinking traditional Roman Catholic concerns: the sacramentality of nature, the role of myth and symbol in the history of revelation, the approach to God through mystical experience. Then O'Meara indicates the ground plan for the remainder of the book. Following the broad lines of Schelling's own intellectual development, he divides the period of German Roman Catholic Romanticism into three parts: 1798-1806 (Schelling's philosophy of nature and philosophy of identity), 1806-1821 (Schelling's middle period in which he wrote the *Essay on Human Freedom* and the *Ages of the World*), and finally 1826-1841 (Schelling's lectures on the philosophy of mythology and of revelation at the University of Munich). A concluding chapter deals with Schelling's move to Berlin and the decline of Romanticism among Roman Catholics (together with the rise of Neoscholasticism).

In Part One, titled "Odyssey of the Spirit," O'Meara initially sketches Schelling's youth and early philosophical training, including the years at Jena (1798-1803) in the company of Fichte, Novalis, August and Friedrich Schlegel and their wives. A second chapter gives brief summaries of the life and writings of the first generation of Roman Catholic Schelling disciples: J.M. Sailer, P.B. Zimmer, and J.J. Görres (although the last-named ultimately had as much influence on Schelling as Schelling had on him). Finally, a third subdivision takes up Schelling's lectureship at Würzburg, his growing interest in the relationship between philosophy and religion, and ironically the mounting criticism of his philosophy among conservative Roman Catholics.

Part Two, "God and the World Becoming," first describes Schelling's relationship with Franz von Baader, the latter's deep interest in mysticism, in particular, the theosophical writings of Jacob Böhme, and Schelling's own shift of focus from a philosophy of objective mind to one of subjective will and feeling,

as evidenced by the writings of the middle period. A second chapter is devoted to the life and writings of Johann Sebastian Drey, the founder of the school of Roman Catholic theology at Tübingen. Drey was attracted to Schelling because the latter offered an organic or "scientific" understanding of the history of revelation with its subjective counterpart in the progressive self-realization of the human spirit. At the same time, however, he maintained the primacy of Christ and Christian revelation by postulating a direct intervention by God into that same dialectical process. Likewise, he distinguished more carefully than Schelling the history of human religious consciousness from "theodrama," the projected history of God's own becoming through creation.

Part Three, "Freedom for Systems," encompasses the peak years of German Catholic Romanticism, when Schelling, Franz von Baader and Joseph Görres were all lecturing at the University of Munich and the movement of philosophical/theological speculation begun by Drey at Tübingen was perpetuated and deepened in the lectures and writings of his disciples: Franz Anton Staudenmaier, Johann Adam Möhler and Johann Evangelist Kuhn. In addition, Friedrich Schlegel, lecturing at the University of Vienna during the same period, in one "system" after another sought to integrate history, mythology and psychology with Christianity and social theory. Not all these individuals, of course, were in agreement with one another as to the basic requirements of the ultimate system. As O'Meara notes, Schelling in particular kept a certain distance from his Roman Catholic colleagues at the University of Munich. Furthermore, the Tübingen trio, Staudenmaier, Möhler and Kuhn, while at first enthusiastic about Schelling's objective idealism, gradually became more critical of his speculative blending of divine and human becoming within one and the same world process. Their interests were more pragmatic, focussed on the ongoing life of the Christian community rather than on cosmic process as such.

A concluding chapter to Part Three, "The Decline of the Munich Circle," analyzes the contributions of two later students of Schelling's thought, Martin Deutinger and Ignaz von Döllinger, to the overall movement of Roman Catholic Romanticism. Deutinger was a student at the University of Munich from 1833-35 where he attended the lectures of Schelling, von Baader and Görres. Though strongly influenced by Schelling's *Essay on Human Freedom*, Deutinger concluded that Schelling had not really solved the basic question of the interrelationship of divine and human freedom. In his mature years he produced a philosophy of art which resembled in some measure Schelling's *Philosophy of Mythology*; but, unlike Schelling, he claimed that God in his own being transcends the various art forms in which the divine nature becomes manifest. Döllinger's father had been a colleague of Schelling at the University of Würzburg in 1803-06. Twenty years later, Döllinger himself received an appointment as professor of church history at the University of Munich, but he associated more with von Baader and Görres than with Schelling. For Döllinger was primarily a historian who was suspicious of Schelling's system-building which in his mind would inevitably distort the true meaning of the events of history.

Döllinger, however, like Schelling, cherished the ideal of creativity and freedom of thought in academic research. Hence he resisted passionately the growing tendencies toward (Neoscholastic) conformism in Roman Catholic

thought at the halfway point of the century. In fact, as O'Meara elaborates in his last chapter, Döllinger convened a congress of Roman Catholic scholars at Munich in 1863 during which he defended vigorously "German theology" as opposed to "Roman theology." The congress, however, ended without effective resolution of this controversial issue, and no further congresses on this same theme were ever held again. Meanwhile, Schelling's career had come to a somewhat ambivalent end when his lectures in Berlin from 1841 onward were coolly received, even sharply criticized, by a generation of students that included such celebrated names as Kierkegaard, Engels, Bakunin and Jakob Burckhardt. Thus, concludes O'Meara, Schelling's personal life-history and the epoch of Roman Catholic Romanticism came to a close at about the same time. Yet, he adds, the underlying themes of freedom and subjectivity resident within the thought of Schelling and the Catholic Romantics resurfaced a century later at the Second Vatican Council. Hence one may legitimately infer that the intervening decades in which Neoscholasticism and a positivist approach to history held sway were only an interlude in a broader movement of thought which still goes on today.

By way of critique, I would first of all call attention to O'Meara's sparkling prose style. He writes with an eye for metaphor and other figures of speech, so that the text has appeal on literary as well as purely scholarly grounds. Secondly, I stand in admiration of the breadth of reading which must have been necessary to compose this book. Not only does O'Meara show a quite respectable knowledge of the primary works of Schelling and the various Roman Catholic Romantics, but he seems also to have gotten into the secondary literature, at least to some extent, in each of the authors treated. The only drawback to the book which I perceive is a matter of perspective. As already noted, O'Meara has basically written a book in historical theology, not in systematic theology or philosophy. Hence, in connection with Schelling and the Catholic Romantics, he inevitably brings up metaphysical issues which never get developed in detail simply because only a modest amount of space can be allotted for any given author.

