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Rafał P. Wierzchosławski, Tadeusz Szubka
Rafał P. Wierzchosławski
Księdzu Profesorowi Józefowi Herbutowi na siedemdziesięciolecie w darze
Księdzu Profesorowi Józefowi Herbutowi na siedemdziesięciolecie w darze
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Roman Schmidt
Roman Schmidt
Bibliografia prac Ks. Prof. Józefa Herbuta
Bibliografia prac Ks. Prof. Józefa Herbuta
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listy gratulacyjne i teksty okolicznościowe |
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Józef Życiński
Józef Życiński
Wielki Kanclerz KUL, List gratulacyjny
Wielki Kanclerz KUL, List gratulacyjny
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Alfons Nossol
Alfons Nossol
Nasz Filozof
Nasz Filozof
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Andrzej Szostek
Andrzej Szostek
Z okazji 70-lecia urodzin Ks. Prof. Józefa Herbuta
Z okazji 70-lecia urodzin Ks. Prof. Józefa Herbuta
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Alfons Nossol
Alfons Nossol
Polskie doświadczenie współistnienia kultur, narodów i religii
Polskie doświadczenie współistnienia kultur, narodów i religii
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Romuald Jakub Weksler-Waszkinel
Romuald Jakub Weksler-Waszkinel
Od asymilacji do dialogu:
„Swój” – „Obcy” – „Inny”
Od asymilacji do dialogu
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artykuły ofiarowane księdzu profesorowi józefowi herbutowi |
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Andrzej Bronk, Stanisław Majdański
Andrzej Bronk
Filozofowanie w kontekście języka:
Refleksje w związku z dociekaniami Anny Wierzbickiej
Philosophising in the Context of Language
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The linguistic studies written by Anna Wierzbicka have been an occasion for the remarks on the relationship between linguistics and philosophy and for the question whether linguistic enquiries entitle us to put forward philosophical theses. In particular, whether and to what extent we indeed learn something philosophically significant about the world (of culture) and the nature man and his mind by examining language. Defining here position as interdisciplinary, Wierzbicka draws on the studies of the relationship between language and culture, language and mind (language is a mirror of the mind – Leibniz). She claims that philosophy can be made a reliable science, provided it is based on linguistics, and the results of linguistic analyses can be found at the grounds of philosophical theses. Such philosophical references are A. Wierzbicka’s attempts to combine semantics with generativism (Chomsky). Her intention to bring about a holistic description of language through defining elementary expressions (concepts, meanings), the so-called indefinibilia (“primitives”) can also be called philosophical in character. They suffice to define all the remaining expressions, and basic universal syntactic constructs in the form of a grammar of elementary units, i.e. the ways of combining elementary units into greater wholes. We think that Wierzbicka’s procedure, her quest after primary elements (of language) are reducing. A. Wierzbicka’s main idea, with regard to the relationship between language and mind, may be understood as follows: this is a Janus-faced relationship – one face (empirically accessible) is language, the other one is the mind accessible through investigations on language. Both “faces” (spheres) are somehow functionally “glued together”. In fact, however, Wierzbicka speaks little about the philosophically comprehended nature of man, whereas she speaks much about linguistic varieties and similarities among people. Generally speaking, while she declares herself to be a linguist, she has a philosophical temper and ambitions to generalise, i.e. she conducts linguistic studies with an intention to arrive at philosophical theses (by examining language she wants to obtain knowledge about the world and man). She issues statements which go beyond a purely linguistic knowledge and strictly linguistic data, hence they are not made legitimate by the linguistic material itself. A. Wierzbicka does not explain in more detail her way of understanding philosophy, assuming its intuitive comprehension. From some contexts it can be deduced that she takes it to mean a worldview. Should we call some parts of her reasoning a philosophy, it is then not a realistic philosophy but subject-oriented (first-person philosophising), such that touches upon the problems of the borderline between linguistics and philosophy, more concerned with the axis language-user than language-the world. Simultaneously, it is a non-demarcated and non-autonomic philosophising, exactly within the context of science, for it takes advantage of the results of empirical sciences to pose philosophical theses. The belief that philosophy can be pursued within a linguistic context coincides with the approach of analytical philosophy with its linguistic turn. Despite her declarations to make philosophy more scientific, Wierzbicka’s arguments on behalf of the generalised (philosophical) theses are more their illustration and explication than a decisive legitimacy. Her belief that one can find some common, primitive linguistic units (simplicia) in the form of a complete set of independent concepts for all languages of the world seems utopian. It is difficult to do it even in deductive systems, constructed by way of the axiomatic method and with a finite set of initial expressions.
