

# THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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## THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.

### PART II: THE FORM OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTELLIGIBILITY.<sup>1</sup>

AN intelligible world, a *mundus intelligibilis*, we have said in an earlier paper, is the world in which the masters of human thought have lived and moved and had their being. Their 'grandiose and primitive schemes' may not, indeed, meet the more complicated problems of modern times, but there remains something in them that is irrefutable, something to which the mind returns again and again, as it returns to the simplicity and lucidity of the greatest works of art.

"Surely," says Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*,<sup>2</sup> "it is not likely that fire or earth or any such element should be the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty both in their being and their

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted for this expression, as indeed for much of the impulse to write on this subject, to the valuable paper by Professor J. E. Creighton, under the same title, and published in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* for May, 1923. For Professor Creighton, the form of philosophical intelligibility is "that of a concrete universal which expresses the inwardness and essence of individuals through a grasp of their constitutive relations." The very real sympathy of my own view with that of Professor Creighton has already been made clear in the preceding paper. For me also "the key to all sound philosophy lies in taking the concrete universal as the true type of universality." The expressive and intelligible concepts of philosophy may properly be so described. But by the form of philosophical intelligibility, as I shall use it in this paper, something more is meant. It is rather a certain structure or system of thought that necessarily emerges when we retain these expressive concepts in communication and interpretation. All this will become clear as the paper progresses. It seems desirable, however, to emphasize this difference at the start, more particularly for the reason that certain forms of modern idealism have shown little sympathy for the very form of thought I propose to develop.

<sup>2</sup> 984b11-22.