In dealing with the systematic theology of Martin Deutinger, for example, O'Meara comments:

Deutinger began his system with the customary analysis of the powers of knowing and willing. Objects not only focus and limit but realize human subjectivity. Our being finds itself not in dialogue with abstract being but with being made concrete. (p. 164).

Each of the latter two sentences begs further explanation and development. But, since only ten pages are reserved for Deutinger's life and work, one can only guess at what O'Meara might also have had in mind in composing them. Thus either O'Meara himself or someone else equally skilled in the history of the period should write another work which simply addresses the underlying philosophical issues of subjectivity and freedom as the basis for a philosophy/theology of history. Only thus will it be clear, for example, whether transcendental Thomism, Whitehead's philosophy of organism or some other contemporary philosophical scheme is the logical heir to the great

speculative enterprise initiated by Schelling and his Roman Catholic admirers almost two hundred years ago.

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Werke, II, *Vom Ich als Princip* (1795), *De Marcione* (1795). By Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, ed. by Hartmut Buchner and Jörg Jantzen. (Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, I, 2). Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980. Pp. xi + 428. ISBN 3-7728-0779-8 (this volume), 3-7728-0542-6 (whole series).

These are handsome tomes, 7 x 10", bound in spring green cloth, printed on good heavy paper, with restful clear type pleasingly arranged on the page with broad margins, so that to see the page is a joy. Rosters on the inner margins make it easy to look up a line indicated by its number.

The first volume of this Historico-Critical Edition appeared in 1976. It contained the following earliest publications by Schelling:

Elegy sung at Hahn's grave (published 1790).

The Latin thesis for the degree of Master in Philosophy, *A Critical and Philosophical Interpretation of the Oldest Philosopheme (Genesis III) on the First Origin of Human Evil* (1792), with a German translation by Reinhold Mokrosch.

The German treatise *On Myths, Historical Legends and Philosophemes of the Most Ancient World* (1793).

The small German book *On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy* (1794).

In 1790 when, at the age of fifteen, Schelling was accepted as a full-time student in the Stift (the later University) of Tübingen, he was already unusually well prepared, writing an idiomatic Latin, even in verse, also writing Greek hexameters, and reading Hebrew and some Arabic (Plitt I, 20). In 1790 almost

all educated people still knew French. (The old Schelling corresponded with Victor Cousin in French.) At sixteen, by March 23, 1791 he had privately read the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In dealing with Kant and his successors we must never forget our dates. Kant's three *Critiques* date all from the time of the "ancien régime". Of course Kant is the most radical of the revolutionaries, digging deepest at the roots of authoritarianism, and having the most lasting effect to our own day.

As for the intellectual revolution itself, in its making, the first two volumes of Schelling (of which we here review the second) make it quite clear that well before 1790 even in so autocratic a country as Württemberg, of all people the theologians at Tübingen were practicing the most rigorous textual criticism. No wonder that young minds like Schelling's and Hegel's would be set aflame by the explosive ideas coming from Königsberg and Paris.

It is the great merit of these two volumes to present us with a full documentation of this theological Tübingen radicalism, practiced long before the generation of Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860), Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) and David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874).

The second volume contains only the treatise *Of the I as Principle of Philosophy* or *On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge* and Schelling's Latin theological dissertation *On Marcion as Emendator of the Pauline Letters*, both first published in 1795. A welcome German translation of the dissertation is given by Jörg Jantzen and Miss S. Michalczyk. The apparatus, pages 373-428, has a 22 page bibliography, an index of names, 18 pages of topical index, a very useful concordance of pagination of five different editions, and a list of signs. The volume starts with Buchner's 61 page editorial report on *Of the I*.

The editorial thoroughness of the volume is exemplary. For instance, Buchner found differences in the two printings of the first (and only) volume of Schelling's works that appeared in 1809. He reports in detail on the edition of Schelling's works published in 1816-20 by Palmblad in Upsala, an edition which had 251 Scandinavian subscribers, mostly in Sweden. Palmblad boasted that his edition was handsomer and only half the price of the one produced in Germany by Krüll in Landshut, 1809.

Here are some tidbits from the editorial report by Buchner. He stresses what Schelling said in the preface to the 1809 edition, that the book, *Of the I*, "shows idealism in its freshest manifestation," since "the I is still taken as absolute or as identity of the subjective and objective" (in the *Werke* of 1856, Vol. I, 159¹). (I would say the subjective I is the thinking I, the objective I the thought I, and the word 'absolute' means the identity of what merely seems to be two.) In January 1795 Schelling wrote to Hegel: "I am now working on an Ethics à la Spinoza". This was the *Of the I* in the making. Buchner warns that one must be cautious when looking for the roots of young Schelling's thought in Fichte alone; one must remember that, in his letter of February 4, 1795 to Hegel, Schelling wrote, "I have become a Spinozist, but not I have become a Fichtean."

Buchner sketches briefly but carefully the early reception of *Of the I*, on the part of a Herbart, a Reinhold, a thoroughly approving Friedrich Schlegel, a Novalis. In his Kantian vein, Reinhold wrote: "Hitherto I believed that the *pure I*, if not conceived as merely problematic, must be deduced from the *moral law*—not the other way round" (40). Schlegel offered many worthwhile

criticisms, which Buchner quotes with the fragment numbers of Ernst Behler's 1963 edition of Schlegel's works (41⁸¹). For instance: —66. "Properly speaking, the Absolute is no concept at all." —80. "Neither is it an idea." —75. "It is dense empirical egoism to say of the absolute I: *my* I." —94. "From the absolute I Schelling can indeed develop the concept of the Not-I, but not its real absolute being-positing. There is the hitch."

Buchner rightly quotes most of the long letter which, in mid-January 1796, Jacob Hermann Obereit (1725-98) wrote to Schelling (Plitt I, 82), with a few things Obereit had published under the pen name Abaris. (The Greek *báros* means "load." The shrewd old physician may have meant he carried no burden and was luckily carefree.) Schelling thanked him in a cordial letter of March 12, 1796. — Buchner also reports negative reactions. Nicolai's shows his utter lack of comprehension. So does an anonymous reviewer in Abicht's *Philosophic Journal*, as early as April 1795, and another one in Nicolai's *New General German Library*. Buchner gives long quotations, also from reviews in two other journals. These perplexed reviewers feel helpless and annoyed and therefore poke fun at words and sentences they do not understand. Have things changed very much?

