

# Klotzes and Glotzes, Semiotics and Embodying Normative Stances

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A RESPONSE TO Daniel Layman (2016), “Expressive Objections to Markets: Normative, Not Symbolic,” *Bus Ethics J Rev* 4(1): 1–6, <http://doi.org/10.12747/bejr2016.04.01>

## ABSTRACT

Daniel Layman attempts to critique our recent paper debunking semiotic objections to commodification. Semiotic objections hold that commodifying certain goods and services is wrong because doing so expresses disrespect for the things in question. Layman claims instead that the problem is that such markets “embody” the “wrong norms” or the “wrong deliberative stance.” Given the length-requirements, we, at the moment, need to hear a lot more about the difference between “embodying” a norm, and expressing it. As far as we can tell at the moment, we’re suspicious that he might be begging the question, or just re-describing semiotic objections in a more obscure way.

IN “HOW TO Tell a Klotz from a Glotz,” Dr. Seuss (1979) writes:

Well, the Glotz, you will notice, has lots of black spots.  
The Klotz is quite different with lots of black dots.

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