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BOSANQUET ON MIND AND THE ABSOLUTE.

IN a former article on "the conflict of idealism and realism," which appeared in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW for May, 1924 (Vol. XXXIII, pp. 229-244), an attempt was made to show that Professor Alexander hardly does justice to the central idea of Bradley's philosophy, and that the abrupt contrast of Idealism and Realism is very much modified when justice is done to both sides of their respective theories of reality and truth. Bosanquet, as is well known, has never concealed the essential agreement between himself and Bradley, but he has developed his philosophy in a thoroughly independent way. At the close of the article referred to it was suggested that neither Professor Alexander nor Bradley did complete justice to the religious consciousness, and therefore that some correction or modification of their theories should be made. In the present article an attempt will be made to indicate the difficulty that I still find in accepting the form of Idealism advocated in common by Bradley and Bosanquet; but to do so at all convincingly it will be necessary to give an outline of the comprehensive philosophy of the latter, avoiding as far as possible the specific applications by which Bosanquet seeks to commend his particular form of Idealism. This task is made harder by the admirable spirit of conciliation which is distinctive of all his expositions of his own system, a spirit which is nowhere so distinctly shown as in his comparatively recent work, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, and in the posthumous book edited by his accomplished widow, entitled *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind*.