Buchner adds eighteen pages of helpful explanatory notes which refer to the text of *Of the I* by page and line, the inner margins of the text furnishing rosters of lines.

Jörg Jantzen, the editor of Schelling's theological dissertation on Marcion, starts with a 32 page editorial report. He compares eight different copies of the first edition and finds differences showing two different type settings. He also checks differences in the edition of the works edited by Schelling's son. The first print came out in June 1795.

Jantzen presents a history of the text. Of course we know from Plitt that Schelling had intended to write his dissertation on a different topic. On July 21, 1795 he wrote to Hegel: "I would have liked to choose another theme, but was privately advised against the first on which I wanted to work: *de parecipuis orthodoxorum antiquiorum adversus haereticos armis* (on the choice weapons of the orthodox ancients against heretics). Without any merit of mine, it would have been the most biting satire" (Plitt I, 78ff.). Indirectly the satire also would have exposed the questionable weapons of the Tübinger Kantians and their "system of accomodation" (Plitt I, 75 and *Vom Ich*, I, 230²). No wonder Schelling was advised against writing it. Yet even the non-satirical treatise on Marcion could not leave the Tübinger peace of mind undisturbed. Jantzen quotes Dieter Henrich's *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt: 1971, p. 60): "The theory of autonomy became a contrivance to defend the theology of authority" (187²⁹). It is this contrivance which is found intolerable in both of our treatises, *Vom Ich* and *De Marcione*.

Jantzen speaks of "a clearly contoured counter-program to the Tübinger theology" and he means Schelling's sketch of a preface to a never published collection of his Biblical works. As early as 1869 Plitt published that preface (I, 39-46). It shows an amazingly mature insight of the eighteen year old Schelling. The main point is that "every time has its own forms in which its concepts appear, . . . its peculiar forma by means of which it makes sense of its concepts" (Plitt I, 45). Jantzen adds that it is the genuine task of historical interpretation to ascertain that sense and bring it up to date in a new form (190).

The work on this task, with regard to Marcion, leads Schelling to a very simple and persuasive result. Marcion's extramundane God has nothing to do with Yahweh into whose domain he trespasses. This savior God is neither demiurge nor judge of the world. Marcion needed a clear and unmistakable Scripture for his considerable following, especially in Rome but also all over the empire. The Marcionitic New Testament must not attribute to God any of the functions of the Jewish Yahweh. Therefore Marcion had to omit any such attributions in the parts of Scripture he used. (Nowadays we can simply refer to Harnack's *Markion* of 1921. According to Harnack, Marcion wrote his extract between 139 and 144 A.D. — See Harnack's page 24.) He was excommunicated in July 144. The ecclesiastic accusation that he *falsified* Biblical texts is far-fetched. Omissions are not necessarily falsifications. Besides, the Christian canon was established a generation after Marcion. How could he falsify it? (This is the reviewer's question.)

Schelling's Tübingen teacher Storr conceived of God precisely as demiurge and legislator (Jantzen's note 194⁹⁰). Jantzen writes that Schelling's "exculpation of Marcion hits not only the Tübingen orthodoxy but at the same time Christian theology and its history, because its textual criticism justifies the Marcionitic conception of Christianity" (195).

Schelling's Latin text covers 37 pages, and Schelling himself gives 115 footnotes, about three per page. Jantzen documents all of them at length and adds notes of his own, a total of 232, covering 56 pages. One of them is a four page quotation from Christian Wilhelm Franz Walch's book of 1762, a "Sketch of a Complete History of Heresies, Schisms and Religious Quarrels," and specifically of its section "On the Heresy of Cerdo, Marcion and Their Adherents." Everywhere Jantzen presents long passages in the original languages, Greek, Latin, German. The whole amounts to a treasure of information, to which the indices of names and topics are a key.

Page 9 of Volume One announced that the Historico-Critical Edition of Schelling's works would appear in four series:

- AA I. Works (= the complete publications by Schelling).
- AA II. Posthumous works (= manuscripts, notes, etc., excluding letters).
- AA III. Letters (= letters by and to Schelling).
- AA IV. Lecture notes (= notes taken by hearers of lectures, etc.).

It will be a monumental work of scholarship, if there is no atomic war.

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Imagination and Reflection: Intersubjectivity: Fichte's "Grundlage" of 1794. By T. P. Hohler. (Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, 8). The Hague and Boston: Nijhoff, 1982. Pp. x + 159. Dfl. 70 = approx. \$29.50. ISBN 90-247-2732-4.

The importance of the positions of Fichte and Hegel for the correct interpretation of each other's respective views is perhaps more frequently recognized than acknowledged. At a time when Hegel's influence on the interpretation, or perhaps one ought to say misinterpretation, of his predecessor's thought is being more widely recognized, particularly among Fichte scholars, Fichte's contribution to the constitution of the Hegelian philosophy has still not been widely appreciated. In part, this is no doubt due to the lack of attention accorded Fichte's writings, among the most obscure by any nineteenth century writer, whose meaning is well hidden by the intrinsic difficulty of the thought and the infelicitous manner in which it is expressed.

Even in German speaking countries, where the language poses less of an obstacle, Fichte is not now widely read. Of course, this was not always the case. It is well known that at the turn of the nineteenth century, Fichte was for a brief moment the central star in the philosophical firmament. Numerous younger philosophers of the day, including Schelling and Hegel, took seriously the Fichtean boast to be the true conceptual heir to the critical philosophy. Fichte's reception by Hegel provides an important clue to the latter's position, as can be noted in relation to his first published philosophical text. The *Differenzschrift* is mainly devoted to two interrelated tasks: 1) to state a normative view of philosophy intended to bring to fruition the one true, or Fichtean, system of philosophy; 2) to be the result of Hegel's interpretation of the Fichtean position as the correct, indeed genuinely speculative, form of the critical philosophy, whose highest point was allegedly attained in Schelling's own version of the same system.

