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Edmund Leszczuk, Zenomena Płużek
Edmund Leszczuk
Psychologia na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim w latach 1918—1968
Psychologia na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim w latach 1918—1968
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Jozef Pastuszka
Jozef Pastuszka
Koncepcja człowieka w uchwałach Soboru Watykańskiego II (Konstytucja o Kościele w świecie współczesnym) na tle współczesnych humanizmów
The Conception of Man in the Resolutions of the Second Vatican Council on the Background of Other Modern Humanisms
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Summing up at the last session the work of the Second Vatican Council, Pope Paul VI remarked that never before had a Council given man so much consideration not only within the context of doctrinal and moral decisions, connected to the mysteries of the Revelation, of which the Church is the guardian and interpreter, but also man as concrete, living being, within actual circumstances of the world. This was necessary, if one considers that the modern intellectual trends that shape man’s attitude towards the world and life have an anthropological character, that their position regarding the whole reality depends on their judgement of man. That is why the problem of humanism is the central problem of modern mentality.The decisions of the Vatican Council contain an expose of Christian humanism, particularly in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, dealing with the Church in the modern World. The paper discusses the major theses of the Council regarding man such as the resolutions on the structure and dignity of the human person (its rationality, freedom and moral life), its transcendence, its social character and its duties towards other human individuals and social groups, also on the human person as cultural being.These views on Christian humanism expressed by the Second Vatican Council are presented on the background of modern Non-Christian systems: rationalism, which sees man only as a thinking, temporal being; depth psychology for which man appears as full of conflicts resulting from deep undercurrents of biological instincts; existentialism reducing man to an irrational being deeply disturbed by the anxiety of existence; finally, marxism which conceives man as a natural being, whose consciousness is a function of higher organized matter.
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Władysław Prężyna
Władysław Prężyna
Skala postaw religijnych
Skala postaw religijnych
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The paper presents an attempt to work out a scale measuring religious attitudes. The object of the attitude investigated is the problem of the supernatural as understood by Christian religion. The scale was constructed with the view to measure one characteristic of religious attitude — intensity.In the process of construction were isolated first a number of statements having a distinctly discriminating value as regards positive or negative response to religion. That work was carried out by 70 competent judges. Only those statements were accepted as differentiating which were ascribed extreme ranks (1—3 and 6—7) by the judges in an eleven-point continuum (Thurstone type). 30 statements were thus obtained: 17 positive and 13 negative towards religion. In order that the constructed scale might provide a valid measure of intensity a seven-point principle (Likert’s type) was adopted: I definitely agree, I agree, etc.The reliability of the scale wąs tested by the calculation of the coefficient of stability, the method applied being that of double investigation of the same population with a week’s interval between. The two sets of data were correlated by means of Pearson’s coofficient r for primary data. The index obtained was 0.979 with a standard deviation of 0.005 (for N = 70).The validity of the scale was tested by means of external criteria. Two methods were applied: a ’’scale” of religious practices, and a hierarchy of values. The "scale” of religious practices included: frequency of practices (prayers, mass attendance, communion), their motivation and meaning for the individual investigated. 219 individuals were tested with the religious scale and the ’’scale” of practice. The data were then correlated, yielding a coefficient (Pearson’s r) at the level of 0.669 with 0.031 standard deviation.The second method — grading of values — included the following items: one’s own life, property, fame, religious convictions and values, social good, man’s (woman’s) love, possibility of attaining higher learning, the good of one’s own family. The correlation between the two sets of data — religious scale and hierarchy of values — was measured by Spearman’s method of sequence correlation. The coefficient was 0.84 with a standard deviation of 0.02 (for N = 255).The population investigated consisted of graduates or individuals approaching the end of undergraduate studies.
