This article aims to present Cicero and Wang Chong as theorists of divination. While it has already been determined that they advanced both defenses and criticisms, I specifically intend to focus on their significant criticisms of divination, which emerged as corrective for the practice by supporting or disapproving and extending or limiting its underlying principles. I also emphasize that these thinkers have different objectives and emphases in their criticisms. Cicero’s objective is to maintain the fundamental teachings of their forefathers, prompting him to criticize anything that contradicts their teachings. Wang Chong’s objective is to make an appeal and encourage their people to be critical, and he often showed this through his criticism of the old, their classic texts, or even their tradition. In bringing them together, I show a robust and united rebuttal to the old ways of thinking about the divine and its ritualization. In conclusion, I offer an analysis that their critical attitudes, although different and may even be opposed, are complementary and both necessary.

Aristotle discovered the law of contradiction more than 2000 years ago. Since then, this law has been regarded as one of the basic principles of logic. Aristotle considered this principle to be 'the most indisputable of all beliefs,' but nearly half a century ago, it began to be criticized. The voice of criticism came from a philosophical logic - paraconsistent logic. This study analyses in depth the specific properties of the positive logic plus approach, non-adjunctive approach, and relevant approach of paraconsistent logic and presents three definitions of the law of contradiction. It also shows that there are two types of the law of contradiction in C-logics and that the law of contradiction with classical negation is valid in them. Furthermore, this study proves that the law of contradiction with classical negation is also valid in a non-adjunctive approach and explains the reason this law cannot be deduced in some relevant logic systems. Based on these, we can clarify what type of the law of contradiction is questioned by paraconsistent logics and thoroughly reveal the exact meaning of 'the law of contradiction is invalid' in paraconsistent logics.

Since Descartes, the quest for the foundation in epistemology has suffered a series of setbacks. The consequence of the opposition against an epistemic foundation is epistemic skepticism. The irony of the skeptic position is that scepticism in all its hues is self-refuting. Although the establishment of a foundation is essential for coherent epistemology, the quest for epistemic foundation has suffered some oppositions because most attempts at establishing foundational epistemology have focused on intentional signs or products – beliefs, concepts, propositions, etc. In this essay, I argue that in order to establish foundational epistemology, cognitional and intentionality analysis should take priority over conceptual analysis. Hence, instead of focusing on intentional signs or products, attention should be paid to intentional acts – experiencing, understanding and judging – of the knowing subject. In other words, I argue that paying adequate attention to human cognitional structure is vital in the defense of epistemic foundation and that the foundation is found in the structure of human knowing rather than in the products of human knowing. Focusing on cognitional analysis will help to account for both epistemic foundation and epistemic pluralism. The shift from conceptual to cognitional and intentionality analysis has implications for the articulation of the African perspective on knowledge since the human cognitional structure is the same, but contextual differences arise because of one's epistemic environment. Following the example of Bernard Lonergan, I argue that self-knowledge or self-affirmation of the knower, as he terms it, is the paradigmatic case for the establishment of epistemic foundation.

In this article, we contest the idea that evil does not exist, or that it is a mistaken grasp of reality to contend that evil exists. We analyze two versions of this argument: the 'orchestra argument' and the 'mystical argument.' In common, these arguments contend that those who affirm the existence of evil in the world have a limited view of reality. We argue that these views are either over-abstract from reality or do not offer a plausible approach to the problem of evil. We then advance a decolonial perspective on evil. According to the perspective advanced here, evil is conceptualized as a phenomenon that diminishes life. We contend this view provides a better account of how to understand evil.