The clear reliance on Fichte's view, as he interprets it, in this early text, is important for Hegel's position, even in his mature thought, since Hegel's development does not reveal sharp discontinuity, but rather progressive elaboration of the initial *Denkansatz*. Nonetheless, Hegel's relation to Fichte's thought can, at best, be described as ambiguous, or perhaps even paradoxical, in ways which can be held to distort significantly the understanding, not only of Fichte's position, but also of his own. Although Hegel at least conceded to Fichte the title of philosopher, which he otherwise restricted merely to Schelling among his philosophical contemporaries, the manner in which he construed Fichte's position had three unfortunate consequences: To begin with, his depiction of his predecessor as a mere precursor deflected attention away from the latter's thought as such. Secondly, a by-product of Hegel's enormous influence on the received view of the history of his philosophical moment has been to perpetuate a tendentious, and perhaps even erroneous, view of Fichte's thought. And to the extent that, whatever the intrinsic value of Fichte's position, Hegel's philosophy is partially dependent on his reading of it, Hegel's deflection of attention from Fichte's view has rendered more difficult the proper interpretation of his own thought.

The concern to redress Hegel's judgment of Fichte, while it has not produced a Fichte renaissance, unlikely at this late date, has made available a

number of careful studies which present a considerably different and perhaps more interesting theory than that portrayed by Hegel. The present slender volume in part belongs to the movement to rehabilitate Fichte's view. The book is the result of the author's interest in contemporary phenomenology, in particular in the question of intersubjectivity in Fichte's egological philosophy, which is discussed here under the headings of imagination, reflection, and intersubjectivity. It is the author's thesis that Fichte's position, which he regards as the first full-fledged egology, makes intersubjectivity constitutive of the transcendental I through a rethinking of the role of the imagination.

In view of the author's own phenomenological leanings, it is regrettable that they were not more fully exploited, especially as concerns the relation between Fichtean egology and Husserl. The allusions to Hyppolite's discussion of the concept of science in their respective positions is unfortunately overshadowed by an absence of any form of *rapprochement*, or even an allusion to the relevant literature, in particular to C. Hunter's account of intersubjectivity in Fichte and Husserl.

The phenomenological bent of the author is more evident in the choice of terminology and the framing of the problem. There is a slight, but persistent tendency to inject contemporary phenomenological terminology, largely due to Heidegger and Husserl, in ways not always consistent with the original usage, or if consistent, perhaps not wholly appropriate (e.g., 'ecstasis', pp. 51, 56; 'intentionality', pp. 44, 50, 52; 'pre-reflective', p. 25). While not inappropriate, this kind of talk would be more relevant if the analogies between Fichte and contemporary phenomenology were brought out, and not left merely to the reader.

The problem here under discussion appears to be an extension of Heidegger's reading of Kant. If, as Heidegger suggests, greater importance than has hitherto been the case should be attached to the role of the imagination in the critical philosophy, then by implication this faculty should receive equal emphasis in the thought of Kant's self-appointed heir. Perhaps following this line of reasoning, Hohler suggests that Fichte's position manifests the displacement of imagination, from the Kantian role of the mediation between sensibility and understanding, to provide "the originary unity and possibility for self-reflection and experience" (p. 2). It follows, then, that if the I is intersubjective, the possibility of its intersubjectivity is grounded in the transcendental imagination, as revealed in reflection.

Hohler's argument for this thesis is made in the course of an exposition of some main features of Fichte's position. The sheerly expository side of this book is, it should be said at once, outstanding. To the best of my knowledge, the clarity with which Fichte's thought is here presented, a task whose difficulty is readily apparent to anyone who has ever made the attempt, is unsurpassed in English or indeed any other language. I can think of no better general presentation of some main Fichtean doctrines in clear, declarative sentences, stylistically and pedagogically immensely more successful than Fichte's own syllabine writings.

The argument is developed in four chapters. "Philosophy as a Systematic Ideal" is in part devoted to an account of Fichte's seldom studied text, "On the Concept of the *Wissenschaftslehre*," crucial for an interpretation of the *Wissenschaftslehre* in all its many forms. The author carefully records Fichte's

view of science as certain but necessarily circular, although it is to be regretted that there is no discussion of the how such a science is possible. The point is of considerable importance for Hegel, since it is certainly the proximal source of Hegel's own view of science as circular (e.g., *Enc.*, Para. 1 and elsewhere).

Discussion of the concept of ideal science leads in turn to the concept of the subject. In "The Transcendental Imagination," the author examines this faculty as the key to understanding the self, or I. In an account which apparently relies on Philonenko's work, Hohler correctly suggests that the transcendental imagination provides the required synthetic unity between the aspects of reflection and common consciousness (p. 42), namely between self-consciousness and consciousness, in virtue of which the subject is a single whole. The interesting observation that striving (*Streben*) is future-oriented perhaps could be broadened to include a relation of positing (*Setzen*) toward the past and the I in general toward time. Yet since Fichte is explicit that the self is activity and Hohler here relies on the concept of the imagination, an attempt to relate activity and imagination would have been welcome. This point is of considerable importance since if, for Fichte, activity is only on the mental level, then his philosophy is indeed imprisoned within subjectivity, as Hegel and others influenced by him have claimed, but others, including Dilthey, have denied.

The author takes up the problem of "The I as Intersubjective" in order to complete his account of Fichte's view of subjectivity. The argument is that as the later deduction of the other in the *Naturrecht* is already implicit in the *Grundlage*, the need for a not-I, or *Anstoss*, can be interpreted as the need for another subject, since the I is basically intersubjective (p. 89). The problem with this account is not that it is false, but that it is radically incomplete. More precisely, the Fichtean view of intersubjectivity cannot, I believe, be grasped unless it is related to the concept of community, for instance in *Das System der Sittenlehre* and above all in *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat*, texts not mentioned here. To put the same point differently, for Fichte full self-consciousness and full self-development as an individual depend not only, as Hohler remarks, upon another subject (p. 61), but further upon an appropriate social environment, in an almost Marxian way, as Marianne Weber, for example, clearly saw.

