

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

KANT'S CRITICAL PROBLEM: WHAT IS IT IN ITSELF AND FOR US?

"The key to the right understanding of the entire *Critique* is to be sought for the most part in the introduction."—BRASTBERGER.

A PART from the introductory matter, with which we have in this article principally to deal,¹ Kant's greatest work, if we exclude the important closing chapters on method, falls into three main divisions, called, respectively, transcendental æsthetic, transcendental analytic, and transcendental dialectic. The first proves that space and time are *a priori* forms of sensibility, and explains from that fact the existence of mathematics as a pure or *a priori* sensuous science. The second shows there are *a priori* forms of thought, which are validly applied to appearances, but not to things in themselves; and claims that on them rests a pure science of phenomenal nature, an *a priori* physic. The third exhibits the antinomies into which thinking falls when it applies the *a priori* forms of thought to things in themselves, and overcomes them by showing the subjective source and objective invalidity of metaphysics.

I.

In formulating the problem of the *Critique* in the preface to the first edition, Kant begins with a reference to the

¹ The exposition in this article, unless otherwise specified, is based on the prefaces and introductions of the two editions of the *Critique*, on the chapter on "The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Polemical Use," and the introduction to the *Prolegomena*.

The references are, in German, to Hartenstein's edition, and, in English, to Max Müller's translation of the *Critique* and Mahaffy's translation of the *Prolegomena*, — the pages of the English works being enclosed by ().