

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

VALUE, OBJECTIVE REFERENCE AND CRITICISM.

IN some writings of mine on judgments of value considered as evaluations, there was no attempt to reach or state any conclusion as to the nature of value itself.¹ The position taken was virtually this: *No matter what* value is or is taken to be, certain traits of evaluative judgments as judgments can be formulated. One can assuredly consider the nature of impersonal judgments, such as 'it rains,' without going into the physical and meteorological constitution of rain. So it seemed possible to consider the nature of value-judgments (as evaluations, not just statements about values already had) without consideration of value, just as, once more, one might discuss deliberation without analysis of things deliberated upon.

The outcome soon showed the mistake. There was a tactical error in connection with the present status of the discussion. There was much interest in value, and little in the theory of judgments, and my essay to disentangle the two only gave the impression that I was trying in a roundabout way to insinuate a peculiar theory concerning value itself, or else that because I did not discuss value I thought it of little importance as compared with instrumentalities. But the error was more than one of mode of presentation, as, indeed, might have occurred to me in considering the analogy between evaluation judgments and deliberation. For if deliberation constitutes a distinctive type of

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, essay on "Judgments of Practice," pp. 335-389, and THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," vol. XXXI, pp. 325-351.