

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AFFECTIONS IN PLATO
AND ARISTOTLE.

II. ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE'S treatment of the affections, like Plato's, is conditioned throughout by other than purely psychological interests. His principal discussion of pleasure is in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the primary aim is to define the relation of pleasure to the pursuit of the moral end; and his principal discussion of the emotions is in the second book of the *Rhetoric*, where the main object is to relate the emotional susceptibilities of an audience to the art of persuasion. In the *De Anima*, where psychological problems are handled more from the point of view of a philosophy of mind, with the emphasis on cognition, references to the phenomena of the affective life are few and incidental. Nevertheless, wherever Aristotle does treat of these phenomena, whether incidentally or in a connected discussion subordinate to an ulterior purpose, he seems to be genuinely interested in the facts. His inventory of the facts is far fuller than Plato's, his analysis more thorough. In constructing a theory there is always a certain selection of the material, a guiding idea and a mutual adaptation and molding of the two as the theory develops. But the emphasis may be now on the one factor, and now on the other. Plato's emphasis is on the ideal factor, Aristotle is more careful in the manipulation of the material. Thus in the doctrine of pleasure Aristotle's theory seems to be more molded on the facts, whereas Plato makes the im-