The paper presents an attempt to work out a scale measuring religious attitudes. The object of the attitude investigated is the problem of the supernatural as understood by Christian religion. The scale was constructed with the view to measure one characteristic of religious attitude — intensity.In the process of construction were isolated first a number of statements having a distinctly discriminating value as regards positive or negative response to religion. That work was carried out by 70 competent judges. Only those statements were accepted as differentiating which were ascribed extreme ranks (1—3 and 6—7) by the judges in an eleven-point continuum (Thurstone type). 30 statements were thus obtained: 17 positive and 13 negative towards religion. In order that the constructed scale might provide a valid measure of intensity a seven-point principle (Likert’s type) was adopted: I definitely agree, I agree, etc.The reliability of the scale wąs tested by the calculation of the coefficient of stability, the method applied being that of double investigation of the same population with a week’s interval between. The two sets of data were correlated by means of Pearson’s coofficient r for primary data. The index obtained was 0.979 with a standard deviation of 0.005 (for N = 70).The validity of the scale was tested by means of external criteria. Two methods were applied: a ’’scale” of religious practices, and a hierarchy of values. The "scale” of religious practices included: frequency of practices (prayers, mass attendance, communion), their motivation and meaning for the individual investigated. 219 individuals were tested with the religious scale and the ’’scale” of practice. The data were then correlated, yielding a coefficient (Pearson’s r) at the level of 0.669 with 0.031 standard deviation.The second method — grading of values — included the following items: one’s own life, property, fame, religious convictions and values, social good, man’s (woman’s) love, possibility of attaining higher learning, the good of one’s own family. The correlation between the two sets of data — religious scale and hierarchy of values — was measured by Spearman’s method of sequence correlation. The coefficient was 0.84 with a standard deviation of 0.02 (for N = 255).The population investigated consisted of graduates or individuals approaching the end of undergraduate studies.
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Mieczysław Dybowski
Mieczysław Dybowski
O sposobach występowania celów życiowych
On the Modes of Appearance of Vital Ends
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When I. Pavlov showed purposiveness to be a phenomenon common to all living beings since it is an instinct leading to the preservation of life, N. Ach reduced it to determination, which degree of intensity increases with the frequence of the representation of the end.The paper presents the result of an investigation carried out to discover in what forms the end occurs in people; the method applied was that of a questionnaire dealing with the representation of ideal and real end, as well as that of means and consequences. In the experimental part (six pauses during the time given to answering the questions) the author appraised those forms, ranking them in a nine- -grade scale according to their values.The experiment consisted in writing and drawing during which the representation of the end occurred.The investigation included 51 fourth year psychology students.Qualitative analysis revealed nine end forms, as follows: 1. representation of aim only 2. representation of means only (mediate ends); 3. ends developing from means; 4. no ultimate end, proximate end appears alone;* 5. momentary ends only; 6. impulsive though efficient tending to the end; 7. end together with means (1 + 2); 8. ends develop from means, while the pursuit is impulsive and efficient (3 + 6); 9. end not explicitly mentioned (1).Quantitative analysis (be means of ranks) permitted to estimate the relative values of end forms (the numbers refer to the above mentioned forms beginning with the most valuable ones: (3 + 6); (1 + 2); 6; 2; 1; 3; (1); 5 and 4.It appeared then that the end forms can be divided into simple and compound ones, the latter being more valuable (3 + 6) and (1 + 2); the forms can be produced by way of purposive thinking (1, 2, 4 and 5) or arise impulsively (3 and 6).
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Janusz Kostrzewski
Janusz Kostrzewski
Wyniki badań rozwoju umysłowego 1530 dzieci w wieku od 2 do 30 miesięcy, dokonanych polskim przekładem skali Psyche Cattell
Mental Development in Infants Aged 2—30 Months Investigated With the Polish Translation of Psyche Cattell Intelligence Scale