The discussion, which has so far been confined to exposition, assumes a mildly polemical tone in the fourth chapter, "The Intellectual Intuition," in which the author employs the interpretation of the I as essentially intersubjective to challenge the Hegelian reading of it as absolutely subjective. In the *Differenzschrift* and in many later texts, Hegel maintains that the foundation of Fichte's thought is intellectual intuition. Hohler's stated aim is to save Fichte from Hegel's interpretation, as well as his own reading of Fichte, through a correct account of intellectual intuition.

The chosen strategy consists in demonstrating the internal consistency in Fichte's development through an exposition of the concept of intellectual intuition in *Die zweite Einleitung* and then in the *Wissenschaftslehre novo methodo* and in the *Grundlage*. As the author points out, this concept refers both to the immediate awareness of the I's activity as well as to the disparity between the real and the ideal (p. 96). Intellectual intuition cannot be the foundation of the *Grundlage* since the latter is only a series of general principles in terms of which a *Wissenschaftslehre* could be undertaken, which is the point of the difference between the *Grundlage* and the *Wissenschaftslehre*

novo methodo. But although this line of reasoning does indeed suffice to protect the author's own insistence on transcendental imagination as central to the *Grundlage*, against Hegel's emphasis on intellectual intuition, it can by no stretch of the imagination be held to rescue Fichte from Hegel's general interpretation, since this is neither considered directly or even indirectly.

In a final, brief statement, "Intersubjectivity and Reflection," the author again insists, despite the Hegelian reading of intellectual intuition, on the intersubjective dimension of the I (p. 117). If one takes this point as the task of the book, then it must be considered as successful, although the account of intersubjectivity is, as noted, incomplete. But the precise nature of the author's task is not unambiguous since he also gives the impression that he intends to relate Fichte's position to phenomenology as well as to free Fichte's thought from its Hegelian interpretation.

Neither of these latter tasks is accomplished as a result of the discussion of intersubjectivity as concerns the I. Nothing further need be said about the relation of Fichte's view to phenomenology, since this topic has been mentioned above. But it should be emphasized that this study is unlikely to be decisive in the rehabilitation of Fichte's thought for its own sake, an issue which is clearly joined in the recent Fichte literature (e.g., Baumanns, Siep, Girndt, Lauth), since the general problem is never directly or even indirectly faced. But there is perhaps another manner in which this book can contribute to this goal, since in rectifying even a part of the picture of Fichte's position it makes it more difficult to maintain the overall Hegelian reading of it.

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Entwicklung und Widerspruch: ein Vergleich zwischen Piagets genetischer Erkenntnistheorie und Hegels Dialektik. By Thomas Kesselring. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981. Pp. 389. ISBN 3-518-07598-5.

Appropriately enough the author asks why compare these two seemingly disparate thinkers? The answers provided in the introduction and scattered

elsewhere throughout the text are: First, Piaget, who died in 1980, had never read Hegel before 1977, yet during the last three years of his life the theme of the dialectic was becoming very important to him. Attention is drawn to the themes of Piaget's last studies: contradiction, reflective abstraction, and dialectics (p. 206). Second, the wealth of parallels between Piaget and Hegel are not based on an especially close reading of the latter by the former, rather, they find their coherence in the philosophical issues themselves. Indeed we are informed that much of Piaget's knowledge came to him second and third hand and burdened with prejudices (p. 50). Despite this Kesselring finds an advantage in the fact that Piaget almost never read Hegel until late in his life. By there being no direct influence on Piaget the parallels between their respective philosophies will be all the more objectively clear (p. 19). Third, a comparative reading between the two thinkers is intended not so much as a gloss by a contemporary empirical psychologist on a 19th century speculative philosopher, but as a contribution to expanding the possible forms that the development of a genetic epistemology can take (p. 17). This comparison is to be achieved by using one thinker as a corrective to the other.

Of 291 commentary pages in total, we find that only 89 pages are actually devoted to the sections Kesselring recommends to the reader interested exclusively in a comparison between the two thinkers (p. 18), while 110 pages are recommended to the reader interested in Piaget primarily. The book embraces many ideas and goals, which perhaps explains why it had to be compartmentalized so much. This arrangement makes it easier for readers coming from such disparate backgrounds as philosophy and most areas of psychology to satisfy their initial interests and then, if they wish, to wade deeper into the expanded argument of the text. Given the juxtaposition of two theoretical giants, who have written so voluminously in fields that have regrettably diverged so widely, I see this as a great assist to the reader. There are 98 pages of appendix and documentation, and the remaining 92 pages of commentary include sections in which Kesselring develops his argument. Readers who are not satisfied with the scant attention given to Hegel exclusively in sections 1-3 may be "consoled" (*vertrösten*) by the author's forthcoming publication on the "Rational Reconstruction of Hegel's Dialectic."

Kesselring's project presupposes more than the late interest shown by Piaget in Hegel; it builds on a small but growing body of scholarship and is inextricably linked to an ongoing debate between the French structuralists and those of a phenomenological and dialectical persuasion. Kesselring's contribution here might be considered, for the purpose of summary classification, as taking a middle-of-the-road position between that of thinkers who concentrate mostly around the journal *Human Development*, who regard Piaget as either not Hegelian enough or not Hegelian at all, and that of thinkers such as L. Goldmann *et al.*, who have linked Piaget to dialectical materialism. Against the backdrop of this debate Kesselring's presentation is narrowly epistemological, as may be expected of one adhering to Piaget's *Grundfrage: Wie entwickelt sich Erkenntnis?* (p. 19), almost exclusively within the foundational framework of logical and mathematical formalism. Rather than subject Piaget's philosophy to any radical surgery, he methodically advances a definition of contradiction that is intended to open up discussion of a genetic psychology that goes beyond its present form in Piaget's writings. But in borrowing from Hegel,

from whom concepts are taken and pruned of their ontological context, the author applies them within the epistemological parameters set down by Piaget. He seems to believe that so long as Hegel experts are not unanimous about, say, the conceptual negation of the negation or dialectical contradiction, then one interpretation is as good as another (see pp. 216, 295 fn. 7). This procedure can be a source of much theoretical fertility, but it can also lead to many comparisons between these two thinkers which, however interesting, are digressive at best.