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Barbara Chyrowicz
Barbara Chyrowicz
Etyka pragmatystyczna:
moralność jako zwyczaj
Pragmatic Ethics
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The paper discusses the basic assumptions proposed by John Dewey in his pragmatist ethics, posing at the same time a question whether pragmatist ethics satisfies the basic conditions of the ethical theory. The central category and criterion assumed in pragmatist ethics is a habit. Only good habits ensure good action. Habits are shaped by the milieu, and any attempts to change them entail a change in the conditions of the milieu. Permanent modification of habits is written in the basic goal of moral action, i.e. development. Dewey rejects the theory of ethics comprehended as an order of moral norms and evaluations settled in advance. The theory proposed by him does not satisfy the conditions that a standard ethical theory is supposed to meet. This does not mean that it cannot be called a theory. It is Dewey’s programme to give up traditional tasks assigned to an ethical theory.
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Jan Czerkawski
Jan Czerkawski
Badania nad dziejami filozofii a historyzm
Inquiries on the History of Philosophy versus Historicism
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Is the history of philosophy one of philosophical disciplines? Should not one give up pursuing the traditional history of philosophy on behalf of the history of philosophical culture as a historical discipline? Considerable divergences in defining the history of philosophy and its relation to philosophy and history show profound differences in the views on philosophy itself. The differences are an essential part of the history of philosophy. This paper does not intend to give a critical assessment of all positions that concern the relationship between the history of philosophy and philosophy. We shall address the issue of consequences of historicism that bear on the history of philosophy. The main negative point of reference will R. Rorty’s standpoint, which is representative of the radical version of historicism. The American neo-pragmatist’s manners of pursuing philosophy and the relations between them will be submitted to criticism. In the perspective of radical historicism (historical and cultural relativism) the inquiries on the history of philosophy have no strictly philosophical importance. They may be cognitively interesting only from the historical point of view, for the history of culture, to be precise. Moderate historicism does not mean acceptance for the relativistic theory of truth. It makes us reconsider the issue of the difference between true knowledge and adequate knowledge, the difference well-known in tradition. Overcoming radical historicism prepares grounds for the pursuit of the history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline, the discipline that studies the history of philosophical problems in their variability and permanence.
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Włodzimierz Galewicz
Włodzimierz Galewicz
Pokusy i grzechy wiary pragmatycznej:
Immanuel Kant o wewnętrznym kłamstwie
Temptations and Sins of Pragmatic Faith
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The paper an analytical-interpretative commentary on several excerpts from I. Kant. The first one with an example of a doctor who thinks he knows his patient’s illness deals with the concept of pragmatic faith. The author seeks to explicate this concept by giving three interpretations of Kantian example. In a further part of the paper the internal lie is defined as a sin which may fall part of any „believers not careful enough” of the titular faith. The first example is this sin is an internal profession of faith in God („just in case”) without actual participation in it. The second example is a false worship to the Creator, the one that is motivated by fear or punishment. When interpreting these examples, the author refers to the Kantian distinction between homo noumenon (moral being) and homo phaenomenon (physical being). This distinction is related to the interdiction of using homo phaenomenon only as a means (an instrument to speak).
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Jerzy Gałkowski
Jerzy Gałkowski
Jacques’a Maritaina koncepcja federacyjna Europy (szkic problemu)
Jacques Maritain’s Conception of Federational Europe
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As early as the beginning of the Second World War J. Maritain in his two articles presented the vision of a United Europe. Our continent in fact was always in the state of war. The 20th century could have become a decline of European history, if the wars had not ended. J. Maritain’s initiation was therefore to show the ways to peace. One way is unity of Europe. a formation of the federation of European nations. The article shows this way and its theoretical justification, something that can be found in his philosophical conception of politics.
