Claro R. Ceniza [1927-2001] is arguably one of the best philosophers that the Philippines has ever produced. However, it is quite unfortunate that some of his important contributions are not that well-known. This paper aims to rectify this by presenting an evaluation of his original insights on three outstanding problems in philosophy, viz., the paradoxes of material implication, the nature of probability, and the metaphysics of modality.

This paper attempts to provide a concise but systematic presentation of the discursive ontology of the social that underpins the thought of the Argentinian political theorist Ernesto Laclau. First articulated by Laclau and his collaborator Chantal Mouffe at the historical conjuncture of the late twentieth century that witnessed the disintegration of established leftist political visions and the rise of a plurality of new social movements, the post-structuralist discursive ontology on which Laclau bases his theorization of hegemony as the paradigm of politics is one that continues to exert a powerful influence on contemporary post-foundational political thought, discourse analysis, and “left populist” political movements. This paper traces the fundamental claims of that ontology, paying special attention to Laclau’s theses apropos the limits of universality and impossibility of “fullness.” In the final third of this paper, the French philosopher Alain Badiou’s approach to the conceptualization of social change is employed as a foil to draw some key implications of Laclau’s elevation of “hegemony” as the universal form of the political for political thought and practice.

Theoretically, this essay is a psycho-social reflection on the patrimonial character of Philippine political democracy. Many scholars attest that Philippine politics is marred by oligarchic rule composed of elite families, knitted by blood and marriage, who use state resources to perpetuate themselves into public office. These officials control and exploit the economic and political landscape to rule and govern the lives of the Filipino people. Hence, I argue that the patrimonial culture is a social pathology and has imbibed other names such as patron-client democracy, cacique democracy, predatory oligarchic state, and bossism. This type of social malady highlights the coercive forms of control in the Philippine political arena and, thus, expanding oligarchic power relations over and above the interest of the people. Money and power are the main causes why this social malady persists. However, more than that, I want to add that the persistence of patrimonial culture in the Philippines lies probably in what Freud calls the introjected father image, which unconsciously becomes the standard of authority. Further, I contend that, like the Oedipus rivalry, fear is a primordial element in the introjection of this authority figure which began at the nascent of the Spanish rule. Particularly, the abuses and atrocities of the colonizers over the natives created a deep-seated traumatic experience that would later fortify the immanence of a patrimonial power structure in the Philippines. Hence, a psycho-social approach could perhaps unearth these 'events' that perpetuate a patrimonial culture in our country. I believe that excavating our collective experiences could probably help us in our search for leaders who could usher us towards real liberation.

This paper argues that the educators' vocation, in the Arendtian sense, is to prepare and cultivate in students the love for the world – amor mundi. Educators are responsible for introducing the world to students through the conservation and preservation of human tradition and the 'realm of the past.' Thus, it requires a practice of truth-telling or parrhesia. However, this parrhesiastic activity is not explicit in Arendt. This paper also invokes Foucault's account of parrhesia to emphasize another main point of this paper, i.e., Arendt's conservationist view of education implies or presupposes the practice of truth-telling. If such an idea is correct, the positioning of education becomes ambiguous. For Arendt, education is located 'in between' the realms of the pre-political and political. However, suppose this implicitness of truth-telling is proven to be correct and affirmed. In such a case, we can say that education and its main motor – educators as intellectuals/scholars have a quasi-political role in society.

This paper provides a discussion of Jacques Rancière’s former teacher at École Normale Supérieure (ÉNS), then famous for fashioning Marxism with the philosophical gauge of structuralism, Louis Althusser (1918-1990). Perhaps a brief discussion on the relation between the two would render context to the origins of Rancière's philosophico-political praxis, specifically the humble beginnings of conceptualizing an egalitarian method out of his philosophical rupture with Althusserianism. Meanwhile, to reduce the philosophical enterprise of Althusser into its practical shortcomings and silence during the revolutionary events of May 1968 in France would do an injustice to the magnitude of his contribution to contemporary French political theory and his major revisions in the theoretical direction of the Parti communiste français (PCF). Thus, the following discussions focus on sketching Althusser's theoretical foundations, which possibly clarifies the political decision he has made during May '68: a demand for organization over spontaneous revolutionary activity based on the authority of theoretical practice over the ideological activities—a decision that became the point of departure for Rancière's subversion of both mastery and the structural inequality Althusserianism entail. The whole piece is guided by the following two-fold question—a question, perhaps, akin to Badiou's inquiry: What were the philosophico-political interventions of Louis Althusser, and why did Rancière move away from his direction?

The year 2020 began with the world being controlled by a then-unknown force. This unknown force would later be called a coronavirus or Covid-19. Not a single country would be free from infection by this virus. We are petrified with astonishment when confronted with this disease. Initially, after admitting the reality, we started struggling with and revolting against this virus. Time has led us to the consideration of our existence. This pandemic inclines us to revisit the major themes in existential philosophy discussed by Sartre in the Nausea and the philosophy of the absurd by Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus, The Plague, and The Stranger. The study addresses the concepts of anxiety, suffering, freedom, self-deception, absurdity, and choices. When confronted with the reality of the disease, we are shocked by an odd sensation like what Roquentin felt in his experience of nausea. This bizarre feeling brought an initial rejection, a self-deception followed by suffering, and a reflection of one's freedom. The concept of freedom leads us to certain decisions we make and the choices we are offered. The absurdity brought about by the pandemic is a reality that we must accept as it is. How would Sisyphus feel if he were living in the present? The struggle by Sisyphus can be our struggle now against a coronavirus. We feel condemned to roll a rock to the top of a mountain, a punishment that seems like 'futile and hopeless labor.' However, we are stronger than our rock. The paper presents a parallelism between our suffering during the pandemic and the sufferings of Sisyphus and Roquentin.

The literature has shown that the theory of mental models is able to describe human inductive processes. That theory has been related to the structure of inductive inferences, such as Gautama’s Syllogism indicates. On the other hand, the theory of mental models has also been linked to modal system K. This paper argues that there can be a connection between Gautama’s Syllogism and system K, not in rigorous logical deductions but in describing how the human mind can work. They can refer to two different moments of inductive reasoning; the rule of necessitation of K can be a key element in the second of those moments.