This work pursues two general objectives: First, it seeks to provide a systematic introduction to Piaget's work as seen from an epistemological perspective. Kesselring's attempt in this direction is an outright success. He has a definite mastery over an amorphous mass of material. Second, it seeks to achieve a focus for the comparison by using Hegel's dialectic and its claim to explain the stages of the human spirit in its development. In this light the *Phenomenology* is seen as the forerunner to Piaget's genetic method. This is somewhat of a novel claim if one considers that Kant is the philosopher with whom Piaget is often compared. As indicated above not that many pages of commentary are devoted to Hegel and the dialectic, but the attention that is given to it marks the path by which the concept of contradiction is arrived at as the *idealer Konvergenzpunkt* (p. 18) of his focus.

Students of Hegel are well-acquainted with the break-up of his philosophy after his death. Left-wing Hegelians claimed the method and Right-wing Hegelians laid claim to the system. The early and later Hegel were played off against one another by the priority given to the *Phenomenology* or to the *Logic* (e.g., in the former work stress is given to self-developing consciousness knowing the content of its knowledge only as opposed to *Denken als solches* in the latter work). As the later Hegel has often been accused of destroying the project of the *Phenomenology* by choking off self-developing consciousness by the ontological contemplation of timeless forms, the later Piaget is similarly described as abandoning the dialectical psychological insights gleaned from the observation of childhood's early years, e.g., ambivalence (p. 54) in favor of a structuralism (pp. 20, 73-77) which progressively leaves psychology behind and yields to subjective thought constructions. This critical line of inquiry breaks off as it concludes the last section of Part One and the exposition thereafter turns in Part Two toward a detailed account of Piaget's long philosophical development and proofs for the claim that his genetic epistemology can be broadened into a dialectical theory.

After sketching a model of Hegel's dialectic in Section Three as an alternative to Piaget's equilibration theory, the author holds that Piaget had accorded too little value to an epistemological dialectic, while Hegel had overestimated it as ontology. The middle position staked out by Kesselring is that contradiction is not absolutely constitutive of the dynamic of cognitive and organic growth processes, yet the theoretical conception of this dynamic does provide a rational model in which contradictions play a central role (p. 241).

To understand the importance of contradiction much attention is necessarily given to the concept of equilibration or auto-regulation, the *schwierigsten Komplex in Piagets gesamtem Schaffen* (p. 179). Not only was it a lifelong preoccupation of Piaget, but he revised this concept constantly. This cognitive model had as its design or motive the elimination of contradiction or

disturbances to the organism with the aim of re-establishing balance or internal coherence. Kesselring rejects this model of cognition in Section Ten by claiming that Piaget tried to explain too much by it, but not that it is fundamentally wrong (pp. 180, 205). In seeking to remedy some of the problems associated with this core concept Hegel is selectively welcomed and rejected. With respect to lower-level explanation Hegel is criticized, on the one hand, for paying insufficient attention to the "how" and "why" of the *Mechanismen* by which the *Umkehrung des Bewusstseins* works (p. 72). On the other hand, Hegel's concern for higher-level theoretical conception, and the unity it implies, is deemed to be a corrective to Piaget. Indeed the very important Section Eleven is entitled: *Eine Dialektische Ergänzung der Piagetschen Theorie* (see also pp. 57, 230f.). The proposal made by Klaus Riegel to add a fifth stage, also intended as a dialectical reorganization, to Piaget's four stages of cognitive growth is rejected (pp. 231, 347 fn. 3).

Bound up with the effort to reorganize and unify Piaget's concepts is the concept of *kognitiven "Projektion,"* which Piaget frequently mentioned but never analyzed (p. 215). If I understand the author properly, the effort to reorganize dialectically means giving this concept the importance it deserves. This entails shifting the locus of contradiction from a discrepancy between actions and inferences about actions into the realm of the mind itself. Cognitive projection is a kind of dynamic quality or intentionality. Related to this is Kesselring's definition of the negation of negation as having *die Grundstruktur strikter (logischer) Antinomien* (p. 216) whose basic property is non-identity (*Sich nicht auf sich zu beziehen*) (p. 218). By this move the groundwork of dialectical logic becomes possible (something Piaget never thought was possible) or, to put it differently, the structures of logical thinking which tend towards closure in the ontogenesis of the individual remain open. If this reading of Kesselring is correct then he may be accomplishing next to nothing by shifting the locus of contradiction, for Piaget remains now more than ever in the throes of a dialectically formal subjectivism. It was precisely Hegel's achievement to have surpassed this position in going beyond Kant. Estrangement from non-formal and non-logical operations becomes even more acutely problematic when the concrete interfusion of the subject with the object is ignored in any Hegelian understanding of Piaget. Despite the frequent references to the writings of Piaget's last three years and the fact that Piaget himself is cited in the credits as an important assist to the author, the end result of Kesselring's dalliance with dialectical philosophy is still devoid of concreteness and for this reason remains a "*Dialektik ohne Widerspruch.*"

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The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time. By Tom Darby. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 234. \$27.50. ISBN 0802055788.

Few categories are as useful for illuminating the whole complex of correlative intellectual, spiritual and political problems of the modern world as the opposites of time and eternity. Tom Darby has made impressive use of the dialectic of time and its overcoming in the "eternal instant" not only to analyse the central preoccupations of Rousseau, Hegel and others, but also to reveal their representative significance within the peculiarly modern concern with existence. One is reminded of the Homeric distinction between men and gods as that of mortals versus immortals, which was replaced by the Platonic redefinition of man as the mortal immortal who lives in the tension between life and death. For it is precisely the rejection of that tension that has formed the self-understanding of Western man since the Renaissance and has so completely absorbed the interest of the thinkers covered by Darby's study. The search for perfection in individual and political existence is in essence the desire to escape the temporality of the human condition. Imperfection, finiteness, contingency and death are the inescapable fate of all creatures that live within time. It is only by escaping temporality that we can aspire to the being of eternity which, in Boethius's formulation, is "the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life".

