

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

KANT'S THEORY OF THE A PRIORI FORMS OF
SENSE.

II.

HAVING seen in a previous article¹ that Kant's arguments for the *a priori* nature of time are untenable, we now ask, Does the case stand otherwise with space? There is at any rate this difference, that Kant's arguments originated with space, and were thence transferred to time. And it is quite conceivable that they have an original validity which is yet lacking in their derivative application to time. Furthermore, they may draw support from the fact of geometry, though, in truth, they were put forward to explain its possibility. However this may be, there is difference enough to justify a separate consideration of the question.

The analysis or "metaphysical exposition"² of the notion of space need not long detain us, as it is identical with that of time. First, comes the negative thesis that "space is not an empirical notion which has been derived from external experience." And the reason is that "external experience is itself possible only by means of the *Vorstellung* of space." There is here no word of a world beyond our actual perceptions.³ The meaning is that

¹ THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, January, 1899.

² III, 53 ff. (20 ff., S. 140 ff.).

³ On that account, the first argument cannot, as Erdmann (*Kant's Reflexionen*, II, 108 note; see no. 347) supposes, be directed against what Kant calls "Leibniz's