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The paper aims 1. to present the results of an investigation carried out by means of the Polish translation of Psyche Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale; 2. to ascertain whether American norms can apply without modification to investigations on Polish children aged 2—30 months; 3. to determine if there exist and, in the affirmative, to explain differences as to the general level of mental development between town and country infants, tested with Psyche Cattell Scale; 4. to find out possible sex-conditioned differences; 5. to compare our results with those obtained by the author of the Scale; 6. to test the diagnostical validity of the Polish version of the Scale.The investigation covered 1530 infants, 2—30 months of age, from 10 voivo- deships; each of the 19 age levels comprised 78—84 infants; their distribution as to sex was 765 boys for 765 girls; as to provenience: 765 from town and 765 from the country. The author characterizes the educational level of the parents: he found that secondary or higher education was more common among town people than among country people.The statistical analyses led the author to the following conclusions with regard to the questions put above:1. One age level only, out of the 19, namely that of 27-month children showed an I.Q. pattern deviating from the normal curve; for the remaining 18 levels, there is no reason to discard the hypothesis that the I.Q. pattern calculated on the basis of the Polish translation (by the author of the article) of the original Psyche Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale is a normal one. Three probable hypotheses are suggested to explain the significance of the I.Q. deviation from normal curve in children aged 27 months.The mean I.Q. of the infants investigated by us is 105.81 with a standard deviation of 13.3. The mean I.Q. of an unselected sample of population should be 100 when the different tests have an appropriate degree of difficulty. Statistical analysis shows that the tests found in the Polish version of the Scale seem too easy for the group investigated. The I.Q.s at the different age levels range from 101.0 (22 months) to 117.6 (2 months). At five levels (11, 12, 22, 24, 27 months), they do not differ significantly from 100; at these levels of age the tests seem appropriate for investigation in this country; at the other fourteen levels (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 20 and 30 months) the mean I.Q.s are significantly above 100; the tests proposed at these levels appear therefore too easy for our infants. The standard deviations range from 9.28 to 18.5. The I.Q. variances at all levels of age differ significantly (P < 0.001).2. The investigation has showed that American norms cannot be applied to Polish infants aged 2—30 months. The raw values of I.Q. yielded by the Psyche Cattell Scale at various levels of age are not comparable. That is why the author proposes to calculate standardized I.Q.s (standard-score; ’deviation’ I.Q.s with mean 100 and standard deviation 13.3 at every age level). He gives the rules for the calculation of these, also a numerical table (7) to that effect. He gives Polish norms which make possible the use of Psyche Cattell original Scale in the Polish version, without its modification.3. The difference between the mean I.Q. of 765 country infants and that of an equal number of town infants (104.5098 and 107.11 respectively), revealed by statistical analysis is small, though statistically significant (P<0.01). However, out of the 19 age levels, a statistically significant difference in mental development between town children and country children tested with the Psyche Cattell Scale was found in 8-, 20-, 22-, and 30-month’s old infants, to the disadvantage of the country children. On the basis of a thorough statistical analysis of the material, the author believes these differences to depend not on town or country provenience but on the educational level of the parents. Some of the tests appearing in the Scale are particularly sensitive to differences in the cultural level of the infant’s home. The differences of the mental development of infants whose parents possess widely different educational achievements should be ascribed to the influence of intellectual climate on the development of the mental aptitudes measured by some tests of the Scale, though genetic factors should not be disregarded.4. No statistically significant differences were found between the levels of intellectual development of the 765 girls and those of an equal number of boys, all aged 2—30 months.5. No statistically significant differences appeared either between the mean I.Q. of the Polish infants and that of 274 American children tested by the author of the Scale.6. The investigation showed a high diagnostical validity of the Polish version of the Psyche Cattell Scale for the investigation of mentally defective handicapped children. 37 infants aged 7—35 months, with Down’s disease, served as criterial group. The mean I.Q. of those infants differed very significantly from that of the 1530 included in the general investigation. The I.Q.s of the infants with Down’s syndrome ranged from 30 to 64.8. None of them reached beyond the border of mental deficiency. Clinical observation extended over a number of years, further investigation of the same children carried out later with Stanford-Binet Scale, 1937, version L, confirmed the diagnosis obtained earlier by means of the Psyche Cattell Scale. It should be mentioned that, besides mental development, other factors were taken into account in the diagnosis of mental deficiency — social competence, aptitude to learn and others — in the investigated group of infants with Down’s syndrome (cf. 12).After the preliminary analyses of the results of the investigations carried out, further efforts are directed towards elaborating a Polish adaptation of the Psyche Cattell Scale. Some of the tests, which proved too easy for our children will be replaced by tests with an appropriate degree of difficulty; the number of tests proposed at the different levels will be increased from 5 to 8—10 so as to insure the scale higher reliability. The reliability and validity of the Polish adaptation of the scale will be discussed in a separate paper.