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Arkadiusz Gut
Arkadiusz Gut
Myśl Gottloba Fregego w świetle badań prowadzonych w filozofii współczesnej
The Thought of Gottlob Frege in the Light of Inquiries Conducted in Contemporary Philosophy
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The paper introduces the reader to the contemporary trends in the interpretation of Frege’s thought. The point of departure in this description points out that the way of looking at Frege’s accomplishment depends on the manner of characterising contemporary philosophy, in particular analytical philosophy. In order to have a closer look at the above relationship we have outlined the style of historical-systematic studies as proposed by Dummett. A series of historical facts are given with a view to explain the sources of the renaissance of Frege’s thought in contemporary philosophy. A description of various interpretations of the thoughts of Frege is given in line with four oppositions which appeared in contemporary literature: 1) genius – continuator; 2) epistemologist – philosopher of language; 3) theorist of meaning – theorist of thought; 4) anti-naturalist – realist. Noticing the drawbacks of the above characterisation, an alternative historical reconstruction is proposed. This proposal consists in distinguishing a basic category or object whose inquiries have become important and dominated various kinds of philosophical enterprise in a certain philosophical period. The category of proposition have been chosen to be such an object. At the same time, it is pinpointed that owing to this choice one may characterise Frege’s accomplishment and explain from many points of view the sources of the relationship between Frege’s thought and analytical philosophy.
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Piotr Gutowski
Piotr Gutowski
Charlesa S. Peirce’a krytyka epistemologii kartezjańskiej:
U źródeł filozofii współczesnej
Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Cartesian Epistemology
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The paper presents Ch. S. Peirce’s attack on Cartesian epistemology as it was formulated in 1868 article Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Peirce’s arguments are analyzed in the context of possible Descartes’ responses. One conclusion of the paper is that Peirce uses two different notions of knowledge and science, and that the distance of his ideas from that of Descartes depends, among others, on which notion we take into account. Another conclusion is that although Peirce’s general project of combining falibilism and anti-scepticism looks very attractive (especially in the light of what we now know about the development of science) it generates many problems that Descartes could have pointed out if he had a chance to talk to his two and a half century younger debater. Despite, however, the problems Peircean project generates, it may be regarerd as a forerunner of typical tendencies of 20th century philosophy such as e.g. fallibilism or antifoundationalism.
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Zygmunt Hajduk
Zygmunt Hajduk
Teologiczna i światopoglądowa relewantność filozofii przyrody
Theological and Worldview Relevancy of the Philosophy of Nature
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While establishing the first type of relevancy, one takes into account the standard issues of the classical philosophy of nature. In particular, they are focused on the question of hylomorphism, evolutionism and miraculous events. This type of relevancy is defined through the relationships between the results of the natural sciences. They imply philosophical problems, a fact that enables us to establish the relationships between these sciences and theology. As a rule, it is the philosophy of nature and philosophy of God (I. G. Barbour, A. Anderwald) that play the role of mediators between the natural sciences and theology. The problems in question continue the relationships between evolution and creation, between science and religion, or religious faith, and between theology and the natural sciences. A discussion on the second type of relevancy depends to a large extent on the aspectual additional definitions of its terms. Obviously, they contain the concepts of science, philosophy, worldview, ideology, religion, and theology. These explicative manoeuvres allow us to take advantage of the strategies, introduced beforehand, of establishing the relationship between science and religion. It is essential for our context to construct a coherent image of the world, an image that is characteristic of the philosophy of nature. This image combines some aspects of science, philosophy, including metaphysics, ethics, and theology.
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Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
O poglądach Floriana Bochwica. Rozdział z dziejów myśli polskiej
On the Views of Florian Bochwic (a Chapter from the history of Polish Thought)
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The paper depicts the philosophical views of F. Bochwic (1799-1856) which are as follows: ontology, anthropology, epistemology, ethics, and education.The world, according to Bochwic, was created by God (creationism) and is divided into two spheres: spiritual and carnal (ontological dualism). The factor that unites them is man. His purpose, as a free creature, is his tendency to perfection. The sources of human knowledge are the following: unreliable senses and reliable conscience (intuitionism). Conscience is the source of our presentiments with regard to: the existence of God, immortality of the soul, God’s justice, and moral orders obligatory for all people (axiological absolutism): the order to make good and avoid evil, the order to love oneself and the neighbour, and the order to obey one’s parents and superiors.The philosophical views of Bochwic lay at the grounds of his educational doctrine. According to it, education should instil civil virtues in adolescents and be versatile, balanced, varied, imitative, kind, and permanent.
