

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE METAPHYSICS OF T. H. GREEN.¹

THE question, 'What is the Real,' says Green, is unmeaning because it presupposes something really to be other than real, which is self-contradictory. This, it seems to me, is a mere play on words. In a sense the whole of experience, *false or true*, is the real for each of us. The philosophic question presupposes Truth or Objectivity as a fact universal, independently of my private perceptions and conceptions; and the question is: What, in my private experience, is the Truth of things — the Objective — the Real? You maintain then, Green would say, that there is something 'really' unreal? Certainly, and the subjective experience is constantly (nay, almost always) 'unreal' in the philosophic and objective sense.

But, Green admits, we may fairly ask what 'is implied in there being a nature of things.' But surely the nature of things is the 'real,' as 'an all-inclusive system of relations' (in Green's phraseology). Now, how can I ask the question as to the implication in a system, if I cannot rationally ask the question: What is the real? — in other words: Is there a system at all, and if so, what is it, as a Real?

The *realitas phenomenon* is, I hold, the Real in attuition or reflexive recipience just as we have it, presuming that we take it in correctly, that is to say, presuming that we are normal

¹I assume that the reader of this article is acquainted with Book I of the *Prolegomena to Ethics*.