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Zdzisław Chlewiński
Zdzisław Chlewiński
History of Psychology, An Overwiew
History of Psychology, An Overwiew
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Jerzy Strojnowski
Jerzy Strojnowski
Zaburzenia wyższych czynności korowych wskutek ogniskowych uszkodzeń mózgu. Wprowadzenie do neuropsychologii
Zaburzenia wyższych czynności korowych wskutek ogniskowych uszkodzeń mózgu. Wprowadzenie do neuropsychologii
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Stanisław Mazierski
Stanisław Mazierski
Z dziejow specjalizacji filozofii przyrody na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim
Z dziejow specjalizacji filozofii przyrody na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim
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Stanisław Adamczyk
Stanisław Adamczyk
Współdziałanie Boga z czynnościami przyrody:
według nauki św. Tomasza z Akwinu
God’s Cooperation in the Activity of Nature According to St. Thomas Aquinas
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„Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine”. The accuracy of this maxim of Aristotle’s placed by St. Thomas at the beginning of his short treatise De Ente et Essentia was substantiated in my book De existentia substantiali in doctri- na s. Thomae Aquinatis (Romae 1962). It is even much more apparent when one tries to see the operations of nature as in the light of God’s cooperation, i.e. in the question called „concursus divinus” by the Scholastics. This question has recently attracted the interest of theologians, among others of the Jesuits John Stufler and Martinez del Campo. The former, however, on the ground of Suarez’ doctrine, does not go further than God’s indirect cooperation, while the latter, for not having pointed out the relation of this problem with that of the difference between essence and existence, fails to bring a rational explanation of the necessity of divine cooperation. The purpose of the present article is precisely to fill in this gap.Before discussing the fundamental problem, the author answers to all those who, like the „loquentes in lege Maurorum” or later occasionalists (Geulinxc, Malebranche, Edward) maintain that creatures do not perform their actions by themselves but only through the operation of God acting in them. St. Thomas criticizes that view strongly (II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, c; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, c); he simply calls it „positio stulta”. Next follow a few remarks on the causation by the power of nature and faculties of the operations themselves which, again, J. Gredt OSB, sees as compound of essence and existence.Lastly, following in that regard St. Thomas’ classical text De Pot., q. 3, a. 7, c, the author affirms that God, qua proper efficient cause of all existence, cooperates with the operations of nature, both living and inanimate, insofar as He gives and preserves their existence and faculties (powers), which He applies to action, and insofar as any power whatsoever operates by His power. Hence, if the individual becomes to some extent the efficient cause of the essence of an operation, it is God who is the proper and immediate efficient cause of its existence. And as neither the essence nor the existence comprise the whole operation, we can say that both the creatüre and the Creator are the efficient cause thereof (causalités instrumentons).In this way St. Thomas avoids the difficulty from which cannot extricate themselves those who do not recognize any difference between essence and existence (Duns Scotus, Durandus, Suarez, Stufler, Wais), and, at best, do not go beyond indirect efficient dependence on God in the entire activity of nature.
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Stanisław Mazierski
Stanisław Mazierski
Czy filozofia Tomasza z Akwinu jest systemem zamkniętym?
Is Thomas Aquinas’s Philosophy a Closed System?
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The author tries to answer the question whether Thomas’s system is open or closed to other philosophical or scientific systems; whether theses belonging to other doctrines can be, transplanted into the soil of his philosophy. To help himself with this task, the author applied K. Ajdukiewicz’s theory of open and closed language to the philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas, which lead him to the following conclusions:From the theoretical point of view, and without forejudging the point what elements actually enrich traditional philosophy, it must be said that if Thomas’y system is a closed one it cannot be enriched by any new theses without its essential theses being deformed. If it is an open system, it can be enlarged by new theses, with no alteration of the older ones.From the factual viewpoint, it must be maintained that Aquinas’s philosophy is an open system, at least insofar as it is subject to development from inside. Indeed, different ideas of being and a variety of intellectual visions of reality arise. Thomas’s philosophy has been shown to possess existential foundations among others. The fresh awareness of these existential elements has enriched the system itself and our knowledge thereof. There is no doubt that traditional philosophy follows a vertical line of development, and is an open system in that regard.It remains open to discussion, however, it some at least of the theses from other philosophies may be incorporated into traditional philosophy. The author’s position is that the process is justified only when these do not involve changing the rules of meanings and ordinating definitions proper to Thomas’s philosophy. One of the questions particularly worth while considering is whether the Aristote- lician and Thomist cosmology is open to natural sciences. As these two types of knowledge study the material world in different aspects, and use different languages, they represent separate types of cognition. Therefore, natural science theses are not translatable into the language of philosophy. Natural facts cannot become an integral part of philosophy until they have been interpreted in the light of philosophical principles. The latter condition ensures philosophy from changing the meanings of its theses and terms.The question arises, then, whether particular sciences can develop without any metaphysics whatsoever. The analysis of this point reveals a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, positivistically minded scientists track down metaphysical elements in order to eliminate them from the field of science, while, on the other hand, the metaphysicians, as if anxious to preserve the building of science from falling, endeavour to give it a firm metaphysical basis. This seemingly incompatible marriage between metaphysics and particular sciences can be reconciled if each side perceives the difference between ontic assumptions, having a basis inside the system, and those with a basis outside the system. By reason of its structure, the foundations of metaphysics rest on a number of ontic hypotheses, ultimate, necessary, unmovable and unabolishable, which form an integral part of the system. As for particular sciences, their ontic assumptions are externally based. They do not belong to the structure of these sciences as consciously programmed elements, but are accepted implicitly, incidentally, externally. The reason is that particular sciences have fundamental assumptions of their own, integrally related with the system, unnecessary, abolishable, empirically confirmable. St. Thomas’s philosophy is also open to such externally based ontic assumptions.