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Stanisław Judycki
Stanisław Judycki
Intuicja i spekulacja
Intuition and Speculation
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The paper deals with the nature of internal experience. The views on this subject appear in I. Kant, J.G. Fichte, E. Husserl, and K. Rahner. The author seeks to prove that internal experience is an intuitive experience in which the subject presents to himself or herself in the so-called intellectual inspection (intellektuelle Anschaung). The subject has the feature of atemporality (nunc status) and is capable of transcending each content while preserving its identity. „Speculation” means reflection: the structure of the person of God is reflected in internal experience. He is semper stans. These views are compared with the standpoint of fourteenth-century mystics (J. Eckhart, J. Tauler, H. Suzo) about the so-called ground of the soul (Seelengrund).
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Paweł Kawalec
Paweł Kawalec
Wyjaśnić to podać model przyczynowy
Explanation and Causal Models
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A survey of the modern theories of explanation leads us to conclude that it is J. Woodward’s conterfactual approach that seems to set out a promising agenda for setting up a satisfactory model of explanation. Such a model would need to come to terms with two stipulations, i.e. to reflect causal asymmetry and be empirically adequate. To meet the latter I modify the counterfactual model of explanation to require a class of observationally equivalent (Bayesian) causal models instead of the true causal model. For in most cases empirical adequacy of causal models, i.e. their identifiability and consistency with observed distributions, would neither grant the stronger conclusion Woodward embeds in his conterfactual account of explanation nor license metaphysical naturalism.
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Robert Kublikowski
Robert Kublikowski
Antyesencjalizm jako założenie antydefinicjonizmu Karla R. Poppera
Antiessentialism as the Presupposition of Karl R. Popper’s Antidefinitionism
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The paper aims at reconstructing Karl R. Popper’s critical standpoint with regard to essentialism, as antiessentialism is the main presupposition of his antidefinitionism. Popper criticised essentialism for claiming that it is justified to apply the concept of things’ essential properties within the procedure of scientific explanation. He argued that the essentialists’ ”faith in essence” is not scientific because of the lack of a criterion which would allow us to tell whether a certain definition grasps the essential properties of a given object. He doubted also that it is justified to apply the concept of intellectual intuition to the procedure of scientific explanation. Popper claimed that falsificationism gives a better concept of explanation, than that motivated by essentialism. He was convinced that falsificationism is logically more correct and more appropriately describes the real practice of scientists.
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Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Dlaczego nauka nie może być wolna od wartości
Why Science cannot be Value-free
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Against the background of the ideal of value-free science formulated by M. Weber the paper defends the view that science is not – and cannot be – value-free, and, moreover, that values relevant to science are both cognitive and moral.Three arguments are developed to support this thesis: (1) Since there is no algorithm for making methodological decisions as to what theory should be accepted, what method should be used, etc, scientists have to pass judgements that are essentially evaluative. Those judgements belong to science. The attempt to save the ideal of value-free science by distinguishing value-free object language and value-laden metalanguage (in which those evaluative judgements would be formulated) does not work. For there are no reasons to expel the methodology of a given science from that science, and even if we made this move, we would finally come to the level of evaluative judgements, unless we accept regressus ad infinitum. (2) Even if the above distinction were tenable, this would not save the ideal of value-free science. For our language is full of the so-called „thick ethical concepts” that are both descriptive and evaluative. They are justifiably used at least in some sciences. We could exclude – by definition - such concepts from science, but this would result in expelling many legitimate disciplines from the realm of science. This would mean not that science was value-free but that we made it so. (3) The fact that scientific results are sometimes expressed by means of ethically thick concepts does not allow us to restrict values involved in science to epistemological values – moral values are involved as well. Moreover, apparently pure methodological concepts such as „good solution” or „sufficient evidence” seem to be also „ethically thick”. Such considerations allow us to draw a conclusion that science possesses intrinsic moral dimension, and separating the epistemic and moral points of view in discussions about science is unjustified.
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