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VALUATION AND EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE.

PLATO long ago called notice to the disadvantage of written discussion as compared with oral. The printed page does not respond to questions addressed it. It will not share in conversation. But there is a disadvantage for the writer as well as for the reader. He is never quite free in discussing the same topic again; he is committed and hence compromised. Even if he can escape the vanity of consistency, it may not be altogether easy to reapproach the subject-matter wholly on its own account. What is written may have called out comments and criticisms which need a reply; thus indirectly one gets called away from the subject to discussion of what one has previously thought and said about it.

These remarks are preliminary to a consideration of the relation of value to judgment, or the problem of knowing values. In the embarrassment of prior committal¹ and of various comments and criticisms, mostly unfavorable, I shall do what I can to stick to the subject on its own merits, inevitably repeating some things which I have said before, while modifying and expanding the discussion so as to give heed to the main contentions of my critics. The consistency of what is said here with what was said in the earlier discussion, I shall for the most part leave to the reader to pass upon, in case he takes an interest in that not very interesting topic.

¹ "Judgments of Practice," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XII., pp. 505-523. The article is reprinted with slight changes in *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 335-389. Pages 374-384, however, a discussion of standards, is not found in the original article. Reference to criticisms will be given below.