Among those who have struggled with this dilemma Rousseau is of special significance. He was, as Darby points out, the first thinker to develop the modern conception of alienation as "the phenomenon of the isolated self existing in opposition to society" (p. 5). Relying on the work of Cassirer, Poulet and Kelly, Darby traces Rousseau's attempt to restore the isolated self, not to a lost Arcadia of the past, but to a "lost present" (p. 19), "a state beyond duration" (p. 21), beyond the self-negating influence of time emerging from a past and directed toward a future. It was a high aspiration, although the results were disappointing. For Rousseau time was transcended only in the occasional epiphanies of the *Solitary Walker* and in the unrealized utopia of *The Social Contract*. From there the ideas were soon taken up as a principal support of the Jacobin ideology with all of the disastrous consequences of the revolutionary cult which, as Darby shows, included an extravagant attempt to transform human nature and to recreate *de novo* the spatial and temporal horizon of society. The shock of this collapse of revolutionary promise formed the subject of German reflection for the next several decades, leading eventually to Hegel's speculative supersession of temporality within the totality of the System. Only through the attainment of absolute knowledge could the corrosive oppositions of time be finally overcome.

In extracting Hegel's conception of time Darby draws heavily on two articles by Alexandre Koyré and on Kojève's celebrated "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology*. He evidently disagrees with the latter's "anthropocentric" approach, however much he follows Kojève's interpretation in the details. Darby returns us instead to the transcendent and even mystical sources in order to elucidate "the unsaid side of Hegel's thought" (p. 123). His point of departure is Koyré's claim that "the core of Hegel's philosophy, the eternity-time prob-

lematic, owes its greatest debt to Boehme" (p. 123), and in its development Darby follows the guidance of Koyré's own masterful study of the seventeenth century mystic. It is regrettable that Koyré himself never elaborated on the relationship between Hegel and Boehme, apart from his indication that Boehme was the source for Hegel's notion of "atemporal becoming," and it is somewhat disappointing that Darby does little to illuminate the connection any further. He could have shown, for example, that Boehme was a determining influence in the development of Hegel's conception of *Geist*, especially the recognition of the positive significance of the negative which ultimately made possible his reconciliation of finite and infinite being. Boehme conceived of God as a process of self-revelation who projects a separate self-will outside himself in order that the outgoing divine light might be reflected back to its source. Wrath, evil and self-will became moments within the eternal simultaneity of God's self-realization. The implications were already present and had only to be drawn out by Hegel to their logical conclusion: to see the atemporal becoming of divine Spirit as a process extended within time. Boehme, in other words, provided Hegel with the image of the dialectical self-unfolding of God and thereby enabled him to comprehend and transcend time as a moment within the self-revelation of eternity. For if once the final self-recognition of Spirit occurs within time, then time itself will have been completed. The future is wholly absorbed into the atemporal 'now' of absolute knowledge.

It is doubly disappointing that Darby does not pursue this relationship in depth, since Hegel's continuity with the mystical tradition is pivotal to the whole argument he is making. For it is not the final development of human spirit that is reached in the emergence of absolute knowledge. Such a culmination would not stop history, it would suffer the perennial human fate of being overtaken by the omnivorous future. History will reach its end only if the perfection of eternity has been drawn into time. The future must become a moment in the atemporal 'now' of God. Besides, anything less than the attainment of divine self-recognition would not constitute truly absolute knowledge. It would remain only human knowledge of reality, to be superseded by an improved human insight, but not knowledge of "the absolute from the standpoint of the absolute itself" (p. 136). Yet instead of exploring the details of Hegel's immanentization of the mystical glimpse of the divine process, Darby digresses into a discussion of the symbol that continually points beyond itself until it reaches the stage of pointing to itself and becomes a sign or image. In that moment subject and object, I and Thou, are united in an eternal absolute We.

The final two chapters are in many respects the most interesting as Darby explores the intriguing Hegelian question of what happens when history has in principle been completed and time reabsorbed as a moment in eternity, or when eternity has found itself in time. He follows Kojève's speculation on "what this obliteration of time and this supersession of his humanity might mean for man in terms of this new social existence" (p. 172). Kojève sees two possibilities. First is the "reanimalization of man," in which his life becomes purely natural again, without work, self-consciousness or wisdom. Second is the "Japanization" of man, in which life is emptied of all content and the focus becomes a snobbish attachment to form, a purely stylized way of life where style is its own *raison d'être*. Darby makes much of this remarkably perceptive extrapolation of the consequences but, instead of directing us to a re-

examination of their source in Hegel, he merely leaves us with the suggestion that the alternatives represent the twin poles of the final dialectical moment before the actual (not just in principle) completion of history.

It is in the concluding chapter that we at last confront the prospects for this final denouement. Darby seems to be saying that the descent of infinite Spirit has occurred, but that the ultimate reconciliation still awaits the elevation of finite spirit. This is undoubtedly the crux of the problem for Hegel. One can see his struggle with it in trying to determine where the self-consciousness of absolute being belongs—to Hegel? to Napoleon? to the System of Science? to the “ether”? Darby is probably correct in concluding: “It will belong to the community of believers whose existence will harbor the essence of that science” (p. 208). The only difficulty is that such a community does not yet exist. Hegel may have revealed Napoleon, but Napoleon has not recognized Hegel. How will the universal and homogeneous state come about? Hegel’s answer is that it will be achieved through the power of the Book, the self-actualization of Spirit in his *Phenomenology*. “But strangely enough,” as Darby ruefully observes, “to attempt to operate in this substance that is the ether of the system in such a way as to influence the reality of the phenomenal world is tantamount to magic. But is magic beyond the reach of men?” (p. 216). Darby’s own response, despite Hegel’s frequent evocation of the magical power of the negative, is unequivocally “No!” At this juncture he ceases to be a Hegelian. Temporality and the sense of estrangement he regards as the inexorable fate of all mankind. The attempt to abolish this tension, “while it may culminate in both man and God being at home in the world, would abolish man *qua* man and God *qua* God altogether” (p. 225).

More could undoubtedly be said concerning the political and philosophical implications of this conclusion and, like his earlier reluctance to pursue Hegel’s transformation of the mystical sources, it is to be regretted that Darby has left us with such a perfunctory assessment. The work of Eric Voegelin might usefully be consulted in this context, for he has long been engaged in elaborating a deliberately non-Hegelian philosophy of history. In particular one would want to know why Hegel sought to employ a “magic” that he must surely have known to be ineffective. What was it that impelled him to proclaim his System “from the standpoint of God” (p. 218)? And above all, what are the consequences when such an attempt is translated into the real world of politics? Perhaps Darby will tell us more about such matters in the promised succeeding volumes to the present one. For the moment he has made a beginning which has the palpable merit of suggesting a new and useful approach to Hegel, one that forces us to confront the most disturbing problems at the root of his thought. It deserves the attention of Hegel scholars and students of modernity alike.

