

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

ON THE MEANING OF VALUE.

THE interpretation of the ideas of value to be suggested in this article may be best approached through a consideration of the relation of the practical to the theoretic reason.

Starting from the standpoint of the idealistic view of the universe, the article will maintain that the implications of that view do not appear to be fully recognised in any of the chief forms of modern idealism, and that as a result, the problem of the practical activity is insufficiently appreciated. The irreducible contrast between the nature of mind as functioning in knowledge, and its nature as practical has not been affected by attempts of modern philosophy to conceive the essence of mind as activity, or as 'creative,' in the two forms of knowledge, and practice. For the ordinary experience, indeed, the greater part of which consists in pursuits related to action, such pursuits in the sphere of knowledge as are engaged in, inevitably take on the appearance of activity, and are attended by emotions similar to those concerned in practical energy. Yet the highest acts of knowledge, when abstracted from the preliminary effort to adopt the standpoint of the knower (which involves the search for the true object of knowledge under investigation) appear in so far as the experience can be communicated, to be characterised by a state of steady, effortless contemplation. And even ordinary thought may enjoy this experience and would, when induced to give exact attention to it, probably support the view that it is in the rare moments of pure consciousness of knowledge that the real nature of mind as knowing is experienced, *i.e.*, its contemplative character.