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Stefan Piotrowski
Stefan Piotrowski
Ewolucja gwiazd
Ewolucja gwiazd
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Modern knowledge about stars is founded 1. on a theory of the inner structure of stars and nuclear processes occurring within them; 2. on empirical data concerning the brilliance, colour and chemical composition of groups of stars of identic origin as regards space, time and material.In his description of the empirical and theoretical laws ruling the world of stars, the author makes use of two factors (representations): a model of our Galaxy, i.e. the system of ca. 100 milliard stars to which our sun belongs, and, on the other hand, the so-called Hertzsprung-Russel's diagram. After an architectonic outline of our Galaxy, which is made up of a number of star populations (galactic groups, populations of the disc and spiral arms, that of the so-called galactic halo), the author proceeds to answer the question how the stars of the particular populations set in the diagram just mentioned.The diagram shows different areas (zones) occupied by corresponding populations. This general picture is further explained by the theory and the data about the inner structure of stars and the course of thermo-nuclear processes.
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Michał Heller
Michał Heller
Definicja terminu „wszechświat” w kosmologii relatywistycznej
The Definition of the „Universe” in Relativistic Cosmology
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Scientific theories directly define only those terms which appear in empirically testable sentences. The definition gives them such a meaning as the whole sentence receives the sense determined by the content of the observation. Theoretical terms, i.e. those that do not appear directly in empirically tested sentences, are ascribed a meaning such as empirically testable sentences can result from the propositions which contain them. A theoretical term can, therefore, be defined only in the context of a given theory. The purpose of this paper is to try to define the theoretical term „universe” within the theory called relativistic cosmology.In the relativistic cosmology, „universe” is not a singlemeaning word. The analysis reveals that it comes into the theory at several stages:1. It first appears during the construction of the material substratum. The „universe” is then defined: „a cosmic area sufficiently vast so that, compared to its linear dimensions, the distances between individual galaxies appear negligible” (Def. 1.). 2. The construction of the cosmological model results on a „already-model- led universe”. The latter can be defined: „a space-time in which has been set a metric being the solution of the gravitational field equations in which the constants R0, k and l have determined values” (Def. 2). 3. For the observer placed at a point defined by the coordinates xa = 0, at the moment t = 0, the „universe” consists in a set of events lying inside a light cone or on the surface thereof, the top of which is the moment-point (0, 0, 0, 0) (Def. 3). Consonantly to this definition, the „universe” is a relative concept, depending on a concrete observer and concrete moment t. It can be proved that the section of space-time by the light cone, i.e. the universe of def. 3, is finished and closed both in closed models and in the open ones. 4. The concept „universe” for the observer at a certain moment (according to def. 3) may be generalized into that of „universe for a certain observer, not restricted to one moment” (Def. 4). Considering the brevity, in cosmic scale, of the time during which man has carried out astronomical observations, def. 4 can be, for practical purposes, reduced to def. 3.The above definitions of the „universe” fulfill the methodological requirement of reducibility to the terms appearing in empirically testable propositions insofar as the testing of cosmic models is feasible. Such a testing can take place only „within the frame” of a universe consonant with def. 3.In the so-called Klein’s model, the concept of metagalaxy is used instead of universe. The metagalaxy is a system of galaxies originated from one condensation of primitive ambiplasma (plasma made up of a mixture of matter and antimatter). The theory admits the possibility that other metagalaxies exist.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Mieczysław Lubański
Mieczysław Lubański
Matematyka a nauki filozoficzne
Mathematics and Philosophical Sciences
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It is more and more common for mathematical methods to penetrate into other disciplines today, natural sciences as well as humanities. The question arises whether this „mathematization” may, to some extent, concern philosophy, too. The paper shows that one can speak of a subservient function of mathematics in philosophy, then of the application of mathematical methods and also of the achievements of mathematics itself in the field of philosophy. Attention is also drawn to the fact that the study of mathematics is a good practical school of precise, exact thinking, which is of particular import in philosophical disciplines. The paper reviews next some major chapters of mathematics of special interest for the philosopher and including essential data for philosophy itself: set theory, general topology, modern algebra, mathematical analysis, various kinds of geometry, probability theory and cybernetical methods. Lastly, the advantages which philosophy can derive from the study of mathematics are pointed out. These may be worded as follows: mathematical knowledge allows an understanding of the nature of „pure” reasoning; furthermore, it gives a deeper insight into the problems of the relation between experience and „pure” thinking; finally, it enables us better to grasp the nature of philosophical thinking itself, at least in a negative sense.