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Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in Hegels Jenaer Anfängen. By Werner Hartkopf. (Studien zur Entwicklung der modernen Dialektik, 4; Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, 184). Königstein: Forum Academicum in der Verlagsgruppe Athenäum, Hain, Scriptor, Hanstein, 1976. Pp. 267. DM 49.80. ISBN 3-445-02007-8.

Hartkopf's monograph promises by virtue of its title to be a critical evaluation of both the continuity and discontinuity in Hegel's thinking as he joins Schelling in Jena and publishes in 1801 his *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (Differenzschrift)*. His question is to what extent the dialectical aspects of the *Differenzschrift* "are related to the dialectical traits already available in Hegel's Frankfurt fragments as consequences or further developments, or whether these are inspired or even definitively co-determined by Schelling's dialectic, which is already clearly further developed, especially his concept of identity which is in the making" (p. 1). Together the title and the question Hartkopf claims to be addressing lead us to expect a study of the *Differenzschrift* which extends and is comparable to Dilthey's *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels*. This is misleading. What we have instead, as the series title correctly indicates, is part of an ongoing study of the development of "modern dialectic."

This is the latest of four monographs and two articles that represent altogether almost fifteen years of research into the initial conditions and further development of modern dialectic taken as a method. The articles, "Die Dialektik Fichtes als Vorstufe zu Hegels Dialektik" [in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 21, 2 (April-June 1967): 173-207], "Die Dialektik in Schellings Frühschriften" [in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 23, 1 (January-March 1969): 3-23], and the earlier monographs, *Die Dialektik in Schellings Ansätzen zu einer Naturphilosophie (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung*, 102: 1974), *Die Dialektik in Schellings Transzendental- und Identitätsphilosophie (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung*, 138: 1975), and *Der Durchbruch zur Dialektik in Hegels Denken (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung*, 150: 1976) provide the background for the assumptions governing the present study of the *Differenzschrift*, and the conclusions reached therein.

For example, as early as the 1967 article on Fichte Hartkopf was convinced that "In Hegel, there is hardly any evidence of a development [of the dialectic]. Right from the start, the dialectic appears in Hegel in a completely finished form—even where he does not explicitly speak of dialectic in the *Differenzschrift*. The development of the dialectic must therefore be demonstrated in those [thinkers] who inspired Hegel" (p. 174). Thus in the present monograph on the *Differenzschrift*, he reaches the following conclusions: first, "It is undoubtedly the acceptance of Schelling's total conception of the Absolute or of absolute identity which provides the foundation or rather the presupposition for the individual arguments in the *Differenzschrift*" (p. 254f.); and second, "Even in respect to his mode of formulation, Hegel makes extensive use of Schelling's terminology. The most striking example is Hegel's famous characterization of the dialectic as 'the identity of identity and non-identity.'

Here he expresses in a terminology related to Schelling's concept of identity a conception of his own which we find presented in its basic sense in diverse formulations within his 'Systemfragment von 1800' " (p. 255).

What is mistaken about Hartkopf's extensive analysis (pp. 59-250) of the contents of the *Differenzschrift* is not so much these and related conclusions summarized at the end of the monograph (pp. 250-267), especially 4 a-g) as his taking this text "as evidence for the state of the development of Schelling's total concept of a philosophy of identity at the time of Hegel's arrival in Jena" (p. 10). The point of Hegel's inquiry is missing when Hartkopf presents the *Differenzschrift* only as a document providing factual evidence for a study of modern dialectic. By assuming that prior to coming to Jena, Hegel already had a fully developed concept of thinking as dialectical (evidence for Hartkopf of continuity) and that upon his arrival there Hegel was influenced by the subsequently appropriated for himself Schelling's concept of absolute identity (evidence for Hartkopf of discontinuity), Hartkopf fails to appreciate that what is at issue for Hegel within the *Differenzschrift* is "die Aufgabe der Philosophie" and that this is the question which guided Hegel in his study of the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. Thus, in contrast to Hartkopf's conclusions, what was already available for Hegel prior to 1801 was the concept of identity. What is discontinuous between the Frankfurt writings and the *Differenzschrift* is Hegel's assessment of the role and task of philosophy given this concept of identity. Hartkopf fails to see that the real question of continuity and discontinuity pertains to "*das Bedürfnis der Philosophie*," namely, that of which philosophy stands in need and that for which philosophy is needed.

To justify this criticism of Hartkopf's conclusions, one need only point to the identity characteristic of the divine in *Moralität, Liebe, Religion*, dated mid-1797: ("Divinity is at once subject and object"); of love in *Liebe*, dated 1797-98: ("in it [love], life is present as a duplicate of itself and as a single and unified self"); and of life in the *Systemfragment von 1800*: ("life is the union of opposition and relation"). This identity clearly prefigures in its structure that found in the *Differenzschrift* ("Hence the absolute itself is the identity of identity and non-identity; being opposed and being one are both together in it"). That is is the need for philosophy that remains in question for Hegel as he joins Schelling in Jena is evident from the following statement from the *Systemfragment*: "What has been called a union of synthesis and antithesis is not something propounded by the understanding or by reflection but has a character of its own, namely, that of being a reality beyond all reflection. . . . Philosophy therefore has to stop short of religion because it is a process of thinking and, as such a process, implies an opposition with nonthinking [processes] as well as the opposition between the thinking mind and the object of thought." Once these points are granted, the *Differenzschrift* can then be read as Hegel's own breakthrough to dialectical thinking, although as yet not so named, that is, to a thinking (speculative reason) which works with the differences introduced by reflection (understanding) and reconciles them with and in an identity which is absolute.

Such a reading of the *Differenzschrift* is precluded by Hartkopf's understanding of method in philosophy. In his first chapter, entitled "Die Problematik des Verhältnisses von Schelling und Hegel in Hegels Jenaer Anfängen" (pp. 8-58), Hartkopf treats the question of whether Schelling in-