
Corporations and Voting: A Response to Kenneth Silver

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A RESPONSE TO Kenneth Silver (2018), “Do I Think Corporations Should Be Able to Vote Now?”, *Bus Ethics J Rev* 6(4): 18–23.

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ABSTRACT

In his thoughtful Commentary on my article, “Should Corporations Have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency,” Kenneth Silver incorrectly asserts that I endorse (i) Robert Dahl’s Principle of Affected Interests and (ii) social contract theory. To the extent that Silver’s criticism of my argument is based on the claim that I appeal to either theory as the ground for my claim that corporate moral agency entails a corporate right to vote, it is misguided. I rely only on the Rawlsian equal participation principle that invests those subject to the law with the right to vote. To the extent Silver’s criticism is directed to that assertion, it is on point.

I AM GRATEFUL that Kenneth Silver thought my article, “Should Corporations Have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency” (Hasnas 2018), to be worthy of further discussion, and I thank him for his thoughtful comments. I pen this brief Response merely to clarify a few points.

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