La fin du XXème siècle vit une situation paradoxale, où les droits civils, politiques, économiques et sociaux sont proclamés dans des documents internationaux et dans des textes constituionnels, ce qui représente dans l’histoire du droit, l’affirmation la plus emphatique de la croyance de l’homme en sa propre dignité, quoique subsistent, néanmoins, des pratiques qui nient ces droits. La fragilité des droits de l’homme face à l’autoritarisme trouve ses racines précisément dans l’absence d’un accord sur les principes fondamentaux de cette catégorie de droits. Cet accord peut être construit autour de principes rationnels, ce qui permettra d’attribuer aux droits de l’homme une dimension universelle. La question des fondements des droits de l’homme a été reléguée à un plan secondaire dans la réflexion philosophique du XXème siècle, en vertu, précisément des difficultés tenant à sa mise en oeuvre; elle n’a acquis de for académique que lorsque la société elle-même manifesta sa répulsion aux violations constantes des droits fondamentaux de l’être humain. Il s’agit, donc, de récupérer l’analyse des principes moraux minimaux qui justifient rationnellement les droits de l’homme, ce qui permettra, ainsi, l’établissement d’une universalité légitimée de ceux-ci.

Responding to a call by Pierre Sané, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, for a worldwide political movement to overcome the social damage that has been wrought by economic globalization, this paper asks whether such a movement can invoke current conceptions of human rights. In particular, if human rights are Euro-centric, how well would they serve the self-understanding of a movement that is to be global, culturally pluralistic and counterhegemonic to Northern capital? I argue that it is not human rights that are Eurocentric, but only certain conceptions of human rights. Properly understood, human rights are justifiable from within all cultures. Moreover, current conceptions of human rights are not as narrow as they were in 1948, when the Universal Declaration was drafted. Nearly five decades of international dialogue have transformed human rights discourse in ways that are profoundly anti-Eurocentric, and further transformations are already underway. There are resources of moral and political experience, within all cultures, which argue strongly in favor of these transformations. Therefore, a more consistent and more complete knowledge of human rights can emerge cross-culturally if the dialogue is not abused and if the relevant moral and political experience is let into the dialogue from all quarters.

The priority and absoluteness of rights is often gist for ethical debates. I consider these issues from the perspective of my ethical theory, which I call the "ethics of social consequences." The ethics of social consequences is one means of satisfying non-utilitarian consequentialism. It is characterized by the principles of positive social consequences, humanity, human dignity, legality, justice, responsibility, tolerance as well as moral obligation. I analyze Gewirth’s position regarding the absoluteness of rights as well as Nagel’s opinion that rights enjoy priority forever. However, I also concentrate on Williams’s critique of utilitarianism. I contend that the priority of the protection and respect of individual rights in ordinary situations is acceptable. However, the individual must respect the rights and justified interests of other concerned people. Nevertheless, in extraordinary situations one must accept that consequences are more significant than rights.

The risk of executing innocent persons is a decisive objection to the institution of capital punishment in the United States. Consequentialist arguments for the death penalty are inconclusive at best; the strongest justification is a retributive one. However, this argument is seriously undercut if a significant risk of executing the innocent exists. Any criminal justice system carries the risk of punishing innocent persons, but the punishment of death is unique and requires greater precautions. Retributive justifications for the death penalty are grounded in respect for innocent victims of homicide; but accepting serious risks of mistaken executions demonstrates disrespect for innocent human life. United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1990’s (Coleman v. Thompson and Herrara v. Collins) illustrate the existence of serious risk and suggest some explanations for it.

Recent analyses of the concept of inalienable rights (i.e., analyses of the inalienable rights to life) transmute these rights into restrictions on the choices of individuals who possess the rights. In this paper I argue that such construals are counter-intuitive, and incompatible with the modern notion of rights as positive benefits to be enjoyed by those who possess them. I offer an alternative (somewhat Lockean) view which proposes that inalienable rights be regarded as entitlements to discretionary options, options the objects of which need not be chosen. To flesh out the theory, such rights (construed as discretionary options) are distinguished from absolute rights, from alienable rights, and from some kinds of indefeasible human rights. I point to several advantages of the open options account of inalienable rights, including the fact that inalienable rights construed as open options are rights that may provide grounds for calling oppressive governments to account, while at the same time protecting areas of freedom which make the possession of the rights worthwhile rather than burdensome. A concluding appeal suggests that the open options view of inalienable rights awaits and encourages the development of theories which bolster modern intuitions concerning the plausibility of affirming individuated, comprehensive, desirable, and universally applicable human rights.

