Whole Number 125.

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY IN 1911.1

THE first decade of the twentieth century has its intellectual physiognomy, as does every century and indeed every year. If, however, we desire to comprehend the basic movements that dominate contemporary intellectual life, we must extend our survey and interpret these movements in relation to the past.

Taking this larger historical area into account, contemporary philosophy is an attempt to reconstruct on a new foundation the universalism of antiquity. The ancient philosophy, Indic as well as Greek, was essentially universalistic, i. e., the opposition between subject and object, between psychical and physical, disappears in the ultimate unity of the world. Its point of departure is neither the ego nor its counterpart, the non-ego, but the totality, which comprehends in itself both ego and non-ego. The Christian middle-ages established the fundamental dualism of subject and object, and the modern philosophy of nature is based on this antithesis; one of its essential aims is to exclude from the conception of the object every factor originating in the subjective sphere, i. e., all anthropomorphism. The physical world is a completely self-contained, independent system, explicable by its own laws, a pure mechanism. Reaction against this extreme objectivism appeared as early as Leibniz and Berkeley, whose ideas threatened to modify the notion of psychical and intellectual. When, on the one hand, the Kantian philosophy brought the objectivistic, purely naturalistic point of view to its extreme expression, it prepared the way, on the other hand, for the transition to a new stage of development through its critical determination of the insuperable limits of the mathe-

¹ Translated from the German by Professor Wm. A. Hammond.