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Włodzimierz Sedlak
Włodzimierz Sedlak
Zaburzenia pola biologicznego jako przyczyna narośli rakowatej na drzewach
The Distortion of Biological Field
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On the basis of factual material — tumour growth in trees — the author tries to ascertain the function of biological field inside the biological system. The whole problem can be reduced to the effects of organic substance, biological field and geometry of the system, i.e. to space relations.The biological field inside a system (field information). By introducing the simplification which sees the biological system as an aperiodic crystal we extend the range of problems involved (reflection, refraction, absorption, polarization of electromagnetic information). As biologically active organic compounds as well as tissues evince semiconductor properties the aperiodic crystal may be considered as semiconductor. This induces the author to believe that the biological system may be treated as physical plasma by a large approximation. The assumption is, in fact, generally accepted for semiconductors. In this way 4 the steering influence of the biological field with actual displacement of mass is easier to interpret. The approximation applies to all biological levels (molecule, cell, tissue and organism) simultaneously. The distinction of plasma as special state of living matter has some analogy to the fourth state of matter in physics — plasma. For distinction sake, we may call it bioplasma (as different from cytoplasma or protoplasma).Treating the living system as plasma allows to explain extremely subtle interdependences between the organism and the environment such as the electric influence of changing warm and cold air fronts, the effect of meteorological conditions on the dissemination of neoplasma, the effect of ionosphere radiations on the organism with relation to the succeeding moon phases, the dependence of the organism on a weak magnetic field, etc.Weak electric stimuli are most probably received through the medium of electrostasis (ECS) Electrostasis might then be the electric protosensę of the organism.The schematization of the plasma allows the analysis of the way in which informations are received by an living system, without having to examine the mechanics of how the biological field is formed. Inside the plasma, impulses can be carried through like acoustic waves (longitudinal impulses), electrostatic, electromagnetic and magnetohydrodynamic, when even a weak magnetic field exists outside. As a rule, the informing impulses are of metabolic origin conditioned by the electric setting of the environment. The general metabolic background is therefore modified by the electromagnetic activity of the environment through the channel of the inner information of the biological system. Field information functions in an intermediate way through change of metabolism and variation of electrostasis (ECS), both in plants and in animals. The nervous system is only a particular case of information.Geometry and life processes. The spreading of biological field impulses in a living system will depend on its geometry. The geometry of life is „three-dimensional”: mass, directional forces (field) and space. The biological material reveals two directions: a longitudinal one (L), and a radial one (R) at a right angle with the latter. The resulting symmetry may be generally called hexagonal (a = b = R, and L = c). The polarity of the directions L and R being taken into account, the biological system fulfills the postulate of a quadrupole and its variants. The quadrupole was an early evolutionary acquisition. Anisotropy is a higher form of geometry than isotropy.The "hexagonal” symmetry appears at molecular level, and up to and including the organismal one, through that of tissue, in both vegetable and animal worlds, though in the latter more complexity is due to the existence of the organs of motion. The historical transmission of geometry in the phenomenological scale is paleontologically confirmed.The "hexagonal” symmetry with L directed longitudinally and R radially, and with RlL should evince potential gradient. Two different points on L or R should show a difference of potential. On the other hand, the anisotropy of the biological system has a large range of characteristics, and includes also mechanical, optical, thermic, piezoelectric, magnetic and other properties. Anisotropy must also appear in the processes of physical plasma and in the field information within the biological systems. The author examines this question taking tree trunks for illustration. Field information (electrostatic, electromagnetic or magnetohydrody- namic) is strictly conditioned by the directional forces of the environment such as geomagnetic field lines, atmosphere electric gradient, telluric currents, light. This dependence has developed by evolution.The trunk of a tree can be considered as a multiplates condenser, the outer tissue of which is active and most sensitive. The