

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

MIND IN PLATONISM.

THE aim of the present investigation is to put together the various statements as to the nature and function of mind in the Platonic Dialogues, so as to penetrate behind the particularities of special contexts and discover the essential meaning which the term has in the logical system which we call, after the name of its chief representative, Platonism. We shall begin without prejudice,¹ using the term in the broadest and most general sense that we find, and shall proceed empirically, passing by due gradations from the many to the one, in the hope of thus reaching a conclusion which should be final.

For the typical post-Heraclitean Hellenic thinker, physical nature is obviously a texture of motions or, perhaps, of moving particles, *A, B, C*. . . . *B* receives motion from impact with an already moving *A* and passes on the motion, by impact, to *C*, and the general texture of the physical universe is thus an affair of motions transmitted by impact. To the scientific Greek, fertile in hypotheses, this situation suggested many problems. Amongst others, the question as to the *source* of the motions whose interplay constituted the physical drama was asked and answered in a

¹ To those who accept the usual view of Platonic thought as essentially transcendental, the present investigation will appear 'un-Platonic' and specifically Aristotelian. It rests, however, upon a study of *the whole* of the evidence contained in the Dialogues. In particular, the reason for beginning with a discussion of motion is suggested by *Soph.*, 249*b*, as well as by Bk. X of the *Laws*. Beare's caveat against such an investigation (*Gk. Theor. of Elem. Cognition*, p. 8) seems to the present writer an example of *ignava ratio*.