Volume VIII. Number 3. May, 1899.

Whole Number 45.

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

KANT'S A PRIORI ELEMENTS OF UNDERSTANDING AS CONDITIONS OF EXPERIENCE.

LET the *Æsthetic*, which we have in previous articles disputed at every point, be completely taken for granted. Then it is clear that, in resolving the problem of the possibility of mathematics, it has raised a new question which cannot be left unanswered. Space and time are the universal and necessary forms of perception. How then do they combine with the sensegiven matter and transform it into the object we know? It is an ineradicable, though unproven, conviction of Kant's that for the metamorphosis of sense-presentations into objects of experience, there are required, besides the spatial and temporal forms of sensibility, conceptual relations which are the functions of the un-The discovery of these thought-elements in perderstanding. ception, along with an exhibition of their use and a demonstration of their validity, is an undertaking, therefore, forced upon us by the incomplete results of the *Æsthetic*.

The *Æsthetic* dealt with the pure elements of sensibility. But, as Kant is never tired of repeating, "our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of our soul." What sensibility gives would not be known as objects without the relating activity of the understanding. As notions without perceptions are empty, so perceptions without notions are blind. The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced. The *a priori* forms of sense have been