

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

TRUTH AND THE TESTS OF TRUTH.

I.

HOWEVER at variance logicians may be on other points, there are certain fundamental tenets on which, for the most part, they tacitly at least agree. Whether they announce their subject as the Organon of Discovery, or as the Grammar of Assent, they are at one in the belief that it may be of service at some stage in the ascertainment of truth. To whatever extent they may carry their absorption in grammatical detail, however prone they may be to imply that truth is a bright emanation from the parts of speech, and was materially affected at the Tower of Babel by the Confusion of Tongues,¹ they admit (when they are put to it) that it is justness of representation—precision in the correspondence between a state of mind and the original of which it is a forecast or a copy.² For

¹ Sigwart, for instance, finds a material difference in the same thought expressed in different idioms, *e.g.*, between ‘I am hungry’ and ‘Mich hungert.’ See *Logik*, vol. I, p. 76.

² See Bradley’s *Principles of Logic*, book I, ch. ii, sect. 1 *et seq.* Aquinas (*Contra Gentiles*, lib. I, c. 59) says: “Veritas intellectus est adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse, quod est, vel non esse, quod non est.” Hamilton quotes this definition (*Lectures on Logic*, vol. II, p. 63), and claims it for the Schoolmen. He must refer to a certain neatness in the wording simply; in substance it differs not at all from statements made by Aristotle, as is evident from the following quotations: τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὄν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές (*Metaφh.* III, 7, 1011 b, 26 *seq.*). οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἰεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι, εἰ σὺ λευκός· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι, λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν (*Id.* VIII, 10, 1051 b, 6 *seq.*). οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, . . . ἀλλ’ ἐν διανοίᾳ (*Id.* V, 4, 1027 b, 25).