Which political and juridical foundation can justify the transit from the Western, particular, to the universal? John Rawls tries to answer this question in his article, "The Law of Peoples," proposing a kind of contract or agreement. A first agreement should be attained among liberal-democratic societies on a few political and social issues such as human rights. Then this agreement can be widened to non-liberal/democratic but well organized hierarchical societies or those that satisfy the requisites of being peaceful, of having a reasonably well organized legal system, of admitting a measure of freedom-political and religious-and of admitting the right of emigration. These two groups of nations would belong to a Society of Nations with the juridical and political duty of fulfilling the few political issues that have been previously accepted. But Rawls' proposal overcomes neither eurocentrism nor western-centrism. It seems that the first circle of liberal democratic nations would decide which peoples satisfy the requirements of the 'well organized hierarchical societies.' This second circle of nations are only invited peoples; they are not supposed to contribute new proposals, but only to accept the proposals of the liberal-democratic nations. I present a new effort to attain human rights through a true universal dialogue in which the representatives of all cultures and peoples can equally speak, make proposals, and listen or accept the proposals of others.

It has been argued, and not without emotional detachment, that the Holocaust is unlike other events in world and Jewish history (and I hope to explain that the sheer numbers who perished alone are not crucial to the distinction). Those who offer such arguments also claim that comparisons between events of ethnic cleansing, mass murder and other sorts of criminal behavior are not meant to purvey a kind of moral one-upmanship. The suffering and harm in one instance is as morally repugnant as those in any other instance, whether it is a Jewish child gassed and cremated by the Nazis, a black child lynched in the southern United States, an Armenian child deliberately poisoned in a Turkish hospital, a Ukrainian child starved to death in a Stalinist blockade, a Native American child shot to death by Conquistadors, a Rwandan child hacked to death, or a Bosnian child blown to pieces by a land mine or sniper.

The worth of a civilization can be judged by the place given to women in the society. One of several factors that justify the greatness of India's ancient culture is the honorable place granted to women. The Muslim influence on India caused considerable deterioration in the status of women. They were deprived of their rights of equality with men. Raja Ram Mohan Roy started a movement against this inequality and subjugation. The contact of Indian culture with that of the British also brought improvement in the status of women. The third factor in the revival of women's position was the influence of Mahatma Gandhi who induced women to participate in the Freedom Movement. As a result of this retrieval of freedom, women in Indian have distinguished themselves as teachers, nurses, air-hostesses, booking clerks, receptionists, and doctors. They are also participating in politics and administration. But in spite of this amelioration in the status of women, the evils of illiteracy, dowry, ignorance, and economic slavery would have to be fully removed in order to give them their rightful place in Indian society.

In antiquity, the idea of padeia organically joined learning and education. In today's world it remains the essence of culture. However, philosophy is now characterized by a spirit of pragmatism that correlates present-day needs with actual sociocultural trends. Humanism can seem today nothing more than an illusion, an unrealizable utopia. Nevertheless, philosophy in its educative role should shape a attitude to life that is not only deep and universal but humanistic as well.

This paper defends the claim that the contemporary canon of human rights forms an indivisible and interdependent system of norms against both "Western" and "Asian" critics who have asserted exceptionalist or selectivist counterclaims. After providing a formal definition of human rights, I argue that the set of particular human rights that comprises the contemporary canon represents an ethical-legal paradigm which functions as an implicit theory of human oppression. On this view, human rights originate as normative responses to particular historical experiences of oppression. Since historically known experiences of oppression have resulted from practices that function as parts of systems of domination, normative responses to these practices have sought to disarm and dismantle such systems by depriving potential oppressors of the techniques which enable them to maintain their domination. Therefore, human rights norms form a systematic and interdependent whole because only as parts of a system can they function as effective means for combatting oppression and domination.