The objective of this work is to explore the notion of "action" and "agency" in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of "action" and "agency" in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension, employed in the language and science of artificial intelligence. The advent of the science of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, and the technological applications of artificial intelligence in the production of agents such as driverless cars and expert systems, have raised the question of moral, ethical and/or legal responsibility in AI agents. This has re-emphasized the importance of the philosophical discourse on the notions of action and agency, which in contemporary intellectual discourse are now perceived to be phenomena within the epistemic competence of the natural sciences. This paper argues that AI systems do not and cannot possess free agency and autonomy, thus, cannot be morally and ethically responsible. Hence, it recommends a socio-political response to the question of responsibility in AI. It is then the duty of individual nations, or the global community to define and enact policies on who shoulders the responsibility of actions executed by AIs

One compelling argument challenging the tenability of physicalism, which sees reality as fundamentally comprised of physical facts, is Jackson's knowledge argument. Through a powerful thought experiment involving the case of Mary, the super neuroscientist, the argument demonstrates how knowledge of phenomenal facts cannot be deduced from knowledge of physical facts. For allegedly leaving out phenomenal facts in its account of reality, physicalism is shown to be incomplete and hence mistaken. Physicalists respond to this argument in a variety of ways, challenging, in turn, some aspects of the knowledge argument. This paper focuses on the replies of the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, which respectively try to block the two crucial moves in the knowledge argument: the establishment of an epistemic gap and the inference from the occurrence of this gap to the existence of an ontological gap. The paper critically examines how proponents of these two replies to the knowledge argument respond to some objections to maintain the viability of physicalism.

Recent pluralist accounts of the People and popular sovereignty, defining it as either a performance or a process, are divorced from the realities of mass disempowerment. By shifting emphasis from who to what, these notions of the People, though seemingly unconcerned with the problem of positing this entity as a collective agent, have actually posited the politically active as the concrete subject of the People. Consequently, I argue that these recent theories exclude the reality of mass disempowerment within contemporary democracies by marginalizing agency, presupposing empowerment, and assuming the resonance of the various representations of the People. Simply put, they suffer from an activist-centric bias that renders the politically alienated, disempowered, and inactive as irrelevant entities, a nameless shadow lurking behind analyses of popular power. Hence, my task is to clear the ground for a more comprehensive theory of the People and Popular Sovereignty by exposing the roots, limits, and costs of this activist-centric bias.

In his two articles, F. P. A. Demeterio III attempts to classify works in Filipino philosophy using a list of twelve (or sixteen) supposed discourses that prominent philosophers in the Philippines have engaged in and published over the past few years. From this list, he advises current Filipino philosophers to invest their time and effort in contributing to only five of these because of their alleged higher measure of "developmental potential" as opposed to other discourses. In this paper, we raise some fundamental issues with Demeterio's approach. We show that (i) his work's conclusions rest on questionable methodological assumptions that make (ii) the discourses which the work arrived at and the rankings in terms of "developmental potential" superficial and ungrounded. Finally, (iii) instead of fulfilling the main aim of advancing research in Filipino philosophy, the proposed approach may actually lead to its stagnation and demise. We argue that these issues, if left unanswered, make Demeterio's whole approach to Filipino philosophy unsound and may put into question the employment of such an approach.

The article intends to argue that the roots of religious freedom in the West can be found many centuries before the time of the Reformation, namely in the writings of Christian apologists who wrote in defense of the right to practice the Christian faith in the Roman Empire, in the political context of the time, which was otherwise tolerant of the religious pluralism present in its space. Moreover, we talk about Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, known as Tertullian (160-225): "the first theologian of the West" and "the first political theologian." In last, we will argue that religious freedom is a natural right according to the philosophical and political developments over the centuries.

As we face an uncertain future for our country, philosophers – the so-called lovers of wisdom - are tasked to revisit our role in shaping our country's future and molding the consciousness of our people, especially the young. In this paper, I focus on the evolution of philosophy in the Philippines, what we have done as teachers and philosophers in and for the academe, and what else we need to do not only for the future of philosophy in our country but for the future of our country as well. In this last point, I stress that we need to contribute to shaping the critical consciousness of our people as our contribution to nation-building. That must be the future of philosophy in the Philippines and its critical role in the future of our beloved country