
THE CHALLENGE OF RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY WITHIN LEAD- ERSHIP-AS-PRACTICE

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AN INVITED RESPONSE TO Joe Raelin (2020), “The Genealogical Ethics of Leadership-as-Practice”, *Bus Ethics J Rev* 8(5): 27–31,
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ABSTRACT

Herein, I clarify my concern regarding Raelin’s Leadership-as-Practice (L-A-P) and argue that inconsistent moral philosophies undermine the veracity of leadership theory, especially more recent democratic, shared, collective, and practice oriented theories; that this problem seems to be proliferating in the social sciences, and that this is especially concerning in socio-psychologically oriented theories. I contend that the moral foundations of L-A-P remain philosophically disquieting, unless it is understood as excluding moral agents other than those of a genealogical tradition, and that such exclusionary consequences in practice may lead to moral disengagement, which might then lead to cognitive dissonance and even self-harm.

IN AN ATTEMPT to address my concerns regarding the inconsistent moral foundations of L-A-P, Raelin appeals to a reductive interpretation of MacIntyre’s (1990) *Genealogical Tradition* by minimizing the individual moral agent and transforming the traditional notions of leader-follower relationships, as well as the definition of leadership as is commonly understood. I have previously argued that leadership in any form requires consistent moral foundations as an agentive concern (Mensch 2016; Mensch and Barge 2019). I argue that Raelin’s (2016,

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