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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 87, Issue 1, July 2013
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Displaying: 1-13 of 13 documents
articles
1.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Issue: 1
Mark Kaplan
Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface
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2.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Issue: 1
Michael Williams
Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement
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3.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Alfred R. Mele
Libertarianism and Human Agency
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4.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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David Yates
The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism
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5.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Lieven Decock, Igor Douven
Qualia Compression
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Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for thefundamental unknowability of other persons' color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualiamay go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed "color qualia compression"—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full-blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences.
special symposium
6.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Issue: 1
Stephen Stich
Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel
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7.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Jennifer Nagel
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich
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book symposium
8.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Patricia Kitcher
Précis of Kant's Thinker
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9.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Sebastian Rödl
The Single Act of Combining
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10.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Hannah Ginsborg
Kant's Perceiver
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11.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Lucy Allais
Kitcher on the Deduction
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12.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
Volume
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87
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Issue: 1
Patricia Kitcher
Replies to Rödl, Ginsborg, and Allais
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13.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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87
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Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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