line L is the general steering direction, while the lines R are a differentiating factor. The outer plate of this condenser is the most suitable for observation of a pathological biological field expressed by distorted tissue as anomalies accrue on the outer side.Field pathology and neoplasmic tissue. The existence of the pathology of the biological field is to be accepted on the same grounds as pathological morphology, anatomy and physiology. A pathological field causes a faulty transmission of information which, in turn, involves nontypical morphological structures. Distorted activity of the biological oscillator ensues at molecular level, and leads, through abnormal reception, to a pathological displacement of biological mass. Consequently a nontypical (neoplasmic) tissue is formed, characterized by a changed electric condition. Then normal electrostasis undergoes a deviation.The morphological consequences of a disturbed biological field were investigated by the author on tree material in the Holy Cross National Park (Central Poland). He found several characteristic groups of distorted tissue. Both the directions L and R are subject to distortion in the trunk of a tree. On receiving anomalous field information, cambium divides chaotically, and falls outside the influence of the coordinating factors conditioned by the normal geometry of the system. It is to be assumed that neoplasmic tissue in plants shows, similarly to that of animals, a changed electric state, hence a nontypical electrostasis. There exist many conditions in a tree favouring the possession of non cathabolically originated electrons, as, for instance, following dielectric friction (rain, snow), triboelectricity, setting free of piezoelectrons in result of passive, wind-caused, motion, injuries, and others...The simple geometry of a trunk, expressed by the directions L and R, affords handy material for the investigation of distorted symmetry in the case of tumour growth. This simplicity allows also schematizations and the analysis of normally existing information and its pathological deviations.
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Szczepan W. Ślaga
Szczepan W. Ślaga
Charakterystyka koncepcji organizmalnej
Charakteristik der Organismischen Theorie
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Der Aufsatz ist einer allgemeinen Charakteristik der organismischen Theorie gewidmet. Ihr Schöpfer ist Ludwig von Bertalanffy.Im ersten Abschnitt wird auf die erkenntnistheoretischen und obiektiven Quellen hingewiesen, im einzelnen auf die Unzulänglichkeit der Zellentheorie und die Versuche, ihr den rechten Platz unter anderen biologischen Theorien anzuweisen. Dann wird die Auseinandersetzung dargestellt zwischen Mechanizismus und Vitalismus um die Möglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit einer Reduktion von biologischen Gesetzen zu den physikalischen. Die Unzulänglichkeit der analytisch-meristischen Erkenntnismethode bei vitalen Phänomenen ist betont. Daraus folgt die Notwendigkeit einer synthetisch-ganzheitlichen Auffassung (holistische Quellen: J. S. Haldane, Adolf Meyer-Abich).Die Hauptgedanken der organismischen Theorie L. von Bertalanffys werden im zweiten Abschnitt besprochen. Nach der Charakteristik der allgemeinen Systemtheorie folgt eine Darbietung der Ansichten L. von Bertalanffys auf das Wesen des Organismus als offenes System. Besonders hervorgehoben sind die Grundsätze der Organisation und hierarchischen Einordnung der Systeme im Organismus.Im dritten Abschnitt skiziert der Autor die Perspektiven der organismischen Theorie und deren Anwendung bei Untersuchen konkreter biologischer Probleme. Als Beispiel wurden geboten genetisch-evolutionistische Fragen, da diese heute zu den am meisten diskutierten zählen.
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Henryk Nowik
Henryk Nowik
Pojęcie kompleksu czynników w biologii
The Concept of a Complex of Factors in Biology
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The analysis of the data described in biology shows that the biological term "complex of factors” has a number of different meanings (a1} a2, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j). These have been distinguished upon reflection on the various types of interdependence occurring among independent variables, and due to a dependent variable. The concept of independent variable is identical in content with that of factor.
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Zygmunt Hajduk
Zygmunt Hajduk
The Anatomy of Inquiry
The Anatomy of Inquiry
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Michał Heller
Michał Heller
The Measure of the Universe. A History of Modern Cosmology
The Measure of the Universe. A History of Modern Cosmology
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S. Tarnowski
S. Tarnowski
Fizyka a filozofia
Fizyka a filozofia
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Marian Dewudzki
Marian Dewudzki
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature
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